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vPreface
A man picks an apple from a tree behind a bee house in Gretzenbach, a 
small village between Olten and Aarau. At first glance, one might perceive 
this as the most typically Swiss scene imaginable. A closer look, however, 
ƽƣǁƣƞlƾ ƾƺƸƣ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿiƹƨ Ƣƣƿƞilƾ. Oƹ ƿƩƣ lƣƤƿ iƾ ƿƩƣ hƞƿèdƽiƹƞƨƞƽiƹƢƽƞǁƞƽƞƽƞƸ, 
Switzerland’s biggest Buddhist temple, while at the back right the cooling 
tower of the nuclear power plant of Gösgen-Däniken is visible. This picture is 
ƞ ƻƞƽƿ ƺƤ ‘HƣiƸƞƿlƞƹƢ’ ᄬƩƺƸƣlƞƹƢᄭ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ Bƞƾƣl ƻƩƺƿƺƨƽƞƻƩƣƽ Jǀliƞƹèdƞliƹƞƾ. 
In this series of pictures he tries to avoid the well-known clichés and capture 
Switzerland in all its layers and complexities.
This introduction, too, tries to capture the Swiss legal landscape in all its 
layers. My colleagues of the University of Zurich Law Faculty have all con-
tributed chapters from their area of expertise. From the foundations of law 
(history, philosophy, and sociology) to the classical general subjects of public, 
private, and criminal law, we have tried to cover the most important substan-
tive and procedural aspects of the Swiss legal order. The legislative and execu-
tive institutions as well as the judiciary are explained. The chapters all reflect 
on the underlying principles and give an account of some landmark cases in 
the specific fields of law. 
First of all, I have to thank my colleagues who agreed to participate in this 
project. Without their expert contributions it would not have been possible 
to publish this overview of Swiss Law. Further, I would like to thank Julian 
Salinas for agreeing to the use of his photography. I also owe thanks to Egbert 
Clement for designing the cover and to Alexander Grossmann for supporting 
this project as a publisher. My greatest thanks go to Chrissie Symington and 
Martina Jaussi for their very thorough proof-reading and diligent editing of 
the manuscripts. Without their tireless and very competent support, this 
book would not have been published in time. 
Zurich, 18 May 2018
Marc Thommen
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How to Use This Book
The aim of this book was to create an easy-to-read introduction to Swiss 
Law. The footnotes have therefore been reduced to an absolute minimum. 
Wherever possible we have referenced literature in English. At the end of 
every chapter there is a selection of the available English literature for the 
respective field of law. 
The first reference always mentions the full name of the authors and title of 
their work; then all the following citations refer to the first footnote. The same 
referencing scheme is applied to the Federal Acts. 
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2 Marc Thommen: Swiss Legal System
The purpose of this chapter is to give an “introduction to the introduction” to 
Swiss Law.1 After the discussion of some facts and figures (I.) and a very short 
glimpse at the historical events that led to the founding of the Switzerland 
ǂƣ kƹƺǂ ƿƺƢƞǄ ᄬII.ᄭ, ƿƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƾƿƽǀơƿǀƽƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ơƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᄬIII.ᄭ, ƿƩƣ 
cantons (IV.), and the communes (V.) are explained in detail. Subsequently, 
the main features of direct democracy in Switzerland (VI.), the legislation 
process (VII.), the publication of federal laws (VIII.), and the citation and pub-
lication of the case law (IX.) are examined.
1 Fƺƽ ƞƹ ƣǃơƣllƣƹƿ ᄬƺƤƤiơiƞlᄭ iƹƿƽƺƢǀơƿiƺƹ ƾƣƣ: eƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᅬ é BƽiƣƤ GǀiƢƣ, 
2018, (https: //perma.cc/YM59- ZMFK).
3I. Fƞơƿƾ ƞƹƢ Fiƨǀƽƣƾ
In a nutshell, Switzerland may be described as a country at the heart of 
Europe, yet remaining outside of the European Union. It has roughly 8.5 mil-
lion inhabitants. In terms of national language, 65.6 % of all Swiss inhabitants 
ƾƻƣƞk ᄬdǂiƾƾᄭ GƣƽƸƞƹ, ᇴᇴ.ᇺ % FƽƣƹơƩ, ᇺ.ᇶ % Iƿƞliƞƹ, ƞƹƢ ᇲ.ᇸ % cƺƸƞƹƾƩ. 
Switzerland is divided up into four language regions: 
Fiƨǀƽƣ ᇳ: Lƞƹƨǀƞƨƣ cƣƨiƺƹƾ2
2 Source: Wikipedia (Ʃƿƿƻƾ: //ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ᇶNᇻk- ᇸCᇻBᄭ; ƺƽiƨiƹƞƿƺƽ: eƾơƩǀƟƟǄ, ƿƽƞƹƾlƞƿƣƢ ƟǄ 
Lesqual.
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éƽƿiơlƣ ᇶ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ƾƿƞƿƣƾ: “The National 
Languages are German, French, Italian, and Romansh.” 3 According to Article 
ᇹᇲ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ, ƺƹlǄ GƣƽƸƞƹ, FƽƣƹơƩ, ƞƹƢ Iƿƞliƞƹ ƞƽƣ Ƥǀll- Ƥ lƣƢƨƣƢ “official 
languages of the Confederation”. Federal laws are published in these official 
languages: the three versions are equally binding.ᇶ cƺƸƞƹƾƩ iƾ ƺƹlǄ ƞƹ ƺƤƤiơiƞl 
language of the confederation “when communicating with persons who speak 
Romansh.” eƩiƾ Ƹƣƞƹƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl lƞǂƾ ƞƽƣ ƺƹlǄ iƾƾǀƣƢ iƹ GƣƽƸƞƹ, FƽƣƹơƩ, 
ƞƹƢ Iƿƞliƞƹ. cƺƸƞƹƾƩ- ƾƻƣƞkiƹƨ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞlƾ ơƞƹ, Ʃƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƞƢƢƽƣƾƾ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl 
ƺƽ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ iƹ cƺƸƞƹƾƩ.
eƩƣ ơƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ƾƻƽƣƞƢƾ ƺǁƣƽ ᇶᇳ’ᇲᇲᇲ kilƺƸƣƿƽƣƾ ƾƼǀƞƽƣƢ ᄬkƸ²ᄭ,5 making 
iƿ jǀƾƿ ƞ liƿƿlƣ Ɵiƿ Ɵiƨƨƣƽ ƿƩƞƹ BƩǀƿƞƹ ᄬᇵᇺ’ᇲᇲᇲkƸ2) and little smaller than the 
NƣƿƩƣƽlƞƹƢƾ ᄬᇶᇳ’ᇷᇲᇲkƸ2ᄭ. Iƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇸ, dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ ƽƣƻƺƽƿƣƢ ƞ GDa ƺƤ ᇸᇷᇻ Billiƺƹ 
fdD, ǂƩiơƩ, ƞơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ ƞƹ Iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞl MƺƹƣƿƞƽǄ FǀƹƢ ƽƞƹkiƹƨ, ƻlƞơƣƢ 
Switzerland at the 20th ƻƺƾiƿiƺƹ ǂƺƽlƢǂiƢƣ. FǀƽƿƩƣƽ, iƹ ƿƣƽƸƾ ƺƤ iƿƾ GDa per 
capita ƺƤ ƞlƸƺƾƿ ᇺᇲ’ᇲᇲᇲ fdD, dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ ƽƞƹkƣƢ iƹ ƾƣơƺƹƢ ƻlƞơƣ, ơlƺƾƣlǄ Ƥƺl-
lowing Luxembourg. 
Switzerland enjoys a positive reputation for its mountains, chocolate, 
cheese, and watches. Simultaneously, Switzerland and its private banks have 
long been criticised for offering the wealthy and powerful of this world a safe 
and secret harbour for their fortunes. In response, efforts have been made to 
combat money laundering and to weaken the notorious Swiss bank secrecy in 
recent years. 
Switzerland, adhering to its self- imposed policy of neutrality, managed to 
stay out of two World Wars. The Swiss confederation also hosts international 
organisations such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the World Health 
Oƽƨƞƹiƾƞƿiƺƹ ᄬhHOᄭ, ƺƽ ƿƩƣ Iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞl CƺƸƸiƿƿƣƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ cƣƢ Cƽƺƾƾ. 
Furthermore, sports organisations such as the Fédération Internationale de 
Football Association (FIFA), the Union of European Football Associations 
(UEFA), or the International Olympic Committee (IOC) have their seats in 
dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ. Nƣƞƽ Gƣƹƣǁƞ, ƺƹ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ƞƹƢ FƽƣƹơƩ ƟƺƽƢƣƽ, iƾ ƿƩƣ Eǀƽƺƻƣƞƹ 
Oƽƨƞƹiǅƞƿiƺƹ Ƥƺƽ Nǀơlƣƞƽ cƣƾƣƞƽơƩ ᄬCEcNᄭ,6 an institution operating the 
3 FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ᇳᇺ éƻƽil ᇳᇻᇻᇻ, dc ᇳᇲᇳ; ƾƣƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ EƹƨliƾƩ 
version of the Constitution www.admin.ch (https: //perma.cc/M8UJ-S369).
ᇶ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇶ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl éơƿ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ CƺƸƻilƞƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ FƣƢƣƽƞl Lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl 
Gƞǅƣƿƿƣ ƺƤ ᇳᇺ Jǀƹƣ ᇴᇲᇲᇶ ᄬaǀƟliơƞƿiƺƹƾ éơƿ, aǀƟléᄭ, dc ᇳᇹᇲ.ᇷᇳᇴ; ƾƣƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ EƹƨliƾƩ ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ 
ƺƤ ƿƩƣ aǀƟliơƞƿiƺƹƾ éơƿ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ: //ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/cMᇷᇵᅬᇵEGNᄭ.
5 And over 70 % of it is made up by mountains.
ᇸ eƩiƾ ƾƿƞƹƢƾ Ƥƺƽ: Cƺƹƾƣil Eǀƽƺƻȅƣƹ ƻƺǀƽ lƞ cƣơƩƣƽơƩƣ Nǀơlȅƞiƽƣ. 
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largest particle physics laboratory in the world and famously credited with 
having invented the internet.7 dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ’ƾ Ƹƺƾƿ ƽƣƹƺǂƹƣƢ ǀƹiǁƣƽƾiƿǄ iƾ ƿƩƣ 
ETH, the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, located in Zurich and coun-
ƿiƹƨ ᇴᇳ NƺƟƣl lƞǀƽƣƞƿƣƾ ƞƸƺƹƨƾƿ iƿƾ ƨƽƞƢǀƞƿƣƾ, iƹơlǀƢiƹƨ iƿƾ Ƹƺƾƿ ƤƞƸƺǀƾ ƻǀƻil, 
Albert Einstein.
Switzerland also boasts some famous inventions such as cellophane, absin-
ƿƩƣ, LdD, ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ƻƺƿƞƿƺ ƻƣƣlƣƽ.8 Tobacco consumption is widespread: accor-
ding to a WHO report from 2017 almost 25 % of the population are smokers.9 
Switzerland also has one of the highest rates of cannabis use in the world. It 
iƾ ƣƾƿiƸƞƿƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƾƺƸƣ ᇸᇲᇲ’ᇲᇲᇲ ǀƾƣƽƾ ƨƣƿ ƿƩƽƺǀƨƩ ᇳᇲᇲ ƿƺƹƹƣƾ ƺƤ ƩƞƾƩiƾƩ ƞƹƢ 
marijuana each year. The annual consumption of chocolate averages at bet-
ween 11 and 12 kilos per capita. Switzerland has the third highest level of job 
ƾƣơǀƽiƿǄ ƞƹƢ ƾƞlƞƽǄ ƺǀƿ ƺƤ ƞll OECD ơƺǀƹƿƽiƣƾ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, iƿ lƞƨƾ ƟƣƩiƹƢ Ƹƺƾƿ 
ǂƣƾƿƣƽƹ Eǀƽƺƻƣƞƹ ơƺǀƹƿƽiƣƾ iƹ ƿƣƽƸƾ ƺƤ ƨƣƹƢƣƽ ƣƼǀƞliƿǄ: iƿ ƽƞƹkƾ ᇴᇶ ƺǀƿ ƺƤ ᇵᇺ 
OECD ơƺǀƹƿƽiƣƾ Ƥƺƽ ƨƣƹƢƣƽ iƹƣƼǀƞliƿǄ iƹ ƾƞlƞƽiƣƾ, ǂiƿƩ ƞ ƢiƤƤƣƽƣƹơƣ ƺƤ ƞƽƺǀƹƢ 
17 %. Switzerland is one of only two countries in the world to have a square 
flag (the other country being the Vatican). Foreigners account for nearly 25 % 
ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƺƻǀlƞƿiƺƹèᅬ ƺƹƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƩiƨƩƣƾƿ ƻƣƽơƣƹƿƞƨƣƾ ƨlƺƟƞllǄ. MiliƿƞƽǄ ƾƣƽǁiơƣ iƾ 
still compulsory for male Swiss citizens.10 eƩƣ dǂiƾƾ éiƽ Fƺƽơƣèᅬ ƞơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ 
ƞ ᇴᇲᇳᇶ ƻƽƣƾƾ ƽƣlƣƞƾƣ ƿƩƞƿ lƣƢ ƿƺ iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞl ƸƣƢiƞ ơƺǁƣƽƞƨƣèᅬ iƾ ƺƹlǄ ƺƹ ƢǀƿǄ 
during office hours, i.e. from 9h- 17h.11 
7 Source: www.theculturetrip.com (https: //ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ᇸjᇺi- NEᇴᇵᄭ.
ᇺ dƺǀƽơƣ: ǂǂǂ.ƣǃƻƞƿiơƞ.ơƺƸ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/Nᇵᇹd-GᇶᇸNᄭ
ᇻ hHO cƣƻƺƽƿ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ GlƺƟƞl eƺƟƞơơƺ EƻiƢƣƸiơ, ᇴᇲᇳᇹ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/MfDᇷ- bᇸbᇴᄭ.
10 You can find these and more interesting facts about Switzerland on www.expatica.com 
ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/Nᇵᇹd-GᇶᇸNᄭ
11 dƣƣ ƣ.ƨ. HǀƤƤiƹƨƿƺƹ aƺƾƿ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/JgeᇻᅬᇺNajᄭ. 
6II. HiƾƿƺƽǄ
Figure 2: Federal Charter of 129112
Fiƨǀƽƣ ᇵ: OƞƿƩ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ „cüƿli- hiƣƾƣ“13
12 dƺǀƽơƣ: hikiƻƣƢiƞ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/DHfᇶᅬᇶNKJᄭ.
13 dƺǀƽơƣ: hikiƻƣƢiƞ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ᇵᇷjᇵ- bᇸcKᄭ.
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The 19th century historians determined that the founding of the Old Swiss 
Confederacy occurred on 1ƾƿè August 1291. This is the date of the so called 
Federal Charter (Bundesbrief ) which united Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden as 
a “sworn union” against foreign oppressors. According to subsequent mystifi-
cations, the oath was taken on the Rütli- Wiese, a commons near Seelisberg/Uri. 
This legend also made its way into Fإ؜ؘؗإ؜ؖ؛ dؖ؛؜؟؟ؘإ’ƾ ƢƽƞƸƞ ƺƤ hilliƞƸ 
eƣll ᄬᇳᇺᇲᇶᄭ. eƩƣ Ƣƞƿƣ ƺƤ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ’ƾ ƹƞƿiƺƹƞl ƩƺliƢƞǄ ƿƺƢƞǄ iƾ ƿƩƣ ᇳstèƺƤ éǀƨǀƾƿ.
The modern Swiss federal state only emerged after a short civil war in 
NƺǁƣƸƟƣƽ ᇳᇺᇶᇹ. Iƹ ƿƩƣ lƣƞƢ ǀƻ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƤliơƿ, CƞƿƩƺliơ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ƤƺƽƸƣƢ ƞ ƾƣƻƞ-
rate alliance (Sonderbund) to oppose the gradual centra lisation of powers 
ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƣƢƺƸiƹƞƹƿlǄ aƽƺƿƣƾ ƿƞƹƿ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ. Iƹ ƿƩƣ ƣƹƾǀiƹƨ Sonder bund War, 
ƿƩƣ aƽƺƿƣƾƿƞƹƿƾ ƻƽƣǁƞilƣƢ. dƿill, iƹ ƿƩƣ Ƥƺllƺǂiƹƨ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ơƺƹǁƣƹƿiƺƹ, 
the majority of the founding fathers recognised that a centralised political 
system, as was the French model for example, would not be sustainable. The 
different cultural and religious identities of the cantons had to be respected. 
Hence, taking much inspiration from the United States of America, the foun-
ding fathers drew up a constitution for a Swiss federal state. Its two main fea-
tures were (and are) the separation of powers at the federal level (III.) and the 
sovereignty of the cantons (IV.).
8III. CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ
As will be explained in great detail by Mؔاا؛؜ؔئ Oؘئؖ؛ in the Chapter on 
Constitutional Law,ᇳᇶ the Swiss federal state is defined by its three levels of 
government: the confederation, the cantons, and the communes.15 The confe-
deration (der Bund) is the top level. It fulfils “the duties that are assigned to it 
by Federal Constitution” ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇶᇴ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. OƹlǄ ƿƞƾkƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ 
are unable to perform or that need uniform regulation are allocated to the 
ơƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇶᇵƞ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. éƽƿiơlƣ ᇴ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ᇳᇺᇶᇺ 
stated that the aim of the confederation was „to maintain the independence of 
the fatherland against foreign countries, and to maintain quiet and order within 
the country, the protection of the freedom and rights of the Swiss, and the advan-
cement of their common welfare”.16 These aims remain unchanged today.17 The 
confederation is inter alia responsible for foreign relations, the military, social 
welfare, and trade and tariffs. 
eƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ᇳᇺᇶᇺ ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩƣƢ ƿƩƣ ơƣƹƿƽƞl iƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƤƣ-
deration according to the principle of separation of powers: the parliament as 
the legislator (Federal Assembly, 1.), the government as the executive (Federal 
Cƺǀƹơil, ᇴ.ᄭ, ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƞƾ ƿƩƣ jǀƢiơiƞƽǄ ᄬᇵ.ᄭ. Bƣƽƹ ǂƞƾ 
ƢƣƾiƨƹƞƿƣƢ ƞƾ ƿƩƣ “ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ơiƿǄ” iƹ ᇳᇺᇶᇺ, ƻƽƣǁƞiliƹƨ ƺǁƣƽ kǀƽiơƩ ƞƹƢ Lǀơƣƽƹƣ. 
ᇳᇶ dƣƣ CƩƞƻƿƣƽ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl Lƞǂ, ƻƻ. ᇳᇶᇷ.
15 See Title 3 of the Constitution (“Confederation, Cantons and Communes”). 
16 Oǂƹ ƿƽƞƹƾlƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇴ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ᇳᇺᇶᇺ: “Der Bund hat zum Zweck: 
Behauptung der Unabhängigkeit des Vaterlandes gegen außen, Handhabung von Ruhe 
und Ordnung im Innern, Schutz der Freiheit und der Rechte der Eidgenossen und Beförde-
rung ihrer gemeinsamen Wohlfahrt.”
17 See Article 2 Constitution: “1 The Swiss Confederation shall protect the liberty and rights 
of the people and safeguard the independence and security of the country.” However, the 
scope of the aims has been broadened: “2 It shall promote the common welfare, sustain-
able development, internal cohesion and cultural diversity of the country. 3 It shall en-
sure the greatest possible equality of opportunity among its citizens. 4 It is committed to 
the long term preservation of natural resources and to a just and peaceful international 
order.”
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eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl éƾƾƣƸƟlǄ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺǀƹơil ƟƺƿƩ Ʃƞǁƣ ƿƩƣiƽ ƾƣƞƿƾ iƹ Bƣƽƹ.18 
eƩǀƾ, Ƣƣ Ƥƞơƿƺ Bƣƽƹ iƾ ƿƩƣ ơƞƻiƿƞl ƺƤ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, ƞlƿƩƺǀƨƩ Ƣƣ iǀƽƣ iƿ Ʃƞƾ ƹƣǁƣƽ 
held that title. The Federal Supreme Court resides in Lausanne.19
ᇳ. Fؘؘؗإؔ؟ Aئئؘؠؕ؟ج
As mentioned above, the founding fathers of the Swiss Federal State deci-
ded to respect the cultural, economic, and religious differences between the 
various cantons. Following the example of the Constitution of the United 
States of America they drew up a bicameral system for the Federal Assembly 
(Bundesversammlungᄭ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ Nƞƿiƺƹƞl Cƺǀƹơil ᄬNationalrat) acting as 
ƿƩƣ “Hƺǀƾƣ ƺƤ cƣƻƽƣƾƣƹƿƞƿiǁƣƾ” ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ Cƺǀƹơil ƺƤ dƿƞƿƣƾ ᄬStänderat) as the 
“Senate”. The Federal Assembly is the supreme authority of the confederation 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇶᇺ I Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. 
The National Council is composed of 200 representatives of the people 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇶᇻ I Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. eƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ƞƽƣ ƻƽƺƻƺƽƿiƺƹƞllǄ ƽƣƻƽƣƾƣƹƿƣƢ 
according to their populations. The canton of Zurich, for example, gets to send 
ᇵᇷ Nƞƿiƺƹƞl Cƺǀƹơillƺƽƾ ƿƺ Bƣƽƹ, ǂƩilƣ Gƣƹƣǁƞ ƾƣƹƢƾ ᇳᇳ ƞƹƢ Glƞƽǀƾ ƾƣƹƢƾ ƺƹlǄ 
ƺƹƣ. Gƣƹƣƽƞl ƣlƣơƿiƺƹƾ ƞƽƣ ƩƣlƢ ƣǁƣƽǄ Ƥƺǀƽ Ǆƣƞƽƾ.20 In the media, the president 
ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Nƞƿiƺƹƞl Cƺǀƹơil iƾ ƺƤƿƣƹ ƽƣƤƣƽƽƣƢ ƿƺ ƞƾ ƿƩƣ ƩiƨƩƣƾƿ ƽƞƹkiƹƨ dǂiƾƾ ƺƤƤi-
cial. However, in the official order of precedence set by the department of for-
eign affairs, he or she only ranks at the fourth position, behind the president 
and vice- president of the Confederation and the other Federal Councillors.21 
18 éƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇴ I ƺƤ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl éơƿ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl éƾƾƣƸƟlǄ ƺƤ ᇳᇵ DƣơƣƸƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇲᇴ ᄬaƞƽliƞƸƣƹƿ 
éơƿ, aƞƽléᄭ, dc ᇳᇹᇳ.ᇳᇲèᅬ dƣƞƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl éƾƾƣƸƟlǄ ᄬ“The Federal Assembly meets in 
Bern.”ᄭ. dƣƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ EƹƨliƾƩ ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ aƞƽliƞƸƣƹƿ éơƿ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.
ơơ/ᇵkᇺj- aᇺbHᄭ; éƽƿiơlƣ ᇷᇺ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ GƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿ ƞƹƢ éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiƺƹ Oƽƨƞƹiƾƞƿiƺƹ éơƿ ƺƤ 
ᇴᇳ MƞƽơƩ ᇳᇻᇻᇹ ᄬGéOéᄭ, dc ᇳᇹᇴ.ᇲᇳᇲèᅬ OƤƤiơiƞl ƾƣƞƿ ᄬ“The official seat of the Federal Council, 
the departments and the Federal Chancellery is the City of Bern.”). See for an English ver-
ƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Oƽƨƞƹiƾƞƿiƺƹ éơƿ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ᇻDKM- Jhkᇶᄭ.
19 éƽƿiơlƣ ᇶ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ éơƿ ƺƤ ᇳᇹ Jǀƹƣ ᇴᇲᇲᇷ, dc ᇳᇹᇵ.ᇳᇳᇲ.
20 éƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇶᇻ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹèᅬ CƺƸƻƺƾiƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ƣlƣơƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Nƞƿiƺƹƞl Cƺǀƹơil: “1 The 
National Council is composed of 200 representatives of the People. 2 The representatives 
are elected directly by the People according to a system of proportional representation. A 
general election is held every four years. 3 Each Canton constitutes an electoral constitu-
ency. 4 The seats are allocated to the Cantons according to their relative populations. Each 
Canton has at least one seat.”
21 aƽƺƿƺơƺl cƣƨǀlƞƿiƺƹƾ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ, ƞƻƻƽƺǁƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺǀƹơil ƺƹ ᇴᇻ 
dƣƻƿƣƸƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇳᇹ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ᇷᇷfᇺ- kHGLᄭ, ƻ. ᇳᇳ.
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Fiƨǀƽƣ ᇶ: dƣƻƞƽƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ aƺǂƣƽƾ iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ
In the Council of States ƿƩƣƽƣ ƞƽƣ ᇶᇸ ƽƣƻƽƣƾƣƹƿƞƿiǁƣƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ 
150 I Constitution). 20 cantons get to appoint two delegates, while Obwalden, 
NiƢǂƞlƢƣƹ, Bƞƾƣl- dƿƞƢƿ, Bƞƾƣl- LƞƹƢƾơƩƞƤƿ, éƻƻƣƹǅƣll éǀƾƾƣƽƽƩƺƢƣƹ ƞƹƢ 
Appenzell Innerrhoden are only permitted to appoint one delegate. This is 
why these six cantons are commonly referred to as “half- cantons” or as can-
tons with a split vote in the Council of States.22 
BƺƿƩ ơƩƞƸƟƣƽƾ ƞƽƣ ƺƤ ƣƼǀƞl ƾƿƞƹƢiƹƨ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇶᇺ II Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. eƩƣ Ƹƞiƹ 
legislative task of the Federal Assembly is to make federal laws. Its main elec-
toral tasks are to appoint the Federal Councillors and the Supreme Court 
Justices.
ᇴ. Fؘؘؗإؔ؟ Cآبءؖ؜؟
The Federal Council is the supreme governing and executive authority of 
ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇹᇶ I Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. Iƿ iƾ ƿƩƣ ƩƣƞƢ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl 
administration. The seven members of the Federal Council act as the gover-
nment of Switzerland. They are elected by the two chambers of the Federal 
22 According to Article 150 II Constitution “the Cantons of Obwalden, Nidwalden, Basel- 
Stadt, Basel- Landschaft, Appenzell Ausserrhoden and Appenzell Innerrhoden each elect 
one representative [ƿƩƣǄ ƞƽƣ ƾƺ ơƞllƣƢ ‘ƩƞlƤ- ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ’]; the other Cantons each elect two 
representatives.”
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Assembly for a term of four years.23 They can be re- elected repeatedly for 
as long as the Federal Assembly regards them as fit to serve. Kؔإ؟ dؖ؛ؘء؞ 
(born 1823) served as a Federal Councillor for 31 years. He was first elected in 
ᇳᇺᇸᇶ ƞƹƢ ƢiƣƢ iƹ ƺƤƤiơƣ iƹ ᇳᇺᇻᇷ. FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺǀƹơillƺƽƾ ơƞƹƹƺƿ Ɵƣ iƸƻƣƞơƩƣƢ.ᇴᇶ 
The only way the Federal Assembly can end their term of office is by not re- 
electing them. In 2007 this happened to the former right- wing opposition 
leader, Federal Councillor C؛إ؜ئاآأ؛ B؟آؖ؛ؘإ. aƞƽliƞƸƣƹƿ ơƞƹ ƞlƾƺ Ƹƺǀƹƿ 
political pressure on a Federal Councillor to resign. E؟؜ئؘؔؕا؛ Kآأأ, the 
first woman to be elected to the Swiss Federal Council, resigned in 1989 after 
it became public that she had tipped off her husband about alleged criminal 
activities of a company he was involved in. Every year, the Federal Assembly 
appoints one of the Federal Councillors as the president of the confedera-
tion. The president is, however, not vested with any particular powers, nor 
is he or she the formal head of state. Instead, the president is merely consi-
dered the “primus inter pares” (the first among equals). The president of the 
confederation primarily has a representative task. Immediate re- election as 
a president is not possible.
Fiƨǀƽƣ ᇷ: eƩƣ OfƧ iơiƞl ᇴᇲᇳᇺ aƩƺƿƺƨƽƞƻƩ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺǀƹơil25
23 dƣƣ éƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇹᇶ ƣƿ ƾƣƼƼ. Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ.
ᇴᇶ There is only a very narrow exception: the Federal Assembly can declare a Federal 
Councillor unable to discharge the duties of office if “owing to serious health problem 
or other reasons that prevent him or her from returning to work, the person concerned is 
manifestly unable carry out his or her duties” ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇶᇲƞ aƞƽliƞƸƣƹƿ éơƿᄭ.
25 Gبج aؔإؠؘ؟؜ء, d؜ؠآءؘااؔ dآؠؠؔإبؚؔ, fؘ؟؜ Mؔبإؘإ, é؟ؔ؜ء Bؘإئؘا ᄬaƽƣƾiƢƣƹƿᄭ, 
Dآإ؜ئ Lؘبا؛ؔإؗ, Jآ؛ؔءء dؖ؛ءؘ؜ؘؗإ- éؠؠؔءء, Iؚءؔح؜آ Cؔئئ؜ئ, hؔ؟اؘإ e؛بإء؛ؘإإ 
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Each of the seven Federal Councillors is the head of one department of 
ƿƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiƺƹ: FƣƢƣƽƞl DƣƻƞƽƿƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ Fƺƽƣiƨƹ éƤƤƞiƽƾ ᄬIؚءؔح؜آ 
Cؔئئ؜ئᄭ, FƣƢƣƽƞl DƣƻƞƽƿƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ HƺƸƣ éƤƤƞiƽƾ ᄬé؟ؔ؜ء Bؘإئؘا), Federal 
DƣƻƞƽƿƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ Jǀƾƿiơƣ ƞƹƢ aƺliơƣ ᄬd؜ؠآءؘااؔ dآؠؠؔإبؚؔ), Federal 
DƣƻƞƽƿƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ DƣƤƣƹơƣ, Ciǁil aƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ, ƞƹƢ dƻƺƽƿƾ ᄬGبج aؔإؠؘ؟؜ء), 
FƣƢƣƽƞlè DƣƻƞƽƿƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ Fiƹƞƹơƣ ᄬfؘ؟؜ Mؔبإؘإᄭ, FƣƢƣƽƞl DƣƻƞƽƿƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ 
EơƺƹƺƸiơ éƤƤƞiƽƾ, EƢǀơƞƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ cƣƾƣƞƽơƩ ᄬJƺƩƞƹƹ dơƩƹƣiƢƣƽ-éƸƸƞƹƹᄭ, 
ƞƹƢ FƣƢƣƽƞl DƣƻƞƽƿƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ EƹǁiƽƺƹƸƣƹƿ, eƽƞƹƾƻƺƽƿ, EƹƣƽƨǄ, ƞƹƢ 
Communications (Dآإ؜ئ Lؘبا؛ؔإ ᄭؗ. Dƣƾƻiƿƣ Ʃiƾ ƾƺƸƣǂƩƞƿ ƸiƾlƣƞƢiƹƨ 
title, the Federal Chancellor (currently hؔ؟اؘإ e؛بإء؛ؘإإ) does not hold a 
ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿƞl ƻƺƾiƿiƺƹ. Hƣ iƾ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺǀƹơil’ƾ ơƩiƣƤ ƺƤ ƾƿƞƤƤ.26 
ᇵ. Fؘؘؗإؔ؟ dبأإؘؠؘ Cآبإا
eƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ᇳᇺᇶᇺ iƹƾƿƞllƣƢ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƞƾ ƞƹ ad hoc 
judicial authority of the Swiss confederation. It was only the Constitution 
ƺƤ ᇳᇺᇹᇶ ƿƩƞƿ ƤƺǀƹƢƣƢ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƞƾ ƿƩƣ ƻƣƽƸƞƹƣƹƿ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl 
judiciary. The Federal Supreme Court is independent of both the Federal 
Assembly and the Federal Council. The 38 Supreme Court Justices are elec-
ƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl éƾƾƣƸƟlǄ Ƥƺƽ ƞ ᇸ Ǆƣƞƽ ƿƣƹǀƽƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇶᇷ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. 
All federal Supreme Court Justices are members of a political party. It is 
their party who nominates them for election and re- elections. Since 2017, 
the repartition along party lines has been as follows: Justices of the Swiss 
aƣƺƻlƣ’ƾ ƻƞƽƿǄèᄬᇳᇲᄭ, dǂiƾƾ dƺơiƞl DƣƸƺơƽƞƿiơ aƞƽƿǄ ᄬᇻᄭ, CƩƽiƾƿiƞƹ DƣƸƺơƽƞƿiơ 
aƣƺƻlƣ’ƾ aƞƽƿǄè ᄬᇹᄭ, LiƟƣƽƞlƾè ᄬᇸᄭ, Gƽƣƣƹƾ ᄬᇶᄭ, dǂiƾƾ Gƽƣƣƹ LiƟƣƽƞl aƞƽƿǄ ᄬᇳᄭ, 
ƞƹƢ Cƺƹƾƣƽǁƞƿiǁƣ DƣƸƺơƽƞƿiơ aƞƽƿǄ ᄬᇳᄭ. Iƹ ƿǀƽƹ, ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ 
Justices then pay a fixed or proportional part of their yearly salary to their 
political party. This (election) system has repeatedly and rightly been criti-
cised with view to judicial independence and discrimination of non- party 
members.27 
ᄬFƣƢƣƽƞl CƩƞƹơƣllƺƽᄭ; dƺǀƽơƣ: dơƩǂƣiǅƣƽiƾơƩƣ BǀƹƢƣƾkƞƹǅlƣi, ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://
perma.cc/CXV7- WKKH). 
26 eƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᅬ é BƽiƣƤ GǀiƢƣ, ᇴᇲᇳᇺ, ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/jMᇷᇻ- kMFKᄭ, ƻ. ᇹᇶ.
27 dƣƣ Ƥƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ: GcECOè ᅬ Gƽƺǀƻ ƺƤ dƿƞƿƣƾ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ Cƺƽƽǀƻƿiƺƹ / Cƺǀƹơil ƺƤ Eǀƽƺƻƣ, 
FƺǀƽƿƩ Eǁƞlǀƞƿiƺƹ cƺǀƹƢ, Cƺƽƽǀƻƿiƺƹ ƻƽƣǁƣƹƿiƺƹ iƹ ƽƣƾƻƣơƿ ƺƤ MƣƸƟƣƽƾ ƺƤ aƞƽliƞƸƣƹƿ, 
JǀƢƨƣƾ ƞƹƢ aƽƺƾƣơǀƿƺƽƾ, Eǁƞlǀƞƿiƺƹ cƣƻƺƽƿ, dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, éƢƺƻƿƣƢ ƟǄ GcECO ƞƿ iƿƾ ᇹᇶƿƩ 
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cƣ- ƣlƣơƿiƺƹ ƺƤ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ Jǀƾƿiơƣƾ iƾ ƻƺƾƾiƟlƣ ƞƹƢ iƹƢƣƣƢ ƾƿƞƹ-
dard. Historically, there have been only three cases in which Federal Supreme 
Cƺǀƽƿ Jǀƾƿiơƣƾ ǂƩƺ ƾƿƺƺƢ Ƥƺƽ ƽƣ- ƣlƣơƿiƺƹ ǂƣƽƣ ǀƹƾǀơơƣƾƾƤǀl. BƺƿƩ Jǀƾƿiơƣ 
cآؘؕإا Fؔحج iƹ ᇳᇻᇶᇴ ƞƹƢ Jǀƾƿiơƣ Hؔءئ f؟إ؜ؖ؛ h؜؟؟؜ in 1995 were not re- 
elected for reasons of age: Fؔحج was 70 years old, h؜؟؟؜ 68. Justice Mؔإا؜ء 
dؖ؛بؕؔإا؛ ǂƞƾ ƹƺƿ ƽƣ- ƣlƣơƿƣƢ ƺƹ ᇷ DƣơƣƸƟƣƽ ᇳᇻᇻᇲ Ɵƣơƞǀƾƣ ƞƹƺƿƩƣƽ Jǀƾƿiơƣ 
had lobbied against him with the conservative parliamentarians, following 
dؖ؛بؕؔإا؛’s involvement in initiating a fundamental change in judicial 
practice.28 However, the media then made this plot public and only one week 
later, the Federal Assembly reconsidered its own decision and confirmed the 
re- election. This case shows how problematic the need for re- election is in 
terms of judicial independence from politics. Another occasion where there 
ǂƞƾ ƺƟǁiƺǀƾ iƹƿƣƽƤƣƽƣƹơƣ ǂiƿƩ jǀƢiơiƞl iƸƻƞƽƿiƞliƿǄ ƺơơǀƽƽƣƢ ƺƹ ᇴᇶ dƣƻƿƣƸƟƣƽ 
ᇴᇲᇳᇶ, ǂƩƣƹ ƾƣǁƣƽƞl ƸƣƸƟƣƽƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl éƾƾƣƸƟlǄ ơƩƺƾƣ ƹƺƿ ƿƺ ƨiǁƣ ƿƩƣiƽ 
votes for the re- election of all six Justices of one chamber of the Federal Supreme 
Court because they disagreed with the jurisprudence of this chamber.29
Today, Federal Supreme Court Justices may hold their office until the 
age of 68. As is the case for Federal Councillors, there is no possibility of 
impeachment. This situation came under attack when Justice Mؔإا؜ء 
alƣƹƞƽǄ Mƣƣƿiƹƨ, dƿƽƞƾƟƺǀƽƨ, ᇴᇺ NƺǁƣƸƟƣƽ - ᇴ DƣơƣƸƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇳᇸ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/GᇷgB- 
L66E), p. 29.
28 After three conservative justices had left the Federal Supreme Court, a generation of 
liberal justices had gained a majority, and the Federal Justice Eؗت؜ء hؘجؘإؠؔءء, a 
ƸƣƸƟƣƽ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ aƣƺƻlƣ’ƾ aƞƽƿǄ, ƤƺǀƹƢ ƩiƸƾƣlƤ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƸiƹƺƽiƿǄ ǂiƿƩ Ʃiƾ ơƺƹƾƣƽǁƞƿiǁƣ 
views. Hence, he lobbied against Justice Mؔإا؜ء dؖ؛بؕؔإا؛ among the conservative 
parliamentarians, which is why dؖ؛بؕؔإا؛ ǂƞƾ ƹƺƿ ƽƣ- ƣlƣơƿƣƢ ƞƿ Ƥiƽƾƿ; ƾƣƣ ƽƣƻƺƽƿ ƺƤ 
Nƞƿiƺƹƞl Cƺǀƹơil ᇸ OơƿƺƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇲᇵ, ƻ. ᇶᇲ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/fiᇺi-ᇴHᇻᇴᄭ.
29 Iƹ ƽƣ-ƣlƣơƿiƺƹƾ Jǀƾƿiơƣƾ ơƞƹ ƽƣơƣiǁƣ ƞ ƸƞǃiƸǀƸ ƺƤ ᇴᇶᇸ ǁƺƿƣƾ, i.ƣ. ᇴᇲᇲ ǁƺƿƣƾ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ Nƞƿiƺƹƞl 
Cƺǀƹơillƺƽƾ ƞƹƢ ᇶᇸ ǁƺƿƣƾ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ Cƺǀơillƺƽƾ ƺƤ dƿƞƿƣ. Oƹ ᇴᇶ dƣƻƿƣƸƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇳᇶ ƿƩƣ Jǀƾƿiơƣƾ ƺƤ 
ƿƩƣ II. aǀƟliơ Lƞǂ CƩƞƸƟƣƽ ǂƣƽƣ ƽƣ-ƣlƣơƿƣƢ ƞƾ Ƥƺllƺǂƾ: F؟آإؘءؘؖ éبؕإج G؜إؔإؗ؜ء (party 
ƞƤƤiliƞƿiƺƹ: ƿƩƣ Gƽƣƣƹƾ, ǁƺƿƣƾ: ᇳᇸᇶᄭ, jةؘئ Dآءحؔ؟؟ؔح ᄬdǂiƾƾ aƣƺƻlƣ‘ƾ aƞƽƿǄ, ᇳᇷᇻᄭ, Lآإؘءح 
Kءؘبؕü؛؟ؘإ ᄬdǂiƾƾ dƺơiƞl DƣƸƺơƽƞƿiơ aƞƽƿǄ, ᇳᇻᇲᄭ, Hؔءئ Gؘآإؚ dؘ؜؟ؘإ ᄬdǂiƾƾ aƣƺƻlƣ‘ƾ 
aƞƽƿǄ, ᇳᇻᇺᄭ, e؛آؠؔئ dاؘؔؗ؟ؠؔءء ᄬCƩƽiƾƿiƞƹ DƣƸƺơƽƞƿiơ aƞƽƿǄ, ᇳᇸᇹᄭ ƞƹƢ éءؗإؘؔئ küءؗ 
ᄬdǂiƾƾ dƺơiƞl DƣƸƺơƽƞƿiơ aƞƽƿǄ, ᇳᇸᇸᄭ. éllƣƨƣƢlǄ, ƺƹƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƞƾƺƹƾ ǂƩǄ ƿƩƣƾƣ jǀƾƿiơƣƾ 
were denied so many votes at their re-election was their jurisprudence regarding (crimi-
ƹƞlᄭ Ƥƺƽƣiƨƹƣƽƾ, ƣ.ƨ. BGE ᇳᇵᇻ I ᇳᇸ, ǂƩƣƽƣ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƼǀƞƾƩƣƢ ƞ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl 
court‘s decision to have a drug dealer deported who originally stemmed from Mazedonia 
but had lived in Switzerland since the age of 7. This Supreme Court decision enraged a 
lƺƿ ƺƤ ƻƞƽlƞƸƣƹƿƞƽiƞƹƾ Ɵƣơƞǀƾƣ ƿǂƺ Ǆƣƞƽƾ ƟƣƤƺƽƣ, ƺƹ ᇴᇺ NƺǁƣƸƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇳᇲ, ƞ ƸƞjƺƽiƿǄ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ 
Swiss electorate had accepted a popular initiative to deport criminal foreigners.
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dؖ؛بؕؔإا؛’ƾ ƹƞƸƣ ƽƣƞƻƻƣƞƽƣƢ iƹ ƞƹƺƿƩƣƽ iƹơiƢƣƹƿ: ƺƹ ᇳᇳ FƣƟƽǀƞƽǄ ᇴᇲᇲᇵ, 
Justice dؖ؛بؕؔإا؛ spat on a court reporter in the hallways of the Federal 
dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ. eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ iƿƾƣlƤè ᅬ ƺƹ ƼǀƣƾƿiƺƹƞƟlƣ lƣƨƞl 
ƨƽƺǀƹƢƾè ᅬ ƾǀƟƾƣƼǀƣƹƿlǄ ƢƣƻƽiǁƣƢ Jǀƾƿiơƣ dؖ؛بؕؔإا؛ of his judicial duties 
and asked him to resign. A special commission of the Federal Assembly 
ƿƩƣƹèᅬ ƺƹ ƣƼǀƞllǄ ƾƩƞkǄ ƨƽƺǀƹƢƾèᅬ ƻƽƺƻƺƾƣƢ ƿƺ iƸƻƣƞơƩ ƩiƸ ƟǄ ƞ ƾiƹƨǀlƞƽlǄ 
applicable tailor- made federal decree. These events led to his resignation on 
ᇶ OơƿƺƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇲᇵ. 
The Federal Supreme Court is composed of seven chambers, two dea-
ling with matters of constitutional and public law, two with private 
law, one with criminal law, and two with social security. The first five 
ơƩƞƸƟƣƽƾ ƞƽƣ lƺơƞƿƣƢ ƞƿ ƿƩƣ dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ’ƾ Ƹƞiƹ ƾƣƞƿ iƹ Lƞǀƾƞƹƹƣ, ƿƩƣ 
two social law divisions reside in Lucerne. Considering the fact that the 
FƣƢƣƽƞl éƾƾƣƸƟlǄ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺǀƹơil ƞƽƣ ƟƺƿƩ ƾƣƞƿƣƢ iƹ Bƣƽƹ, Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ 
judiciary there is not only an institutional but also a geographical sepa-
ration of powers.
The Federal Supreme Court is the supreme judicial authority of the con-
federation (Article 188 I Constitution). Its two main tasks are to supervise 
the application of the federal law and to protect individual constitutional 
rights. In terms of its first key task, the Federal Supreme Court has to 
make sure that the cantonal and federal courts apply the federal laws in 
a uniform manner. For example, a woman who had killed her daughter 
was sentenced to six years of imprisonment, the minimum sentence being 
ᇷ Ǆƣƞƽƾ. éƽƿiơlƣ ᇶᇹ I CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣ ƾƿƞƿƣƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ơƺǀƽƿ ƢƣƿƣƽƸiƹƣƾ ƿƩƣ 
sentence according to the culpability of the offender. The Federal Supreme 
Court ruled that the cantonal courts had not properly considered culpabi-
lity and thus violated federal law.30 In fulfilling this first task, the crimi-
nal law chamber of the Federal Supreme Court de facto acts as a Court of 
Cƞƾƾƞƿiƺƹ. BƣƤƺƽƣ ƿƩƣ ƣƹƞơƿƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ éơƿ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ 
in 2007, the criminal law chamber was in fact called “Kassationshof”, i.e. 
Court of Cassation.
In terms of its second key task, the Federal Supreme Court deals with indi-
vidual complaints regarding constitutional rights. One notable case was ini-
ƿiƞƿƣƢ ƞƤƿƣƽ ƿƩƣ Gƣƹƣǁƞ ƾơƩƺƺl ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ ƤƺƽƟƞƢƣ ƞ MǀƾliƸ ƿƣƞơƩƣƽ ƤƽƺƸ 
wearing her headscarf during class. At the Federal Supreme Court, the teacher 
30 BGE ᇳᇵᇸ Ig ᇷᇷ.
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claimed a violation of her freedom of religion (Article 15 Constitution). The 
Court, stressing the religious neutrality of public schools, ruled that the pro-
hibition was not unconstitutional.31 
Figure 6: Swiss Court Hierarchy32
Iƿƾ ƻƺƾiƿiƺƹ iƹ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƞƾ ƿƩƣ ‘ƿƩiƽƢ ƻƺǂƣƽ’ iƾ ƿƩƣ Ƥiƽƾƿ iƹƢiơƞƿƺƽ 
that the Federal Supreme Court is the least important branch of gover-
nment. Its relative weakness becomes particularly obvious when consi-
dering its powers as a constitutional court in the strict sense of the term. 
Although the Federal Supreme Court is entitled to rule on the violation of 
individual constitutional claims, its powers to test the constitutionality of 
laws are limited. The Supreme Court can at least declare cantonal laws to 
be unconstitutional. For example, it declared the surveillance measures of 
31 BGE ᇳᇴᇵ I ᇴᇻᇸ.
32 dƺǀƽơƣ ᄬƸƺƢiƤiƣƢᄭ: hikiƻƣƢiƞ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/DbFᇴ- edᇵbᄭ; ƺƽiƨiƹƞƿƺƽ: dƞƹƢƾƿƣiƹ. 
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ƿƩƣ aƺliơƣ éơƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ kǀƽiơƩ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ǀƹơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl.33 However, 
acts of the Federal Assembly or the Federal Council may not be challenged 
in the Federal Supreme Court (Article 189 IV Constitution). With view to 
the separation of powers and the checks and balances operating between 
the branches of government, this restriction of constitutional review is not 
convincing. It means that the very same surveillance measures that are ens-
ƩƽiƹƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl CƽiƸiƹƞl aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ CƺƢƣ ơƞƹƹƺƿ Ɵƣ ơƩƞllƣƹƨƣƢ ƞƿ ƿƩƣ 
Federal Supreme Court.
Iƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇹ, ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƢƣơiƢƣƢ ᇹ’ᇹᇺᇴ ơƞƾƣƾ. Mƺƾƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣƾƣ ơƞƾƣƾ 
ᄬᇶ’ᇵᇻᇴᄭ ǂƣƽƣ ƢƣơiƢƣƢ ƟǄ ƞ ƻƞƹƣl ƺƤ ƿƩƽƣƣ Jǀƾƿiơƣƾ. Iƹ iƸƻƺƽƿƞƹƿ ơƞƾƣƾ ƺƽ ǀƻƺƹ 
request of one Justice there was a panel of five Justices (661). Cases which are 
clearly inadmissible or manifestly ill- founded can be decided by one Justice 
ᄬᇴ’ᇷᇺᇷᄭ. Iƹ ƣǁƣƽǄ ơƞƾƣ, ƺƹƣ Jǀƾƿiơƣ iƾ ơƩƞƽƨƣƢ ǂiƿƩ Ƣƽƞǂiƹƨ ǀƻ ƿƩƣ jǀƢƨƸƣƹƿ 
(Referent, juge rapporteur). Thus, on average each one of the 38 Justices is res-
ponsible for drafting 205 judgments per year, or almost one per working day. 
As well as this drafting responsibility, Justices have to decide more than one 
additional case per day where they are “merely” part of the panel. To manage 
ƿƩiƾ ƣƹƺƽƸƺǀƾ ǂƺƽklƺƞƢ, ƣƞơƩ Jǀƾƿiơƣ iƾ ƾǀƻƻƺƽƿƣƢ ƟǄ ᇵᅬᇶ lƞǂ ơlƣƽkƾ. Iƹ Ƹƺƾƿ 
cases, Justices have the law clerk draft the judgment that is to be decided 
upon. 
The proceedings at the Supreme Court are conducted almost entirely in 
writing. The parties hand in their written complaints. Although Article 57 
of the Federal Supreme Court Act allows for a hearing to be ordered by the 
president of the chamber, the parties de facto never get to plead orally at 
the Court. The Court decides most cases by way of circulation. This means 
that the draft is circulated among the members of the panel. If everyone 
agrees then the judgment becomes final. However, if the Justices disagree, 
they must hold a public debate on the case. Thus, the “public hearings” 
that take place at the Supreme Court are not actual hearings, but public 
debates. There the Justices discuss the merits of the case in an open cour-
troom. Even the final vote on the judgment is a process open to the public. 
eƩƣ ƽƞƿiƺƹƞlƣ ƟƣƩiƹƢ ƿƩiƾèᅬ ƻƽƺƟƞƟlǄ ǀƹiƼǀƣèᅬ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣ iƾ ƿƩƞƿ Jǀƾƿiơƣƾ ƺƤ 
the Swiss Federal Supreme Court are not permitted to publish their dis-
senting or concurring opinions: the public debate presents an alternative 
33 BGE ᇳᇵᇸ I ᇺᇹ. 
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opportunity for them to utter such opinions.ᇵᇶ Such public sessions are in 
practice very rare. In 2016, a public debate and public pronouncement of 
the judgement only occurred in 78 of the 7811 cases, i.e. in less than 1 % of 
cases.
ᇵᇶ Historically, dissenting opinions were not provided for because the courts used to de-
liberate their verdicts publicly and had an open vote at the end of the deliberations. As 
previously mentioned, the Supreme Court continues to deliberate and vote on cases in 
open court up to this day. On the cantonal level, however, these open deliberations are 
vanishing for reasons of efficiency. It is this that has sparked a new debate over whether 
ƿƩƣ ƻǀƟliơƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ Ƣiƾƾƣƹƿiƹƨ ƺƻiƹiƺƹƾ ƺǀƨƩƿ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƞllƺǂƣƢ. eƩƣ Ƹƞiƹèᅬ ƹƺƿ ǁƣƽǄ ơƺƹǁiƹ-
ơiƹƨèᅬ ơƺǀƹƿƣƽ ƞƽƨǀƸƣƹƿ ƻǀƽƻƺƽƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƺƻƻƺƹƣƹƿƾ iƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƻǀƟliơƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ Ƣiƾƾƣƹƿiƹƨ 
opinions undermines the authority of the courts.
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Ig. Cƞƹƿƺƹƾ
Iƹ ᇳᇺᇶᇺ, ƿƩƣƽƣ ǂƣƽƣ ᇴᇷ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ iƹ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ: kǀƽiơƩ, Bƣƽƹ, 
Lǀơƣƽƹƣ, fƽi, dơƩǂǄǅ, OƟǂƞlƢƣƹ ƞƹƢ NiƢǂƞlƢƣƹ, Glƞƽǀƾ, kǀƨ, FƽiƟƺǀƽƨ, 
dƺlƺƿƩǀƽƹ, Bƞƾƣl dƿƞƢƿ ƞƹƢ Bƞƾƣl LƞƹƢƾơƩƞƤƿ, dơƩƞƤƤƩƞǀƾƣƹ, éƻƻƣƹǅƣll 
éǀƾƾƣƽƽƩƺƢƣƹ ƞƹƢ éƻƻƣƹǅƣll IƹƹƣƽƽƩƺƢƣƹ, dƿ.èGƞllƣƹ, GƽƞǀƟüƹƢƣƹ, éƞƽƨƞǀ, 
eƩǀƽƨƞǀ, eiơiƹƺ, gƞǀƢ, gƞlƞiƾ, NƣǀơƩǈƿƣl, ƞƹƢ Gƣƹƣǁƞ.35 In 1978, Jura was 
accepted as the 26th canton in a constitutional referendum after it had deci-
ƢƣƢ ƿƺ ƾƣơƣƢƣ ƤƽƺƸ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ Bƣƽƹ iƹ ƞ ƻƺƻǀlƞƽ ǁƺƿƣ.
Figure 8: The 26 Cantons of Switzerland36
35 éƽƿiơlƣ ᇳ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ᇳᇺᇶᇺ.
36 dƺǀƽơƣ: hikiƻƣƢiƞ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ᇷDᇻM- hᇺᇴNᄭ; ƺƽiƨiƹƞƿƺƽ: efBd. 
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Up to this day, understanding the role of the cantons is key in being able 
ƿƺ ǀƹƢƣƽƾƿƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƾǄƾƿƣƸ. eƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ᇳᇺᇶᇺ ƣƾƿƞƟliƾ-
ƩƣƢ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ ƞƾ ƞ ơƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ᇴᇷ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƾƿƞƿƣƾ ᄬơƞƹƿƺƹƾᄭ ƿƩƞƿèᅬ ƸǀơƩ 
iƹƾƻiƽƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ fƹiƿƣƢ dƿƞƿƣƾ ƺƤ éƸƣƽiơƞèᅬ ƺƹlǄ ơƺƹƤƣƽƽƣƢ ƾƺƸƣ ƻƺǂƣƽƾ ᄬlikƣ 
foreign relations or control over the military) to the central authorities and 
left all the others (like policing, schooling, taxes, health care, etc.) with the 
ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ. eƩǀƾ, ƤƽƺƸ ƿƩƣ ǁƣƽǄ Ɵƣƨiƹƹiƹƨ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƾƿƞƿƣ’ƾ ƣǃiƾƿƣƹơƣ, 
the cantons retained their autonomous standing. 
This strong independent position of the cantons can best be understood by 
ƣǃƞƸiƹiƹƨ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇵ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ, ǂƩiơƩ Ʃƞƾ ƹƺƿ ơƩƞƹƨƣƢ ƾiƹơƣ ᇳᇺᇶᇺ: 
“The Cantons are sovereign ... They exercise all rights that are not vested in the 
Confederation.” The confederation, on the other hand, only possesses “the 
duties that are assigned to it by Federal Constitution” ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇶᇴ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. 
The principles for the allocation of powers and tasks are circumscribed in 
éƽƿiơlƣ ᇶᇵƞ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ: “The Confederation only undertakes tasks that 
the Cantons are unable to perform or which require uniform regulation by the 
Confederation.”  eƽƞƢiƿiƺƹƞllǄ, ƿƩƣƽƣ ǂƣƽƣ ƺƹlǄ ƞ liƸiƿƣƢ ƞƸƺǀƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƞƾkƾ ǁƣƾ-
ted in the confederation. In recent years, however, the confederation has assu-
med greater responsibility. The feeling had begun to develop, particularly in 
the fields of civil procedural law (Article 122 I Constitution), criminal procedu-
ral law (Article 123 I Constitution), vocational and professional education and 
training (Article 63 Constitution), or road transport (Article 82 Constitution), 
ƿƩƞƿ ƹƞƿiƺƹǂiƢƣ ǀƹiƤƺƽƸ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ ǂƞƾ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣƢ. NƣǁƣƽƿƩƣlƣƾƾ, Ƣƣƾƻiƿƣ ƿƩƣƾƣ 
developments, the cantons remain strong and independent entities within 
the federal system today. 
Each canton must provide for a democratic system of government.37 Firstly, 
this means that the people of the canton must have the opportunity to elect 
their representatives to the cantonal parliament. Secondly, the separation of 
powers must be respected within the canton. Separation of powers is gua-
ranteed in all 26 cantons. Each canton has a democratically elected cantonal 
parliament, an executive, and an independent judiciary. The cantonal parlia-
ments issue the cantonal laws, for example on education or on regional plan-
ning. These cantonal laws are then implemented by the cantonal executives 
and controlled by the cantonal courts. So, for example, a cantonal govern-
ment (executive) issues permits to build houses. If such a permit is refused 
37 Article 51 Constitution: “Each Canton shall adopt a democratic constitution.”
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or restricted, the individual who wants to build a house can take the govern-
ment to court, and the court will decide upon the application of the law in 
the circumstances. Thirdly, the cantonal constitutions themselves must be 
democratically approved and the people of the canton must have the possibi-
lity to amend or change the constitution in a popular vote.38
38 Article 51 I Constitution: “Each Canton shall adopt a democratic constitution. This 
requires the approval of the People and must be capable of being revised if the majority of 
those eligible to vote so request.”
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g. CƺƸƸǀƹƣƾ
At the third layer of the Swiss federal landscape are the communes, i.e. cities 
ƞƹƢ ǁillƞƨƣƾ ƿƩƽƺǀƨƩƺǀƿ ƿƩƣ ơƺǀƹƿƽǄ. Iƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇺ, ƿƩƣƽƣ ǂƣƽƣ ᇴ’ᇴᇴᇴ ơƺƸƸǀƹƣƾ iƹ 
dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ. eƩƣ ơiƿǄ ƺƤ kǀƽiơƩ iƾ ƿƩƣ lƞƽƨƣƾƿ ơƺƸƸǀƹƣ ᄬơƞ. ᇶᇲᇲ’ᇲᇲᇲ iƹƩƞƟ-
itants) and the village of Corippo is the smallest (13 inhabitants).39 On aver-
ƞƨƣ, dǂiƾƾ ơƺƸƸǀƹƣƾ Ʃƞǁƣ ƞƟƺǀƿ ᇴ’ᇺᇲᇲ iƹƩƞƟiƿƞƹƿƾ, ƿƩƣ ƸƣƢiƞƹ ƾƿƞƹƢiƹƨ ƞƿ 
jǀƾƿ ƺǁƣƽ ᇳ’ᇲᇲᇲ iƹƩƞƟiƿƞƹƿƾ. eƩƣ ƹǀƸƟƣƽ ƺƤ ơƺƸƸǀƹƣƾ iƾ ƽƞƻiƢlǄ Ƣƣơliƹiƹƨ, ƞƾ 
many of them are merging to ease their administrative burdens. The degree of 
autonomy of communes is determined by the Constitution of the canton they 
Ɵƣlƺƹƨ ƿƺ. éơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇺᇵ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ kǀƽiơƩ,èƿƩƣ 
communes are responsible for all public tasks that are neither assigned to 
the confederation nor the cantons. Thus, communes provide institutions like 
social welfare authorities, primary schools, the local police, or the justices 
of the peace. They are responsible for the maintenance of streets and urban 
development in general, supply of electrical energy, and the levying of taxes. 
Some larger communes (cities) have a parliament, but in over 80 % of all com-
munes in Switzerland it is the communal assembly, a gathering of all local 
citizens, that is the legislative body. They decide on the statute (“constitution”) 
of the commune and elect the local government or mayor. 
39 eƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᅬ é BƽiƣƤ GǀiƢƣ, ᇴᇲᇳᇺ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/jMᇷᇻ- kMFKᄭ, ƻ. ᇳᇵ.
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gI. Diƽƣơƿ DƣƸƺơƽƞơǄ
In this chapter, an initial glimpse at direct democracy in Switzerland is taken. 
aƞƽƿiơiƻƞƿiƺƹ ƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ᄬᇳ.ᄭ, ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ᄬᇴ.ᄭ, ƞƹƢ ᄬᇵ.ᄭ ơƺƸƸǀƹƞl lƣǁƣl ǂill Ɵƣ 
examined separately. A thorough examination of direct democracy will be 
undertaken in Mؔاا؛؜ؔئ Oؘئؖ؛’ƾ ơƩƞƻƿƣƽ ƺƹ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl lƞǂ.ᇶᇲ 
ᇳ. Fؘؘؗإؔ؟ Lؘةؘ؟
For the average Swiss person, direct democracy is more than merely a specific 
ƤƺƽƸ ƺƤ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ- Ƹƞkiƹƨ. Diƽƣơƿ ƢƣƸƺơƽƞơǄ iƾ ƞ ơƺƽƣ ƣlƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ƹƞƿi-
onal identity. As éءؗإؘؔئ e؛؜ؘإ convincingly argues, political participation 
and self- determination are deeply rooted in Swiss tradition. Their importance 
can be traced back to the public peaces (Landfrieden) of the high and later 
Middle Ages: “The conceptual basis of these public peaces was the idea of cre-
ating associations based on collective vows. This kind of association was called 
sworn union (coniuratio).”ᇶᇳ
The importance of the coniuratio in the narrative of the Swiss nation 
ᄬ“cüƿli- dơƩǂǀƽ”ᄭᇶᇴ might also explain why, up to this day, democratic parti-
cipation in Switzerland is inextricably tied to citizenship and not to financial 
contribution. In order to vote in elections, referenda, and initiatives, one must 
Ɵƣ ƞ dǂiƾƾ ơiƿiǅƣƹ; Ɵƣiƹƨ ƞ dǂiƾƾ ƿƞǃ- ƻƞǄƣƽ ƞlƺƹƣ iƾ iƹƾǀƤƤiơiƣƹƿ. Iƿ ơƺǀlƢ ƿƩǀƾ 
be argued that although the federal structure of Switzerland was inspired by 
the United States, the origins of Swiss democracy do not lie in the battle- cry of 
ƿƩƣ éƸƣƽiơƞƹ cƣǁƺlǀƿiƺƹ ᄬ“ƹƺ ƿƞǃƞƿiƺƹ ǂiƿƩƺǀƿ ƽƣƻƽƣƾƣƹƿƞƿiƺƹ”ᄭ Ɵǀƿ ƽƞƿƩƣƽ iƹ 
the small and self- determined communities of peers in the Old Confederacy. 
In order to participate in national elections and polls the voters not only 
need to be Swiss citizens, they also must be of legal age, i.e. 18 years, and must 
not “lack legal capacity due to mental illness or mental incapacity” (Article 136 
ᇶᇲ See pp. 151. 
ᇶᇳ dƣƣ CƩƞƻƿƣƽ Lƣƨƞl HiƾƿƺƽǄ ƻ. ᇶᇸ.
ᇶᇴ See Figure 3, p. 6.
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I Constitution).ᇶᇵ Dǀƞl ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ ƞƽƣ ƞllƺǂƣƢ ƿƺ ǁƺƿƣ, ƞƾ ƞƽƣ dǂiƾƾ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ ǂƩƺ 
live abroad. In contrast, as already mentioned, foreigners who live, work, and 
pay taxes in Switzerland do not have any right to participate in federal elec-
tions or polls. In a limited number of cantons, foreigners have the right to 
vote. Considering the high threshold for becoming a Swiss citizen,ᇶᇶ this total 
exclusion of foreigners (25 % of population)ᇶᇷ from political participation is 
questionable. However, the darkest chapter in the history of political rights 
iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ ƾƿill ƽƣƸƞiƹƾ ǂƺƸƣƹ’ƾ ƾǀƤƤƽƞƨƣ. Oƹ ƿƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl lƣǁƣl, ǂƺƸƣƹ 
ƺƹlǄ ƺƟƿƞiƹƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ ǁƺƿƣ iƹ ᇳᇻᇹᇳ. Oƹ ᇴᇹ NƺǁƣƸƟƣƽ ᇳᇻᇻᇲ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ FƣƢƣƽƞl 
Supreme Court had to force the canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden to intro-
duce suffrage for women at the cantonal level.ᇶᇸ
Diƽƣơƿ ƢƣƸƺơƽƞơǄ iƾ ơƺƸƸƺƹlǄ ƢƣƤiƹƣƢ ƞƾ ƞ ƻƺliƿiơƞl ƾǄƾƿƣƸ ǂƩƣƽƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ 
ƞƽƣ ƿƞkƣƹ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƣlƣơƿƺƽƞƿƣ, i.ƣ. ƿƩƣ ƻƣƺƻlƣ ƿƩƣƸƾƣlǁƣƾ. Diƽƣơƿ ƢƣƸƺơƽƞơǄ iƾ ƢiƤ-
ferent from representative democracy: in the latter form, decisions are taken 
ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƣlƣơƿƣƢ, i.ƣ. ƿƩƣ ƻƞƽliƞƸƣƹƿ ƞƹƢ/ƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿ. Dƣơiƾiƺƹ- Ƹƞkiƹƨ 
by the people traditionally comes in two forms: top- down or bottom- up. 
In the top- down category, a decision that has been taken by the legislator 
is taken back (Latin: re- ferre) to the electorate for approval, hence the term 
referendum. In Switzerland, any amendment of the constitution through the 
Federal Assembly must be submitted to a “mandatory referendum” (Article 
ᇳᇶᇲ Iƞ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. OƹlǄ ǂƩƣƹ ƿƩƣ ƸƞjƺƽiƿǄ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ƞƹƢ ƻƣƺƻlƣ 
approve does the amendment take legal force. For example, on 30 September 
2016, the Federal Assembly decided that the confederation should enact sim-
plified regulations on the naturalisation of third generation immigrants and 
stateless children. To fulfil this, the Federal Assembly had to change Article 
38 of the Constitution by adding a paragraph 3 and submitting this addition 
to a mandatory referendum. On 12 February 2017, the proposed change was 
ƞƻƻƽƺǁƣƢ ƟǄ ƺǁƣƽ ᇸᇲè% ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ƻƣƺƻlƣ ƞƹƢ ƟǄ ᇳᇻ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ.ᇶᇹ 
ᇶᇵ This English translation of Article 136 I Constitution is inaccurate for it does not contain 
any mention of guardianship. A more accurate translated provision on the ineligibility 
ƿƺ ǁƺƿƣ iƾ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇴ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl éơƿ ƺƹ aƺliƿiơƞl ciƨƩƿƾ ƺƤ ᇳᇹ DƣơƣƸƟƣƽ ᇳᇻᇹᇸ ᄬacéᄭ, dc 
161.1: “Persons lacking legal capacity who are ineligible to vote in accordance with Article 
136 paragraph 1 of the Federal Constitution are persons who are subject to a general depu-
tyship or are represented by a carer as they are permanently incapable of judgement.”
ᇶᇶ dƣƣ ƿƩƣ ƞƽƿiơlƣ ‘BƣơƺƸiƹƨ ƞ ơiƿiǅƣƹ’ ƺƹ: ǂǂǂ.ƾǂiƾƾiƹƤƺ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/jᇸba- fcFdᄭ.
ᇶᇷ See p. 5.
ᇶᇸ Fƺƽ ƞƹ iƹ- ƢƣƻƿƩ Ƣiƾơǀƾƾiƺƹ ƺƤ BGE ᇳᇳᇸ Iƞ ᇵᇷᇻ ƾƣƣ CƩƞƻƿƣƽ ƺƹ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl Lƞǂ, ƻƻ. 159.
ᇶᇹ FƣƢƣƽƞl Gƞǅƣƿƿƣ Nƺ ᇳᇹ ƺƤ ᇴ MƞǄ ᇴᇲᇳᇹ, ƻƻ. ᇵᇵᇺᇹ.
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In the bottom- up form of direct democracy, change is initiated by the people 
(Latin: plebs) themselves who want to bring about a decision (Latin: scitum), 
hence the term plebiscite. In Switzerland there are mainly two forms of plebis-
cites on the federal level. First, the popular initiative: this instrument is used 
ƿƺ ơƩƞƹƨƣ ƺƽ ƞƸƣƹƢ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ. éƹǄ ᇳᇲᇲ’ᇲᇲᇲ dǂiƾƾ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ ƸƞǄ, ǂiƿ-
hin 18 months of the official publication of their initiative, request a revision 
of the Federal Constitution (Article 138 I and Article 139 I Constitution). On 
ᇳèMƞǄ ᇴᇲᇲᇹ, ƻƺliƿiơiƞƹƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƽiƨƩƿ- ǂiƹƨ dǂiƾƾ aƣƺƻlƣ’ƾ aƞƽƿǄ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl 
DƣƸƺơƽƞƿiơ fƹiƺƹ ƺƤ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ lƞǀƹơƩƣƢ ƞƹ iƹiƿiƞƿiǁƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞ ƹƞƿiƺƹǂiƢƣ Ɵƞƹ 
ƺƹ Ƹiƹƞƽƣƿƾ. hiƿƩiƹ ᇳᇶ ƸƺƹƿƩƾ, ƿƩƣǄ ƨƞƿƩƣƽƣƢ ƺǁƣƽ ᇳᇳᇵ’ᇲᇲᇲ ƾiƨƹƞƿǀƽƣƾ iƹ ƾǀƻ-
port of the initiative. The Federal Council and an overwhelming majority of 
both chambers of the Federal Assembly recommended that the people should 
reject the initiative. It was argued that the initiative stood at odds with seve-
ral fundamental values of the Swiss Constitution, such as equality, freedom 
ƺƤ ƽƣliƨiƺƹ, ƺƽ ƻƽƺƻƺƽƿiƺƹƞliƿǄ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƺƹ ᇴᇻ NƺǁƣƸƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇲᇻ, ᇷᇹ.ᇷ % ƺƤ ƿƩƣ 
voters as well as 19 cantons and one half- canton approved the initiative. On 
that day Article 72 III Constitution was enacted: “The construction of minarets 
is prohibited.” Since 1893 a total of 210 popular initiatives have been put to the 
vote, but only 22 have been accepted by the people and the cantons.
The second form of plebiscite on the federal level is the possibility for the 
people to challenge federal laws. Within 100 days of official publication, any 
ᇷᇲ’ᇲᇲᇲ dǂiƾƾ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ ơƞƹ ƽƣƼǀƣƾƿ ƿƩƞƿ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƞơƿƾ ƺƤ ƻƞƽliƞƸƣƹƿ Ɵƣ ƾǀƟƸiƿƿƣƢ 
ƿƺ ƞ ǁƺƿƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƣƺƻlƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇶᇳ Iƞ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. CƺƹƤǀƾiƹƨlǄ, ƿƩiƾ ƤƺƽƸ ƺƤ 
bottom-up plebiscite is called an “optional referendum” although is not a ref-
erendum in the previously explained technical sense of the term (top-down). 
In the case of an optional referendum, it is not the legislator that submits the 
act to popular approval but the people that demand their say on the matter. 
On 25 September 2015, the Federal Assembly decreed a new federal act on 
the Swiss intelligence service. This act inter alia created the possibility for 
large scale surveillance through the secret service. Several civil liberty groups 
ƞƹƢ lƣƤƿ- ǂiƹƨ ƻƞƽƿiƣƾ ƺƻƻƺƾƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƹƣǂ lƞǂ ƞƹƢ ƨƞƿƩƣƽƣƢ ᇷᇲ’ᇲᇲᇲ ƾiƨƹƞƿǀƽƣƾ ƿƺ 
bring about a plebiscite. However, the “referendum” was unsuccessful. In the 
national poll of 25 September 2016, over 65 % of the voters accepted the new 
law. It entered into force on 1 September 2017.ᇶᇺ Since 1875, the Swiss people 
ᇶᇺ Federal Act on the Intelligence Service of 25 September 2015 (Intelligence Service Act, 
Idéᄭ, dc ᇳᇴᇳ.
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have had to decide on 185 “optional referenda”. In 105 cases they voted in 
favour of the “referendum”, thus disavowing the legislator.ᇶᇻ 
ᇴ. Cؔءاآءؔ؟ Lؘةؘ؟
Article 51 I of the Federal Constitution obliges the cantons to provide a 
democratic Constitution as well as for the possibility of a mandatory refe-
rendum and popular initiative: “Each Canton shall adopt a democratic cons-
titution. This requires the approval of the People and must be capable of being 
revised if the majority of those eligible to vote so request.” The specific requi-
rements under the mandatory referendum and the popular initiative are 
lƣƤƿ ǀƻ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ. Fƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, iƹ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ kǀƽiơƩ, ᇸ’ᇲᇲᇲ ƣliƨiƟlƣ 
citizens can at any point request the total or partial revision of the cantonal 
Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇴᇵ liƿ. ƞ ƞƹƢ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇴᇶ liƿ. ƞ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ/kHᄭ.50 
Apart from these democratic minimal standards guaranteed by the federal 
Constitution, the cantons are free to create other instruments to enhance the 
participation of their citizens in the political process. Most cantons do so by 
providing at least an optional referendum and a legislative initiative to chal-
lƣƹƨƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl lƞǂƾ. Iƹ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ kǀƽiơƩ, ᇸ’ᇲᇲᇲ ƣliƨiƟlƣ ƻƣƺƻlƣ, ᇳᇴ ơƺƸ-
munes, the city of Zurich, or the city of Winterthur can request that cantonal 
acts be submitted to a vote of the people (“optional referendum”, Article 33 
Constitution/ZH): they must do so within 60 days of the official publication. 
éơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇴᇵ liƿ. Ɵ ƞƹƢ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇴᇶ liƿ. ƞ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ/kH, ƞƹǄ ᇸ’ᇲᇲᇲ 
eligible people can request the adoption, amendment, or rescission of canto-
nal laws (legislative initiative). 
A Swiss particularity that currently exists in all 26 cantons is the refe-
rendum on financial matters (Finanzreferendum): new large, one- time or 
recurring public investments, which leave considerable room for political 
ᇶᇻ eƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᅬ é BƽiƣƤ GǀiƢƣ, ᇴᇲᇳᇺ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/jMᇷᇻ- kMFKᄭ, ƻ. ᇳᇻ.
50 Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ kǀƽiơƩ ƺƤ ᇴᇹ FƣƟƽǀƞƽǄ ᇴᇲᇲᇷ ᄬCƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ/kHᄭ, dc ᇳᇵᇳ.ᇴᇳᇳ. é 
particularity in the canton of Zurich is the so called individual initiative: A single person 
can request the revision of the cantonal Constitution as well as the adoption, amend-
ment, or rescission of cantonal laws. If at least 60 members of the Cantonal Council (Le-
ƨiƾlƞƿǀƽƣᄭ ƾǀƻƻƺƽƿ ƿƩƣ iƹiƿiƞƿiǁƣ, iƿ ǂill Ɵƣ ƾǀƟƸiƿƿƣƢ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ GƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿ ơƺǀƹơil ᄬEǃƣơǀ-
ƿiǁƣ; éƽƿiơlƣ ᇴᇵ liƿ. ƞ ƞƹƢ Ɵ, éƽƿiơlƣ ᇴᇶ liƿ. ơ ƞƹƢ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇳ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ/kHᄭ. 
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choices, are submitted to the public for approval.51 In the canton of Zurich, the 
financial referendum can be held on an optional basis against new one- time 
investments of more than 6 Million Francs as well as new recurring invest-
Ƹƣƹƿƾ ƺƤ Ƹƺƽƣ ƿƩƞƹ ᇸᇲᇲ’ᇲᇲᇲ Fƽƞƹơƾ ǄƣƞƽlǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇵ I liƿ. Ƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ/kHᄭ, 
ǂƩƣƽƣ ƿƩiƾ iƾ ƽƣƼǀƣƾƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƞƿ lƣƞƾƿ ᇵ’ᇲᇲᇲ ƣliƨiƟlƣ ƻƣƺƻlƣ, ᇳᇴ ơƺƸƸǀƹƣƾ, ƿƩƣ ơiƿǄ 
of Zurich, or the city of Winterthur (Article 33 II Constitution/ZH). 
Furthermore, one of the oldest forms of direct democracy in Switzerland is 
the so- called Landsgemeinde or “Cantonal Assembly,” where all the eligible 
citizens of a canton form the main decision- making body. They gather once 
a year on the main square of the canton and decide on specific issues. Voting 
is conducted through the raising of hands by those in favour of a motion, 
which conflicts with the constitutional right to submit a secret vote (Article 
ᇵᇶ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. eƩƣ ǀƾƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƞƹƿƺƹƞl éƾƾƣƸƟlǄ Ʃƞƾ ƾƩƞƽƻlǄ ƢƣơƽƣƞƾƣƢ iƹ 
ƿƩƣ ƻƞƾƿ ơƣƹƿǀƽǄ. eƺƢƞǄ, ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ƺƤ éƻƻƣƹǅƣll IƹƹƣƽƽƩƺƢƣƹ ƞƹƢ Glƞƽǀƾ ƞƽƣ 
the only remaining cantons using this form of direct democracy.52
ᇵ. Cآؠؠبءؔ؟ Lؘةؘ؟
eƩƣ ơƺƸƸǀƹƣƾ ơƞƹèᅬ ǂiƿƩiƹ ƿƩƣ ƟƺǀƹƢƞƽiƣƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƾǀƻƣƽƺƽƢiƹƞƿƣ lƞǂèᅬ ƻƽƺǁiƢƣ 
their own democratic rules. Usually, the cantons set certain standards and 
requirements, e.g. the canton of Zurich stipulates in Article 86 Constitution/ZH 
that there shall be an initiative, a referendum, and a right to make requests 
on communal level. As explained above in most Swiss villages it is the com-
munal assembly, a personal reunion of all citizens, that is the legislative body. 
Thus, the citizens of these communes directly decide on the statute of the 
commune and elect their local government or president.
51 éءؗإؘؔئ Lؔؗءؘإ, dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ: dǀƟƾiƢiƞƽiƿǄ, aƺǂƣƽ- dƩƞƽiƹƨ, ƞƹƢ Diƽƣơƿ DƣƸƺơƽƞơǄ, iƹ 
Fƽƞƹk HƣƹƢƽikƾ/éƹƢƣƽƾ LiƢƾƿƽöƸ/JƺƩƹ LƺǀƨƩliƹ ᄬƣƢƾ.ᄭ, OǃƤƺƽƢ ᇴᇲᇳᇲ, ƻƻ. ᇴᇲᇶ.
52 dƺǀƽơƣ: hikiƻƣƢiƞ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/eNᇵL- hgᇵLᄭ. 
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gII. Lƣƨiƾlƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƾƾ
How are laws made in Switzerland?53 Oƹ ᇳᇵ Jǀƹƣ ᇳᇻᇻᇸ, ƿƩƣ Nƞƿiƺƹƞl Cƺǀƹơil 
decided that the possibility of legalising same sex marriage should be exa-
mined by the Federal Council. In June 1999, the Federal Council published 
a report on the legal situation of same sex couples in Switzerland in which 
different solutions were outlined which ranged from private contracts or offi-
cially registered partnerships to a fully- f ledged marriage for same sex part-
ners. The proposals were submitted to a first national consultation procedure 
(Vernehmlassung). A consultation procedure has the aim of allowing the can-
tons, political parties, and interested groups to participate in the shaping of 
opinion and the decision- making process of the confederation.ᇷᇶ Anyone may 
participate in a consultation procedure and submit an opinion. Some import-
ant entities or organisations, such as the cantonal governments and the politi-
cal parties, are formally invited to participate.55 The participants have at least 
three months to submit their opinion.56 
The majority of participants that submitted opinions in the 1999 consulta-
tion procedure favoured the introduction of some form of registered partners-
Ʃiƻ Ƥƺƽ ƾƞƸƣ ƾƣǃ ơƺǀƻlƣƾ. eƩƣƽƣƤƺƽƣ, iƹ NƺǁƣƸƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇲᇳ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺǀƹơil 
published a preliminary draft and an explanatory report on a federal act on 
registered partnerships for same sex couples. It is important to note that pre-
liminary draft (Vorentwurf) and explanatory report ᄬƣƽläǀƿƣƽƹƢƣƽ BƣƽiơƩƿᄭ ƞƽƣ 
technical terms used for the draft legislation at this stage of the legislative 
procedure.
FƽƺƸ ᇳᇶ NƺǁƣƸƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇲᇳ ƿƺ ᇴᇺ FƣƟƽǀƞƽǄ ᇴᇲᇲᇴ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƣliƸiƹƞƽǄ ƢƽƞƤƿ ƞƹƢ 
the explanatory report were submitted to a second national consultation 
53 Fƺƽ ƞƹ ƣǃơƣllƣƹƿ Ƣƣƾơƽiƻƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩiƾ ƻƽƺơƣƾƾ ƾƣƣ: eƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᅬ é BƽiƣƤ 
GǀiƢƣ, ᇴᇲᇳᇺ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/jMᇷᇻ- kMFKᄭ, ƻƻ. ᇵᇸ.
ᇷᇶ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇴ I ƺƤ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl éơƿ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾǀlƿƞƿiƺƹ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ ᄬCƺƹƾǀlƿƞƿiƺƹ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ 
éơƿ, Caéᄭ ƺƤ ᇳᇺ MƞƽơƩ ᇴᇲᇲᇷ ᄬdc ᇳᇹᇴ.ᇲᇸᇳᄭ; ƾƣƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ EƹƨliƾƩ ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾǀlƿƞƿiƺƹ 
aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/HdᇺB- ᇴageᄭ. 
55 éƽƿiơlƣ ᇶ Cƺƹƾǀlƿƞƿiƺƹ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿ.
56 éƽƿiơlƣ ᇹ III Cƺƹƾǀlƿƞƿiƺƹ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿ. 
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ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣè ᅬ ƞ ǁƣƽǄ ƽƞƽƣlǄ ƺơơǀƽƽiƹƨ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣ.57 All 26 cantons, 10 political 
parties, and 38 organisations took part in the consultation. The preliminary 
draft, proposing a specially protected legal status for same sex couples, met 
wide spread approval. However, some groups continued to advocate for a 
fully- f ledged marriage model, often also demanding that gay and lesbian cou-
ples be allowed to adopt children. 
BƞƾƣƢ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƾǀlƿƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƾǀlƿƞƿiƺƹ ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ, ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺǀƹơil ƩƞƢ 
the department of justice issue a draft for a federal act on registered part-
ƹƣƽƾƩiƻƾ. Oƹ ᇴᇻ NƺǁƣƸƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇲᇴ, ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺǀƹơil ƻǀƟliƾƩƣƢ ƿƩiƾ ƢƽƞƤƿ 
and handed it to the Federal Assembly. Together with the draft the Federal 
Council also passed the so called dispatch (message, Botschaft) to the Federal 
éƾƾƣƸƟlǄ. DiƾƻƞƿơƩ iƾ ƿƩƣ ƿƣơƩƹiơƞl ƿƣƽƸ ǀƾƣƢ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƣǃƻlƞƹƞƿƺƽǄ ƽƣƻƺƽƿ Ʃƞƹ-
ƢƣƢ ƿƺ ƻƞƽliƞƸƣƹƿ ƺƹ ƞ ƾƻƣơiƤiơ ƻƽƺƻƺƾƞl. Iƿ ơƺƹƿƞiƹƾ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƻƺƾƞl’ƾ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiǁƣ 
history, remarks on its constitutionality, and a commentary on the provisions 
of the draft. As a standard procedure, both the draft and the dispatch are 
ƻǀƟliƾƩƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl Gƞǅƣƿƿƣ, ƿƩƣ ƺƤƤiơiƞl jƺǀƽƹƞl ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ.58
Once the draft has reached the Federal Assembly, the presidents of the two 
ơƩƞƸƟƣƽƾ jƺiƹƿlǄ ƢƣơiƢƣ ǂƩiơƩ ơƩƞƸƟƣƽèᅬ ƿƩƣ Nƞƿiƺƹƞl Cƺǀƹơil ƺƽ ƿƩƣ Cƺǀƹơil 
ƺƤ dƿƞƿƣƾèᅬ Ƥiƽƾƿ ƨƣƿƾ ƿƺ ƣǃƞƸiƹƣ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƻƺƾƣƢ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ. IƤ ƿƩƣǄ ơƞƹƹƺƿ ƞƨƽƣƣ, 
lots are drawn. In our case the draft on registered partnership was first assi-
ƨƹƣƢ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ Nƞƿiƺƹƞl Cƺǀƹơil Ƥƺƽ ƽƣǁiƣǂ. eƩƣƹ ƿƩƣ Ƣƺƾƾiƣƽ ǂƞƾ ƩƞƹƢƣƢ Ƣƺǂƹ ƿƺ 
ƞ ƾƻƣơiƞl ơƺƸƸiƾƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Nƞƿiƺƹƞl Cƺǀƹơil. eƩiƾ ơƺƸƸiƾƾiƺƹ Ƥiƽƾƿ ƢƣƟƞƿƣƢ 
on whether or not to approve the introduction of the bill at all. After deciding 
to approve the introduction, they engaged in an in- depth discussion of the pro-
ƻƺƾƣƢ Ɵill. Oƹ ᇴ DƣơƣƸƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇲᇵ, ƿƩƣ ƢƽƞƤƿ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ ƞƸƣƹƢƸƣƹƿƾ ƻƽƺƻƺƾƣƢ ƟǄ 
ƿƩƣ ơƺƸƸiƾƾiƺƹ ǂƞƾ ƾǀƟƸiƿƿƣƢ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ Ƥǀll ơƩƞƸƟƣƽ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Nƞƿiƺƹƞl Cƺǀƹơil. 
Fƺƽ ƿǂƺ ƢƞǄƾ, ƿƩƣ Nƞƿiƺƹƞl Cƺǀƹơil ƢƣƟƞƿƣƢ ƞƹƢ ƢƣơiƢƣƢ ƺƹ ƣƞơƩ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ éƽƿiơlƣƾ 
individually and then handed the amended draft over to the Council of States. 
eƩiƾ ơƩƞƸƟƣƽ ƞlƾƺ ƩƞƢ iƿƾ ơƺƸƸiƾƾiƺƹ ƣǃƞƸiƹƣ ƿƩƣ ƢƽƞƤƿ Ƥiƽƾƿ. Oƹ ᇵ Jǀƹƣ ᇴᇲᇲᇶ, 
the full chamber of the Council of States debated and amended the code. One 
57 NƺƽƸƞllǄèᅬ Ƥƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ ǂƩƣƹ ƣǃiƾƿiƹƨ ƞơƿƾ ƞƽƣ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƞƸƣƹƢƣƢèᅬ ƺƹlǄ ƿƩiƾ ƻƽƣliƸiƹƞƽǄ 
draft and the explanatory reports are put up for consultation. Two rounds of consul-
tation procedures (as occurred in this example) are only held in exceptional circum-
stances, e.g. when other applicable legal provisions have changed in the meantime (like 
ƿƩƣ ƞƢƺƻƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dơƩƣƹƨƣƹ éƾƾƺơiƞƿiƺƹ éƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿ [dơƩƣƹƨƣƹ/DǀƟliƹ] ƞƤƿƣƽ ƿƩƣ Ƥiƽƾƿ 
round of consultation procedure on the introduction of biometric passports made a 
second round of consultation procedure necessary). 
58 FƣƢƣƽƞl Gƞǅƣƿƿƣ Nƺ ᇹ ƺƤ ᇴᇷ FƣƟƽǀƞƽǄ ᇴᇲᇲᇵ, ƻ. ᇳᇴᇺᇺ ᄬƢiƾƻƞƿơƩᄭ, ƻ. ᇳᇵᇹᇺ ᄬƢƽƞƤƿᄭ. 
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week later, the last remaining disagreements between the two chambers were 
ƣliƸiƹƞƿƣƢ. Oƹ ᇳᇺ Jǀƹƣ ᇴᇲᇲᇶ, ƿƩƣ Ƥiƹƞl ǁƺƿƣ ǂƞƾ ƿƞkƣƹ, ƽƣƾǀlƿiƹƨ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƻƞƾƾiƹƨ 
ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƹƣǂ FƣƢƣƽƞl éơƿ ƺƹ cƣƨiƾƿƣƽƣƢ aƞƽƿƹƣƽƾƩiƻƾ Ƥƺƽ dƞƸƣ dƣǃ Cƺǀƻlƣƾ.59 Two 
issues were fiercely contested during the course of the parliamentarian debate. 
Firstly, whether to allow same sex couples to adopt children and secondly, 
ǂƩƣƿƩƣƽ ƿƺ ƨƽƞƹƿ ƿƩƣƸ ƞơơƣƾƾ ƿƺ iƹ- ǁiƿƽƺ Ƥƣƽƿiliƾƞƿiƺƹ. BƺƿƩ Ƽǀƣƾƿiƺƹƾ ǂƣƽƣ ƞƹƾ-
ǂƣƽƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƹƣƨƞƿiǁƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇴᇺ aƞƽƿƹƣƽƾƩiƻ éơƿᄭ. 
Fƺllƺǂiƹƨ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl éƾƾƣƸƟlǄ’ƾ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ, ƿƩƣ ƞơƿ ƩƞƢ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƻǀƟliƾƩƣƢ iƹ 
ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl Gƞǅƣƿƿƣ.60 hiƿƩiƹ ƿƩƣ ƞơƿ’ƾ ƺƤƤiơiƞl ƻǀƟliơƞƿiƺƹ, ƞ ᇳᇲᇲ- ƢƞǄ ƻƣƽiƺƢ 
ǂƞƾ ƾƣƿ Ƥƺƽ ƞƹǄ ᇷᇲ’ᇲᇲᇲ dǂiƾƾ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ ƿƺ ƢƣƸƞƹƢ ƞƹ ƺƻƿiƺƹƞl ƻƺƻǀlƞƽ “ƽƣƤƣ-
ƽƣƹƢǀƸ” ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇶᇳ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. eƩƣƽƣƞƤƿƣƽ, ƿƩƣ Eǁƞƹƨƣliơƞl aƣƺƻlƣ’ƾ aƞƽƿǄ 
of Switzerland led the opposition against this new act, securing the signature 
ƺƤ ƺǁƣƽ ᇸᇹ’ᇲᇲᇲ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ. eƩƣ ƺƻƻƺƹƣƹƿƾ ƞƽƨǀƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƞơƿ ǂƣƞkƣƹƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƻƺƾi-
tion of the traditional family, would ultimately open the path for same sex 
couples to adoption, and would create enormous administrative costs for the 
benefit of only a very minor percentage of citizens. Those supporting the act 
argued that the existing laws on matters like inheritance and social security 
benefits discriminated against same sex couples. 
Oƹ ᇷ Jǀƹƣ ᇴᇲᇲᇷ, ƿƩƣ ƹƞƿiƺƹƞl ƻƺll ǂƞƾ ƩƣlƢ. ᇳ’ᇷᇷᇻ’ᇺᇶᇺ ᄬᇷᇺ %ᄭ dǂiƾƾ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ 
ǁƺƿƣƢ iƹ Ƥƞǁƺǀƽ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƹƣǂ ƞơƿ ƺƹ ƽƣƨiƾƿƣƽƣƢ ƻƞƽƿƹƣƽƾƩiƻ ƞƹƢ ᇳ’ᇳᇴᇹ’ᇷᇴᇲ ᄬᇶᇴ %ᄭ 
against it.61 The voter turnout was at 56.5 %. As can be seen in the chart below, 
in the seven mostly catholic or rural cantons of Jura, Wallis, Tessin, Appenzell 
Innerrhoden, Uri, Schwyz, and Thurgau (marked in red) the act was rejected 
by the majority of the voters. On the other hand, in the metropolitan areas of 
Gƣƹƣǁƞ, Lƞǀƾƞƹƹƣ, Bƞƾƣl, ƞƹƢ kǀƽiơƩ ᄬƸƞƽkƣƢ iƹ Ƣƞƽk ƨƽƣƣƹᄭ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƨiƾƿƣƽƣƢ 
partnership was approved by over 60 % of the electorate. 
59 FƣƢƣƽƞl éơƿ ƺƹ cƣƨiƾƿƣƽƣƢ aƞƽƿƹƣƽƾƩiƻƾ Ƥƺƽ dƞƸƣ dƣǃ Cƺǀƻlƣƾ ƺƤ ᇳᇺ Jǀƹƣ ᇴᇲᇲᇶ ᄬaƞƽƿƹƣƽƾƩiƻ 
éơƿᄭ, dc ᇴᇳᇳ.ᇴᇵᇳ.
60 FƣƢƣƽƞl Gƞǅƣƿƿƣ Nƺ ᇴᇷ ƺƤ ᇴᇻ Jǀƹƣ ᇴᇲᇲᇶ, ƻ. ᇵᇳᇵᇹ.
61 FƣƢƣƽƞl Gƞǅƣƿƿƣ Nƺ ᇵᇶ ƺƤ ᇵᇲ éǀƨǀƾƿ ᇴᇲᇲᇷ, ƻ. ᇷᇳᇺᇵ. 
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Fiƨǀƽƣ ᇻ: cƣƾǀlƿƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Nƞƿiƺƹƞl aƺll ƺƹ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl éơƿ ƺƹ cƣƨiƾƿƣƽƣƢ aƞƽƿƹƣƽƾƩiƻ Ƥƺƽ dƞƸƣ 
Sex Couples62
eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺǀƹơil ƾƣƿ ƿƩƣ ƞơƿ’ƾ Ƣƞƿƣ ƺƤ ƣƹƿƽǄ iƹƿƺ Ƥƺƽơƣ ƞƾ ᇳ JƞƹǀƞƽǄ ᇴᇲᇲᇹ. 
62 dƺǀƽơƣ: hikiƻƣƢiƞ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/aᇺfD- ᇵᇺᇺDᄭ; ƺƽiƨiƹƞƿƺƽ: JƣƢi FƽiƣƹƢ.
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gIII.  aǀƟliơƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ FƣƢƣƽƞl 
Laws
aƽƣliƸiƹƞƽǄ ƢƽƞƤƿƾ ƞƹƢ ƢƽƞƤƿƾ ƺƤ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƞơƿƾ, ƞƾ ǂƣll ƞƾ ƣǃƻlƞƹƞƿƺƽǄ ƽƣƻƺƽƿƾ 
ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺǀƹơil’ƾ ƢiƾƻƞƿơƩƣƾ, ƞƽƣ ƞll ƻǀƟliƾƩƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ Federal Gazette. 
eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl Gƞǅƣƿƿƣ ᄬBundesblatt, BBl; feuille fédérale FF) is the official jour-
nal confederation for standard publications and communications (Article 13 
aǀƟliơƞƿiƺƹƾ éơƿᄭ. Iƹ ƺƽƢƣƽ Ƥƺƽ ƞ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl lƞǂ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƻƽƺƻƣƽlǄ ƣƹƞơƿƣƢ, Ʃƺǂƣǁƣƽ, 
it must be published in the official compilation of federal legislation (amtliche 
Sammlung, AS; recueil officiel, RO). It is through this publication that federal 
ƞơƿƾ ƞơƼǀiƽƣ ƟiƹƢiƹƨ lƣƨƞl Ƥƺƽơƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇺ aǀƟliơƞƿiƺƹƾ éơƿᄭ. eƩƣ ƺƤƤiơiƞl ơƺƸ-
pilation is a chronological collection of all federal acts of legislation. Upon 
their entry into force, federal acts also become a part of the classified compila-
tion of federal legislation (Systematische Sammlung, SR; recueil systématique, 
RS; éƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇳ aǀƟliơƞƿiƺƹƾ éơƿᄭ. eƩiƾ ơƺƸƻilƞƿiƺƹ liƾƿƾ ƞll ƤƣƢƣƽƞl lƞǂƾ ƞƹƢ 
ordinances under the following categories according to their content: 
ᇳ dƿƞƿƣèᅬ aƣƺƻlƣèᅬ éǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ
ᇴ aƽiǁƞƿƣ lƞǂèᅬ Ciǁil jǀƾƿiơƣèᅬ EƹƤƺƽơƣƸƣƹƿ
ᇵ CƽiƸiƹƞl lƞǂèᅬ CƽiƸiƹƞl jǀƾƿiơƣèᅬ Eǃƣơǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƾƞƹơƿiƺƹƾ
ᇶ EƢǀơƞƿiƺƹèᅬ dơiƣƹơƣèᅬ Cǀlƿǀƽƣ
ᇷ Nƞƿiƺƹƞl ƢƣƤƣƹơƣ
6 Finance
ᇹ aǀƟliơ ơƺƹƾƿƽǀơƿiƺƹƾèᅬ EƹƣƽƨǄèᅬ eƽƞƹƾƻƺƽƿ
ᇺ HƣƞlƿƩèᅬ EƸƻlƺǄƸƣƹƿèᅬ dƺơiƞl ƾƣơǀƽiƿǄ
ᇻ EơƺƹƺƸǄèᅬ eƣơƩƹiơƞl ơƺƺƻƣƽƞƿiƺƹ
eƩƣ dǂiƾƾ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ iƾ ơlƞƾƾiƤiƣƢ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ ơƺƢƣ dc ᇳᇲᇳ. eƩƣ ơiǁil 
ơƺƢƣ iƾ ơlƞƾƾiƤiƣƢ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ ƹǀƸƟƣƽ dc ᇴᇳᇲ. FƞƸilǄ Lƞǂƾ ƞƽƣ ƣƹǀƸƣƽƞƿƣƢ ƾƿƞƽ-
ting at 211. As the act on registered partnership mainly concerns the family 
lƞǂ ƾƿƞƿǀƾ ƺƤ ƾƞƸƣ ƾƣǃ ƻƞƽƿƹƣƽƾ, iƿ ǂƞƾ ƞllƺơƞƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƹǀƸƟƣƽ dc ᇴᇳᇳ.ᇴᇵᇳ. eƩiƾ 
number allows the unequivocal identification of all federal acts. 
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dc- ƹǀƸƟƣƽƾ ƾƿƞƽƿiƹƨ ǂiƿƩ “ᇲ.” ƽƣƤƣƽ ƿƺ iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞl lƞǂ ƿƩƞƿ iƾ ƻƞƽƿ ƺƤ 
the Swiss legislation. The numbering of international law follows the same 
classification method as the domestic law. The European Convention on 
HǀƸƞƹ ciƨƩƿƾ iƾ ơlƞƾƾiƤiƣƢ ƞƿ dc ᇲ.ᇳᇲᇳ, Ƥƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ. eƩƣ Hƞƨǀƣ Cƺƹǁƣƹƿiƺƹ 
ƺƹ aƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ ƺƤ CƩilƢƽƣƹ ƞƹƢ Cƺ- ƺƻƣƽƞƿiƺƹ iƹ cƣƾƻƣơƿ ƺƤ IƹƿƣƽơƺǀƹƿƽǄ 
Adoption (Hague Adoption Convention) of 29 May 1993 is filed under 
dcèᇲ.ᇴᇳᇳ.ᇴᇴᇳ.ᇵᇳᇳ.
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Ii. Cƞƾƣ Ciƿƞƿiƺƹ
The most important cases in the Swiss legal system are the decisions of the 
Swiss Federal Supreme Court in Lausanne/Lucerne and the decisions of the 
Eǀƽƺƻƣƞƹ Cƺǀƽƿ ƺƤ HǀƸƞƹ ciƨƩƿƾ iƹ dƿƽƞƾƟƺǀƽƨ.63 
The Federal Supreme Court has a statutory duty to inform the public 
about its jurisprudence (Article 27 I Federal Supreme Court Act). According 
ƿƺ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇷᇹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ’ƾ ƺǂƹ ƽǀlƣƾ ƺƤ ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ,ᇸᇶ this 
information is provided in four different ways: in the official compilation of 
the Federal Supreme Court decisions (1.), on the internet (2.), by making judg-
Ƹƣƹƿƾ ƻƩǄƾiơƞllǄ ƞơơƣƾƾiƟlƣ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƻǀƟliơ ᄬᇵ.ᄭ, ƞƹƢ ƿƩƽƺǀƨƩ ƻƽƣƾƾ ƽƣlƣƞƾƣƾ ᄬᇶ.ᄭ. 
ᇳ. Oؙؙ؜ؖ؜ؔ؟ Cآؠأ؜؟ؔا؜آء ᄬBGEᄭ
The Federal Supreme Court publishes landmark cases in its official compi-
lation of decisions.65 eƩiƾ ƺƤƤiơiƞl ơƺƸƻilƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ’ƾ Ƣƣơiƾi-
ons must not be confused with the official compilation of federal laws of the 
confederation, discussed above.66 BǄ ǁiƽƿǀƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣiƽ ƻǀƟliơƞƿiƺƹ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƺƤƤi-
cial compilation, decisions are regarded as de facto binding precedents. The 
decisions included in the official compilation are edited, printed, and pub-
liƾƩƣƢ iƹ ǄƣƞƽlǄ ǁƺlǀƸƣƾ. eƩƣǄ ƞƽƣ ơiƿƣƢ ƞƾ BGE, ƣ.ƨ. “BGE ᇳᇳᇵ Ig ᇷᇺ”.67 “BGE” 
stands for Bundes gerichts entscheid, i.e. Federal Supreme Court decision. In 
63 Fƺƽ ƿƩƣ ơiƿƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ơƞƾƣƾ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ Eǀƽƺƻƣƞƹ Cƺǀƽƿ ƺƤ HǀƸƞƹ ciƨƩƿƾ ƾƣƣ ƿƩƣiƽ ƨǀiƢƣliƹƣƾ 
ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/JᇹKb- jᇹGNᄭ. 
ᇸᇶ cƣƨǀlƞƿiƺƹƾ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƺƤ ᇴᇲ NƺǁƣƸƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇲᇸ, dc ᇳᇹᇵ.ᇳᇳᇲ.ᇳᇵᇳ.
65 GƣƽƸƞƹ: Amtliche Sammlung der Entscheide des schweizerischen Bundesgerichts (BGE); 
French: recueil officiel des arrêts du Tribunal fédéral suisse (ATF); Italian: Raccolta uffi-
ciale delle decisioni del Tribunale federale svizzero (DTF).
66 See pp. 31.
67 This case was about two men who pushed a 52 kg stone down a hill, killing a fisherman 
at the foot of the slope. It had to consider the question of whether the two men could 
be held criminally liable as co- offenders for negligent homicide. For a discussion of the 
merits of this “rolling stones” case see the Chapter on Criminal Law, p. 390.
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French, this decision would be referred to as ATF 113 IV 58. “ATF” stands for 
Arrêt du Tribunal fȅƢȅƽƞl. Iƹ Iƿƞliƞƹ, ƿƩƣ ơƞƾƣ ǂƺǀlƢ Ɵƣ ơiƿƣƢ ƞƾ “DeF ᇳᇳᇵ Ig ᇷᇺ” 
Decisione del Tribunale federale. 
The first three digits of the citation indicate the yearly volume. The first 
ǁƺlǀƸƣ ǂƞƾ ƻǀƟliƾƩƣƢ iƹ ᇳᇺᇹᇶ ǂƩƣƹ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ǂƞƾ ƤƺǀƹƢƣƢ 
as a permanent institution of the confederation.68 Thus, using the example of 
BGE ᇳᇳᇵ Ig ᇷᇺ, ƿƩƣ Ƥiƽƾƿ ƿƩƽƣƣ Ƣiƨiƿƾ, “ᇳᇳᇵ”, iƹƢiơƞƿƣ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩiƾ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ ǂƞƾ ƽƣƹ-
ƢƣƽƣƢ ᇳᇳᇵ Ǆƣƞƽƾ ƞƤƿƣƽ ᇳᇺᇹᇶ, iƹ ᇳᇻᇺᇹ. eƩƣ cƺƸƞƹ NǀƸƣƽƞlƾ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƸiƢƢlƣ iƹƢiơƞƿƣ 
the field of law the case relates to: 
I.  Constitutional law
II.  Administrative and public international law
III.  Civil law, bankruptcy law
IV.  Criminal law, enforcement of sanctions, and criminal procedure
V.  Social security law69 
eƩǀƾ, Ƥƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, BGE ᇳᇳᇵ Ig ᇷᇺ iƾ ƞ ơƞƾƣ ƽƣƨƞƽƢiƹƨ ơƽiƸiƹƞl lƞǂ ᄬơƺ- ƺƤƤƣƹƢiƹƨ 
in negligent homicide). The last group of digits designates the relevant page(s) 
within the volume, so in this example, pp. 58. Sometimes more specific cita-
ƿiƺƹƾ ơƞƹ Ɵƣ ƤƺǀƹƢ, Ƥƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ: BGE ᇳᇳᇵ Ig ᇷᇺ, E. ᇴ ᄬᇸᇲᄭ. Hƣƽƣ, ƿƩƣ ơiƿƞƿiƺƹ ƺƹlǄ 
refers to consideration (Eƽǂäƨǀƹƨᄭ Nƽ. ᇴ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ jǀƢƨƸƣƹƿ ƺƹ ƻƞƨƣ ᇸᇲ. 
As previously mentioned, it is only the landmark cases that are published 
in the official compilation. In 2016, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court handled 
ᇹ’ᇺᇳᇳ ơƞƾƣƾ: ƺƹlǄ ᇵᇳᇻ ƺƽ ᇶ % ƺƤ ƿƩƣƾƣ ǂƣƽƣ ƻǀƟliƾƩƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƺƤƤiơiƞl ơƺƸƻilƞƿiƺƹ. 
Whether or not a case ought to be considered a landmark case is decided by 
the Justices involved in the relevant case. The rationale of this rule is not very 
convincing as their view on the importance of the case is likely to be tain-
ted by their involvement in it. The decisions in the official compilation are 
only published in the language that was used for the Federal Supreme Court 
ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ, i.ƣ. GƣƽƸƞƹ, FƽƣƹơƩ ƺƽ Iƿƞliƞƹ.70 The language used in the pro-
68 See p. 12.
69 Iƹ ƿƩƣ ǁƺlǀƸƣƾ BGE ᇻᇺ ƿƺ BGE ᇳᇴᇲ, i.ƣ. Ƥƺƽ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ ᇳᇻᇹᇴ ƞƹƢ ᇳᇻᇻᇶ, ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl 
dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƿƣƸƻƺƽƞƽilǄ ǀƾƣƢ ƞ ƢiƤƤƣƽƣƹƿ ƹǀƸƣƽƞƿiƺƹ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ cƺƸƞƹ ƸiƢƢlƣ Ƣiƨiƿƾ iƹ 
the official compilation: Ia. Constitutional law, Ib. Administrative law and public inter-
ƹƞƿiƺƹƞl lƞǂ, II. Ciǁil lƞǂ, III. DƣƟƿ ƣƹƤƺƽơƣƸƣƹƿ ƞƹƢ iƹƾƺlǁƣƹơǄ lƞǂ, Ig. CƽiƸiƹƞl lƞǂ ƞƹƢ 
enforcement of sanctions, V. Social security law.
70 FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ iƹ cƺƸƞƹƾƩ ƞƽƣ ƣǃƿƽƣƸƣlǄ ƽƞƽƣ. dƣƣ Ƥƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ: BGE 
122 I 93.
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ceedings at the Federal Supreme Court is usually determined by the language 
ǀƾƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇷᇶ I FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ éơƿᄭ. 
There are no official translations of the Supreme Court decisions.71 However, 
the Court publishes a summary of the main findings of every landmark case, 
a so- called Regeste, in all three official languages. It is important to note that 
only part of the judgment rendered by the Federal Supreme Court is published 
in the official compilation. This compilation only contains the excerpts that 
the deciding Justices deemed most relevant in the particular case. In order to 
ƨƣƿ ƞơơƣƾƾ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ Ƥǀll jǀƢƨƸƣƹƿ, ƺƹƣ ƹƣƣƢƾ ƿƺ kƹƺǂ ƿƩƣ ơƞƾƣ ƹǀƸƟƣƽ ǂƩiơƩèᅬ 
ƤƽƺƸ ǁƺlǀƸƣ BGE ᇳᇴᇺ ᄬᇴᇲᇲᇷᄭ ƺƹǂƞƽƢƾè ᅬ ơƞƹ Ɵƣ ƤƺǀƹƢ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƩƣƞƢƣƽ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ 
officially published decisions (see below 2.). 
ᇴ. aبؕ؟؜ؖؔا؜آء Oء؟؜ءؘ
For a long time, the publication practice of the Federal Supreme Court was in 
ǁiƺlƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Eǀƽƺƻƣƞƹ Cƺƹǁƣƹƿiƺƹ ƺƤ HǀƸƞƹ ciƨƩƿƾ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ. 
éơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇸ I ECHc “[ j]udgment shall be pronounced publicly”. 
Article 30 III Constitution also requires that the delivery of judgments be 
ƻǀƟliơ. BƣƤƺƽƣ ƿƩƣ Ǆƣƞƽ ᇴᇲᇲᇲ, ƺƹlǄ ƿƩƣ jǀƢƨƸƣƹƿƾ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƺƤƤiơiƞl ơƺƸƻilƞƿiƺƹ 
and a handful of other judgments that had been published in journals were 
accessible. Hence, less than 5 % of all judgments were made public. Further, 
such published decisions were still not in compliance with the constitutional 
requirements, as only small excerpts were published.
From the year 2000 onwards, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court started to 
make its judgments available online. This change in its publication practice 
was the result of mounting pressure on the Court from the media and legal 
practitioners. Since 2007, all final decisions72 ƞƽƣ ƞơơƣƾƾiƟlƣ ƞƿ ƿƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ’ƾ ᄬƾƿillᄭ 
not very user- friendly homepage.73 However, up to this day the Court only 
ƻǀƟliƾƩƣƾ iƿƾ Ƥiƹƞl jǀƢƨƣƸƣƹƿƾ; ƹƺƿ iƿƾ iƹƿƣƽiƸ ƺƹƣƾ. FǀƽƿƩƣƽ, ƿƩƣƽƣ ƞƽƣ ƾƣǁƣƽƞl 
71 fƹƺƤƤiơiƞl GƣƽƸƞƹ ƿƽƞƹƾlƞƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ FƽƣƹơƩ ƞƹƢ Iƿƞliƞƹ dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ ơƞƹ Ɵƣ 
ƤƺǀƹƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ jƺǀƽƹƞl ‘Diƣ aƽƞǃiƾ’, Bƞƾƣl. fƹƺƤƤiơiƞl FƽƣƹơƩ ƿƽƞƹƾlƞƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ GƣƽƸƞƹ ƞƹƢ 
Italian decisions are published in: Journal des Tribunaux, Lausanne. 
72 Interim decisions of the Court are still not available online. 
73 See the official site of the Federal Supreme Court www.bger.ch (https://perma.cc/
jᇴah- BNgᇻ), or, much more user friendly, this privately run site: www.bger.li (https://
ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ᇷᇴDF- ᇻKjᇶᄭ.
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thousand decisions from the 1990s that the Court possesses in electronic form 
but, for no immediately obvious reason, refuses to make publicly available.
Iƿ iƾ ƹƺƿ ƺƹlǄ ƿƩƣ ƞƻƻƽƺǃiƸƞƿƣlǄ ᇶ % ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ ƻǀƟliƾƩƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƺƤƤiơiƞl 
compilationᇹᇶ ƿƩƞƿ ơƞƹ Ɵƣ ƤƺǀƹƢ ƞƿ ƿƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ’ƾ ƩƺƸƣƻƞƨƣ; ƞll Ƥiƹƞl Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ 
of the Court are available here.75 In the latter category, full decisions can be 
found which include the header of the judgment with the case number, the 
date of the judgment, the chamber in charge, the Federal Justices, the clerk of 
the Court and the parties (anonymised), the facts of the case, the reasoning 
on the merits of case, and the judgment (non- admissibility, approval or dis-
missal of complaint):
Fiƨǀƽƣ ᇳᇲ: MƺƢiƧ iƣƢ dơƽƣƣƹƾƩƺƿ ƺƤ ƞ Dƣơiƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ᄬǂiƿƩ LƞƟƣlƾᄭ76
ᇹᇶ dƣƣ ƩƣƞƢƣƽ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ lƣƤƿ „BGE ǀƹƢ EGMc-EƹƿƾơƩƣiƢƣ“; since 2018 the access to the index of 
the decisions of the official compilation is no longer free of charge. 
75 Under the enigmatic header of “further decisions from 2000 onwards” (“weitere Urteile 
ab 2000; https://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/jᇴah- BNgᇻ).
76 Source of the unmodified screenshot: www.bger.ch (https://perma.cc/YC7Z- TVAU). 
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As highlighted in the figure above, every case is assigned a specific case 
ƹǀƸƟƣƽ ᄬᇸB_ᇵᇲᇲ/ᇴᇲᇳᇹᄭ. eƩiƾ ơƞƾƣ ƹǀƸƟƣƽ ơƞƹ Ɵƣ Ɵƽƺkƣƹ Ƣƺǂƹ ƞƾ Ƥƺllƺǂƾ:77
Chronology of cases(300th entry in 2017)
6B_300/2017
Type of Procedure
Chamber
1 = 1st Chamber of Public Law
2 = 2nd Chamber of Public Law
3 = Not yet attributed
4 = 1st Chamber of Civil Law 
5 = 2nd Chamber of Civil Law 
6 = Chamber of Criminal Law 
7 = Not yet attributed
8 = 1st Chamber of Social Law
9 = 2nd Chamber of Social Law
A = Complaint in civil matters
B = Complaint in criminal matters
C = Complaint in public law matters
D = Subsidiary constitutional complaint
E = Competence disputes, civil claims
F = Review
G = Rectification
Fiƨǀƽƣ ᇳᇳ: Eǃƻlƞƹƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƞƾƣ NǀƸƟƣƽ ƺƤ ƞ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ Dƣơiƾiƺƹ
Hƣƹơƣ, ƿƩƣ ơƞƾƣ ƹǀƸƟƣƽ ᇸB_ᇵᇲᇲ/ᇴᇲᇳᇹ iƹƢiơƞƿƣƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩiƾ ơƞƾƣ ǂƞƾ ƿƩƣ ᇵᇲᇲth 
complaint in criminal matters in 2017 that was addressed to the criminal 
law chamber of the Federal Supreme Court. The case was decided on 6 June 
ᇴᇲᇳᇹ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl Jǀƾƿiơƣƾ CƩƽiƾƿiƞƹ DƣƹǄƾ ᄬƻƽƣƾiƢƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ CƽiƸiƹƞl Lƞǂ 
CƩƞƸƟƣƽᄭ, Lƞǀƽƞ JƞơƼǀƣƸƺǀƢ- cƺƾƾƞƽi ƞƹƢ Niklƞǀƾ OƟƣƽƩƺlǅƣƽ. hƞlƿƣƽ Bƽiǂ 
was the law clerk on this case. X was the defendant: he filed the complaint 
through his counsel, Thomas Zogg. The responding party was the public pro-
ƾƣơǀƿƺƽ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ dƿ.è Gƞllƣƹ. éơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ơiƿƞƿiƺƹ ƨǀiƢƣliƹƣƾ ƺƤ 
the Federal Supreme Court, this “ordinary” case is to be cited as follows:78 
JǀƢƨƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ᇸB_ᇵᇲᇲ/ᇴᇲᇳᇹ ƺƤ ᇸ Jǀƹƣ ᇴᇲᇳᇹ. 
As mentioned above (1.), the landmark cases of the Federal Supreme Court 
are published in the official compilation ƺƤ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ. BǄ ǁiƽƿǀƣ ƺƤ ƿƩiƾ ƺƤƤiơiƞl 
publication, the decisions acquire legal force as binding precedents. The same 
is not true for the remaining 96 % of judgments: these are merely published 
online. Still, the courts of first and second instance, legal practitioners and 
scholars very frequently utilise these judgments when searching for answers 
to specific legal questions. 
77 The numeration explained in the figure only applies to cases that have been decided 
after the enactment of the Federal Supreme Court Act on 1 January 2007.
78 Source: www.bger.ch ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ᇵgaᇸᅬᇺebGᄭ.
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ᇵ. aبؕ؟؜ؖ aإآءآبءؘؖؠؘءا
The Federal Supreme Court also enhances public awareness of its jurispru-
dence by making its judgements publicly available. According to Article 6 I 
ECHc, “[ j]udgment shall be pronounced publicly.” Article 30 III Constitution 
similarly requires that the delivery of judgments be public. As mentioned 
above, from the year 2000 onwards, the Court took steps to better meet its 
obligation to pronounce judgments publicly, by publishing its written judg-
ments online. However, these online decisions are published anonymously.79 
For data protection reasons, the Court refused to publish judgments with the 
name of the parties included. It argued that once these names are out, they 
will forever be traceable online. 
However, this strict anonymisation practice did lead to a key problem: it 
was impossible for the media and the general public to find out whether a 
judgment had been rendered against a specific person. Only on the very rare 
occasion of a public debate, i.e. in less than 1 % of all cases, the names of the 
parties became public. Thus, in recognition of the problem, the court found a 
compromise. For four weeks after the decision, the judgments of the Federal 
Supreme Court are put at public disposal in a non- anonymous manner. In 
practice, this means that the header of the judgment with the full names of 
the parties and the finding of the court (non- admissibility, approval, or dis-
Ƹiƾƾƞlᄭ ƞƽƣ ƻƽiƹƿƣƢ ƺǀƿ ƞƹƢ ƞƽƣ ƻƩǄƾiơƞllǄ ƢiƾƻlƞǄƣƢ ƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƻǀƟliơ ǁiƾiƿƺƽ’ƾ 
room of the Court. Thus, everyone can enter the Court and browse through 
these files. They are, however, not published online. 
ᇶ. aإؘئئ cؘ؟ؘؔئؘئ
The fourth way in which the Court informs the public about its jurispru-
dence is through press releases. Important cases are summarised and exp-
lained in short written statements for the press. Since 26 January 2016, the 
Federal Supreme Court has also been distributing its press releases via Twitter 
ᄬ@Ɵƨƣƽ_CHᄭ. 
79 hƩƣƽƣƞƾ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƣƞƽlǄ Ǆƣƞƽƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ’ƾ jǀƽiƾƻƽǀƢƣƹơƣ ƣǁƣƹ ƿƩƣ ƻƞƽƿiƣƾ iƹ ơƽiƸiƹƞl ƻƽƺ-
ơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ ǂƣƽƣ ƹƞƸƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƺƤƤiơiƞl ƻǀƟliơƞƿiƺƹ ᄬƾƣƣ ƣ.ƨ. BGE ᇺᇹ Ig ᇳᇵ, Oؘإا؟ج ة. aبؕ؟؜ؖ 
aإآئؘؖباآإ آؙ ا؛ؘ ؖؔءاآء آؙ kبإ؜ؖ؛), in recent years the Court increasingly began 
anonymising its written judgments.
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I.  alǀƽƞliƿǄ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ eƽƞƢiƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ 
Swiss Legal Culture
IƤ ǂƣ lƺƺk Ƥƺƽ ƢƣƤiƹiƹƨ ƣlƣƸƣƹƿƾ ƺƤ dǂiƾƾ lƣƨƞl ơǀlƿǀƽƣèᅬ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƿƺƿƞliƿǄ ƺƤ dǂiƾƾ 
lƣƨƞl ƽǀlƣƾ, Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƻƺliƿiơƞl, ƾƺơiƞl, ƞƹƢ ƣơƺƹƺƸiơ ƻƽƣơƺƹƢiƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣiƽ ơƽƣ-
ƞƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ƞƻƻliơƞƿiƺƹ, ƞƹƢ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƤƣƽƣƹơƣƾ ƿƺ ƢiƤƤƣƽƣƹƿ ơƺllƣơƿiǁƣ ƻƽƺơƣƾƾƣƾ 
ƺƤ ơƽƣƞƿiƹƨ ƾƣƹƾƣ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣƾƣ ƻƩƣƹƺƸƣƹƞèᅬ ƿƩƣƽƣ ƞƻƻƣƞƽƾ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƞƿ lƣƞƾƿ ƿǂƺ ƢƣƤi-
ƹiƹƨ Ƥƣƞƿǀƽƣƾ. CƣƽƿƞiƹlǄ, ƺƹƣ ƢiƾƿiƹƨǀiƾƩiƹƨ Ƥƣƞƿǀƽƣ iƾ ƿƩƣ internationality of 
ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ lƣƨƞl ƺƽƢƣƽ, iƹ ƿƣƽƸƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƾƿƽƺƹƨ dǂiƾƾ ơƺƸƸiƿƸƣƹƿ ƿƺ iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿi-
ƺƹƞl ƽǀlƣƾ ƞƹƢ iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞl ƺƽƨƞƹiƾƞƿiƺƹƾ, ƞlƿƩƺǀƨƩ ƿƩƣƽƣ ƺƤ ơƺǀƽƾƣ ƽƣƸƞiƹƾ 
ƾƿƽƺƹƨ ƺƻƻƺƾiƿiƺƹ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ ƾǀơƩ iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞliƾƞƿiƺƹ. éƹƺƿƩƣƽ ƢƣƤiƹiƹƨ ơƩƞ-
ƽƞơƿƣƽiƾƿiơèᅬ ǂƩiơƩ ƾƩƞll Ɵƣ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹơƣƻƿǀƞl ƾƿƞƽƿiƹƨ ƻƺiƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩiƾ ơƩƞƻƿƣƽèᅬ iƾ 
ƿƩƣ iƸƻƺƽƿƞƹơƣ ƺƤ plurality. dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ Ʃƞƾ Ƥƺǀƽ ƺƤƤiơiƞl lƞƹƨǀƞƨƣƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇶ 
Federal Constitution)1, ƞƹƢ ƻlƞơƣƾ ƞ ƾƿƽƺƹƨ, iƤ ƹƺƿ ƢƣƤiƹiƹƨ iƸƻƺƽƿƞƹơƣ ƺƹ 
ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣiƽ ơǀlƿǀƽƣƾ ƞƾ Ƹƞkiƹƨ ǀƻ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ơƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳ 
FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ, ƾƣƣ ƞlƾƺ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇵ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. FǀƽƿƩƣƽ, ơƺƹ-
ƾiƢƣƽiƹƨ ƿƩƣ iƸƻƺƽƿƞƹơƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Ƹǀƹiơiƻƞl lƣǁƣl iƹ ƢƞilǄ lƣƨƞl ƻƽƞơƿiơƣ, ƿƩƣ 
dǂiƾƾ lƣƨƞl ƺƽƢƣƽ ơƞƹ Ɵƣ ƽƣƨƞƽƢƣƢ ƞƾ ƾƿƽǀơƿǀƽƞllǄ ƻlǀƽƞliƾƿiơ. eƩiƾ ƽƣlƞƿƣƾ ƿƺ 
ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƹƣơƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƢiƤƤƣƽƣƹƿ ơǀlƿǀƽƞl ƞƽƣƞƾ ƞƹƢ ƿƽƞƢiƿiƺƹƾ ƞƾ ƣƸƟƺƢiƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ 
ƾƺƸƣƿiƸƣƾ- ơƺƸƻlƣǃ ƽƣlƞƿiƺƹƾƩiƻ Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ ƿƩƣ ƨƽƣƞƿ dǂiƾƾ ƽƣƨiƺƹƾ ᄬhƣƾƿ, Eƞƾƿ 
ƞƹƢ dƺǀƿƩᄭ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣiƽ ǁƞƽiƺǀƾ ơǀlƿǀƽƞl ƿƽƞƢiƿiƺƹƾ. éƾ ƞ ơƺƹƾƣƼǀƣƹơƣ, dǂiƾƾ 
lƣƨƞl ơǀlƿǀƽƣ iƾ ƞlƾƺ ƢƣƤiƹƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƸƣơƩƞƹiƾƸƾ ƞƹƢ ơƺƹơƣƻƿƾ iƿ ǀƿiliƾƣƾ ƿƺ 
Ƹƞƹƞƨƣ, ơƺƺƽƢiƹƞƿƣ ƞƹƢ ƸƣƢiƞƿƣ ƿƩƣƾƣ ƻlǀƽƞliƿiƣƾ. Fƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, ƿƩƣ iƢƣƞ ƺƤ 
ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ “Willensnation”, i.ƣ. ƞ ƹƞƿiƺƹ ǂƩiơƩ ƽƣƾƿƾ ƺƹ ƿƩƣiƽ ƸƣƸƟƣƽƾ ǂill,2 
ǂƞƾ ƞƹ iƸƻƺƽƿƞƹƿ ơƺƹơƣƻƿǀƞl ƣlƣƸƣƹƿ iƹ ƢƣƤiƹiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ǀƹiƿǄ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ƻƣƺ-
ƻlƣ ƞƾ ƞơƿiƹƨ ƣƹƿiƿǄ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ. eƩiƾ ơƺƽƽƣƾƻƺƹƢƾ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ 
ƾƿƽƺƹƨ ƻƽƣƾƣƹơƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ iƢƣƞ ƺƤ ƻƺƻǀlƞƽ ƾƺǁƣƽƣiƨƹƿǄ ƞƾ ƞƹ iƹƿƣƨƽƞƿiƹƨ ƣlƣƸƣƹƿ 
iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ: Diƽƣơƿ ƢƣƸƺơƽƞơǄ iƾ ƞ ƻiǁƺƿƞl ƣlƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ dǂiƾƾ lƣƨƞl ơǀlƿǀƽƣ, 
1 FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ᇳᇺ éƻƽil ᇳᇻᇻᇻ, dc ᇳᇲᇳ; ƾƣƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ EƹƨliƾƩ 
ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/MᇺfJ- dᇵᇸᇻᄭ.
2 Iƹ ƨƽƣƞƿƣƽ ƢƣƻƿƩ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƣǁƺlǀƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ơǀlƿǀƽƞl Ƥǀƹơƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩiƾ ơƺƹơƣƻƿ O؟؜ةؘإ k؜ؠؠؘإ, 
é CƺƹƿƣƾƿƣƢ Nƞƿiƺƹ: HiƾƿƺƽǄ, MƣƸƺƽǄ ƞƹƢ NƞƿiƺƹƞliƾƸ iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, ᇳᇹᇸᇳᅬᇳᇺᇻᇳ, 
CƞƸƟƽiƢƨƣ ᇴᇲᇲᇹ, ƻƻ. ᇳᇷᇳ, ƻƻ. ᇴᇲᇹ. 
44 Andreas Thier: Legal History
Ɵƣơƞǀƾƣ iƿ iƾ ƻƣƽơƣiǁƣƢ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƞ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽ ƾƿƽƺƹƨ Ƣƣǁiơƣ ƺƤ ƣǃƻƽƣƾƾiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ǂill 
ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƣƺƻlƣ. éƹƺƿƩƣƽ Ƹƣƞƹƾ ƺƤ ơƺƺƽƢiƹƞƿiƹƨ ƻlǀƽƞliƿǄ ƟǄ ƸƣƢiƞƿiƹƨ ơƺƹƤliơƿƾ 
ƺƤ ƢiƤƤƣƽƣƹƿ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿƾ ƞƹƢ ƽƣƨiƺƹƾ iƾ ƻƽƺǁiƢƣƢ ƟǄ ơƣƽƿƞiƹ Ƥƣƞƿǀƽƣƾ ƺƤ dǂiƾƾ lƣƨƞl 
ƿƽƞƢiƿiƺƹ. eƩƣƾƣ ƣlƣƸƣƹƿƾ Ʃƞǁƣ ƢƣǁƣlƺƻƣƢ ƺǁƣƽ ƿƩƣ ơƺǀƽƾƣ ƺƤ dǂiƾƾ lƣƨƞl Ʃiƾ-
ƿƺƽǄ, iƹ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿƣ ƞƹƢ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl lƣǁƣl. eƩƣiƽ ƣƸƣƽƨƣƹơƣ ƞƹƢ 
ƣǁƺlǀƿiƺƹ ƾƩƞll Ɵƣ ƞƢƢƽƣƾƾƣƢ iƹ ƿƩiƾ ơƩƞƻƿƣƽ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƺƹlǄ ƾƻƣơiƤiơ ƞƾƻƣơƿƾ ƺƤ 
dǂiƾƾ lƣƨƞl ƿƽƞƢiƿiƺƹ ƾƩƞll Ɵƣ ƢiƾơǀƾƾƣƢ. 
Fƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƻǀƽƻƺƾƣƾ ƺƤ ƿƩiƾ ƾǀƽǁƣǄ, ƿǂƺ lƞƽƨƣƽ ƻƣƽiƺƢƾ ƾƩƞll Ɵƣ ƞƢƢƽƣƾƾƣƢ. eƩƣ 
Ƥiƽƾƿ ƻƣƽiƺƢ iƹơlǀƢƣƾ ƿƩƣ ƩiƾƿƺƽǄ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƾƺ- ơƞllƣƢ Old Confederacy ƤƽƺƸ ƿƩƣ 
ᇳᇵƿƩ/ᇳᇶƿƩ ơƣƹƿǀƽǄ ƿƺ ᇳᇹᇻᇺ, ǂƩilƣ ƿƩƣ ƾƣơƺƹƢ ƾƿƞƨƣ iƾ ƢƣƤiƹƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƣƸƣƽƨƣƹơƣ 
ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƸƺƢƣƽƹ Swiss constitutional welfare state. Iƹ ǂƩƞƿ Ƥƺllƺǂƾ, iƿ ƾƩƞll Ɵƣ 
ƞƽƨǀƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ lƣƨƞl ƩiƾƿƺƽǄ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ OlƢ CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞơǄ ǂƞƾ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽlǄ ƢƣƤiƹƣƢ 
ƟǄ ƾƿƽƺƹƨ ƿƽƞƢiƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ ƞǀƿƺƹƺƸƺǀƾ ƽǀlƣƸƞkiƹƨ ƟǄ Ƹƣƞƹƾ ƺƤ ơƺǁƣƹƞƹƿƾ ƞƹƢ 
ơǀƾƿƺƸƞƽǄ lƞǂ, ƞlƟƣiƿ ƿƩƞƿ Ƣƣơƽƣƣƾ Ʃƞǁƣ Ɵƣƣƹ ƨƞiƹiƹƨ iƹơƽƣƞƾiƹƨ iƸƻƺƽƿƞƹơƣ 
ƾiƹơƣ ƿƩƣ ᇳᇸƿƩ ơƣƹƿǀƽǄ ᄬII.ᄭ. Iƹ ƞ ƾƣơƺƹƢ ƾƿƣƻ, ƿƩƣ iƸƻƺƽƿƞƹơƣ ƺƤ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƾ 
ƞƹƢ ơƺƢiƤiơƞƿiƺƹƾ ƞƾ ƢƣƤiƹiƹƨ ƣlƣƸƣƹƿƾ ƺƤ lƞǂƸƞkiƹƨ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƸƺƢƣƽƹ dǂiƾƾ 
ƾƿƞƿƣ ƾƩƞll Ɵƣ ƢiƾơǀƾƾƣƢ ᄬIII.ᄭ. eƩƣ ƣƸƣƽƨƣƹơƣ ƺƤ iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞliƿǄ ƞƾ ƻƞƽƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ 
ƿƽƞƢiƿiƺƹ ƺƤ dǂiƾƾ lƣƨƞl ơǀlƿǀƽƣ iƾ ƾǀƟjƣơƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Ƥƺllƺǂiƹƨ ơƩƞƻƿƣƽ. 
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II.  eƩƣ OlƢ CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞơǄ  
(13th/14th CƣƹƿǀƽǄ – ᇳᇹᇻᇺᄭ
ᇳ. Cآء؜بإؔا؜آ, Cآةؘءؔءائ, ؔءؗ C؛ؔإاؘإئ
eƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ǀƾƣƾ iƹƿƣƽ ƞliƞ ƿƩƣ ƿƣƽƸ Schweizerische 
Eidgenossenschaft ƿƺ ƢƣƾơƽiƟƣ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƾƿƞƿƣ ᄬƟƣƾiƢƣƾ ƿƩƣ ǂƺƽƢƾ 
Confédération suisse/Confederazione Svizzera/Confederaziun svizraᄭ. hiƿƩ ƿƩƣ 
elements Eid ᄬƺƞƿƩᄭ ƞƹƢ Genossenschaft ᄬƤƣllƺǂƾƩiƻᄭ, ƿƩiƾ Ƣƣƾơƽiƻƿƺƽ iƾ ƞ ƽƣƸiƹ-
Ƣƣƽ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ lƺƹƨ- lƞƾƿiƹƨ ƿƽƞƢiƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƞǀƿƺƹƺƸƺǀƾ ƺƽƨƞƹiƾƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ 
ƽƣƨiƺƹƾ, ƟƞƾƣƢ ƺƹ Ƹǀƿǀƞl ƺƞƿƩ. diƹơƣ ƞƿ lƣƞƾƿ ƿƩƣ ᇳᇵƿƩ ơƣƹƿǀƽǄ, ƿƩƣƾƣ ƞlliƞƹơƣƾ 
Ʃƞǁƣ ƤƺƽƸƣƢ ƿƩƣ Ɵƞƾiƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ OlƢ dǂiƾƾ CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞơǄ. éƽƺǀƹƢ ᇳᇴᇻᇳ ᄬƞlƿƩƺǀƨƩ 
ƸƞǄƟƣ ƹƺƿ ǀƹƿil ᇳᇵᇲᇻᄭ “all people of the valley community of Uri, the entirety 
of the Schwyz valley and the community of people from the lower Unterwalden 
valley” ƻƽƺƸiƾƣƢ ƿƺ “assist each other by every means possible with every coun-
sel and favour, with persons or goods within their valleys and without, against 
any and all who inflict on them or any among them acts of violence or injustice 
against persons or goods”.ᇵ FƽƺƸ ƿƩƣ ᇳᇷƿƩ ơƣƹƿǀƽǄ ƺƹǂƞƽƢƾ, ƿƩiƾ ơƩƞƽƿƣƽ ƞƹƢ iƿƾ 
ƤƺƽƸǀlƞƣ ǂƺǀlƢ ƟƣơƺƸƣ ƻƞƽƿ ƺƤ ƞ ƩiƾƿƺƽiƺƨƽƞƻƩiơ ƹƞƽƽƞƿiǁƣ ƺƤ ƞ ơƺƹƿiƹǀƺǀƾ 
ƣƤƤƺƽƿƾ ƞƹƢ ƾƿƽǀƨƨlƣ ƺƤ liƟƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ƽƣƾiƾƿƞƹơƣ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ Ƥƺƽƣiƨƹ ƣƹƣƸiƣƾ. 
éƽƺǀƹƢ ƿƩƣ ƾƞƸƣ ƿiƸƣ ƞ ƾiƸilƞƽ Ƹƺƿiǁƣ ƣƸƣƽƨƣƢ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ lƣƨƣƹƢ ƺƤ ƞƹ ƺƞƿƩ, 
ƿƞkƣƹ ƟǄ h؜؟؟؜ؔؠ eؘ؟؟ ƞƹƢ ƺƿƩƣƽƾ ƞƾ ƻƞƽƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣiƽ ƽƣƾiƾƿƞƹơƣ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ Ƥƺƽƣiƨƹ 
ƻƺǂƣƽƾ. eƩiƾ lƣƨƣƹƢ, ǂƩiơƩ Ʃƞƾ ƟƣơƺƸƣ ƤƞƸƺǀƾ ƟǄ iƿƾ liƿƣƽƞƽǄ ƞƢƺƻƿiƺƹ iƹ 
Fإ؜ؘؗإ؜ؖ؛ dؖ؛؜؟؟ؘإ’ƾ ƻlƞǄ “hilliƞƸ eƣll”, ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ơƩƞƽƿƣƽ, ƢiƾơǀƾƾƣƢ Ʃƣƽƣ, 
ƸƣƽƨƣƢ ƾiƹơƣ ƞƽƺǀƹƢ ƿƩƣ lƞƿƣ ᇳᇻƿƩ ơƣƹƿǀƽǄ ƿƺ ƞ ơƺllƣơƿiǁƣ, ƹƞƿiƺƹƞl ƹƞƽƽƞƿiǁƣ 
ƞƟƺǀƿ ƿƩƣ ƤƺǀƹƢƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ƹƞƿiƺƹ. 
ᇵ eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl CƩƞƽƿƣƽ ƺƤ ᇳᇴᇻᇳ, aƽƣƞƸƟlƣ; ƿƩƣ EƹƨliƾƩ ƿƽƞƹƾlƞƿiƺƹ Ƥƺllƺǂƾ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƻƺƾƞl 
ƟǄ ƿƩƣ Bundesbriefmuseum, ƺƹliƹƣ ƞǁƞilƞƟlƣ ƞƿ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/
hBᇻᇷ- DKéDᄭ.
46 Andreas Thier: Legal History
BƺƿƩ ƽƣƨƞƽƢiƹƨ iƿƾ ƿƺƻiơ ƞƹƢ iƿƾ Ɵƞƾiƾ ƺƤ ǁƞliƢiƿǄ ƞƾ ƞƹ ƺƞƿƩ, ƿƞkƣƹ ƟǄ ƞll 
iƿƾ ƞƾƾƺơiƞƿƣƾ, ƿƩiƾ ơƺǁƣƹƞƹƿ ƽƣƻƽƣƾƣƹƿƣƢ ƞ ƿǄƻiơƞl lƣƨƞl ƻƩƣƹƺƸƣƹƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ 
HiƨƩ ƞƹƢ Lƞƿƣƽ MiƢƢlƣ éƨƣƾ. eƩiƾ ƻƩƣƹƺƸƣƹƺƹ ǂƞƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƺƤ ƻǀƟliơ ƻƣƞơƣƾ 
ᄬLandfriedenᄭ: ƿƩƣƾƣ ǂƣƽƣ ƞ kiƹƢ ƺƤ ƾǂƺƽƹ Ƹǀlƿilƞƿƣƽƞl ƞƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿ Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ 
ƞƽƸƾ Ɵƣƞƽiƹƨ ƻƣƽƾƺƹƾ, i.ƣ. ƹƺƟlƣƾ ƺƽ Ƥƽƣƣ ƻƣƞƾƞƹƿƾ ƞƾ ƺƻƻƺƾƣƢ ƿƺ ǁillƣiƹƾ ǂiƿƩ 
ƺƟliƨƞƿiƺƹ ƿƺ ƽƣƹƢƣƽ ƻƣƽƾƺƹƞl ƾƣƽǁiơƣƾ ƺƽ ƿƺ ƻƞǄ Ƣǀƿiƣƾ, ơƞƽƽǄiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƺƟliƨƞƿiƺƹ 
ƿƺ Ƹƞiƹƿƞiƹ ƻƣƞơƣ ƞƹƢ ƣƹƤƺƽơƣ ơƺƸƸƺƹ ƽǀlƣƾ, ƞƾ ƿƩƣǄ ǂƣƽƣ ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩƣƢ ƟǄ 
ƿƩƣƾƣ ƻǀƟliơ ƻƣƞơƣƾ. 
eƩƣ ơƺƹơƣƻƿǀƞl Ɵƞƾiƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣƾƣ ƻǀƟliơ ƻƣƞơƣƾ ǂƞƾ ƿƩƣ iƢƣƞ ƺƤ ơƽƣƞƿiƹƨ ƞƾƾƺ-
ơiƞƿiƺƹƾ ƟƞƾƣƢ ƺƹ ơƺllƣơƿiǁƣ ǁƺǂƾ. eƩiƾ kiƹƢ ƺƤ ƞƾƾƺơiƞƿiƺƹ ǂƞƾ ơƞllƣƢ ƾǂƺƽƹ 
ǀƹiƺƹ ᄬconiuratioᄭ. Iƹ ƞ ƻƣƽiƺƢ lƞơkiƹƨ ƞƹ ƺǁƣƽƞƽơƩiƹƨ ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿƞl ƻƺǂƣƽ, 
ƞƾ ƣƸƟƺƢiƣƢ iƹ ƾƿƞƿƣ ƞƹƢ ƾƿƞƿƣƩƺƺƢ Ƣǀƽiƹƨ cƺƸƞƹ ƞƹƿiƼǀiƿǄ ƞƹƢ ƾiƹơƣ ƿƩƣ 
ƣƞƽlǄ ƸƺƢƣƽƹ ƻƣƽiƺƢ iƹ Eǀƽƺƻƣ, ƿƩƣ ƾǂƺƽƹ ǀƹiƺƹ ǂƞƾ iƹ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽ ƻƽƣƾƣƹƿ iƹ 
ƽƣƨiƺƹƾ ǂiƿƩƺǀƿ ƾƿƽƺƹƨ ƽƺǄƞl ƺƽ ƹƺƟlƣ ƢƺƸiƹiƺƹ,ᇶ ƞƾ ƞ Ɵƞƾiơ Ƹƣƞƹƾ ƺƤ ƾƺơiƞl 
ƞƹƢ Ƹƺƽƣƺǁƣƽ ƻƺliƿiơƞl ƾƣlƤ- ƺƽƨƞƹiƾƞƿiƺƹ, ǂƩiơƩ ƣƹjƺǄƣƢ ƟiƹƢiƹƨ Ƥƺƽơƣ ƟǄ ǁiƽ-
ƿǀƣ ƺƤ ƞǀƿƺƹƺƸƺǀƾlǄ ơƽƣƞƿƣƢ lƣƨƞl ƹƺƽƸƞƿiǁiƿǄ. 
dǂƺƽƹ ǀƹiƺƹ, ƻǀƟliơ ƻƣƞơƣƾ, ƞƹƢ ơƺǁƣƹƞƹƿƾ ǂƣƽƣ ƞlƾƺ kƣǄ iƹƾƿƽǀƸƣƹƿƾ iƹ 
Ƣƣǁƣlƺƻiƹƨ ƤǀƽƿƩƣƽ ơƺƺƽƢiƹƞƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ơƺƺƻƣƽƞƿiƺƹ iƹ ƿƩƣ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ ƺƤ ƿƺƢƞǄ.ᇷ 
eǂƺ liƹƣƾ ƺƤ ƢƣǁƣlƺƻƸƣƹƿ ơƞƹ Ɵƣ ƢiƾƿiƹƨǀiƾƩƣƢ. FiƽƾƿlǄ, ǀƹƢƣƽ ƞ ƹƣƿǂƺƽk ƺƤ 
ƿƽƣƞƿiƣƾ ƢƣǁƣlƺƻƣƢ ǀƻ ǀƹƿil ᇳᇷᇳᇵ, ƞ ơƺƸƻlƣǃ ơƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿƣ ƾƿƽǀơƿǀƽƣ Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ 
ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ᄬƿƩƣƹ ƾƺ- ơƞllƣƢ Orte) and associated cantons (zugewandte Orte) 
ƣƸƣƽƨƣƢ. BǄ ǂƞǄ ƺƤ ƸiliƿƞƽǄ ƣǃƻƞƹƾiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ƞƹƹƣǃƞƿiƺƹ, ƿƩiƾ ƨƽƺǀƻ ƺƤ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ 
ƣƹlƞƽƨƣƢ iƿƾ ƿƣƽƽiƿƺƽǄ ƟǄ ơƺƸƸƺƹ ƢƺƸiƹiƺƹƾ ᄬƾƺ- ơƞllƣƢ gemeine Herrschaften) 
ǂiƿƩƺǀƿ ƞƹǄ kiƹƢ ƺƤ ƸƣƸƟƣƽƾƩiƻ ƾƿƞƿǀƾ. dƣơƺƹƢlǄ, ƾƣǁƣƽƞl ƾƺ- ơƞllƣƢ ơƩƞƽƿƣƽƾ 
(Briefe), ǂƩƺƾƣ ǁƞliƢiƿǄ ǂƞƾ ƟƞƾƣƢ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ iƢƣƞ ƺƤ ƾǂƺƽƹ ǀƹiƺƹ ᄬconiuratio) 
ƞƹƢ ƻǀƟliơ ƻƣƞơƣƾ (Landfriede), ơƺƹƾƺliƢƞƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƺƽƨƞƹiƾƞƿiƺƹƞl ƾƿƽǀơƿǀƽƣƾ 
ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƣƸƣƽƨiƹƨ ơƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞơǄ: ƿƩƣ eƽƣƞƿǄ ƺƹ Clƣƽiơƾ ᇳᇵᇹᇲ ᄬPfaffenbrief )ᇸ Ɵƣƿ-
ǂƣƣƹ kǀƽiơƩ, Lǀǅƣƽƹ, fƽi, dơƩǂǄǅ, fƹƿƣƽǂƞlƢƣƹ, ƞƹƢ kǀƨ ƟƞƹƹƣƢ ƤƣǀƢ ƞƹƢ 
ƿƩǀƾ ǁiƺlƣƹƿ ơƺƹƤliơƿ ƞƹƢ ƣǃơlǀƢƣƢ ƣơơlƣƾiƞƾƿiơƞl jǀƽiƾƢiơƿiƺƹ ƤƽƺƸ ƿƩƣ ƿƣƽƽi-
ƿƺƽǄ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƞƾƾƺơiƞƿƣƢ ƻƞƽƿƹƣƽƾ. Iƹ ƿƩƣƾƣ ƽǀlƣƾ, ƿƩƣ ơƺƹơƣƻƿ ƺƤ jǀƽiƾƢiơƿiƺƹƞl 
ᇶ Fƺƽ ƞ ǁƣƽǄ ƾƩƺƽƿ, Ɵǀƿ ơƺƩƣƽƣƹƿ ƾǀƽǁƣǄ ƾƣƣ Kؔإ؟ fؕ؟, Cƺƽƻƺƽƞƿƣ OƽƢƣƽ, iƹ Bƽill’ƾ 
EƹơǄơlƺƻƣƢiƞ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ MiƢƢlƣ éƨƣƾ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/KᇶJf- NDdNᄭ. 
ᇷ Fƺƽ ƞƹ ƺǀƿliƹƣ ƺƤ ƿƩiƾ ƻƣƽiƺƢ iƹ dǂiƾƾ ƩiƾƿƺƽǄ ƾƣƣ C؟؜ةؘ H. C؛بإؖ؛/cؔءؗآ؟أ؛ C. Hؘؔؗ, 
é Cƺƹơiƾƣ HiƾƿƺƽǄ ƺƤ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, CƞƸƟƽiƢƨƣ ᇴᇲᇳᇵ ᄬᇸƿƩ ƻƽiƹƿiƹƨ ᇴᇲᇳᇹᄭ, ƻƻ. ᇴᇴ; cآؘؚإ 
dؔؕ؟آء؜ؘإ, eƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ, iƹ CƩƽiƾƿƺƻƩƣƽ éllƸƞƹƢ ᄬƣƢ.ᄭ, eƩƣ Nƣǂ CƞƸƟƽiƢƨƣ 
MƣƢiƣǁƞl HiƾƿƺƽǄ, ǁƺl. ᇹ, CƞƸƟƽiƢƨƣ ᇳᇻᇻᇺ, ƻƻ. ᇸᇶᇷ, ƺƹliƹƣ ƞǁƞilƞƟlƣ ƞƿ ǂǂǂ.ơƞƸƟƽiƢƨƣ.
ƺƽƨ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/Cᇹhj- ffGéᄭ.
ᇸ C؛بإؖ؛/Hؘؔؗ, ƻ. ᇵᇳ.
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ƿƣƽƽiƿƺƽiƞl ơlƺƾǀƽƣ ƤƺǀƹƢ ƞ ƿǄƻiơƞl ƹƺƽƸƞƿiǁƣ ơƺƹơƽƣƿiƾƞƿiƺƹ. eƩƣ dƣƸƻƞơƩ 
eƽƣƞƿǄ ƺƤ ᇳᇵᇻᇵ (Sempacherbrief )ᇹ ƟƺƿƩ ơƺƹƤiƽƸƣƢ ƞƹƢ ƞƸƻliƤiƣƢ ƿƩƣ ơƺƸƟiƹƞ-
ƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƻǀƟliơ ƻƣƞơƣ ƞƹƢ ơƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞơǄ. éƾ ƞ ƻƣƞơƣ ƿƽƣƞƿǄ Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ fƽi, dơƩǂǄǅ, 
fƹƿƣƽǂƞlƢƣƹ, Lǀǅƣƽƹ, kǀƽiơƩ, Glƞƽǀƾ, kǀƨ, ƞƹƢ Bƣƽƹ ƞƾ ǂƣll ƞƾ dƺlƺƿƩǀƽƹ, ƿƩiƾ 
ơƩƞƽƿƣƽ ƟƞƹƹƣƢ ǁiƺlƣƹơƣ Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ ƿƩƣ ƾiƨƹƞƿƺƽiƣƾ, ƺƽƢƣƽƣƢ ƻƣƞơƣ Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ 
ƿƩƣƸ Ƣǀƽiƹƨ jƺiƹƿ ƸiliƿƞƽǄ ƺƻƣƽƞƿiƺƹƾ ƞƹƢ ƞlƾƺ ƟƞƹƹƣƢ ƾƺlƺ ƸiliƿƞƽǄ ƞơƿiƺƹƾ 
ƟǄ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl ƞlliƣƾ. EǁƣƹƿǀƞllǄ, ƿƩƣ CƺƸƻƞơƿ ƺƤ dƿƞƹƾ ᇳᇶᇺᇳ (Stanser Verkomnis) 
Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ fƽi, dơƩǂǄǅ, fƹƿƣƽǂƞlƢƣƹ, Lǀǅƣƽƹ, kǀƽiơƩ, Glƞƽǀƾ, kǀƨ, ƞƹƢ Bƣƽƹ, ƞƾ 
ǂƣll ƞƾ FƽƣiƟǀƽƨ ƞƹƢ dƺlƺƿƩǀƽƹ ơƺƹƤiƽƸƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƤƺƽƸƣƽ ơƺƹǁƣƹƿiƺƹƾ.ᇺ Mƺƽƣƺǁƣƽ, 
ƿƩƣ CƺƸƻƞơƿ ƺƤ dƿƞƹƾ ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩƣƢ ƞ ƢǀƿǄ ƿƺ ƻƽƺǁiƢƣ Ƹǀƿǀƞl ƞƾƾiƾƿƞƹơƣ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ 
ƣǃƿƣƽƹƞl ƣƹƣƸiƣƾ ƞƾ ǂƣll ƞƾ ƿƺ ơƺƸƟƞƿ ƽƣǁƺlƿƾ. Iƿ ƞlƾƺ ơƺƸƸiƿƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƞlliƣƾ 
ƿƺ ơƺƸƸƺƹ ǂƞƽƤƞƽƣ. aƞƽƞllƣl ƿƺ ƿƩiƾ ƤƺƽƸƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ơƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿƣ ƾƿƽǀơƿǀƽƣƾ, ƿƩƣ 
Federal Diet (Tagsatzung) ƞƾ ơƣƹƿƽƞl ơƺǀƹơil ƣƸƣƽƨƣƢ ƾiƹơƣ ᇳᇶᇳᇷ ƞƹƢ iƹ ƞ Ƹƺƽƣ 
ơƺƹƾƺliƢƞƿƣƢ ƾƿƽǀơƿǀƽƣ ƾiƹơƣ ᇳᇶᇹᇲ. Iƿ ơƺƺƽƢiƹƞƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ ơƺƸƸƺƹ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿƾ ƺƤ 
ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿƣƾ: iƹ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽ Ƥƺƽƣiƨƹ ƻƺliơǄ Ƹƞƿƿƣƽƾ, Ƽǀƣƾƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ ơƺƸƸƺƹ 
ƣơƺƹƺƸiơ ƻƺliƿiơƾ ƞƹƢ ƻƺliơǄ, ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ jƺiƹƿ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƺƸƸƺƹ 
dominions.ᇻ 
ᇴ. Cبئاآؠؔإج Lؔت, cؘؖآإؗئ آؙ Lؔت, ؔءؗ 
dبؠأابؔإج Mؔءؗؔاؘئ
eƩƣ ƾǂƺƽƹ ǀƹiƺƹ (coniuratio) ƞƾ ƞ ơƺƹơƣƻƿ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƤƺƽƸƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞƾƾƺơiƞƿiƺƹƾ 
ǂƞƾ ƞlƾƺ ƢƺƸiƹƞƹƿ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ Ƹǀƹiơiƻƞl lƣǁƣl.ᇳᇲ Hƣƽƣ, ƿƩƣ lƞǂƾ ƺƤ Ƥƽƣƣ Ƹǀƹiơiƻƞ-
liƿiƣƾ ƞƹƢ ơiƿiƣƾ, ƣƸƣƽƨiƹƨ ƾiƹơƣ ƿƩƣ ᇳᇴƿƩ ơƣƹƿǀƽǄ iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, ǂƣƽƣ ƟƞƾƣƢ iƹ 
ƿƩƣiƽ ǁƞliƢiƿǄ ƺƹ ƞƹ ƺƞƿƩ ƸƞƢƣ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ. eƩƣ kǀƽiơƩ CƩƞƽƿƣƽ ƺƤ ƽǀlƣƾ Ƥƺƽ 
jǀƢƨƣƸƣƹƿ (Richtebrief ) Ƥƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, ǂƩiơƩ ǂƞƾ lƞiƢ ƺǀƿ iƹ ǂƽiƿƿƣƹ ƤƺƽƸ Ƥƺƽ 
ƿƩƣ Ƥiƽƾƿ ƿiƸƣ iƹ ᇳᇵᇲᇶ, ƾƿƞƽƿƾ ƟǄ ƢƣƾơƽiƟiƹƨ iƿƾƣlƤ ƞƾ “book of laws of the citizens 
of Zurich”, ǂƩiơƩ ƿƩƣ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ ƺƤ kǀƽiơƩ “have set up by peace and for the honor 
ᇹ C؛بإؖ؛/Hؘؔؗ, ƻ. ᇵᇵ. 
ᇺ C؛بإؖ؛/Hؘؔؗ, ƻƻ. ᇷᇺ, dؔؕ؟آء؜ؘإ, ƻƻ. ᇸᇸᇴ. 
ᇻ Oƹ ƿƩƣ lƞƿƿƣƽ ƞƾƻƣơƿ ƾƣƣ cؔءؗآ؟أ؛ C. Hؘؔؗ, dƩƞƽƣƢ LƺƽƢƾƩiƻ, éǀƿƩƺƽiƿǄ ƞƹƢ 
éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiƺƹ: eƩƣ Eǃƣƽơiƾƣ ƺƤ DƺƸiƹiƺƹ iƹ ƿƩƣ Gemeine Herrschaften ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ 
CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ, ᇳᇶᇳᇹᅬᇳᇸᇲᇲ, iƹ Cƣƹƿƽƞl Eǀƽƺƻƣƞƹ HiƾƿƺƽǄ, gƺlǀƸƣ ᇵᇲ, Iƾƾǀƣ ᇶ, CƞƸƟƽiƢƨƣ 
ᇳᇻᇻᇹ, ƻƻ. ᇶᇺᇻ, ƞǁƞilƞƟlƣ ƺƹliƹƣ ƞƿ ǂǂǂ.ơƞƸƟƽiƢƨƣ.ƺƽƨ (Ʃƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ᇹᇵᇸf- JHCgᄭ.
ᇳᇲ éƾ ƞ ƾǀƽǁƣǄ ƾƣƣ dؔؕ؟آء؜ؘإ, ƻƻ. ᇸᇷᇸ.
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of the city by themselves”.11 eƩƣ ƽƺƺƿƞƨƣ ƺƤ lƣƨƞl ǁƞliƢiƿǄ iƹ ƿƩƣ iƢƣƞ ƺƤ ƺƞƿƩ 
ƟƣơƞƸƣ ƣǁƣƹ ơlƣƞƽƣƽ iƹ ƞƹƺƿƩƣƽ kǀƽiơƩ Ƹǀƹiơiƻƞl lƞǂ ƺƤ ᇳᇵᇵᇸ, ǂƩiơƩ ƢƣơlƞƽƣƢ 
ƣǁƣƽǄ ƞơƿiƺƹ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ iƿƾƣlƤ ƺƽ ƺƿƩƣƽ ƞƽƿiơlƣƾ ƺƤ Ƹǀƹiơiƻƞl lƞǂ ƿƺ Ɵƣ “perjury”.12
eƩƣƽƣ ǂƣƽƣ, Ʃƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƞlƾƺ ƺƿƩƣƽ lƣƨƞl ƾƺǀƽơƣƾ ƻƽƣƾƣƹƿ. Iƹ ƞ ƾƺơiƣƿǄ ǂiƿƩ ƺƹlǄ 
ƞ liƸiƿƣƢ ƽƞƹƨƣ ƺƤ liƿƣƽƞơǄ ᄬǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ ƣǃơƣƻƿiƺƹ, ƺƤ ơƺǀƽƾƣ, ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƣơơlƣƾiƞƾƿiơƞl 
ơǀlƿǀƽƣ, ǂƩiơƩ ǂƞƾ ƟƞƾiơƞllǄ ƢƣƤiƹƣƢ ƟǄ iƿƾ Ƣƣƣƻ ơƺƸƸiƿƸƣƹƿ ƿƺ liƿƣƽƞơǄ ƞƹƢ 
ƿƣǃƿǀƞliƿǄᄭ, ƹƞƿǀƽƞllǄ ƿƩƣƽƣ ǂƞƾ ƨƽƣƞƿ iƸƻƺƽƿƞƹơƣ ƻlƞơƣƢ ƺƹ ƺƽƞliƿǄ ƞƹƢ ƿƩǀƾ 
ǀƹǂƽiƿƿƣƹ lƞǂ, ƞƾ ƽƣƻƽƣƾƣƹƿƣƢ ƟǄ ơǀƾƿƺƸƞƽǄ lƞǂ. eƩiƾ ƻƩƣƹƺƸƣƹƺƹ ǂƞƾ ƞlƾƺ 
ƻƽƣƾƣƹƿ iƹ ƸƣƢiƣǁƞl dǂiƾƾ lƣƨƞl ơǀlƿǀƽƣ: ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽlǄ iƹ ƽǀƽƞl ƞƽƣƞƾ, ơǀƾƿƺƸƞƽǄ 
lƞǂ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƣƢ ƞƾ ƾǀơƩ ƟƞƾƣƢ ƺƹ lƺƹƨ- ƿƣƽƸ ǀƾƣ ƺƤ ƽǀlƣƾ, ƨƺǁƣƽƹƣƢ ƞƻƻƞƽƣƹƿlǄ 
iƹ ƿƩƣ Ƹƺƾƿ ơƞƾƣƾ ƾƺơiƞl ƞƹƢ ƣơƺƹƺƸiơ ƽƣlƞƿiƺƹƾ. 
eƩƣƽƣ ǂƞƾ, Ʃƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƞƹ iƹơƽƣƞƾiƹƨlǄ ƣƸƣƽƨiƹƨ ƹƣƣƢ ƿƺ ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩ ƿƩƣƾƣ ƽǀlƣƾ 
iƹ ǂƽiƿƿƣƹ ƤƺƽƸ ƾƺ ƞƾ ƿƺ ơƽƣƞƿƣ ƞ Ɵƞƾiƾ Ƥƺƽ ƽƣliƞƟlƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ. CƺƹƾƣƼǀƣƹƿlǄ, 
ƿƩƣ ƾƺ- ơƞllƣƢ “Offnungen” ᄬliƿƣƽƞllǄ: “Ƣiƾơlƺƾǀƽƣ”ᄭ ƣƸƣƽƨƣƢ. Iƹ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ, ƿƩƣǄ 
ơlƞiƸƣƢ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƸƣƽƣlǄ ǂƽiƿƿƣƹ ƽƣơƺƽƢƾ ƺƤ lƺƹƨ ƣǃiƾƿiƹƨ ƹƺƹ- ǂƽiƿƿƣƹ ƽǀlƣƾ, 
ƨƺǁƣƽƹiƹƨ iƹ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽ ƿƩƣ ƽƣlƞƿiƺƹƾ Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ ƻƣƞƾƞƹƿƾ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣiƽ lƺƽƢƾ, Ɵƣƿ-
ǂƣƣƹ Ƥƽƣƣ ƻƣƞƾƞƹƿƾ ᄬǂiƿƩ ƽƣƨƞƽƢ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ǀƾƣ ƺƤ ơƺƸƸƺƹ Ƹǀƹiơiƻƞl ƨƺƺƢƾ, Ƥƺƽ 
ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ ǂƺƺƢƾ, ƸƣƞƢƺǂƾ, ƺƽ lƞkƣƾᄭ, ƞƹƢ Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ lƺƽƢƾ. é ƢƺơǀƸƣƹƿ ơƽƣƞƿƣƢ 
ƞƽƺǀƹƢ ᇳᇵᇲᇲ, Ƥƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, ƽƣƨƞƽƢiƹƨ aƤäƤƣƽƾ éƟƟƣǄ ơlƞiƸƣƢ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƞ liƾƿ ƺƤ “the 
rights and powers of the Lord’s house of Pfaevers, which it has from ancient times 
on all things, over people and goods”.ᇳᇵ Iƹ ƽƣƞliƿǄ, Ʃƺǂƣǁƣƽ, Offnungen ǀƾǀƞllǄ 
11 Oƽiƨiƹƞl: küƽiơƩƣƽ ciơƩƿƣƟƽiƣƤ ᇳᇵᇲᇶ, IƹƿƽƺƢǀơƿiƺƹ, II.ᇴᇳ, iƹ: Dƞƹiƣl Biƿƿƣƽli ᄬƣƢ.ᄭ, Diƣ 
cƣơƩƿƾƼǀƣllƣƹ Ƣƣƾ Kƞƹƿƺƹƾ küƽiơƩ, Nƣǀƣ Fƺlƨƣ, Eƽƾƿƣƽ eƣil, Eƽƾƿƣ cƣiƩƣ, Eƽƾƿƣƽ BƞƹƢ, 
kǀƽiơƩ ᇴᇲᇳᇳ ᄬƺƹliƹƣ ƞǁƞilƞƟlƣ ƞƿ ǂǂǂ.ƾƾƽƼ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ᇸᇺND- ᇸéebᄭ, ƻ. ᇳ: „Hie 
vahet an das buoch der gesetzeden der burger von Zurich … D]ise gesezeden, die an disem 
buoche geschriben sint, hant die burger von Zurich dur vride und dur besserunge der stat ze 
eren und in selben uf gesezet.“
12 Fiƽƾƿ dǂƺƽƹ CƺƸƻƞơƿ, Erster Geschworener Brief ᇳᇸƿƩ JǀlǄ ᇳᇵᇵᇸ, iƹ: hƣƽƹƣƽ dơƩƹǄƢƣƽ ᄬƣƢ.ᄭ, 
bǀƣllƣƹ ǅǀƽ küƽơƩƣƽ kǀƹƤƿƨƣƾơƩiơƩƿƣ, ǁƺl. ᇳ, kǀƽiơƩ ᇳᇻᇵᇸ, ƹ. ᇵ, ƻƻ. ᇺ, ƾƣơƿiƺƹ Ǆ: hƩƺ ǁiƺlƞ-
ƿƣƾ ƿƩƣ ƽǀlƣƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƺƸƻƞơƿ, „der sol meineidig sin und sol sin burgrecht verlorn han und 
sol dar zu Zurich in die stat niemer mere komen“.
ᇳᇵ Oƽiƨiƹƞl: dƞƸƸlǀƹƨ dơƩǂƣiǅƣƽiƾơƩƣƽ cƣơƩƿƾƼǀƣllƣƹ, iIg. éƟƿƣilǀƹƨ: Diƣ cƣơƩƿƾƼǀƣllƣƹ 
Ƣƣƾ Kƞƹƿƺƹƾ dƿ.è Gƞllƣƹ, ᇵrd ƻƞƽƿ: Diƣ LƞƹƢƾơƩƞƤƿƣƹ ǀƹƢ LƞƹƢƾƿäƢƿƣ, ǁƺl. ᇴ: Diƣ 
cƣơƩƿƾƼǀƣllƣƹ Ƣƣƾ dƞƽƨƞƹƾƣƽlƞƹƢƣƾ, ƟǄ diƟǄllƣ MƞlƞƸǀƢ/aƞƾơƞlƣ dǀƿƿƣƽ, Bƞƾƣl ᇴᇲᇳᇵ, ƹƺ. 
ᇺ, ƻƻ. ᇸ, ƺƹliƹƣ ƞǁƞilƞƟlƣ ƞƿ ǂǂǂ.ƾƾƽƼ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ᇸDJJ- bfᇷdᄭ, ƻ. ᇹ: „Dis sint des 
gotzhuses von Pfaevers rehtungen, die es von alter behebt an allen sachen, uber lút und 
úber gu° t“.
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ƽƣƻƽƣƾƣƹƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƾǀlƿ ƺƤ ƹƣƨƺƿiƞƿiƺƹƾ ƞƟƺǀƿ ơlƞiƸƾ, Ƣǀƿiƣƾ, ƞƹƢ ƽiƨƩƿƾ Ɵƣƿ-
ǂƣƣƹ ƞll ƻƞƽƿiơiƻƞƹƿƾ, ƞƹƢ ǂƣƽƣ lƞƽƨƣlǄ ƟƞƾƣƢ ƺƹ ơƺƹƾƣƹƾǀƞl ƞơƿiƺƹ.ᇳᇶ 
CǀƾƿƺƸƞƽǄ lƞǂ ƞƹƢ iƿƾ ƿƽƞƹƾƤƺƽƸƞƿiƺƹ iƹƿƺ ǂƽiƿƿƣƹ lƞǂ ơƺǀlƢ ƞlƾƺ Ɵƣ ƺƟƾƣƽ-
ǁƣƢ iƹ ơiƿiƣƾ ƞƹƢ lƞƽƨƣƽ ƽƣƨiƺƹƾ. Hƣƽƣ, ƿƩƣ ƿƣƽƸ “lƞǂ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơiƿǄ”/ “lƞǂ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ 
lƞƹƢ” ǂƞƾ ǀƾƣƢ, ǂƩiơƩ ƣƾƾƣƹƿiƞllǄ ƽƣƤƣƽƽƣƢ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƾǀƸ ƺƤ ǀƹǂƽiƿƿƣƹ ƺƽ ƺƹlǄ 
ƻƞƽƿiƞllǄ ǂƽiƿƿƣƹ ƽǀlƣƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƨƺǁƣƽƹƣƢ ƿƩƣ ơiƿǄ ƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƨiƺƹ. é ƿǄƻiơƞl ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ 
ƢƣƸƺƹƾƿƽƞƿiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƾƿƽƺƹƨ ƻƽƣƾƣƹơƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹơƣƻƿ ƺƤ ơǀƾƿƺƸƞƽǄ lƞǂ ǂƺǀlƢ 
Ɵƣ ƿƩƣ liƟƣƽƿiƣƾ, ƽiƨƩƿƾ ƞƹƢ ơǀƾƿƺƸƞƽǄ lƞǂƾ ƺƤ gƞǀƢ ᄬLibertez, Franchises et 
CƶƼƺƻƼƴƢƺ … ơƼ)Pƞǀƺ)ơƢ)VƞƼƳơᄭ. eƩƣƾƣ ǂƣƽƣ ơƺƸƻilƣƢ ƟǄ Ƣƣơƽƣƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Bƣƽƹ 
ƢƺƸiƹiƺƹ iƹ ᇳᇷᇹᇹ ƞƹƢ iƹ ᇳᇸᇳᇸ ǂƣƽƣ ƿƽƞƹƾƤƺƽƸƣƢ iƹƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƾƺ- ơƞllƣƢ lƞǂƾ ƞƹƢ 
statutes ᄬLoix et statutsᄭ. eƩiƾ ơƩƞƹƨƣ ƺƤ ƿiƿlƣ ƞlƾƺ iƹƢiơƞƿƣƢ ƞ ƿƽƣƹƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ Ʃiƾ-
ƿƺƽǄ ƺƤ ƾƣơǀlƞƽ dǂiƾƾ lƣƨƞl ƾƺǀƽơƣƾ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƿƽƞƹƾiƿiƺƹ ƤƽƺƸ ƿƩƣ lƞƿƣ ƸiƢƢlƣ ƞƨƣƾ 
ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƣƞƽlǄ ƸƺƢƣƽƹ ƻƣƽiƺƢ: ƿƩƣ iƹơƽƣƞƾiƹƨ iƸƻƺƽƿƞƹơƣ ƺƤ ƾƿƞƿǀƿƺƽǄ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ 
ƣƹƞơƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƾǀƻƣƽiƺƽƾèᅬ ǀƾǀƞllǄ ǀƽƟƞƹ ơƺǀƹơilƾ ƞƹƢ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿƾ. 
“eƩƣ ƾǀƸƻƿǀƞƽǄ lƞǂ” ᄬSittenmandat) ƽƣƻƽƣƾƣƹƿƣƢ ƞ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽlǄ ǂiƢƣ ƾƻƽƣƞƢ 
ƿǄƻƣ ƺƤ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ Ƣǀƽiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ᇳᇸƿƩ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ᇳᇹƿƩ ơƣƹƿǀƽiƣƾ. eƩƣƾƣ ƾǀƸƻƿǀƞƽǄ lƞǂƾ 
ǂƣƽƣ iƹƿƣƹƢƣƢ ƿƺ ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩ ƞ ƟƽƺƞƢ ƽƞƹƨƣ ƺƤ ƣơƺƹƺƸiơ ƞƹƢ iƹ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽ ƾƺơiƞl 
ƽƣƨǀlƞƿiƺƹ, ƽƞƹƨiƹƨ ƤƽƺƸ ƻƽiơƣ- ơƞƻƾ iƹƿƣƹƢƣƢ ƿƺ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿ ƿƩƺƾƣ ƺƹ lƺǂ iƹơƺƸƣ 
ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ ƻƺǁƣƽƿǄ ƿƺ ƿƺƻiơƾ likƣ ƞlơƺƩƺl ơƺƹƾǀƸƻƿiƺƹ Ƣǀƽiƹƨ Ƹƞƽƽiƞƨƣ ƺƽ ƿƩƣ 
Ɵƞƹ ƺƤ lǀǃǀƽǄ ƨƺƺƢƾ. Iƹ lƞǂƾ ƾǀơƩ ƞƾ ƿƩƣ “dƿƞƿǀƿƺƽǄ ƸƞƹƢƞƿƣ ƞƹƢ ƺƽƢƣƽ ƺƤ ƺǀƽ 
ƨƽƞơiƺǀƾ lƺƽƢƾ, ƸƞǄƺƽ ƞƹƢ ƾƸƞll ƞƹƢ ƨƽƞƹƢ ơƺǀƹơil ƺƤ kǀƽiơƩ” ᇳᇸᇷᇲ, ƿƩƣ ƽiƾƣ ƺƤ 
lƣƨiƾlƞƿiǁƣ ƞƹƢ ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿƞl ƻƺǂƣƽ iƹƢiơƞƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƣƸƣƽƨƣƹơƣ ƺƤ ƣƞƽlǄ ƸƺƢƣƽƹ 
ƾƿƞƿƣƩƺƺƢ ǂiƿƩ iƿƾ ǂiƢƣ- ƽƞƹƨiƹƨ ơlƞiƸ ƺƤ ƻƺǂƣƽ. Iƿ ǂƞƾ iƹƿƣƽ ƞliƞ ƿƩiƾ kiƹƢ ƺƤ 
ƢƣǁƣlƺƻƸƣƹƿ ƿƩƞƿ ǂƺǀlƢ ƤiƹƢ ƞ ƾƿƽƣƹƨƿƩƣƹƣƢ ơƺƹƿiƹǀƞƿiƺƹ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƻƣƽiƺƢ Ƥƺl-
lƺǂiƹƨ ƿƩƣ FƽƣƹơƩ cƣǁƺlǀƿiƺƹ.
ᇳᇶ Oƹ ƿƩƣ ǂƩƺlƣ iƾƾǀƣ ƾƣƣ d؜ؠآء eؘبئؖ؛ؘإ, LƺƽƢƾ’ ƽiƨƩƿƾ ƞƹƢ ƻƣƞƾƞƹƿ dƿƺƽiƣƾ: hƽiƿiƹƨ 
ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ FƺƽƸƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ eƽƞƢiƿiƺƹ iƹ ƿƩƣ lƞƿƣƽ MiƢƢlƣ éƨƣƾ, ƿƽƞƹƾlƞƿƣƢ ƟǄ aƩiliƻ Gƽƞơƣ, 
aƩilƞƢƣlƻƩiƞ ᇴᇲᇳᇴ.
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III.  eƩƣ ciƾƣ ƺƤ MƺƢƣƽƹ dǂiƾƾ dƿƞƿƣƩƺƺƢ ƾiƹơƣ ᇳᇹᇻᇺ
ᇳ. Cآءئا؜ابا؜آءؔ؟ Dؘةؘ؟آأؠؘءائ ؜ء Eبإآأؘ
diƹơƣ ƿƩƣ FƽƣƹơƩ cƣǁƺlǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ᇳᇹᇺᇻ, ƿƩƣ iƢƣƞ ƺƤ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞliƾƸèᅬ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹ-
ơƣƻƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƞƾ ᄬǂƽiƿƿƣƹᄭ lƣƨƞl ƺƽƢƣƽ Ƥƺƽ ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿƞl ƞƹƢ ƻƺliƿiơƞl 
ƻƺǂƣƽ, ǂƩiơƩ ǂƞƾ iƹ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƟƣǄƺƹƢ ǀƹilƞƿƣƽƞl Ƣiƾƻƺƾiƿiƺƹ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƨƺǁƣƽƹ-
Ƹƣƹƿ ƺƽ ƞ ƾiƹƨlƣ ƽǀlƣƽèᅬ ƾƻƽƣƞƢ ƿƩƽƺǀƨƩƺǀƿ Eǀƽƺƻƣ. Iƹ ƾƣǁƣƽƞl ƾƿƞƨƣƾèᅬ ƻƞƽ-
ƿiơǀlƞƽlǄ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƞƤƿƣƽƸƞƿƩ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ giƣƹƹƞ ơƺƹƨƽƣƾƾ ᇳᇺᇳᇶ/ᇳᇺᇳᇷ ǂiƿƩ iƿƾ ƨƽƞƹƿ ƺƤ 
ƾƺ- ơƞllƣƢ ƣƾƿƞƿƣ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƾ ᄬLandständische Verfassungen) iƹ ƿƩƣ ƸƣƸƟƣƽ 
ƾƿƞƿƣƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ GƣƽƸƞƹ CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ, ƞƾ ƞ ƽƣƞơƿiƺƹ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ FƽƣƹơƩ ƽƣǁƺlǀƿiƺƹ 
ᇳᇺᇵᇲ, ƞƹƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ ơƺǀƽƾƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƸiƢƢlƣ Eǀƽƺƻƣƞƹ ƽƣǁƺlǀƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ ᇳᇺᇶᇺ/ᇳᇺᇶᇻè ᅬ 
Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƾ ƟƣơƞƸƣ ƿƩƣ lƺƹƨƣƽ ƿƩƣ Ƹƺƽƣ ƞ kƣǄ ƻƞƽƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ iƢƣƹƿiƿǄ ƺƤ ƾƿƞƿƣ-
ƩƺƺƢ iƹ Eǀƽƺƻƣ.ᇳᇷ 
diƹơƣ ƿƺǂƞƽƢƾ ƿƩƣ lƞƿƿƣƽ ƿƩiƽƢ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ᇳᇻƿƩ ơƣƹƿǀƽǄ, ƞƹƺƿƩƣƽ Ƥƣƞƿǀƽƣ ƨƞiƹƣƢ 
iƹơƽƣƞƾiƹƨ iƸƻƺƽƿƞƹơƣ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣ ƺƤ ƾƿƞƿƣƾ ƞƹƢ ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿƾ.ᇳᇸ éƾ ƞ ơƺƹ-
ƾƣƼǀƣƹơƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƾƺơiƞl ƞƹƢ ƣơƺƹƺƸiơ ƿǀƽƸƺil ơƞǀƾƣƢ ƟǄ ƽƞƻiƢlǄ ƾƻƽƣƞƢiƹƨ 
iƹƢǀƾƿƽiƞliƾƞƿiƺƹ, ƾƿƞƿƣƾ Ɵƣƨƞƹ ƿƺ iƹƿƣƽǁƣƹƣ ǂiƿƩ iƹơƽƣƞƾiƹƨ iƹƿƣƹƾiƿǄ iƹƿƺ 
ƣơƺƹƺƸiơ ƞƾ ǂƣll ƞƾ ƾƺơiƞl ƾƿƽǀơƿǀƽƣƾ ƞƹƢ ƺƽƢƣƽƾ. eƩƣƾƣ iƹƿƣƽǁƣƹƿiƺƹƾ ǂƣƽƣ 
ƣƸƟƺƢiƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ ơƽƣƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƾƺơiƞl ƾƣơǀƽiƿǄ ƾǄƾƿƣƸƾ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣiƽ ơƺƾƿ ƞllƺơƞƿiƹƨ 
ᇳᇷ éƾ ƞ ƾǀƽǁƣǄ ƺƹ ƿƩƣƾƣ ƢƣǁƣlƺƻƸƣƹƿƾ iƹ Eǀƽƺƻƣ ƾƣƣ Ƥƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƿƽiƟǀƿiƺƹƾ iƹ KƣllǄ L 
Gƽƺƿkƣ/Mƞƽkǀƾ J aƽǀƿƾơƩ ᄬƣƢƾ.ᄭ, CƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞliƾƸ, LƣƨiƿiƸƞơǄ, ƞƹƢ aƺǂƣƽ: NiƹƣƿƣƣƹƿƩ- 
CƣƹƿǀƽǄ Eǃƻƣƽiƣƹơƣƾ, OǃƤƺƽƢ ᇴᇲᇳᇶ, ƺƹliƹƣ ƞǁƞilƞƟlƣ ƞƿ ǂǂǂ.ƺǃƤƺƽƢƾơƩƺlƞƽƾƩiƻ.ơƺƸ 
ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/Hᇶgb- ecEFᄭ. éƾ ƞƹ ƣǃƣƸƻlƞƽǄ ƞơơƺǀƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣƾƣ ƢƣǁƣlƺƻƸƣƹƿƾ ǂiƿƩ 
ƽƣƤƣƽƣƹơƣ ƿƺ GƣƽƸƞƹǄ ƾƣƣ M؜ؖ؛ؘؔ؟ dاآ؟؟ؘ؜ئ, HiƾƿƺƽǄ ƺƤ aǀƟliơ Lƞǂ iƹ GƣƽƸƞƹǄ, ᇳᇺᇲᇲᅬ
ᇳᇻᇶᇷ, Nƣǂ jƺƽk ᇴᇲᇲᇳ; M؜ؖ؛ؘؔ؟ dاآ؟؟ؘ؜ئ, é HiƾƿƺƽǄ ƺƤ aǀƟliơ Lƞǂ iƹ GƣƽƸƞƹǄ, ᇳᇻᇳᇶᅬᇳᇻᇶᇷ, 
OǃƤƺƽƢ ᇴᇲᇲᇶ.
ᇳᇸ Fƺƽ ƞƹ ƺǁƣƽƞll ƾǀƽǁƣǄ ƾƣƣ Jöإء Lؘآء؛ؔإؗ, eƩƣ ciƾƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ MƺƢƣƽƹ LƣǁiƞƿƩƞƹ: dƿƞƿƣ 
Fǀƹơƿiƺƹƾ ƞƹƢ dƿƞƿƣ Fƣƞƿǀƽƣƾ, iƹ: dƿƣƤƞƹ Bƣƽƨƣƽ ᄬƣƢ.ᄭ, é CƺƸƻƞƹiƺƹ ƿƺ NiƹƣƿƣƣƹƿƩ- 
CƣƹƿǀƽǄ Eǀƽƺƻƣ, OǃƤƺƽƢ ᇴᇲᇲᇸ, ƻƻ.èᇳᇵᇹ, ƺƹliƹƣ ƞǁƞilƞƟlƣ ƞƿ hilƣǄ Oƹliƹƣ LiƟƽƞƽǄ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://
ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/Ggᇹᇺ- gFJᇹᄭ.
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ƸƣơƩƞƹiƾƸƾ.ᇳᇹ diƸilƞƽ ƣƤƤƣơƿƾ ǂƣƽƣ ơƽƣƞƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƞ ƹƣǂ kiƹƢ ƺƤ ƿƞǃ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ, 
ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽlǄ ƿƩƣ iƹơƺƸƣ ƿƞǃƞƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ƹƣǂ ƿǄƻƣƾ ƺƤ ǂƣƞlƿƩ ƿƞǃƞƿiƺƹ. eƩƣƾƣ 
ǂƣƽƣ ƹƺƿ ƺƹlǄ ƞ ƸƣơƩƞƹiƾƸ iƹƿƣƹƢƣƢ ƿƺ ƻƽƺǁiƢƣ ƿƩƣ ƾƿƞƿƣ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣƢ 
Ƥiƹƞƹơiƞl ƽƣƾƺǀƽơƣƾ; ƿƩƣǄ ƞlƾƺ ƤƽƣƼǀƣƹƿlǄ ƤƺllƺǂƣƢ ƻƺliƿiơƞl ƞƨƣƹƢƞƾ ƺƤ ƽƣƢiƾ-
ƿƽiƟǀƿiƹƨ ƹƞƿiƺƹƞl ǂƣƞlƿƩ ƟǄ Ƹƣƞƹƾ ƺƤ ƿƞǃƣƾ.ᇳᇺ éƿ ƿƩƣ ƾƞƸƣ ƿiƸƣ, ƻǀƟliơ ƾƣƽ-
ǁiơƣƾ iƹ ƿƽƞƹƾƻƺƽƿƞƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ƣƹƣƽƨǄ ƣƸƣƽƨƣƢ, ǂƩiơƩ ǂƣƽƣ ƻƽƺǁiƢƣƢ ƟǄ ƾƿƞƿƣƾ 
ƞƹƢ ơiƿiƣƾ ƞƹƢ ƿƩǀƾ ƺƟǁiƺǀƾlǄ ƣƹƩƞƹơƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƽƞƹƨƣ ƺƤ ƻǀƟliơ ƽƣƾƻƺƹƾiƟiliƿiƣƾ. 
eƩiƾ ƣƸƣƽƨiƹƨ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞllǄ- ƺƽƢƣƽƣƢ iƹƿƣƽǁƣƹƿiƺƹiƾƿ ǂƣlƤƞƽƣ ƾƿƞƿƣ 
ƸƞiƹlǄ ǀƾƣƢ ƿǂƺ iƹƾƿƽǀƸƣƹƿƾ ƿƺ iƸƻlƣƸƣƹƿ iƿƾ ƻƺǂƣƽ: lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ ᄬiƹơlǀƢiƹƨ 
ơƺƢiƤiơƞƿiƺƹᄭ ƞƹƢ ƞ ƹƣǂlǄ ƻƽƺƤƣƾƾiƺƹƞliƾƣƢ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiƺƹ ǂiƿƩ ǂiƢƣ- ƽƞƹƨiƹƨ 
ƣƹƤƺƽơƣƸƣƹƿ ƻƺǂƣƽƾ. 
eƩƣƾƣ ƢƣǁƣlƺƻƸƣƹƿƾ ƞƹƢ ƻƩƣƹƺƸƣƹƞ ǂƺǀlƢ ƞlƾƺ ƺơơǀƽ iƹ dǂiƾƾ lƣƨƞl ƞƹƢ ơƺƹ-
ƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ƩiƾƿƺƽǄ ƞƤƿƣƽ ᇳᇹᇻᇺ.ᇳᇻ Giǁƣƹ ƿƩƣ ƾƻƞƿiƞl liƸiƿƞƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ ƿƩiƾ ƿƣǃƿ, iƿ iƾ ƺƹlǄ 
ƻƺƾƾiƟlƣ ƿƺ ƺƤƤƣƽ ƞ ƾƩƺƽƿ ƺǀƿliƹƣ ƺƤ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ’ƾ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ƩiƾƿƺƽǄ ᄬƟƣlƺǂ ᇴ.ᄭ, 
ƞƹƢ ƞƹƺƿƩƣƽ ƾƩƺƽƿ ƺǀƿliƹƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ƩiƾƿƺƽǄ ƺƤ ơƺƢiƤiơƞƿiƺƹ ᄬƟƣlƺǂ ᇵ.ᄭ. 
ᇴ. Cآءئا؜ابا؜آءؔ؟ Dؘةؘ؟آأؠؘءائ ؜ء dت؜احؘإ؟ؔءؗ 
ئ؜ءؘؖ ᇳᇹᇻᇺ
é dǂiƾƾ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ƩiƾƿƺƽǄ ƣǃƻƣƽƿ Ʃƞƾ ƢiƤƤƣƽƣƹƿiƞƿƣƢ Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ ƿƩƽƣƣ ƾƿƞ-
ƨƣƾ ƺƤ ƾƿƞƿƣƩƺƺƢ ƞƹƢ ơƺƹơƣƻƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿ ƹƺƿƞƟlƣ ƾiƹơƣ ᇳᇹᇻᇺ.ᇴᇲ eƩƣ Ƥiƽƾƿ 
ƻƣƽiƺƢ ǂƞƾ ơƩƞƽƞơƿƣƽiƾƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƽǀlƣ ƺƤ lƞǂ ǂiƿƩ ƞ ƾƿƽƺƹƨ ƣƸƻƩƞƾiƾ ƺƹ iƹƢi-
ǁiƢǀƞl ƤƽƣƣƢƺƸ ᄬƟƺǀƽƨƣƺiƾ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ƾƿƞƿƣ; bürgerlicher Rechtsstaat;), 
ƻƣƽơƣiǁƞƟlƣ ǀƹƿil ᇳᇺᇶᇺ/ᇳᇺᇹᇶ. eƩiƾ ǂƞƾ ƤƺllƺǂƣƢ ƟǄ ƞ ƾƿƽƺƹƨ iƹơƽƣƞƾƣ iƹ ƨƺǁƣƽƹ-
Ƹƣƹƿƞl iƹƿƣƽǁƣƹƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ƽiƾƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ iƢƣƞ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƾƺơiƞl ƾƿƞƿƣ ᄬInterventions- 
und Sozialstaatᄭ Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ hƺƽlƢ hƞƽ I ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ lƞƿƿƣƽ ƿƩiƽƢ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ᇴᇲƿƩ ơƣƹƿǀƽǄ. 
diƹơƣ ƿƩƣƹ, ƿƩƣ iƢƣƞ ƺƤ ƻƽƣǁƣƹƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ Ƹƞiƹƿƞiƹiƹƨ ƾƣơǀƽiƿǄ ᄬƻƽƣǁƣƹƿiƺƹ ƾƿƞƿƣ; 
ᇳᇹ éƾ ƞ ƾǀƽǁƣǄ ǂiƿƩ ƽƣƨƞƽƢ ƿƺ GƣƽƸƞƹǄ ƾƣƣ M؜ؖ؛ؘؔ؟ dاآ؟؟ؘ؜ئ, HiƾƿƺƽǄ ƺƤ dƺơiƞl Lƞǂ iƹ 
GƣƽƸƞƹǄ, Bƣƽliƹ/HƣiƢƣlƟƣƽƨ ᇴᇲᇳᇶ, ƺƹliƹƣ ƞǁƞilƞƟlƣ ƞƿ dƻƽiƹƨƣƽ Liƹk ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://liƹk. 
ƾƻƽiƹƨƣƽ.ơƺƸ/Ɵƺƺk/ᇳᇲ.ᇳᇲᇲᇹ%ᇴFᇻᇹᇺ-ᇵ-ᇸᇶᇴ-ᇵᇺᇶᇷᇶ-ᇹᄭ, ƻƻ.èᇴᇻ.
ᇳᇺ dƣƣ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƿƽiƟǀƿiƺƹƾ iƹ: Jƺƾȅ Lǀíƾ CƞƽƢƺƾƺ/aƣƢƽƺ Lƞiƹƾ ᄬƣƢƾ.ᄭ, aƞǄiƹƨ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ LiƟƣƽƞl 
dƿƞƿƣ, eƩƣ ciƾƣ ƺƤ aǀƟliơ Fiƹƞƹơƣ iƹ NiƹƣƿƣƣƹƿƩ- CƣƹƿǀƽǄ Eǀƽƺƻƣ, CƞƸƟƽiƢƨƣ ᇴᇲᇳᇲ, ƺƹliƹƣ 
ƞǁƞilƞƟlƣ ǂǂǂ.ơƞƸƟƽiƢƨƣ.ƺƽƨ <Ʃƿƿƻƾ://Ƣƺi.ƺƽƨ/ᇳᇲ.ᇳᇲᇳᇹ/CBOᇻᇹᇺᇲᇷᇳᇳᇺᇶᇷᇳᇲᇻ>.
ᇳᇻ éƾ ƾǀƽǁƣǄ ƺƹ ƸƺƢƣƽƹ dǂiƾƾ ƩiƾƿƺƽǄ iƹ EƹƨliƾƩ lƞƹƨǀƞƨƣ ƾƣƣ C؛بإؖ؛/Hؘؔؗ, ƻ. ᇳᇲᇶ ǂiƿƩ 
ƤǀƽƿƩƣƽ ƽƣƤƣƽƣƹơƣ.
ᇴᇲ éءؗإؘؔئ K؟ؘج, gƣƽƤƞƾƾǀƹƨƾƨƣƾơƩiơƩƿƣ Ƣƣƽ Nƣǀǅƣiƿ, GƽƺƾƾƟƽiƿƞƹƹiƣƹ, Ƣiƣ fdé, 
FƽƞƹkƽƣiơƩ, DƣǀƿƾơƩlƞƹƢ ǀƹƢ Ƣiƣ dơƩǂƣiǅ, ᇵrd ƣƢiƿiƺƹ, Bƣƽƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇵ, ƻƻ. ᇴᇷᇻ, ƻƻ. ᇶᇴᇸ.
52 Andreas Thier: Legal History
Präventionsstaatᄭ Ʃƞƾ ƨƞiƹƣƢ iƹơƽƣƞƾiƹƨ iƸƻƺƽƿƞƹơƣ. Iƹ Ƥƞơƿ, ƿƩƣ ƢƣǁƣlƺƻƸƣƹƿ 
ƺƤ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ƾƿƞƿƣƩƺƺƢ iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ Ʃƞƾ ơƺƽƽƣƾƻƺƹƢƣƢ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩiƾ ƣǁƺlǀ-
ƿiƺƹƞƽǄ ƾơƩƣƸƣ, ƞƾ ƾƩƞll Ɵƣ ƞƽƨǀƣƢ iƹ ǂƩƞƿ Ƥƺllƺǂƾ, ǂiƿƩ ƞ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽ Ƥƺơǀƾ ƺƹ 
ƿƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ƺƽƢƣƽ.
ƞᄭ Fƺơǀƾiƹƨ ƺƹ IƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl ciƨƩƿƾ: eƩƣ “BüƽƨƣƽliơƩƣ 
Rechtsstaat”
Iƹ ᇳᇹᇻᇺ, ƿƩƣ ƞƨƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ OlƢ CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞơǄ ƣƹƢƣƢ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ iƹǁƞƾiƺƹ ƺƤ FƽƣƹơƩ ƿƽƺ-
ƺƻƾ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ƤƺǀƹƢƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Hƣlǁƣƿiơ cƣƻǀƟliơ.21 eƩƣ ƹƣǂ ƾƿƞƿƣ ƞƢƺƻƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ 
ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl Ƥƣƞƿǀƽƣƾ ƿƩƞƿ ǂƣƽƣ ƿǄƻiơƞl Ƥƺƽ ƾƿƞƿƣƾ ǀƹƢƣƽ FƽƣƹơƩ ƢƺƸiƹƞƹơƣ: 
iƹ ƞ ơƣƹƿƽƞliƾƣƢ ƾƿƞƿƣ ƿƩƣƽƣ ǂƞƾ ƹƺ lƺƹƨƣƽ ƽƺƺƸ Ƥƺƽ ƞǀƿƺƹƺƸƺǀƾ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ. Oƹ 
ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƿƽƞƽǄ, “there is no longer any border between the cantons and subjec-
ted lands nor between one canton and another.” IƹƾƿƣƞƢ ƿƩƣ “unity of the home 
country and of the general public interest” ǂƺǀlƢ ƾǀƟƾƿiƿǀƿƣ ƿƩƣ “weak bond” 
Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ ƢiƤƤƣƽƣƹƿ “pieces”.22 eƩiƾ ƣǃƻƣƽiƸƣƹƿ, Ʃƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƤƞilƣƢ Ƣǀƣ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƩƣƞǁǄ 
ƽƣƾiƾƿƞƹơƣ ƟǄ ƞ lƞƽƨƣ ƻƞƽƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƣƺƻlƣ. eƩƣ ƾǀơơƣƾƾ ƺƤ ƿƩiƾ ƽƣƾiƾƿƞƹơƣ ǂƞƾ 
ƻƽƺǁƣƹ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƾƺ- ơƞllƣƢ Mediation iƹ ᇳᇺᇲᇵ, ǂƩiơƩ ƽƣơƣiǁƣƢ iƿƾ ƹƞƸƣ ƟǄ ǁiƽƿǀƣ 
ƺƤ ƿƩƣ éơƿ ƺƤ MƣƢiƞƿiƺƹ ᄬActe de mediationᄭ, ǂƩiơƩ ƟǄ ƞƹƢ lƞƽƨƣ ƽƣƾƿƺƽƣƢ ƿƩƣ 
ƻƽƣ- ƽƣǁƺlǀƿiƺƹƞƽǄ ơƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿƣ ƾƿƽǀơƿǀƽƣ, ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩiƹƨ ᇳᇻ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ǂiƿƩ ơƺƹƾ-
ƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣiƽ ƺǂƹ. Fƺllƺǂiƹƨ Nؔأآ؟ؘآء’ƾ ƢƣƤƣƞƿ iƹ ᇳᇺᇳᇶ/ᇳᇷ, Ʃƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƿƩƣ 
ƻƺliƿiơƞl ƤƺǀƹƢƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩiƾ ƺƽƢƣƽ Ɵƽƺkƣ ƞǂƞǄ. IƹƾƿƣƞƢ, iƹ ᇳᇺᇳᇷ ƿƩƣ ƾƺ- ơƞllƣƢ 
FƣƢƣƽƞl eƽƣƞƿǄ ᄬBundesvertrag/Pacte fédéral) ơƺƹơƣƻƿǀƞliǅƣƢ ƞƾ ƞ ƿƽƣƞƿǄ ƺƤ 
iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞl ᄬƞƹƢ ƹƺƿ ƢƺƸƣƾƿiơᄭ lƞǂ Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ ᇴᇴ ƾƺǁƣƽƣiƨƹ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ, ǀƹƢƣƽ-
ƾƿƺƺƢ ƞƾ iƹƢƣƻƣƹƢƣƹƿ ƾƿƞƿƣƾ, ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ Ƹƞiƹ ƻǀƽƻƺƾƣ ƺƤ ƾƣơǀƽiƹƨ “their free-
dom, independency and safety” ƞƹƢ Ƹƞiƹƿƞiƹiƹƨ ƻǀƟliơ ƻƣƞơƣ “inside” ƿƩiƾ 
confederation.ᇴᇵ Iƿ ǂƞƾ iƹƢiơƞƿiǁƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƾƿƺƽƞƿiǁƣ iƹƿƣƹƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩiƾ ƿƽƣƞƿǄ ƿƩƞƿ 
21 Mؔإ؞ Lؘإءؘإ, é LƞƟƺƽƞƿƺƽǄ ƺƤ LiƟƣƽƿǄ: eƩƣ eƽƞƹƾƤƺƽƸƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ aƺliƿiơƞl Cǀlƿǀƽƣ iƹ 
cƣƻǀƟliơƞƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, ᇳᇹᇷᇲᅬᇳᇺᇶᇺ, LƣiƢƣƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇴ, ƺƹliƹƣ ƞǁƞilƞƟlƣ ƞƿ Bƽill Oƹliƹƣ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://
ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ᇴJLL- ᇻéEhᄭ.
22 Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Hƣlǁƣƿiơ cƣƻǀƟliơ ƺƤ ᇳᇴ éƻƽil ᇳᇹᇻᇺ, éƽƿiơlƣ ᇳ, ƻƞƽƞƨƽƞƻƩ ᇴ; Oƽiƨiƹƞl: „Es 
giebt keine Grenzen mehr zwischen den Kantonen und den unterworfenen Landen, noch 
zwischen einem Kanton und dem andern. Die Einheit des Vaterlandes und das allgemeine 
Interesse vertritt künftig das schwache Band, welches fremdartige, ungleiche, in keinem 
Verhältnisse stehende, kleinlichen Lokalitäten und einheimischen Vorurtheilen unterwor-
fene Theile zusammenhielt und auf’s Gerathewohl leitete.“
ᇴᇵ Oƽiƨiƹƞl: BǀƹƢƣƾǁƣƽƿƽƞƨ ǅǂiƾơƩƣƹ Ƣƣƹ iiII Cƞƹƿƺƹƣƹ, ᇹƿƩ éǀƨǀƾƿ ᇳᇺᇳᇷ, iƹ: OƤƤiǅiƣllƣ 
dƞƸƸlǀƹƨ Ƣƣƽ Ƣƞƾ dơƩǂƣiǅƣƽiƾơƩƣ dƿƞƞƿƾƽƣơƩƿ ƟƣƿƽƣƤƤƣƹƢƣƹ éơƿƣƹƾƿüơkƣ, Ƣƣƽ iƹ KƽƞƤƿ 
ƟƣƾƿƣƩƣƹƢƣƹ EiƢƨƣƹöƾƾiƾơƩƣƹ BƣƾơƩlüƾƾƣ, gƣƽƺƽƢƹǀƹƨƣƹ ǀƹƢ CƺƹơƺƽƢƞƿƣ, ǀƹƢ Ƣƣƽ 
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ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƻƺliƿiơƾ ǂƣƽƣ ƺƹơƣ ƞƨƞiƹ ơƺƺƽƢiƹƞƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl Diƣƿ ƞƾ ƿƩƣ Ƹƞiƹ 
federal institution. 
éƹƺƿƩƣƽ ơƺƽƽƣƾƻƺƹƢƣƹơƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl eƽƣƞƿǄ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƣ- ƽƣǁƺlǀƿiƺƹƞƽǄ 
ƢǄƹƞƸiơƾ ƺƤ dǂiƾƾ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ƩiƾƿƺƽǄ ƸiƨƩƿ Ɵƣ ƹƺƿƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ Ƥƞơƿ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ 
Ƥƺllƺǂiƹƨ ƢƣơƞƢƣƾ ǂƺǀlƢ Ɵƣ ơƩƞƽƞơƿƣƽiƾƣƢ ƹƺƿ ƟǄ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ƢƣǁƣlƺƻƸƣƹƿƾ 
ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl lƣǁƣl, Ɵǀƿ ǂiƿƩiƹ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ. Hƣƽƣ, ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽlǄ ƤƽƺƸ ᇳᇺᇵᇲ, iƹ ƞ 
ƻƣƽiƺƢ ơƞllƣƢ Regeneration, ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƾ ǂƣƽƣ ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩƣƢ iƹ ƣlƣǁƣƹ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ 
likƣ Bƣƽƹ, eiơiƹƺ, dƿ.èGƞllƣƹ, FƽiƟƺǀƽƨ, ƺƽ kǀƽiơƩ;ᇴᇶ ƿƩƣƾƣ ǂƣƽƣ ƾƩƞƻƣƢ ƟǄ liƟƣ-
ƽƞl ơƺƹơƣƻƿƾ ƾǀơƩ ƞƾ ƿƩƣ ƣǃƻƞƹƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ǁƺƿiƹƨ ƽiƨƩƿƾ, ƿƩƣ ƾƣƻƞƽƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƻƺǂƣƽƾ 
ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣƸƣƹƿ Ƥƺƽ lƣƨƞl ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƾƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿƞl iƹƿƽǀƾiƺƹ iƹƿƺ 
iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl ƽiƨƩƿƾ, ǂƩiơƩ, ƞƿ lƣƞƾƿ iƹ ơƞƾƣƾ likƣ ƿƩƣ dƿƞƿƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ 
CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿƣ Cƞƹƿƺƹ eƩǀƽƨƞǀ (Staatsverfassung für den eidgenössischen Stand 
Thurgau), iƹƿƽƺƢǀơƣƢ “full freedom of work, acquisition, and commerce”.ᇴᇷ
eƩƣ ƸƞiƹlǄ liƟƣƽƞl ƸƺǁƣƸƣƹƿ ƟƣƩiƹƢ ƿƩƣƾƣ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞliƾiƹƨ ƣƤƤƺƽƿƾ Ƹƣƿ, 
Ʃƺǂƣǁƣƽ, iƹơƽƣƞƾiƹƨ ƺƻƻƺƾiƿiƺƹ. eƩƣ Ƥƞilǀƽƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ liƟƣƽƞl ƻƽƺjƣơƿ ƿƺ ƽƣǁiƾƣ ƿƩƣ 
ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƿƽƣƞƿǄ iƹ ᇳᇺᇵᇵ ǂƞƾ ƿƣlliƹƨ iƹ ƿƩiƾ ƽƣƨƞƽƢ. eƩƣ ƽiƾiƹƨ ƿƣƹƾiƺƹƾ Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ 
ƞ ƨƽƺǀƻ ƺƤ liƟƣƽƞllǄ ƢƺƸiƹƞƿƣƢ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ƞƹƢ ƞ ƨƽƺǀƻ ƺƤ Ƹƺƽƣ ơƺƹƾƣƽǁƞƿiǁƣlǄ 
ƾƩƞƻƣƢ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ǂƣƽƣ iƹ ƻƞƽƿ Ƣƽiǁƣƹ ƟǄ ơlƞƾƩiƹƨ ơǀlƿǀƽƣƾ: ƞƹ ǀƽƟƞƹ, Ɵƺǀƽƨƣƺiƾ, 
liƟƣƽƞl ơǀlƿǀƽƣ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƺƹƣ ƾiƢƣ, ƞƹƢ ƞ ƽǀƽƞl, Ƹƺƽƣ ơƺƹƾƣƽǁƞƿiǁƣlǄ- ƾƩƞƻƣƢ ƨƽƺǀƻ 
ƺƤ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƺƿƩƣƽ. eƩƣƾƣ ƿƣƹƾiƺƹƾ ǂƣƽƣ ƺƹlǄ ǂƺƽƾƣƹƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƣǁiƺǀƾlǄ 
lƞƿƣƹƿ Ɵǀƿ ơƺƹƿiƹǀƺǀƾlǄ iƹƿƣƹƾiƤǄiƹƨ ơƺƹƤliơƿ Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ aƽƺƿƣƾƿƞƹƿiƾƸ ƞƹƢ 
CƞƿƩƺliơiƾƸ. éƾ ƞ ơƺƹƾƣƼǀƣƹơƣ, dǂiƾƾ ƻƺliƿiơƾ iƹ ƨƣƹƣƽƞl ƞƹƢ dǂiƾƾ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀ-
ƿiƺƹƞl ƻƺliƿiơƾ iƹ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽ ᄬiƹ ƞ Ƹƞƹƹƣƽ Ƥƺllƺǂiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƾƞƸƣ ƻƞƿƩ ƺƤ Ƣƣǁƣlƺƻ-
Ƹƣƹƿ ƞƾ ƿƩƞƿ iƹ GƣƽƸƞƹǄ ƾƺơiƣƿǄᄭ ƟƣơƞƸƣ ơƺƹƤƣƾƾiƺƹƞliƾƣƢ: ƿƩƣ aƽƺƿƣƾƿƞƹƿ 
ƾiƢƣ ǂƞƾ ƸƞiƹlǄ ᄬƞlƟƣiƿ ƹƺƿ ƣǃơlǀƾiǁƣlǄᄭ liƹkƣƢ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ liƟƣƽƞl ƸƺǁƣƸƣƹƿ, ǂƩilƣ 
ƿƩƣ CƞƿƩƺliơ ƾiƢƣ ƟƣơƞƸƣ iƹơƽƣƞƾiƹƨlǄ ơƺƹƾƣƽǁƞƿiǁƣ. 
eƩƣƾƣ ƿƣƹƾiƺƹƾ ƣǁƣƹƿǀƞllǄ ƣƽǀƻƿƣƢ iƹƿƺ ƞ ƾƩƺƽƿ Ɵǀƿ ƹƣǁƣƽƿƩƣlƣƾƾ ǁiƺlƣƹƿ ơƺƹ-
Ƥliơƿ iƹ ᇳᇺᇶᇹ, ǂƩiơƩ ƣƹƢƣƢ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƤƣƞƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƾƣƽǁƞƿiǁƣ- CƞƿƩƺliơ dƻƣơiƞl 
élliƞƹơƣ ᄬSonderbund).ᇴᇸ é ƽƣƾǀlƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣƾƣ ơƺƹƤƣƾƾiƺƹƞl ƞƹƿƞƨƺƹiƾƸ ǂƞƾ ƿƺ ƞ 
ǅǂiƾơƩƣƹ Ƣƣƽ EiƢƨƣƹƺƾƾƣƹƾơƩƞƤƿ ǀƹƢ Ƣƣƹ ƟƣƹƞơƩƟƞƽƿƣƹ dƿƞƞƿƣƹ ƞƟƨƣƾơƩlƺƾƾƣƹƣƹ Ɵƣƾƺƹ-
Ƣƣƽƣƹ gƣƽƿƽäƨƣ, kǀƽiơƩ ᇳᇺᇴᇲ, ƺƹliƹƣ ƞǁƞilƞƟlƣ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ᇴEMi- eᇷNjᄭ, ƻƻ. ᇵ, ƻ. 
ᇵ: „DƩƢ)XXII)ƺƶƼƽƢƹäƵƢƵ)CƞƵƻƶƵƢ)ơƢƹ)SƠƨƾƢƩǁ … ƽƢƹƢƩƵƩƧƢƵ)ƺƩƠƨ)ơƼƹƠƨ)ơƢƵ)ƧƢƧƢƵƾäƹƻƩƧƢƵ)
Bund zur Behauptung ihrer Freiheit, Unabhängigkeit und Sicherheit gegen alle Angriffe 
fremder Mächte, und zur Handhabung der Ruhe und Ordnung im Innern.“
ᇴᇶ Fƺƽ kǀƽiơƩ ƾƣƣ ƞƾ ƞ ƾƣƸiƹƞl ƞơơƺǀƹƿ Gآإؗآء é. Cإؔ؜ؚ, eƩƣ eƽiǀƸƻƩ ƺƤ LiƟƣƽƞliƾƸ: 
kǀƽiơƩ iƹ ƿƩƣ GƺlƢƣƹ éƨƣ, ᇳᇺᇵᇲᅬᇳᇺᇸᇻ, Nƣǂ jƺƽk ᇳᇻᇺᇺ. 
ᇴᇷ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇴ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dƿƞƿƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿƣ Cƞƹƿƺƹ eƩǀƽƨƞǀ ƺƤ ᇳᇶ éƻƽil ᇳᇺᇵᇳ: 
„Alle Bürger des Cantons genießen volle Arbeits- , Erwerbs- und Handelsfreiheit.“ 
ᇴᇸ Jآؔؖ؛؜ؠ cؘؠؔ؞, é ǁƣƽǄ Ciǁil hƞƽ: eƩƣ dǂiƾƾ dƺƹƢƣƽƟǀƹƢ hƞƽ ƺƤ ᇳᇺᇶᇹ, BƺǀlƢƣƽ ᇳᇻᇻᇵ. 
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ơƣƽƿƞiƹ ƣǃƿƣƹƿ ƞlƾƺ ƽƣƻƽƣƾƣƹƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ᇳᇺᇶᇺ,ᇴᇹ ǂƩiơƩ 
ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ƺƤ fƽi, dơƩǂǄǅ, NiƢǂƞlƢƣƹ, OƟǂƞlƢƣƹ, kǀƨ, gƞlƞiƾ, eiơiƹƺ, ƞƹƢ 
éƻƻƣƹǅƣll éǀƾƾƣƽƽƩƺƢƣƹ ƽƣjƣơƿƣƢ iƹ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ƻƺƻǀlƞƽ ǁƺƿƣƾ Ƣǀƽiƹƨ JǀlǄ ƞƹƢ 
éǀƨǀƾƿ ᄬƣǁƣƹ ƿƩƺǀƨƩ ƿƩƣƾƣ ƽƣjƣơƿiƺƹƾ ǂƺǀlƢ ƹƺƿ Ɵƣƞƽ ƞƹǄ ơƺƹƾƣƼǀƣƹơƣ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ 
ƺǁƣƽƞll ǁƞliƢiƿǄ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƹƣǂ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. NƣǁƣƽƿƩƣlƣƾƾ, ƿƩiƾ ơƺƹƿƣƾƿƣƢ 
ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩƣƢ ƞ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƾƿƞƿƣ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl éƾƾƣƸƟlǄ ᄬơƺƹƾiƾƿiƹƨ 
ƺƤ ƿǂƺ ơƩƞƸƟƣƽƾᄭ, ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺǀƹơil ƞƾ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿ ƞƹƢ ƞ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl 
ơƺǀƽƿ ᄬƞlƿƩƺǀƨƩ iƿ ƢiƢ ƹƺƿ ƞơƿ ƞƾ ƻƣƽƸƞƹƣƹƿ iƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. eƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl lƣƨiƾlƞ-
ƿiǁƣ ƻƺǂƣƽƾ ǂƣƽƣ Ƽǀiƿƣ liƸiƿƣƢ, ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ƾƿill iƹ ơƩƞƽƨƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƽǀlƣƾ 
ƺƹ ơƺƸƸƣƽơƣ, Ƥiƹƞƹơiƞl ƿƽƞƹƾƞơƿiƺƹƾ, ƞƹƢ ƣƢǀơƞƿiƺƹ. eƩƣ lƞƽƨƣlǄ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl 
ƽƣƾƻƺƹƾiƟiliƿǄ ƺƤ ǀƻƩƺlƢiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƽiƨƩƿƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƣƺƻlƣ iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ ǂƞƾ ƞlƾƺ 
ƸiƽƽƺƽƣƢ ƟǄ ƞ ƾƸƞll ơƞƿƞlƺƨǀƣ ƺƤ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl ƽiƨƩƿƾ, ǂƩiơƩ ƻƽiƸƞƽilǄ 
ƨǀƞƽƞƹƿƣƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƣƼǀƞl ƽiƨƩƿƾ ƺƤ ƞll dǂiƾƾ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ iƹ ƞll ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ. eƩƣ ƣǃƻlƞƹƞ-
ƿiƺƹ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ liƸiƿƣƢ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƻƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ ǂƞƾ ƿƩƣ ƻƣƽơƣƻƿiƺƹ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl 
lƣǁƣl ƣƹƾǀƽƣƢ ƾƿƽƺƹƨ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ƻƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ ƺƤ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl ƽiƨƩƿƾ.
Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ ƣǃƻƞƹƾiƺƹ ƺƤ iƹƢǀƾƿƽiƞliƾƞƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ iƹơƽƣƞƾiƹƨ 
ƨƽƺǂƿƩ ƺƤ ƻƽƺƢǀơƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ƣơƺƹƺƸiơ ƿƽƞƹƾƞơƿiƺƹ ƿƩƽƺǀƨƩƺǀƿ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, 
ƣƤƤƺƽƿƾ ƿƺ ƾƿƽƣƹƨƿƩƣƹ ƿƩƣ ơƣƹƿƽƞl ƾƿƞƿƣ ƨƞiƹƣƢ ƿƽƞơƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ƽƣƾǀlƿƣƢ iƹ ƞ 
ƾƺ- ơƞllƣƢ ƿƺƿƞl ƽƣǁiƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ iƹ ᇳᇺᇹᇶ.ᇴᇺ eƩƣ ƹƣǂ ơƺƹƾ-
ƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ǂiƢƣƹƣƢ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl lƣƨiƾlƞƿiǁƣ ƻƺǂƣƽƾ ƞƹƢ, ƞƾ ƞ Ƹƣƞƹƾ ƿƺ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿ iƹƢi-
ǁiƢǀƞlƾ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ ƞ ƾƿƽƺƹƨ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl lƣƨiƾlƞƿƺƽ ƾƿƞƿƣ, ƤƣƢƣƽƞl iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl ƽiƨƩƿƾ likƣ 
ƣơƺƹƺƸiơ ƞƹƢ ƽƣliƨiƺǀƾ ƤƽƣƣƢƺƸ ǂƣƽƣ iƹƿƽƺƢǀơƣƢ, ƻƽƺƿƣơƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƞ ƻƣƽƸƞƹƣƹƿ 
dǂiƾƾ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ǂiƿƩ jǀƽiƾƢiơƿiƺƹ Ƥƺƽ iƹƿƣƽ ƞliƞ ơƞƾƣƾ ơƺƹơƣƽ-
ƹiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ǁiƺlƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ƽiƨƩƿƾ ƺƤ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞlƾ. éƾ ƞ ơƺƹƾƣƼǀƣƹơƣ, 
ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ᇳᇺᇹᇶ ƸƺǁƣƢ ƿƩƣ jǀƽiƾƢiơƿiƺƹƞl ƻƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ƣƹƤƺƽơƣ-
Ƹƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƺƤ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl ƤƽƣƣƢƺƸ Ƣƣ Ƥƞơƿƺ ƤƽƺƸ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl lƣǁƣl. 
NƣǁƣƽƿƩƣlƣƾƾ, ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƾ ƽƣƸƞiƹƣƢ iƹ Ƥƺƽơƣ, Ɵǀƿ ƿƩƣǄ ǂƣƽƣèᅬ 
ƞƾ ƞlƽƣƞƢǄ ƾƿiƻǀlƞƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ᇳᇺᇶᇺ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹèᅬ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣƢ ƿƺ ƽƣƾƻƣơƿ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl 
ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ƽǀlƣƾ. eƩiƾ iƹơlǀƢƣƢ ƞlƾƺ ƿƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƤǀƹƢƞƸƣƹƿƞl ƽiƨƩƿƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ 
ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ, ǂƩiơƩ ǂƣƽƣ ƿƩǀƾ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿƣƢ ƣǁƣƹ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ ƿƩƣ ƽǀlƣƾ ƺƤ ơƞƹ-
tonal constitutional law.
é ƤǀƽƿƩƣƽ iƸƻƺƽƿƞƹƿ ƾƿƣƻ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƣǁƺlǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƾƿƞƿƣƩƺƺƢ ǂƞƾ ƿƩƣ 
iƹƿƽƺƢǀơƿiƺƹ iƹ ᇳᇺᇻᇳ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƺƻǀlƞƽ iƹiƿiƞƿiǁƣ Ƥƺƽ ƽƣǁiƾiƺƹƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl 
ᇴᇹ eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ, dƣƻƿƣƸƟƣƽ ᇳᇴ, ᇳᇺᇶᇺ ǂiƿƩ éƽƿiơlƣ iLI 
ƞƹƢ iLgIII ƞƾ ƞƸƣƹƢƣƢ JƞƹǀƞƽǄ ᇳᇶ, ᇳᇺᇸᇸ, Bƣƽƹ ᇳᇺᇸᇹ, ƺƹliƹƣ ƞǁƞilƞƟlƣ ƞƿ Iƹƿƣƽƹƣƿ éƽơƩiǁƣ 
ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƞƽơƩiǁƣ.ƺƽƨ/Ƣƣƿƞilƾ/ƤƣƢƣƽƞlơƺƹƾƿiƿǀᇲᇲƾǂiƿƨƺƺƨᄭ.
ᇴᇺ éƢƺƻƿƣƢ ƺƹ ᇴᇻƿƩ MƞǄ ᇳᇺᇹᇶ, EƹƨliƾƩ ƿƣǃƿ ƺƹliƹƣ ƞǁƞilƞƟlƣ ƞƿ ǂǂǂ.ƾƣƽǁƞƿ.ǀƹiƟƣ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://
ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/kkDᇸ- éeDhᄭ.
Andreas Thier: Legal History 55
Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ. hiƿƩ ƿƩiƾ ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹ, ƿƩƣ ơƺƹơƣƻƿ ƺƤ Ƣiƽƣơƿ ƢƣƸƺơƽƞơǄ ƟƣơƞƸƣ ƞ 
kƣǄ ƻƞƽƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ƺƽƢƣƽ. éƿ ƿƩiƾ ƻƺiƹƿ, ƿƩƣ iƢƣƞ ƺƤ ƞ dǂiƾƾ 
ƹƞƿiƺƹè ᅬ ǀƹiƿƣƢ ƹƺƿ ƺƹlǄ ƟǄ ƿƽƞƢiƿiƺƹ, ƩiƾƿƺƽǄ, ơƺƸƸƺƹ ƾǄƸƟƺlƾ ƞƹƢ ƾiƨƹƾ, 
Ɵǀƿ ƞlƾƺ ƟǄ ƽǀlƣƾ ƣǃƻƽƣƾƾiƹƨ iƿƾ ơƺƸƸƺƹ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ- ơƽƣƞƿiƹƨ ǂillèᅬ ƽƣơƣiǁƣƢ 
legal force.
Ɵᄭ eƩƣ ᄬdlƺǂᄭ ciƾƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Iƹƿƣƽǁƣƹƿiƺƹiƾƿ dƿƞƿƣ 
FƣƢƣƽƞl ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƻƺǂƣƽƾ ǂƣƽƣ liƸiƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƣƹƢ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ᇳᇻƿƩ ơƣƹƿǀƽǄ, ǂiƿƩ 
ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƿƞƾkƾ ƸƞiƹlǄ Ɵƣiƹƨ ƣǃƣơǀƿƣƢ ƞƿ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl lƣǁƣl. NƣǁƣƽƿƩƣlƣƾƾ, 
ǂiƿƩ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiǁƣ ƞơƿƾ likƣ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl lƞǂ ƞƟƺǀƿ ƸiliƿƞƽǄ iƹƾǀƽƞƹơƣ ᇳᇻᇲᇳ ƞƹƢ 
ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dƺơiƞl Iƹƾǀƽƞƹơƣ OƤƤiơƣ ᄬƾƿƞƽƿiƹƨ iƿƾ 
ƞơƿiǁiƿiƣƾ iƹ ᇳᇻᇳᇵᄭ,ᇴᇻ ƿƩƣ Ƥiƽƾƿ ƣlƣƸƣƹƿƾ ƺƤ iƹƿƣƽǁƣƹƿiƺƹiƾƿ ƾƿƞƿƣƩƺƺƢ Ɵƣƨƞƹ ƿƺ 
ƣƸƣƽƨƣ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl lƣǁƣl ƞƾ ǂƣll. Dǀƽiƹƨ hƺƽlƢ hƞƽ I ƞƹƢ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽlǄ hƺƽlƢ 
hƞƽ II, ƿƩƣƾƣ iƹƿƣƽǁƣƹƿiƺƹiƾƿ ƿƣƹƢƣƹơiƣƾ ƨƞiƹƣƢ iƹơƽƣƞƾiƹƨ ƾƿƽƣƹƨƿƩ, ƨiǁƣƹ 
ƿƩƣ ƣƤƤƺƽƿƾ ƺƤ ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿƾ ƞƹƢ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiƺƹƾ ƿƺ ƞƢƞƻƿ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ƣơƺƹƺƸiơ 
ƺƽƢƣƽ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƸƞƹƢƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƺliƿiơƞl lƞƹƢƾơƞƻƣ. éƹ iƸƻƺƽƿƞƹƿ ƻƽƣơƺƹƢiƿiƺƹ 
Ƥƺƽ ƾǀơƩ ƞơƿiƺƹ ǂƞƾ ƞ ƤǀƹƢƞƸƣƹƿƞl ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ơƩƞƹƨƣ, ǂƩiơƩ ƩƞƢ ƺơơǀƽ-
ƽƣƢ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ Ƥiƽƾƿ ƿiƸƣ iƹ éǀƨǀƾƿ ᇳᇻᇳᇶ: ǀƹƢƣƽ ƿƩƣ iƸƻƽƣƾƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞƹ ƣǃiƾƿƣƹƿiƞl 
ƿƩƽƣƞƿ, ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl éƾƾƣƸƟlǄ ƨƽƞƹƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺǀƹơil ǀƹliƸiƿƣƢ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿǄ 
ƿƺ ƿƞkƣ ƣǁƣƽǄ Ƹƣƞƾǀƽƣ ƿƺ ƾƣơǀƽƣ ƿƩƣ iƹƿƣƨƽiƿǄ ƞƾ ǂƣll ƞƾ ƿƩƣ Ɵƺƽƽƺǂiƹƨ ƻƺǂƣƽ 
ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ƣơƺƹƺƸiơ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿ ƺƤ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ. eƩiƾ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƾƞƿiƺƹ ǂƞƾ ǁƞliƢ ǀƹƿil 
ᇳᇻᇴᇳ, Ɵǀƿ iƹ ᇳᇻᇵᇻ, ǂƩƣƹ hƺƽlƢ hƞƽ II Ɵƽƺkƣ ƺǀƿ, ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl éƾƾƣƸƟlǄ ƨƽƞƹƿƣƢ 
ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺǀƹơil ƞ ƾiƸilƞƽ ƣǃƿƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿǄ ƞƨƞiƹ. eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺǀƹơil 
ǂƺǀlƢ ǀƾƣ ƿƩƣƾƣ ƻƺǂƣƽƾ ƣǃƿƣƹƾiǁƣlǄ iƹ ƿƩƣ Ǆƣƞƽƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƤƺllƺǂƣƢ ƟǄ iƾƾǀiƹƨ 
ƹǀƸƣƽƺǀƾ Ƣƣơƽƣƣƾ ǂiƿƩƺǀƿ Ʃƞǁiƹƨ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƾƞƿiƺƹ iƹ ƣǃiƾƿiƹƨ lƞǂƾ ƺƽ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƾƿi-
ƿǀƿiƺƹ. Eǁƣƹ ƿƩƺǀƨƩ ƿƩiƾ ƾƺ- ơƞllƣƢ ƽƣƨiƸƣ ƺƤ Ƥǀll ƻƺǂƣƽƾ (Vollmachtenregime) 
ƣǃƻƣƽiƣƹơƣƢ Ƥiƣƽơƣ ơƽiƿiơiƾƸ ƞƤƿƣƽ ᇳᇻᇶᇷ, iƿ lƞƾƿƣƢ ǀƹƿil ᇳᇻᇷᇴ. 
Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, Ƣǀƽiƹƨ ƞƹƢ ƞƤƿƣƽ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƹƞiƾƾƞƹơƣ ƺƤ ƻƞƽliƞƸƣƹƿƞƽiƞƹ ƞƹƢ Ƣiƽƣơƿ 
ƢƣƸƺơƽƞƿiơ ƺƽƢƣƽ ƿƩƣ ƿƣƹƢƣƹơǄ ƿƺǂƞƽƢƾ ƾƿƽƺƹƨƣƽ ƣơƺƹƺƸiơ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿiƺƹ ơƺƹƿ-
iƹǀƣƢ: Ƥƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, ƿƩƣ ƞƢƺƻƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƾƺ- ơƞllƣƢ ƞƽƿiơlƣƾ ƺƹ ƣơƺƹƺƸiơ ƺƽƢƣƽ 
ᄬWirtschaftsartikel) iƹ ᇳᇻᇶᇹ, ǂƩiơƩ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƾƣƢ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞơǄ ƿƺ ƿƞkƣ ƞơƿiƺƹ 
ƿƺ iƹơƽƣƞƾƣ ƿƩƣ “welfare of the people” ƞƹƢ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ “economic protection of the 
citizens”. IƤ jǀƾƿiƤiƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ “overall interest” ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞơǄ ǂƞƾ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƾƣƢ 
ᇴᇻ Fƺƽ ƞƹ ƺǁƣƽƞll ƞơơƺǀƹƿ Mؔاا؛؜ؘب Lؘ؜ؠؚإبؘؕإ, dƺliƢƞƽiƿǄ ǂiƿƩƺǀƿ ƿƩƣ dƿƞƿƣ? Bǀƾiƹƣƾƾ 
ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ dƩƞƻiƹƨ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ hƣlƤƞƽƣ dƿƞƿƣ, ᇳᇺᇻᇲᅬᇴᇲᇲᇲ, CƞƸƟƽiƢƨƣ ᇴᇲᇲᇺ/ᇴᇲᇳᇳ.
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ƿƺ iƾƾǀƣ ƽǀlƣƾ “if necessary in divergence from economic freedom”.ᇵᇲ Iƹ ƿƩƣ Ƥƺllƺ-
ǂiƹƨ Ǆƣƞƽƾ, Ʃƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƿƩƣƾƣ ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹƾ ƽƣƸƞiƹƣƢ Ƹƺƽƣ ƻƽƺƸiƾƣ ƿƩƞƹ ƞƹ ƞơƿǀƞl 
ƾƿƞƽƿiƹƨ ƻƺiƹƿ Ƥƺƽ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiǁƣ ƞơƿiƺƹ. Iƹ Ƥƞơƿ, ƿƩƣ ơƺƹơƣƻƿ ƺƤ ƾƣlƤ- ƽƣƨǀlƞƿiƺƹ 
ƽƣƸƞiƹƣƢ ƞƾ ƿƩƣ ƨǀiƢiƹƨ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ lƞǂ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƣơƺƹƺƸiơ ƾǄƾƿƣƸ 
ǀƹƿil ƿƩƣ ᇳᇻᇺᇲƾ. OƹlǄ ƞƤƿƣƽ ƿƩƣ ǂƺƽlƢǂiƢƣ ƣơƺƹƺƸiơ ơƽiƾiƾ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƸiƢƢlƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ 
ᇳᇻᇹᇲƾ ƢiƢ ƿƩƣ iƢƣƞƾ ƺƤ ơƺƹƾǀƸƣƽ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ, ƞƹ ƣƤƤƣơƿiǁƣ ƞƹƿiƿƽǀƾƿ lƞǂ ƞƹƢ ƞ 
ƾƿƽƺƹƨƣƽ ƺǁƣƽƾiƨƩƿ ƺǁƣƽ Ƥiƹƞƹơiƞl Ƹƞƽkƣƿƾ ƨƞiƹ iƹƤlǀƣƹơƣ ƞƹƢ ƟƣơƺƸƣ ƽƣƞliƾƣƢ 
iƹ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ. Mƺƽƣƺǁƣƽ, ƾƺơiƞl ƾƣơǀƽiƿǄ ƟƣơƞƸƣ ƞ ơƺƽƹƣƽƾƿƺƹƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ 
lƣƨƞl ƺƽƢƣƽ ƞƾ ƺƤ ᇳᇻᇶᇹ. eƩiƾ ǂƞƾ Ƣǀƣ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƞƢƺƻƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƺlƢ- ƞƨƣ 
ƞƹƢ ƾǀƽǁiǁƺƽƾ’ iƹƾǀƽƞƹơƣ. eƩiƾ ǂƞƾ ƣǁƣƹ Ƹƺƽƣ ƿƩƣ ơƞƾƣ ƞƤƿƣƽ ƿƩƣ ƣǃƻƞƹƾiƺƹ 
ƺƤ ƸƞƹƢƞƿƺƽǄ ƾƺơiƞl iƹƾǀƽƞƹơƣ ơƺƹƿƽiƟǀƿiƺƹƾ iƹơlǀƢiƹƨ ƸƞƹƢƞƿƺƽǄ ƩƣƞlƿƩ 
iƹƾǀƽƞƹơƣ, iƹƿƽƺƢǀơƣƢ iƹ ᇳᇻᇻᇸ. 
ơᄭ eƺǂƞƽƢƾ ƿƩƣ aƽƣǁƣƹƿiƺƹ dƿƞƿƣ
Iƿ ǂƞƾ ƹƣǁƣƽƿƩƣlƣƾƾ ƿƣlliƹƨ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƽƣlǀơƿƞƹơƣ ƺƤ ƞ ƾƿill ƾƿƽƺƹƨlǄ liƟƣƽƞl- 
ƢƺƸiƹƞƿƣƢ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiǁƣ ƟƺƢǄ ƿƩƞƿ, iƹ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƤiƣlƢ ƺƤ Ƥiƹƞƹơiƞl ƽƣƨǀlƞ-
ƿiƺƹ, ƾƿƽƺƹƨƣƽ ƸƣơƩƞƹiƾƸƾ ƺƤ ƺǁƣƽƾiƨƩƿ ǂƣƽƣ ƺƹlǄ ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩƣƢ iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ 
ƞƤƿƣƽ ƿƩƣ ƞlƸƺƾƿ ƢƣƞƢlǄ ơƺllƞƻƾƣ ƺƤ ƞ Ƹƞjƺƽ dǂiƾƾ Ɵƞƹk iƹ ᇴᇲᇲᇺ Ƣǀƽiƹƨ ƿƩƣ 
ǂƺƽlƢ ǂiƢƣ Ƥiƹƞƹơiƞl ơƽiƾiƾ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƿƩƣ ƹƣǂ lƞǂƾ ƺƹ Ƥiƹƞƹơiƞl ƽƣƨǀlƞƿiƺƹ 
ǂƣƽƣ ƞlƾƺ ƻƽƺƺƤ ƺƤ ƞƹƺƿƩƣƽ, Ƹƺƽƣ ƽƣơƣƹƿ ƢƣǁƣlƺƻƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƽǀlƣƸƞkiƹƨ ƞƹƢ ơƺƹ-
ƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ƣǁƺlǀƿiƺƹ: iƹ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽ, ƿƩƣ ƹƣǂ dǂiƾƾ lƞǂ ƺƹ Ƥiƹƞƹơiƞl ƽƣƨǀlƞƿiƺƹ 
ǂƞƾ Ƣƽiǁƣƹ ƟǄ ơƺƹơƣƽƹƾ ƺǁƣƽ ƻƺƿƣƹƿiƞl ƢƞƸƞƨƣ ƽƣƾǀlƿiƹƨ ƤƽƺƸ ƽiƾkǄ ƞơƿiƺƹƾ 
ƿƞkƣƹ ƟǄ Ƥiƹƞƹơƣ- Ƹƞƽkƣƿ ƞơƿƺƽƾ. eƩiƾ ƻƣƽƾƻƣơƿiǁƣ, ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽlǄ iƹƤlǀƣƹơƣƢ ƟǄ 
ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Ƥǀƿǀƽƣ iƹ ƨƣƹƣƽƞl ƞƹƢ ƽiƾk iƹ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽ, ƸƞƽkƣƢ ƞ ƿƽƞƹ-
ƾiƿiƺƹ ƿƩƞƿ Ʃƞƾ ƾƩƞƻƣƢ ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿƞl ƞƾ ǂƣll ƞƾ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞƹƢ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiǁƣ 
ƞơƿiƺƹ ƾiƹơƣ ƞƽƺǀƹƢ ƿƩƣ lƞƾƿ ƿƩiƽƢ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ᇴᇲƿƩ ơƣƹƿǀƽǄ, ǂiƿƩ ƾƺƸƣ ƢƣǁƣlƺƻƸƣƹƿƾ 
ƣǁƣƹ ƻƣƽơƣiǁƞƟlƣ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƸiƢƢlƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƣƹƿǀƽǄ. eƩƣ “colonisation of the future”ᇵᇳ 
ƟǄ prevention ƣƸƣƽƨƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ᄬƿƩǀƾ ƟƣǄƺƹƢ Ƹƣƽƣ 
ᇵᇲ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇳƟiƾ: “(1) Within the limits of its constitutional powers, the Confederation shall take 
ƴƢƞƺƼƹƢƺ)ƻƶ)ƷƹƶƴƶƻƢ)ƻƨƢ)ƧƢƵƢƹƞƳ)ƾƢƳƣƞƹƢ)ƞƵơ)ƻƨƢ)ƢƠƶƵƶƴƩƠ)ƺƢƠƼƹƩƻǀ)ƶƣ) Ʃƻƺ)ƠƩƻƩǁƢƵƺ. … .) ᄂ3ᄃ)
Where this is justified by general interest, the Confederation is entitled to enact regula-
tions departing, if necessary, from the principle of freedom of trade and industry in order 
to: a) preserve important economic sectors or professions whose existence is threatened 
and to improve the skills of persons exercising an independent activity in those sectors or 
professions”.
ᇵᇳ See éءا؛آءج G؜ؘؗؗءئ, MƺƢƣƽƹiƿǄ ƞƹƢ dƣlƤ- iƢƣƹƿiƿǄ: dƣlƤ ƞƹƢ dƺơiƣƿǄ iƹ ƿƩƣ Lƞƿƣ MƺƢƣƽƹ 
éƨƣ, dƿƞƹƤƺƽƢ ᇳᇻᇻᇳ, ƻ. ᇳᇴᇴ; ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƿƣǃƿ ƺƤ ƿƩiƾ ƿƣƽƸ ƞƹƢ Ʃiƾ iƸƻƺƽƿƞƹơƣ Ƥƺƽ lƣƨƞl ƩiƾƿƺƽǄ 
ƽƣƾƣƞƽơƩ ƾƣƣ éءؗإؘؔئ e؛؜ؘإ, eiƸƣ, Lƞǂ, ƞƹƢ Lƣƨƞl HiƾƿƺƽǄèᅬ dƺƸƣ OƟƾƣƽǁƞƿiƺƹƾ ƞƹƢ 
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iƹƾǀƽƞƹơƣ lƞǂᄭ ƿƩƽƺǀƨƩ Ƹƣƞƾǀƽƣƾ likƣ ƻlƞƹƹiƹƨ. Iƿ ƞlƾƺ ƟƣơƞƸƣ ǁiƾiƟlƣ ǂiƿƩ 
ƿƩƣ ƾƿƞƿƣ ƿƞkiƹƨ ƺǁƣƽ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ ƞƟƺǀƿ ơƣƽƿƞiƹ ƿǄƻƣƾ ƺƤ ƽiƾkƾ likƣ ƿƩƣ ơiƽơǀlƞƿiƺƹ 
ƺƤ ƹƣǂ ƿƣơƩƹƺlƺƨiƣƾ, ƻƩƞƽƸƞơƣǀƿiơƞlƾ, ƺƽ, ƞƾ iƹ ƿƩƣ ơƞƾƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Ƥiƹƞƹơiƞl Ƹƞƽ-
kƣƿƾ, ƿǄƻƣƾ ƺƤ Ƥiƹƞƹơiƞl ƿƽƞƹƾƞơƿiƺƹƾ ƞƹƢ ƿƽƞƢiƹƨ. FƣƢƣƽƞl ƻƺǂƣƽƾ Ƥƺƽ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ 
ƺƹ ƹǀơlƣƞƽ ƻƺǂƣƽ, Ƥƺƽ ƣƹǁiƽƺƹƸƣƹƿƞl ƻƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ, ƺƽ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ ƺƤ ơiƿǄ ƞƹƢ ƽƣƨi-
ƺƹƞl ƻlƞƹƹiƹƨ ǂƣƽƣ ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩƣƢ ƟǄ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ƞƸƣƹƢƸƣƹƿƾ. eƩiƾ Ƣƣǁƣlƺƻ-
Ƹƣƹƿ, ǂƩiơƩ Ʃƞƾ ơƺƹƿiƹǀƣƢ ǀƹƢƣƽ ƿƩƣ ᇳᇻᇻᇻ ƽƣǁiƾƣƢ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ,ᇵᇴ Ʃƞƾ 
iƹ ƻƞƽƿ ƽƣƾǀlƿƣƢ iƹ ƞƹ ƣǃƻƞƹƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ lƞǂ, ƿƩƣ ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩ-
Ƹƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƹƣǂ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl jǀƽiƾƢiơƿiƺƹƞl iƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƾ likƣ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ 
Cƺǀƽƿ ƞƹƢ ƞƹ ƞƟǀƹƢƞƹƿ ƾƣƽiƣƾ ƺƤ ơƩƞƹƨƣƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƽǀlƣƾ iƹ ơƽiƸiƹƞl ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ, 
Ƥƺƽ ƻƺliơƣ ƞơƿiƺƹƾ, ƺƹ ƻƽƣǁƣƹƿiǁƣ ơǀƾƿƺƢǄ, ƺƽ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ iƹƿƣlliƨƣƹơƣ ƾƣƽǁiơƣ.
NƣǁƣƽƿƩƣlƣƾƾ, ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ, ƿƞƾkƣƢ iƹƿƣƽ ƞliƞ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ ƞƻƻliơƞƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ƣǃƣ-
ơǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ Ƹƺƾƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƽǀlƣƾ, Ʃƞǁƣ ƽƣƿƞiƹƣƢ ƞƹ iƸƻƺƽƿ-
ƞƹƿ ƻƺƾiƿiƺƹ ƞƾ ƻƺiƹƿƾ ƺƤ ƽƣƤƣƽƣƹơƣ Ƥƺƽ ƽƣƨiƺƹƞl ơƺllƣơƿiǁƣ iƢƣƹƿiƿiƣƾ. Oƹ ƿƩƣ 
lƣƨiƾlƞƿiǁƣ lƣǁƣl, ƿƩƣƾƣ iƢƣƹƿiƿiƣƾ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽlǄ ƤiƹƢ ƿƩƣiƽ ƣǃƻƽƣƾƾiƺƹ iƹ ƞ ǁiǁiƢ 
ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ơǀlƿǀƽƣ. Iƹ ƿƩiƾ ƽƣƨƞƽƢ, ƿƩƣ ƽiƾƣ ƺƤ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿi-
ƺƹƞliƾƸ ƾiƹơƣ ƿƩƣ Ƥiƽƾƿ ƿƩiƽƢ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ᇳᇻƿƩ ơƣƹƿǀƽǄ iƾ ƾƿill iƸƻƽiƹƿƣƢ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ 
lƣƨƞl ƺƽƢƣƽ ƺƤ ƿƺƢƞǄ. éƹƺƿƩƣƽ ƻƞƽƿ ƺƤ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl lƣƨƞl ơǀlƿǀƽƣ, ƹƞƸƣlǄ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺ-
ƹƞl ơƺƢiƤiơƞƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ, ơƽiƸiƹƞl, ƞƹƢ ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƞl lƞǂ, Ʃƞƾ, Ʃƺǂƣǁƣƽ, Ɵƣƣƹ 
ƽƣƻlƞơƣƢ ƟǄ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ. Bǀƿ ƿƩƣ ƩiƾƿƺƽǄ ƺƤ ơƺƢiƤiơƞƿiƺƹ iƾ ƹƺƿ ƺƹlǄ ƞƹ 
ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƣǁƺlǀƿiƺƹƞƽǄ ƻƞƿƿƣƽƹƾ ƺƤ dǂiƾƾ lƣƨƞl ơǀlƿǀƽƣ iƹ ƻƺƾƿ- ƸƺƢƣƽƹ 
ƿiƸƣƾ. Iƿ ƞlƾƺ ƢƣƸƺƹƾƿƽƞƿƣƾ ƿƩƣ ƾƿƽƺƹƨ iƸƻƞơƿ ƺƤ Ƥƺƽƣiƨƹ lƣƨƞl ơǀlƿǀƽƣ ƺƹ lƣƨƞl 
ƣǁƺlǀƿiƺƹ ǂiƿƩiƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, ƞƾ ǂƣ ƾƩƞll ƣǃƞƸiƹƣ iƹ ƿƩƣ Ƥƺllƺǂiƹƨ ƻƞƽƞƨƽƞƻƩ. 
ᇵ. e؛ؘ c؜ئؘ آؙ Cآؗ؜ؙ؜ؖؔا؜آءئ ؜ء dت؜ئئ Lؘؚؔ؟ 
Cب؟ابإؘ
CƺƢiƤiơƞƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ lƞǂƾ Ʃƞǁƣ ƣƸƣƽƨƣƢ ƞƾ ƞƹ iƹơƽƣƞƾiƹƨlǄ ǁiƿƞl ƻƞƽƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ 
lƣƨƞl ƺƽƢƣƽ. eƩƣ iƢƣƞ ƺƤ ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩiƹƨ ƞ ƾǄƾƿƣƸƞƿiơ ƺƽƢƣƽ Ƥƺƽ ƞ ƢƣƤiƹƣƢ ƞƽƣƞ ƺƤ 
lƞǂ, ƣ. ƨ. ơiǁil lƞǂ, ƿƩƽƺǀƨƩ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ ǂiƿƩ ƣǃơlǀƾiǁƣ ǁƞliƢiƿǄ Ʃƞƾ Ɵƣƣƹ ƻƞƽƿ ƺƤ 
ƿƩƣ Eǀƽƺƻƣƞƹ lƣƨƞl ƿƽƞƢiƿiƺƹ ƞƿ lƣƞƾƿ ƾiƹơƣ ƿƩƣ ƞƨƣ ƺƤ Jǀƾƿiƹiƞƹ I ᄬᇷᇴᇹᅬᇷᇸᇷèéDᄭ 
ƞƹƢ Ʃiƾ CƺƢƣǃ ƺƤ ᇷᇴᇻ/ᇷᇵᇶ. eƩƣ ƩiƾƿƺƽǄ ƺƤ ƸƺƢƣƽƹ ơƺƢiƤiơƞƿiƺƹƾ Ɵƣƨiƹƾ iƹ ƿƩƣ 
ᇳᇺƿƩ ơƣƹƿǀƽǄ ǂiƿƩ lƞǂ Ɵƺƺkƾ likƣ ƿƩƣ Gƣƹƣƽƞl dƿƞƿƣ Lƞǂƾ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ aƽǀƾƾiƞƹ dƿƞƿƣƾ 
CƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹƾ, iƹ: cƣơƩƿƾƨƣƾơƩiơƩƿƣèᅬ Lƣƨƞl HiƾƿƺƽǄ cƨ ᇴᇷ ᄬᇴᇲᇳᇹᄭ, ƻƻ. ᇴᇲ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.
ơơ/eᇺbᇴ- JfHcᄭ, ƻƻ. ᇴᇻ, ᇵᇶ ǂiƿƩ ƤǀƽƿƩƣƽ ƽƣƤƣƽƣƹơƣ. 
ᇵᇴ dƣƣ ƿƩƣ ơƩƞƻƿƣƽ ƺƹ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl Lƞǂ, ƻƻ. ᇳᇵᇺ.
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ᇳᇹᇻᇶ ᄬAllgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten). In Switzerland, 
ƿǂƺ ƾƿƞƨƣƾ ƺƤ ơƺƢiƤiơƞƿiƺƹ ƣƤƤƺƽƿƾ ơƞƹ Ɵƣ ƢiƾƿiƹƨǀiƾƩƣƢ: ƞ ƻƣƽiƺƢ ƺƤ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl 
ơƺƢiƤiơƞƿiƺƹƾ, Ɵƣƨiƹƹiƹƨ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƣƞƽlǄ ᇳᇻƿƩ ơƣƹƿǀƽǄ ᄬƣ. ƨ. CƽiƸiƹƞl ơƺƢƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ 
ƽƣƻǀƟliơ ƞƹƢ ơƞƹƿƺƹ eiơiƹƺ ᇳᇺᇳᇸ [Codice penale della republica e cantone del 
Ticino], Ciǁil Lƞǂ CƺƢƣ iƹ kǀƽiơƩ ᇳᇺᇷᇵᅬᇳᇺᇷᇷ [Privatrechtliches Gesetzbuch], 
ǂƞƾ ƤƺllƺǂƣƢ ƞƾ ƺƤ ᇳᇺᇹᇶ ƟǄ ƞ ƾƣƽiƣƾ ƺƤ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ơƺƢiƤiơƞƿiƺƹƾ iƹơlǀƢiƹƨ ƿƩƣ 
Lƞǂ ƺƤ OƟliƨƞƿiƺƹƾ ᇳᇺᇺᇳ [Obligationenrecht] ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ CƺƢƣ ƺƤ Ciǁil Lƞǂ ᇳᇻᇳᇴ 
[Zivilgesetzbuch], ƺƽ ƿƩƣ CƺƢƣ ƺƤ CƽiƸiƹƞl Lƞǂ ƺƤ ᇳᇻᇵᇹ [Strafgesetzbuch], 
ǂƩiơƩ iƾ iƹ Ƥƺƽơƣ ƾiƹơƣ ᇳᇻᇶᇴᄭ. 
eƩƣƾƣ ơƺƢiƤiơƞƿiƺƹƾ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣiƽ ƩiƾƿƺƽǄ ƽƣǁƣƞl ƞƹƺƿƩƣƽ ƢƣƤiƹiƹƨ ƣlƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ 
dǂiƾƾ lƣƨƞl ơǀlƿǀƽƣ ǂƩiơƩ Ʃƞƾ ƽƣơƣƹƿlǄ ƟƣơƺƸƣ ƣǁƣƹ Ƹƺƽƣ iƸƻƺƽƿƞƹƿ. eƩiƾ iƾ 
ƿƩƞƿ lƣƨiƾlƞƿƺƽƾ iƹ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ƞƹƢ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl lƣǁƣl ƤƽƣƼǀƣƹƿlǄ ƞƢƺƻƿƣƢ ơƺƹ-
ơƣƻƿƾ ƞƹƢ ƾƿƽǀơƿǀƽƣƾ ƺƤ ƽǀlƣƾ ƤƽƺƸ ƺƿƩƣƽ, Ƥƺƽƣiƨƹ ƿƽƞƢiƿiƺƹƾ. Iƹ ƨƣƹƣƽƞl, ƿƩƽƣƣ 
lƞǄƣƽƾ ƺƤ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ ǂiƿƩ Ƥƺƽƣiƨƹ ƻƽƺǁƣƹƞƹơƣ ǂƺǀlƢ iƹƤlǀƣƹơƣ dǂiƾƾ ơƺƢiƤiơƞ-
ƿiƺƹƾ iƹ ƿƩƣ ᇳᇻƿƩ ƞƹƢ ᇴᇲƿƩ ơƣƹƿǀƽiƣƾ. Iƹ ƿƩƣ ᇳᇻƿƩ ơƣƹƿǀƽǄ, iƿ ǂƞƾ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽlǄ ƿƩƣ 
GƣƽƸƞƹ Hiƾƿƺƽiơƞl dơƩƺƺl ƺƤ cƺƸƞƹ lƞǂ, ƞƾ ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩƣƢ ƟǄ Fإ؜ؘؗإ؜ؖ؛ Cؔإ؟ آؙ 
dؔة؜ؚءج ᄬᇳᇹᇹᇻᅬᇳᇺᇸᇳᄭ ƞƹƢ ƿƽƞƹƾƤƣƽƽƣƢ ƞƿ Ƥiƽƾƿ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ GƣƽƸƞƹ ƾƻƣƞkiƹƨ ƞơƞƢƣƸiơ 
Ƣiƾơƺǀƽƾƣ ƟǄ dؔة؜ؚءج’s Swiss master student Fإ؜ؘؗإ؜ؖ؛ Lبؗت؜ؚ آؙ Kؘ؟؟ؘإ 
ᄬᇳᇹᇻᇻᅬᇳᇺᇸᇲᄭ, ǂƩƺƾƣ Ƣƺơƿƽiƹƣƾ iƹƤlǀƣƹơƣƢ ƹƺƿ ƺƹlǄ ƿƩƣ ơƺƢiƤiơƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ lƞǂ, Ɵǀƿ 
ƞlƾƺ ƞơƞƢƣƸiơ ƣƢǀơƞƿiƺƹ iƹ lƞǂ. FǀƹƢƞƸƣƹƿƞllǄ, dؔة؜ؚءج, Kؘ؟؟ؘإ, ƞƹƢ ƺƿƩƣƽ 
ƸƣƸƟƣƽƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Hiƾƿƺƽiơƞl dơƩƺƺl ƺƤ cƺƸƞƹ lƞǂ ƞƽƨǀƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ cƺƸƞƹ lƞǂ ƿƣǃƿƾ 
ƞƹƢ Ƣƺơƿƽiƹƣƾ ƤƺƽƸƣƢ ƞ ƻƺiƹƿ ƺƤ ƽƣƤƣƽƣƹơƣ Ƥƺƽ lƣƨƞl iƢƣƞƾ ƞƹƢ ƽƣƤlƣơƿiƺƹ ƞƟƺǀƿ 
ƿƩƣ iƢƣƞl ƾƿƽǀơƿǀƽƣ ƺƤ lƞǂ. aƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽlǄ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ ƺƤ ƺƟliƨƞƿiƺƹƾ ƞƹƢ lƞƽƨƣ ƾƣơ-
ƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ƻƽƺƻƣƽƿǄ lƞǂ ƤƺllƺǂƣƢ ƿƩƣ liƹƣƾ ƺƤ cƺƸƞƹ lƞǂ ᄬlikƣ ƿƩƣ ƞƤƺ-
ƽƣƸƣƹƿiƺƹƣƢ Ciǁil ơƺƢƣ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ kǀƽiơƩ [Privatrechliche Gesetzbuch 
für den Kanton Zürich] ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ơƺƢiƤiơƞƿiƺƹƾ Ƣƽƞǂiƹƨ ƤƽƺƸ iƿ [ƿƩƣ ƾƺ- ơƞllƣƢ 
kǀƽiơƩ ƨƽƺǀƻ], ƞƾ ǂƣll ƞƾ ƿƩƣ Lƞǂ ƺƤ OƟliƨƞƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ ᇳᇺᇺᇳ [Obligationenrecht]). 
Iƿ ǂƞƾ ƞlƾƺ ƿƣlliƹƨ ƿƩƞƿ ơƺƢiƤiơƞƿiƺƹƾ likƣ ƿƩƣ Zivilgesetzbuch ᇳᇻᇳᇴ ƤƺllƺǂƣƢ iƹ 
ƺǁƣƽƞll ƾƿƽǀơƿǀƽƣ ƿƩƣ ƾơƩƣƸƣ iƹ ƿƩƣ Iƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƣƾ ƺƤ Gƞiǀƾ ᄬƻƣƽƾƺƹ, ƿƩiƹƨƾ, 
actions; personae, res, actiones) ǂiƿƩ iƿƾ ƾƣƼǀƣƹƿiƞl ƞƽƽƞƹƨƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ ƺƤ 
ƻƣƽƾƺƹƾ, ƤƞƸilǄ, ƾǀơơƣƾƾiƺƹ, ƞƹƢ ƻƽƺƻƣƽƿǄ. eƩƣ iƸƻƞơƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ éǀƾƿƽiƞƹ Gƣƹƣƽƞl 
Ciǁil CƺƢƣ ƺƤ ᇳᇺᇳᇳ (Allgemeines BüƽƨƣƽliơƩƣs Gesetzbuch) ǂƞƾ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽlǄ 
ƾƿƽƺƹƨ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƾƺ- ơƞllƣƢ Bƣƽƹ ƨƽƺǀƻ, ǂƩiơƩ ǂƞƾ ƢƺƸiƹƞƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ Ciǁil CƺƢƣ ƺƤ 
ơiƿǄ ƞƹƢ ƽƣƻǀƟliơ ƺƤ Bƣƽƹ ᇳᇺᇴᇷᅬᇳᇺᇵᇳ (Civil- Gesetzbuch für die Stadt und Republik 
Bern). eƩƣ FƽƣƹơƩ Ciǁil CƺƢƣ ƺƤ ᇳᇺᇲᇶ (Code civile) ƞlƾƺ ƩƞƢ ƞ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽlǄ ƾƿƽƺƹƨ 
iƸƻƞơƿ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ hƣƾƿƣƽƹ dǂiƾƾ ƽƣƨiƺƹƾ ƞƾ ǂƣll ƞƾ iƹ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ eiơiƹƺ, ǂƩƣƽƣ 
lƣƨiƾlƞƿƺƽƾ ƞƢƺƻƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ Nƞƻƺlƣƺƹiơ lƞǂ Ɵƺƺk ᄬƞlƟƣiƿ ǀƾǀƞllǄ ǂiƿƩ ơƩƞƹƨƣƾ ƞƹƢ 
ƞƢjǀƾƿƸƣƹƿƾ ƿƺ ƽƣƤlƣơƿ ƿƩƣiƽ ƺǂƹ ƾƻƣơiƤiơ ƹƣƣƢƾᄭ ƞƾ iƿ ǂƞƾ Ƣƺƹƣ Ƥƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ 
Andreas Thier: Legal History 59
iƹ FƽiƟƺǀƽƨ ᇳᇺᇵᇶᅬᇳᇺᇷᇲ. diƸilƞƽ ƢƣǁƣlƺƻƸƣƹƿƾ ƺơơǀƽƽƣƢ iƹ ơƽiƸiƹƞl lƞǂ; Ƥƺƽ 
iƹƾƿƞƹơƣ, ƿƩƣ ƞƢƺƻƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ FƽƣƹơƩ CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣ ᇳᇺᇳᇲ (Code penal) in 
hƣƾƿƣƽƹ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ƞƾ ǂƣll ƞƾ iƹ Bƣƽƹ ƺƽ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ iƸƻƞơƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ GƣƽƸƞƹ CƽiƸiƹƞl 
CƺƢƣ ᇳᇺᇹᇳ (Strafgesetzbuch) ƺƹ ƿƩƣ Eƞƾƿƣƽƹ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ likƣ kǀƽiơƩ ƞƹƢ Bƞƾƣl. 
eƩƣƾƣ ƻƩƣƹƺƸƣƹƞ ƽƣǁƣƞl ƿƩƣ ƣǁƺlǀƿiƺƹƞƽǄ ƢǄƹƞƸiơƾ ƺƤ dǂiƾƾ lƣƨƞl ơǀlƿǀƽƣ 
ƾiƹơƣ ƿƩƣ lƞƿƣ ᇳᇺƿƩ ơƣƹƿǀƽǄ. diƹơƣ ƿƩƞƿ ƿiƸƣ, lƞǂǄƣƽƾ, jǀƢƨƣƾ, ƞƹƢ lƣƨiƾlƞƿƺƽƾ 
Ʃƞǁƣ iƹ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƞlǂƞǄƾ Ɵƣƣƹ ƺƻƣƹ ƿƺ ǀƾiƹƨ Ƥƺƽƣiƨƹ lƣƨƞl ơƺƹơƣƻƿƾ ƞƾ ƽƣƤƣ-
ƽƣƹơƣ ƻƺiƹƿ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣiƽ ƺǂƹ ƞƻƻƽƺƞơƩ. CƺƹƾƣƼǀƣƹƿlǄ, dǂiƾƾ lƣƨƞl ơǀlƿǀƽƣ ƞƾ ƞ 
ǂƩƺlƣ Ʃƞƾ ƹƣǁƣƽ Ɵƣƣƹ ƢƣƻƣƹƢƣƹƿ ƺƹ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl Ƥƺƽƣiƨƹ lƣƨƞl ƺƽƢƣƽƾ, Ɵǀƿ iƿ Ʃƞƾ 
ƞlǂƞǄƾ Ɵƣƣƹ ƾƩƞƻƣƢ ƟǄ ƞ ƸǀlƿiƻliơiƿǄ ƺƤ Ƥƺƽƣiƨƹ iƹƤlǀƣƹơƣƾ. Iƹ ƿƩiƾ ƽƣƨƞƽƢ, ƿƩƣ 
ƞƤƺƽƣƸƣƹƿiƺƹƣƢ dǂiƾƾ ơǀlƿǀƽƞl ƢiǁƣƽƾiƿǄ ơƺƽƽƣƾƻƺƹƢƾ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ ƻlǀƽƞliƿǄ ƺƤ Ƥƺƽ-
ƣiƨƹ iƹƤlǀƣƹơƣ, ǂƩiơƩ Ʃƞƾ ƾƩƞƻƣƢ ƞƹƢ ơƺƹƿiƹǀƣƾ ƿƺ ƾƩƞƻƣ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ lƣƨƞl ƺƽƢƣƽ 
ƺƤ ƿƺƢƞǄ.
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I. IƹƿƽƺƢǀơƿiƺƹ
The aim of this chapter is to give an overview about the peculiarities of 
Switzerland in the history of international law, looking into the origin of what 
nowadays Switzerland represents within the international community.
Switzerland is one of the most prominent states in terms of the hosting of 
international organisations and NGOs. The international community values 
Switzerland’s role as a mediator, due to its long- standing international policy 
of neutrality: Within the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 Switzerland’s inde-
pendence was recognized by the European powers. Furthermore, after the 
Napoleonic wars both at the Congress of Vienna in 1814/1815 and within the 
Treaty of Paris (20 November 1815), the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland 
was formally recognized by the international community. Switzerland also 
enjoys positive international reputation, stemming from its humanitarian 
engagements which began to take root in the 19th century. But what are the 
historical legal foundations that have shaped Switzerland’s role?
The following sections will examine two prominent developments in 
Switzerland’s history of international law between the 18th and 20th century. 
The first development to be discussed is the dissemination of the theories 
of natural law and the law of nations during the 18th century in the French- 
speaking part of Switzerland (II.1.). The ideas of Eؠؘإ ؘؗ gؔااؘ؟ are key here: 
he made an essential contribution to the evolution of modern international 
law (II.2.) The second development examines the emergence of international 
humanitarian law that took place in Switzerland in the 19th century which led 
to the preeminent role of Switzerland in this field of law. First, the creation 
of the International Committee of the Red Cross by, among others, Hؘءإج 
Dبءؔءا will be discussed (III.1.). Furthermore, the efforts of Zurich- born 
lawyer Jآ؛ؔءء Cؔئأؔإ B؟بءائؖ؛؟؜ in his attempts to codify international 
law and his contributions to the founding of the International Law Institut 
(Institut de droit International) together with Gبئاؔةؘ Mآجء؜ؘإ will be 
addressed (III.2.). 
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II.  eƩƣƺƽiƣƾ ƺƤ Nƞƿǀƽƞl Lƞǂ ƞƹƢ 
Law of Nations
ᇳ. e؛ؘ dأإؘؔؗ آؙ e؛ؘآإ؜ؘئ آؙ Nؔابإؔ؟ Lؔت ؔءؗ 
ا؛ؘ Lؔت آؙ Nؔا؜آءئ 
At the beginning of the 18th century, the so- called Romandy School of Natural 
Law (Ecole romande du droit naturel) was established in the French- speaking 
part of Switzerland and achieved great influence mainly in Europe during 
the 18th and 19th centuries. It can be perceived as a mediation between the 
German natural law theories (represented, among others, by dؔؠبؘ؟ 
aبؘؙءؗآإ ,ؙ C؛إ؜ئا؜ؔء e؛آؠؔئ؜بئ, and C؛إ؜ئا؜ؔء hآ؟ؙؙ) and the 
French ones symbolised, most prominently, by the works of Mآءاؘئؤب؜ؘب, 
cآبئئؘؔب, and gآ؟اؔ؜إؘ. Geneva, Lausanne, Neuchâtel, and Yverdon were 
the main knowledge centres in which natural law and law of nations theo-
ries circulated. The most important contributors included jurists and philo-
sophers, such as Jؘؔء Bؔإؘؕجإؔؖ (1674–1744), Jؘؔء- Jؔؖؤبؘئ Bبإ؟ؔؠؔؤب؜ 
(1694–1748), Fآإابءؔاآ Bؔإاآ؟آؠؘآ ؘؗ Fؘ؟؜ؘؖ (1723–1789), and Eؠؘإ ؘؗ 
gؔااؘ؟ (1714–1767).
Although there was not an explicit “school” within the natural law 
movement, with the term “école” historians refer to the common features 
shared by those authors who, during their careers as professors and editors, 
played a key role in the spread of natural law theories. These scholars had a 
strong predisposition for Enlightenment ideas within a specific geographical 
context, that is, in Switzerland and particularly in the French- speaking part 
of Switzerland.
The Huguenot1 and French citizen Jؘؔء Bؔإؘؕجإؔؖ was already a well- 
established natural law scholar by the time he arrived in Lausanne in 1711: 
1 A Huguenot was “A French Protestant of the 16th and 17th centuries. Largely Calvinist, 
the Huguenots suffered severe persecution at the hands of the Catholic majority, and 
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he was renowned throughout Europe due to his widely annotated French 
translations of dؔؠبؘ؟ aبؘؙءؗآإؙ’s major works on natural law “The Law 
of Nature and Nations” (“Le droit de la nature et des gens”), 1706, and “On 
ƿƩƣ DǀƿǄ ƺƤ Mƞƹ ƞƹƢ Ciƿiǅƣƹ” ᄬ“Dƣƾ Ƣƣǁƺiƽƾ Ƣƣ l’ƩƺƸƸƣ ƣƿ Ƣǀ ơiƿƺǄƣƹ”ᄭ, 1707.2 
Later, after he’d arrived and started working in Lausanne, Bؔإؘؕجإؔؖ also 
translated the writings of c؜ؖ؛ؔإؗ Cبؠؘؕإ؟ؔءؗ and of Hبؚآ Gإآا؜بئ’ 
“The Rights of War and Peace”, the latter translation being published as “Le 
droit de la guerre et de la paix” in 1724.3 Jؘؔء- Jؔؖؤبؘئ Bبإ؟ؔؠؔؤب؜ taught 
natural law in Geneva, using Barbeyrac’s French translation of aبؘؙءؗآإؙ’s 
“Oƹ ƿƩƣ DǀƿǄ ƺƤ Mƞƹ ƞƹƢ Ciƿiǅƣƹ”. Hƣ ƻǀƟliƾƩƣƢ Ʃiƾ Ƹƞƹǀƞl ƺƹ ƹƞƿǀƽƞl lƞǂ 
under the name “Principles of Natural Law” (“Principes du droit naturel”), 
1747. The “Principles of Political Rights” (“Principes du droit politique”), 1751, 
were posthumously edited by Bبإ؟ؔؠؔؤب؜’s friends on the basis of his notes. 
Bبإ؟ؔؠؔؤب؜’s notebooks (cahiers) provided the basis for some other scho-
lars to publish pieces which expanded on his natural law theory. Among 
them was Fآإابءؔاآ Bؔإاآ؟آؠؘآ ؘؗ Fؘ؟؜ؘؖ (1723–1789), a former Catholic 
priest and professor in Rome and Naples who fled to Bern in 1757, converted to 
Protestantism then became a major cultural mediator and publisher. In 1762, 
he settled in Yverdon where he founded a publishing house and directed the 
creation of the so- called Yverdon Encyclopedia (Encyclopédie d’Yverdon), a 
Protestant adaptation of the Paris Encyclopedia (Paris Encyclopédie).4 Among 
many other works, ؘؗ Fؘ؟؜ؘؖ published a new edition of Bبإ؟ؔؠؔؤب؜’s natu-
ral law courses “The Principles of Natural Law and the Law of Nations” (“Les 
principes du droit de la nature et des gens”) in eight volumes between 1766 and 
1768. Within this new edition, ؗ ؘ Fؘ؟؜ؘؖ incorporated some of Bبإ؟ؔؠؔؤب؜’s 
many thousands emigrated from France” (Source: Oxford Dictionary, https://perma.cc/
Z6YD- DDGH). 
2 dؔؠبؘ؟ aبؘؙءؗآإؙ (1632–1694) was a German jurist, political philosopher, and histo-
rian who was renowned for his works on natural law and law of nations. He held the first 
European chair in natural law and law of nations in Heilderberg in 1661. Barbeyrac trans-
lƞƿƣƢ aǀƤƣƹƢƺƽƤƾ Ƹƺƾƿ iƹƤlǀƣƹƿiƞl ǂƺƽkƾ “Oƹ ƿƩƣ DǀƿǄ ƺƤ Mƞƹ ƞƹƢ Ciƿiǅƣƹ” ᄬDƣ ƺƤƤiơiƺ 
hominis et civis), 1673, and “The Law of Nature and Nations- 8th book” (De iure naturae et 
gentium- libri octo), 1672.
3 Mؘإ؜ aä؜ةäإ؜ءءؘ, Translating Grotius’s De jure belli ac pacis: Courtin vs Barbeyrac, in 
Translation Studies Volume 5, Issue 1, 2012, pp. 33. 
4 Encyclopaedia, or a Systematic Dictionary of the Sciences, Arts, and Crafts (Encyclopédie 
ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, par une Société de Gens de 
lettres). It was published in France, between 1751 and 1772, under the direction of Dؘء؜ئ 
D؜ؘؗإآا and Jؘؔء ؟ؘ cآءؗ ؗ’é؟ؘؠؘؕإا.
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unpublished thoughts, gathered from the latter’s notebooks on natural law. 
Dؘ Fؘ؟؜ؘؖ also included his own comments in these publications.
ᇴ. Eؠؘإ ؘؗ gؔااؘ؟ ؔءؗ ؛؜ئ Lؔت آؙ Nؔا؜آءئ (1758)
Eؠؘإ ؘؗ gؔااؘ؟ (1714–1767), a native of Neuchâtel, is most renowned for his 
treatise on the law of nations, entiteld “The Law of Nations, or, Principles 
of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and 
Sovereigns” (Le droit des gens, ou Principes de la loi naturelle, appliqués à la 
conduite et aux affaires des Nations et des Souverains), 1758. He had become 
acquainted with natural law during his period of study in Geneva, having 
as professor presumably Jؘؔء Jؔؖؤبؘئ Bبإ؟ؔؠؔؤب؜. Instead of harbouring 
a strong intention from the outset to produce a work on the law of nations, 
he had initially only intended to provide a French translation of C؛إ؜ئا؜ؔء 
hآ؟ؙؙ’ƾ “eƩƣ Lƞǂ ƺƤ Nƞƿiƺƹƾ ƿƽƣƞƿƣƢ ƞơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ dơiƣƹƿiƤiơ MƣƿƩƺƢ” (“Ius 
gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum”), 1749.5 However, he then decided 
to compose a more independent piece of work on the basis of hآ؟ؙؙ’s theory 
of the law of nature and nations. 
To give some historical context, gؔااؘ؟ wrote his Law of Nations ten years 
after the publication of “The Spirit of Laws” (“L’esprit des lois”) by Mآءاؘئؤب؜ؘب 
and five years before the “The Social Contract” (“Contract Social”) by cآبئئؘؔب. 
His work made a vital contribution to the development of modern internatio-
nal law.6 The core of gؔااؘ؟’s “Law of Nations” was an emphasis on the tension 
between the law of nature and the law of nations. He criticised his predecessors 
for having constructed the law of nations on the basis of theoretical deductions 
concluded from general principles. gؔااؘ؟, in contrast, focused on the practice 
of states, writing exclusively for sovereigns. He wrote: 
“The law of nations is the law of sovereigns. It is principally for them and for their 
ministers that it ought to be written. All mankind are indeed interested in it; and, in a 
5 C؛إ؜ئا؜ؔء hآ؟ؙؙ (1679–1754) was a German jurist, philosopher, and mathematician. 
He belonged to the school of Rationalist philosophy of the German Enlightenment and 
he is considered the most eminent German thinker between Lؘ؜ؕء؜ح and Kؔءا.
6 g؜ءؘؖءا C؛ؘاؔ؜؟, Vattel and the American Dream: An Inquiry into the Reception of the 
Lƞǂ ƺƤ Nƞƿiƺƹƾ iƹ ƿƩƣ fƹiƿƣƢ dƿƞƿƣƾ, iƹ aiƣƽƽƣ- Mƞƽiƣ DǀƻǀǄ/giƹơƣƹƿ CƩƣƿƞil (eds.), The 
Roots of International Law, Liber Amicorum Peter Haggenmacher, Leiden/Boston 2014, 
pp. 251, p. 295.
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free country, the study of its maxims is a proper employment for every citizen: But it 
would be of little consequence to impart the knowledge of it only to private individu-
als, who are not called to the councils of nations, and who have no influence in direct-
ing the public measures. If the conductors of states, if all those who are employed in 
public affairs, condescended to apply seriously to the study of a science which ought 
to be their law, and, as it were, the compass by which to steer their course, what happy 
effects might we not expect from a good treatise on the law of nations!”7
There are some fundamental aspects of the Law of Nations. gؔااؘ؟ applied a 
strictly inter- state perspective: the law of nations is specifically the law gover-
ning relations between states. gؔااؘ؟ relegates the individual to the position 
of being part of the state’s internal sphere.8 For gؔااؘ؟, the law of nations “is 
the science which teaches the rights subsisting between nations or states, and 
the obligations correspondent to those rights”.9 He dismissed individuals from 
the scene, thereby perceiving nations to be compact entities confronting each 
other within a distinct sphere of action. International society thus becomes a 
ƿƽǀƣ ƾƺơiƣƿǄ ƺƤ ƾƺǁƣƽƣiƨƹ, ƣƼǀƞl, ƞƹƢ iƹƢƣƻƣƹƢƣƹƿ ƾƿƞƿƣƾèᅬ ƣƞơƩ ƟƺǀƹƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ 
fundamental obligation of self- preservation.10 gؔااؘ؟ established the princi-
ple that sovereign states are the legal subjects of classical international law.
gؔااؘ؟ unreservedly recognised the existence of a duality of norms gover-
ning the conduct of sovereign states: the norms imposed by natural law and 
those imposed by the positive law of nations. By virtue of their sovereign 
will, he argued, only states have the capacity to determine the applicability 
of international legal rights and obligations. In this regard it can be said that 
gؔااؘ؟ opened the door to the modern idea of sovereignty. He theorised a 
law of nations that is both “liberal and pluralist” and which is very much in 
line with the state of European society at the time of the Enlightenment, the 
7 Eؠؘإ ؘؗ gؔااؘ؟, The Law of Nations, or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the 
Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, with Three Early Essays on the Origin 
and Nature of Natural Law and on Luxury, edited and with an introduction by Bela 
Kapossy/Richard Whatmore, Indianapolis 2008, p. 18.
8 Eؠؠؔءبؘ؟؟ؘ Jآبؔءءؘا, Emer de Vattel (1714–1767), in Bardo Fassbender/Anne Peters 
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law, Oxford 2012 (cit. 
Jآبؔءءؘا, Emer de Vattel), pp. 1118. See also Eؠؠؔءبؘ؟؟ؘ Jآبؔءءؘا, The Liberal- 
Welfarist Law of Nations, A History of International Law, translated by Christoper 
Sutcliffe, Cambridge 2012.
9 gؔااؘ؟, p. 67.
10 Jآبؔءءؘا, Emer de Vattel, pp. 1118.
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period within which gؔااؘ؟ was writing.11 The “The Law of Nations” set the 
benchmark for a new political and legal science, subjected to a remarkable 
number of translations and commented editions published all through the 
19th century in Europe and beyond. The following quote describes gؔااؘ؟’s 
relevance in the North American context: 
“Vattel’s treaty on the law of nations was quoted by judicial tribunals, in speeches 
before legislative assemblies, and the decrees and correspondence of executive offi-
cials, […] it was also used as the student’s manual, the reference work of the states-
man and the text from which political philosophers drew inspiration”.12
11 Jآبؔءءؘا, Emer de Vattel, pp. 1118.
12 C؛ؔإ؟ؘئ G. Fؘءت؜ؖ؞, The Authority of Vattel, in American Political Science Review, 
Volume 7, Issue 3, Baltimore 1913, pp. 395; see also for the reception C؛ؘاؔ؜؟, pp. 251.
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III.  eƩƣ Eƽƞ ƺƤ Iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞl 
Humanitarian Law
Throughout the 19th century, the Swiss and European legal environment was 
characterised by attempts to codify international law and by the develop-
ment of international humanitarian law. In fact, the 19th century can truly be 
regarded as the century of international law par excellence. It was during this 
period that international law began to assume its precise characteristics and 
a legal science began to appear as a subject separate from those of diplomacy 
and natural law. The protagonists pushing the development of this separate 
subject were international lawyers. It was recently written that 
“[i]nternational lawyers called to mediate between universalism and nationalism, 
humanitarian aspirations and colonial impulses, technical, economic and financial 
challenges, nations and states, recognized states as subjects of knowledge with re-
gard to that they incorporated a deep supranational dimension into their general 
principles. International law became the product of a historical reflection by an elite 
of intellectuals that, through an organic relationship with the conscience of civilized 
nations, translated value into a scientific system”.13 
The international lawyers of this century, in fact, lived through a period of 
radical change in international affairs. This had begun in the late 18th century 
with the American and French Revolutions, the collapse of the Napoleonic 
Empire and the events that led to the Congress of Vienna, during which the 
Holy Alliance had laid the ground for the development of a new international 
order. The order of 1815 had to be redesigned in the mid- 19th century due to 
the Crimean war that ended with the agreement of the Paris Treaty of 1856. 
Important developments in international law during the 19th century, parti-
cularly regarding the role played by Swiss jurists and men, are the emergence 
of the international humanitarian law, the creation of the International Law 
13 Lب؜ؚ؜ Nبححآ/M؜؟آš gؘؖ, The Birth of International Law as a Legal Discipline, in Luigi 
Nǀǅǅƺ/Milƺš gƣơ ᄬƣƢƾ.ᄭ, Cƺƹƾƿƽǀơƿiƹƨ Iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞl Lƞǂ, eƩƣ ƟiƽƿƩ ƺƤ ƞ Ƣiƾơiƻliƹƣ, 
FƽƞƹkƤǀƽƿ ƞ.M ᇴᇲᇳᇴ, ƻ. iII.
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Institut (Institut de droit international) in 1873, and different attempts to 
codify international law.
ᇳ. Hؘءإج Dبءؔءا ؔءؗ ا؛ؘ Iءاؘإءؔا؜آءؔ؟ 
Cآؠؠ؜ااؘؘ آؙ ا؛ؘ cؘؗ Cإآئئ
Hؘءإج Dبءؔءا (1828–1910), a Swiss merchant from Geneva, contributed funda-
mentally to the development of humanitarian law by formulating the idea of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross. Dبءؔءا was born into a wealthy and 
influential family in Geneva. From 1853, he worked in North Africa, overseeing 
the French colonies’ commercial interests. In Algeria, he encountered difficul-
ties with the French authorities: it was due to such circumstances that he travel-
led to meet Nؔأآ؟ؘآء III in Italy where the latter was battling Austrian forces at 
the time. In 1859, Dبءؔءا arrived in the small town of Solferino during his trip 
to meet Napoleon, where close to 40’000 soldiers lay dead or wounded on the 
battlefield. Dبءؔءا was confronted with this sight during his visit. There were 
ƹƺ ƺƽƨƞƹiƾƣƢ ƸƣƢiơƞl Ƣiǁiƾiƺƹƾ ǂiƿƩiƹ ƿƩƣ ƞƽƸƣƢ Ƥƺƽơƣƾ. MƣƢiơƞl ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹƾ 
ǂƣƽƣ iƹƞƢƣƼǀƞƿƣ, Ƣƺơƿƺƽƾ ƾơƞƽơƣ, ƣƼǀiƻƸƣƹƿ ƻƺƺƽ, ƞƹƢ ƿƽƞƹƾƻƺƽƿ ƾƻƞƽƾƣ. MƞƹǄ 
soldiers died from simple wounds as a result of a lack of knowledge or proper 
care. In response to this state of affairs, Hؘءإج Dبءؔءا brought in food, water, 
and supplies to try to ensure adequate medical basic medical aid. He rallied the 
local population into providing assistance, making no distinction between the 
nationalities of the wounded. The term “tutti fratelli” (“all brothers”) was coined 
as rationale for the principle of impartial medical assistance in armed conflict. 
Dبءؔءا ƽƣơƺƽƢƣƢ Ʃiƾ ƣǃƻƣƽiƣƹơƣ iƹ IƿƞlǄ iƹ ƿƩƣ Ɵƺƺk “é MƣƸƺƽǄ ƺƤ 
Solferino”, which he wrote upon his return to Geneva and published in 1862. 
Through the medium of the book, he campaigned for the humane treatment 
of combatants and the protection of the wounded during warfare. The Geneva 
Public Welfare Society, that had as chairman the jurist Gبئاؔةؘ Mآجء؜ؘإ, 
received Dبءؔءا’s plea positively, forming a committee in response to the 
publication. In February 1863 the five-member committee, constituted by 
Dبءؔءا, Mآجء؜ؘإ, Dإ. Lآب؜ئ éأأ؜ؔ, Dإ. e؛éآؗآإؘ Mؔبءآ؜إ and Gؘءؘإؔ؟ 
Dبؙآبإ convened to discuss Dunant‘s proposals. As a result they formed the 
Permanent International Committee for the Relief of Wounded Soldiers that 
later became the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 
In October of the same year, an international conference with governmen-
tal representatives was organized to formalise the concept of introducing 
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national relief societies. The conference also agreed upon a standard emblem 
which would identify medical personnel on the battlefield: a red cross on a 
white background; a reversed- colour tribute to the Swiss flag and the neutra-
lity it represents.14 
In 1864, the Swiss government called a second conference that resulted 
in the adoption of the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded in Armies in the Field which entered into force in 1865. The main 
principles laid down in the Convention are: 
– Relief to the wounded without any distinction as to nationality
– Neutrality (inviolability) of medical personnel and medical establish-
ments and units 
– The distinctive symbol of the organisation: the red cross on a white 
ground.15
Figure 1: Henri Dunant, 1828–191016
14 International Committee of the Red Cross, The History of the Emblems, 2007, (https://
ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/MᇶLg- ᇸiGiᄭ.
15 D؜ؘاإ؜ؖ؛ dؖ؛؜ءؗ؟ؘإ/J؜ří eآؠؔء, The Laws of Armed Conflicts, Dordrecht 1988, pp. 280.
16 Source: Red Cross and Red Crescent (https://perma.cc/A4LD- RTRC).
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The first Geneva Convention of 1864, regulating the protection of the 
wounded combatants in the field was amended in 1906, in 1929, and finally 
in 1949. It was complemented by three other Geneva Conventions regula-
ting maritime warfare, the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection 
of civilians. The four Geneva Conventions were ultimately amended in 1949 
and constitute today the Geneva Convention, that is the Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field (I), the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (II), The Convention rela-
tive to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (III), and the Convention relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (IV). The Convention recei-
ved three Additional Protocols, the first two in 1977 and the third in 2005. 
The second Additional Protocol explicitly extends the scope of international 
humanitarian law to non-international armed conflicts.17
The ICRC was at the origin of the International Federation of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies and the 191 National Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies which form today a humanitarian network, guided by the same 
seven fundamental principles: universality, humanity, impartiality, neutra-
lity, independence, voluntary service, and unity.18 
Despite his achievements in the field of humanitarian law, Dبءؔءا him-
self had a life that could be considered somewhat unfortunate. In 1867, his 
commercial interests in Algeria took a downturn leading to his eventual ban-
kƽǀƻƿơǄ. éƟƺǁƣ ƞll Ʃƣ ƩƞƢ ƿƺ ƽƣƾiƨƹ ƤƽƺƸ ƿƩƣ cƣƢ Cƽƺƾƾèᅬ ƿƩƣ ǁƣƽǄ ƺƽƨƞƹiƾƞƿiƺƹ 
his ideas had inspired. He left Geneva in 1867. From 1887 until his death in 1910 
he lived in relative isolation in the Swiss village of Heiden. In 1901 he received 
the first Nobel Peace Prize, jointly with the French pacifist Fإéؗéإ؜ؖ aؔئئج. 
Dبءؔءا is buried in the Sihlfeld cemetery in Zurich.
17 cآؘؕإا Kآ؟ؕ, The Protection of the Individual in Times of War and Peace, in: Bardo 
Fassbender/Anne Peters (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of International 
Law, Oxford 2012, pp. 324.
18 International Committee of the Red Cross, Founding and Early Years of the ICRC, 2010 
(https://perma.cc/64BT- RQWW).
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ᇴ. Fآبءؗ؜ءؚ آؙ ا؛ؘ Iءئا؜اباؘ آؙ Iءاؘإءؔا؜آءؔ؟ 
Lؔت ᄬᇳᇺᇹᇵᄭ
Some of the most important 19th century international lawyers joined forces 
to create the Institute of International Law (Institut du droit international). 
It was founded in Ghent on 8 September 1873. The aim of the Institute of 
International Law, which presents itself as an authority on the legal cons-
cience of the civilised world, is to promote the development of international 
law. It vowed to raise awareness for and to lay down the general principles 
of international law, and finally to contribute to its gradual codification. Its 
maxim is “Justitia et pace”. In 1904 it was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize and 
it exists until today.19
The founders of the Institute who convened for three days in September 1873 
in the Salle de l’Arsenal of the Ghent Town Hall, were the jurists: aؔئؤبؔ؟ؘ 
dاؔء؜ئ؟ؔآ Mؔءؖ؜ء؜ (Italy), Éؠ؜؟ؘ Lآب؜ئ g؜ؖاآإ ؘؗ Lؔةؘ؟ؘجؘ (Belgium), 
eآؕ؜ؘ M؜ؖ؛ؘ؟ C؛ؔإ؟ؘئ éئئؘإ (Holland), Jؔؠؘئ Lآإ؜ؠؘإ (Scottland), 
h؟ؔؗ؜ؠ؜إ Bؘئآؕإؔئئآؙ (Russia), Gبئاؔةؘ Mآجء؜ؘإ (Switzerland), Jآ؛ؔءء 
Cؔئأؔإ B؟بءائؖ؛؟؜ (Switzerland), éبؚبئاآ a؜ؘإؔءاآء؜ (Italy), Cؔإ؟آئ 
Cؔ؟ةآ (Argentina), Gبئاؔةؘ cآ؟؜ء- Jؘؔؤبؘؠجءئ (Belgium), and Dؔة؜ؗ 
Dبؗ؟ؘج F؜ؘ؟ؗ (United States). The variety of nationalities represented the 
international character and aim of the Institute. Two of these jurists came 
from Switzerland: the aforementioned Gبئاؔةؘ Mآجء؜ؘإ and Jآ؛ؔءء 
Cؔئأؔإ B؟بءائؖ؛؟؜. These two influential persons will presently be discus-
sed in more detail. 
19 Mƺƽƣ iƹƤƺƽƸƞƿiƺƹ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ǂƣƟƾiƿƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Iƹƾƿiƿǀƿƣ: Ʃƿƿƻ://ǂǂǂ.iƢi- iil.ƺƽƨ/ƣƹ/ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://
perma.cc/692V- FLTK).
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ƞᄭ Gǀƾƿƞǁƣ MƺǄƹiƣƽ ᄬᇳᇺᇴᇸ -ᇳᇻᇳᇲᄭ
Fiƨǀƽƣ ᇴ: Gǀƾƿƞǁƣ MƺǄƹiƣƽ ᄬᇳᇺᇴᇸᅬᇳᇻᇳᇲᄭ20
Gبئاؔةؘ Mآجء؜ؘإ (1826–1910) played a significant role in shaping the founda-
tions of international humanitarian law, in two key ways. First, together with 
Hؘءإج Dبءؔءا, he initiated the founding of the ICRC. Secondly, he was also 
involved in working towards the establishment of a permanent international 
criminal court. Mآجء؜ؘإ was born in 1826 into a commercial and industrial 
family of Geneva. Due to political unrest there, he relocated to Paris at the age 
of twenty where he subsequently completed his legal studies. His marriage 
to Jؘؔءءؘ- Fإؔءçآ؜ئؘ aؔؖؖؔإؗ afforded him the financial independence 
necessary to allow him to dedicate his time to questions of public welfare 
upon his return to Geneva in 1851. Mآجء؜ؘإ’s attention had been caught by 
Hؘءإج Dبءؔءا’s witness account and associated analysis regarding the 
battle at Solferino. He brought the matter before the Geneva Society for Public 
Welfare which examined Dبءؔءا’s vision of institutionalising the care for 
20 dƺǀƽơƣ: cƣƢ Cƽƺƾƾ ƞƹƢ cƣƢ Cƽƣƾơƣƹƿ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ᇷgᇵᇴ- iᇻJkᄭ. 
Elisabetta Fiocchi Malaspina: History of International Law 75
the wounded during armed conflict. Mآجء؜ؘإ played an active role in the 
organisation. He took a pragmatic approach to the organisation which even-
tually clashed with the idealism of Hؘءإج Dبءؔءا, leading to the deteriora-
tion of their relationship. Ultimately, Hؘءإج Dبءؔءا was required to leave 
the organisation, while Mآجء؜ؘإ remained its president until his death.21
Remarkably considering the time period, Mآجء؜ؘإ also coined the idea of 
creating an international criminal tribunal to prosecute breaches of huma-
nitarian law. In 1872, he published his draft “Note on the creation of a spe-
cific international judicial institution to prevent and punish violations of 
the Geneva Convention” (“Note sur la Création d’une Institution Judiciaire 
Internationale propre à prévenir et à réprimer les Infractions à la Convention 
de Genève”). Within this draft, he proposed a panel that would decide on 
cases involving breaches of the Geneva Convention occurring during a war 
between member states to the treaties. Mآجء؜ؘإ saw the need to enforce the 
Convention and direct criminal responsibility to the respective perpetrators 
and to impose monetary penalties against belligerent states.22
His draft proposal was widely recognized but also heavily criticised. Some 
lamented the lack of an enforcing authority with regard to the proposals. 
Others did not see the need for the creation of a new institution, preferring to 
stick to the traditional means of bilateral arbitration. Interestingly, Mآجء؜ؘإ 
himself had followed a fundamental change of heart with his draft proposal. 
Later on, he had been opposed to the idea of granting jurisdiction over inter-
national criminal matters to an international body, believing that the threat 
of critical public opinion and indignation would suffice to deter potential bre-
aches of humanitarian law.23
Aside from the proposal for an international criminal tribunal, Mآجء؜ؘإ 
also drafted a manual which aimed to codify already existing legal principles 
ƺƤ ǂƞƽƤƞƽƣ. eƩiƾ Mƞƹǀƞl ƺƹ ƿƩƣ Lƞǂƾ ƺƤ hƞƽ ƺƹ LƞƹƢ ǂƞƾ Ƹƺƽƣ ƤƞǁƺǀƽƞƟlǄ 
received, being unanimously adopted by the Institute of International Law 
ƞƿ iƿƾ ơƺƹƤƣƽƣƹơƣ iƹ OǃƤƺƽƢ iƹ ᇳᇺᇺᇲ. Iƿ iƾ ƾƿill kƹƺǂƹ ƞƾ eƩƣ OǃƤƺƽƢ Mƞƹǀƞl ƿƺ 
this day.24
21 Bؘءؘؗ؜ؖا ةآء eئؖ؛ؔإءؘإ, Inter Gentes: Statesmen, Diplomats, Political Thinkers, 
Gƣƹƣǁƞ ᇴᇲᇳᇴ, ƻƻ.èᇳᇸᇵ.
22 C؛إ؜ئاآأ؛ؘإ Kؘ؜ا؛ Hؔ؟؟, The First Proposal for a Permanent International Criminal 
Court, in International Review of the Red Cross Volume 38, Issue 322, 1998, pp. 57.
23 Hؔ؟؟, pp. 57.
24 gآء eئؖ؛ؔإءؘإ, pp. 36.
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Ɵᄭ JƺƩƞƹƹ Cƞƾƻƞƽ BlǀƹƿƾơƩli ᄬᇳᇺᇲᇺ–ᇳᇺᇺᇳᄭ
Figure 3: Johann Caspar Bluntschli (1808–1881)25
Jآ؛ؔءء Cؔئأؔإ B؟بءائؖ؛؟؜ (1808–1881) was born in Zurich. He attended 
school in Zurich and consequently moved to complete his legal studies in 
Berlin and Bonn, eventually being awarded with a doctoral degree from the 
University of Bonn. He was a student of Fإ؜ؘؗإ؜ؖ؛ Cؔإ؟ ةآء dؔة؜ؚءج who 
introduced him to the so called German Historical School; which influen-
ced B؟بءائؖ؛؟؜ئ own work and teaching substantially. Upon his return to 
Zurich in 1830, he became extraordinary professor in 1833 and then ordinary 
professor in 1836. He held seats in the municipal and cantonal parliaments of 
Zurich and founded the liberal- conservative party. In 1840, B؟بءائؖ؛؟؜ was 
asked to finalise the drafting efforts for the Zurich civil code, which he suc-
cessfully did. In 1844, he lost the election for mayor of Zurich, a matter of sore 
regret for him. In 1847, B؟بءائؖ؛؟؜ decided to withdraw from Swiss politics 
and once again left his hometown to live in Germany. He became professor 
iƹ MǀƹiơƩ ƞƹƢ lƞƿƣƽ HƣiƢƣlƟƣƽƨ ƞƹƢ ƞƾƾǀƸƣƢ ƾƣǁƣƽƞl ƺƤƤiơƣƾ iƹ GƣƽƸƞƹ ƻƺli-
tical life. 
25 dƺǀƽơƣ: hikiƻƣƢiƞ, ǂiƿƩ ƽƣƤƣƽƣƹơƣ ƿƺ: cƣƻƽƺƢǀơƿiƺƹ ƤƽƺƸ kǀƽiơƩè ᅬ GƣƾơƩiơƩƿƣ Kǀlƿǀƽ 
hiƽƿƾơƩƞƤƿ. GƣƟƽüƢƣƽ Fƽƣƿǅ, kǀƽiơƩ ᇳᇻᇵᇴ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ᇷKNN- iFGbᄭ. 
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B؟بءائؖ؛؟؜ has completed two major works of international law:
ᅬ eƩƣ MƺƢƣƽƹ Lƞǂ ƺƤ hƞƽ ᄬDƞƾ ƸƺƢƣƽƹƣ KƽiƣƨƾƽƣơƩƿ; ᇳᇺᇸᇸᄭ
ᅬ eƩƣ MƺƢƣƽƹ Iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞl Lƞǂ ƺƤ CiǁiliǅƣƢ dƿƞƿƣƾ ᄬDƞƾ ƸƺƢƣƽƹƣ 
Völkerrecht der civilisierten Staaten; 1867)
“eƩƣ MƺƢƣƽƹ Lƞǂ ƺƤ hƞƽ” ǂƞƾ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƢǀơƿ ƺƤ ƞ ƤƽǀiƿƤǀl ƽƣlƞƿiƺƹƾƩiƻ Ɵƣƿ-
ween B؟بءائؖ؛؟؜ and Fإؔءؖ؜ئ L؜ؘؘؕإ (1800–1872) of Columbia University in 
New York. L؜ؘؘؕإ was born in Berlin but fled to the United States from Prussia 
in 1826. He is famous for drafting the “Instructions for the Government of 
éƽƸiƣƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ fƹiƿƣƢ dƿƞƿƣƾ iƹ ƿƩƣ FiƣlƢ”, ƞlƾƺ kƹƺǂƹ ƞƾ ƿƩƣ LiƣƟƣƽ CƺƢƣèᅬ ƞ 
set of rules of warfare that éؕإؔ؛ؔؠ L؜ءؖآ؟ء made applicable to the Federal 
Army in the U.S. Civil War in 1863.26 B؟بءائؖ؛؟؜ and L؜ؘؘؕإ maintained 
intensive written correspondence on a range of topics: from books to read 
to law, politics, and theology. Their exchange was mutually beneficial, each 
being influenced by the thinking of the other. The relationship further cul-
minated in the formulation of fundamental principles of international law. 
The principles that L؜ؘؘؕإ had formulated in the Lieber Code were expan-
ded upon by B؟بءائؖ؛؟؜ iƹ Ʃiƾ ƺǂƹ ǂƺƽk “eƩƣ MƺƢƣƽƹ Lƞǂ ƺƤ hƞƽ”. eƩƣǄ 
had a fundamental influence on the codification of the laws of war, manifes-
ted in the Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land as 
developed at the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. 
hiƿƩ Ʃiƾ Ɵƺƺk “eƩƣ MƺƢƣƽƹ Iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞl Lƞǂ ƺƤ CiǁiliǅƣƢ dƿƞƿƣƾ”, 
B؟بءائؖ؛؟؜ successfully created a comprehensive codification of internati-
onal law. He wanted to prove the legal quality of international law by overco-
ming the perceived conflict at the time between natural law and positive law. 
Unlike his contemporaries, he did not merely write a commentary on exis-
ting treaties and customs. Instead, he presented a comprehensive code that 
considered the dynamic or ‘organic’ evolution of law and society.27 The book 
was written in a clear and informative manner and was thus widely received. 
Numerous translations led to the publication becoming influential world-
wide. His code consists of 862 Articles preceded by an elaborate introduction 
dealing with the nature, objects, and basis of international law. It deals with 
the entire law of nations in three general parts:
26 d؜؟؝ؔ göءؘ؞ج, Francis Lieber (1798–1872), in: Bardo Fassbender/Anne Peters (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law, Oxford 2012, pp. 1137.
27 Mؔإاا؜ Kآئ؞ؘءء؜ؘؠ؜, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, The Rise and Fall of International 
Law, Cambridge 2002, pp. 42.
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– The law of peace (1–509)
– The law of war (510–741)
– The law of neutrality (742–862)
B؟بءائؖ؛؟؜ said of his own work: 
“It is substantially the same kind of work as that which I early attempted with success 
at Zurich upon the narrow field of a little Swiss republic with reference to private law. 
The principles of that work were now only transferred to the broader field of civilised 
states in general, and were applied to the moving stream of international relations 
and legal opinions”.28
28 Hؘإؘؕإا Bؔثاؘإ éؗؔؠئ, Bluntschli’s Life- Work, Baltimore 1884, p. 26.
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Switzerland, its jurists, as gؔااؘ؟, Mآجء؜ؘإ, and B؟بءائؖ؛؟؜, and social 
activists, as Dبءؔءا, have played a leading role in the development of inter-
national law. Studying the emergence of International Humanitarian Law 
and the theories of International Law in their historical context contributes 
to an understanding of the development of International Humanitarian Law 
and International Law as they have evolved over the centuries. 
The political and legal culture and environment in Switzerland from the 
18th century onwards served not only for the natives but also for the intellec-
tuals from all over Europe as a safe haven, where they could freely form their 
ideas without the fear of political persecution. In this sense Switzerland has 
not only manifestly promoted the development of International Law by its 
active role as a state in the international community but also by providing a 
solid breeding ground for the ideas of individuals.
Until the present day Switzerland maintained this status in the interna-
tional community having not only the International Committee of the Red 
Cross based in Geneva but also the United Nations Office in Geneva, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Health Organization (WHO), 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and, among many other 
important UN programs, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) to name only a few. gؔااؘ؟ in his “Law of Nations” 
conveys his own praise for his native Switzerland: “I was born in a country of 
which liberty is the soul, the treasure, and the fundamental law; and my birth 
qualifies me to be the friend of all nations”.29
29 gؔااؘ؟, p. 20. 
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I.  eƩƣ aƽƺƟlƣƸƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ 
Philosophy of Law  
and Legal Theory
A good starting point for reflecting on legal philosophy and legal theory and 
its purpose, content, and profound significance in any given legal culture is 
the following observation: law is a mandatory normative order. It is enforced, 
ultimately, by the threat and application of physical force. Coercive force may 
Ɵƣ ƣǃƣơǀƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƻǀƟliơ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ iƹ ƞ ǁƞƽiƣƿǄ ƺƤ ǂƞǄƾèᅬ Ƥƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ ƟǄ ƻƺliơƣ 
agents or, in extreme cases, even military operations to defend certain prin-
ciples of international law. This characteristic of the law raises a crucial issue: 
how do we know that the law being enforced is, in fact, legitimate? What are 
the criteria for well- justified law? 
These are vitally important questions because the mandatory character of 
law seems to necessarily imply that the law enforced has a real claim to legiti-
macy. To enforce and maintain a normative order with physical force without 
such a claim is an indefensible enterprise. 
Thus, it is important that we endeavour to find answers to questions of legi-
timacy, although this is certainly no easy task. Examples of such questions 
can be found in various areas of the law. For instance, constitutional states 
based on fundamental rights are facing new threats posed by international 
terrorism. Is it legitimate to increasingly curtail fundamental rights because 
ƺƤ ƾƣơǀƽiƿǄ ơƺƹơƣƽƹƾ? IƤ ƾƺèᅬ ǂƩƞƿ iƾ ƿƩƣ liƹƣ ƿƩƞƿ ƾƩƺǀlƢ ƹƺƿ Ɵƣ ơƽƺƾƾƣƢ? Iƾ 
there such a line at all? 
It has recently been proposed that the international order should be based 
on the narrow self- interest of nations, pursued with their respective power.1 Is 
that the proper guiding principle for the international community or, on the 
contrary, will this be the highroad to its destruction? 
What about the refugee crisis? Are states’ national laws well- justified in this 
area? Does this body of law properly reflect the moral obligations affluent 
1 Dآءؔ؟ؗ eإبؠأ, Remarks to the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 19 
September 2017.
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states and citizens of the Global North have towards the people seeking shel-
ter and a better life? Or are these laws too generous? What about international 
refugee law: do its principles rest on solid grounds? An example to consider 
is the principle of non- refoulement, a ius cogens norm that prevents a coun-
try from returning asylum seekers to a country in which they would face the 
likely danger of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion.2 Is it justified?
Such questions can be supplemented by traditional problems of legal reflec-
tion like: what are the foundations of public authority, of states in particular? 
How do we sketch the contours of a justified order of relations between pri-
vate parties? What are the bases of guilt, responsibility, and punishment? Are 
human rights universally justified?
These kinds of questions lead to important problems of justice, freedom, 
dignity and solidarity and, importantly, such concepts’ often contentious con-
crete meaning. To attempt to answer such questions consistently and cohe-
rently with reasons understandable to all is the core task of legal theory and 
legal philosophy. 
The following remarks will outline, first, some central topics of legal theory 
and legal philosophy to roughly map the contours of the field (II.). They will 
then explain why spending some time with the questions of legal theory and 
legal philosophy is not an exotic occupation. On the contrary, serious, com-
mitted work with the law is hard to imagine without a substantial reflection 
about its nature, structure and legitimate content (III.). The attention will 
turn then to two paradigmatic questions in more detail to illustrate the dis-
course and some findings of current reflections about justice (IV. and V.) and 
human rights (VI. and VII.). 
A note on terminology: Sometimes legal theory is understood as a predo-
minantly analytic enterprise whereas legal philosophy deals with normative 
questions. The international discourse on these topics, however, mostly uses 
these terms interchangeably. These remarks will follow this latter example.
2 See Article 33 of the Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951 
(Geneva Convention).
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II.  A Mƞƻ ƺƤ aƩilƺƾƺƻƩǄ ƺƤ Lƞǂ 
and Legal Theory
The questions of legitimacy which legal philosophy and legal theory consider 
are part of, and are embedded in, a wider theoretical enterprise which cont-
ains at minimum the following elements:
ᇳ. Dؘئؖإ؜أا؜ةؘ ؔءؗ Aءؔ؟جا؜ؖؔ؟ e؛ؘآإج
Legal philosophy provides a descriptive and analytical theory of concepts and 
phenomena of the law. It asks questions like what is a norm? What is the diffe-
rence between a norm and, say, a habitual pattern of behaviour or the expec-
tation that a certain course of events is going to take place? What is the formal 
structure of a fundamental right? What is the difference between such a right 
ƞƹƢ ƞƹ ƞƨƣƹƿ’ƾ ǂiƾƩ ƺƽ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿ, Ƥƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ? eƩƣ ƹƞƿǀƽƣ ƺƤ ƞƹ ƺƟliƨƞƿiƺƹèᅬ ƞ 
concept that “haunts much legal thought”3èᅬ iƾ ƞƹƺƿƩƣƽ Ƽǀƣƾƿiƺƹ ƿƩƞƿ lƣƨƞl ƻƩi-
losophy has examined in great detail. This issue is vital because obligations 
are a core element of any legal system. Another pertinent issue is the meaning 
of the validity of a norm. What does it mean to assert that a norm is valid? Is 
it a matter of efficiency, of the (unbound) will of an authority, of the consent 
of the addressees of norms, or perhaps of some material standards of justice 
or other ethical principles? Validity is sometimes equated with the existence 
of a law. Validity is an existence condition of norms. What does this mean? In 
what sense does a norm exist when it is valid? 
These questions are of great importance because they outline the basic 
architecture of normative systems, including legal systems. We can have no 
real understanding of legal systems without a clear sense of what concepts 
such as norm, fundamental rights, obligations, or validity mean.4 
3 H.L.é. Hؔإا, The Concept of Law, Oxford 1961, p. 85.
4 See Mؔاا؛؜ؔئ Mؔ؛؟ؠؔءء, Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtstheorie, 5th edition, Baden- 
Baden 2019, paragraph 26.
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These concepts are also important in another respect. Today, one major 
political challenge is to develop a cross- cultural, perhaps even transcultural 
concept of normativity and the law. The world has become highly interde-
pendent and, in various ways, its legal orders attempt to respond by esta-
blishing a legal framework that accommodates this need for international 
legal coordination. A very basic framework of this type is created through the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights5 and other human rights documents 
that define the minimal mandatory standards for the treatment of human 
beings by public authorities and by other agents (individuals and other 
legal subjects like companies). It should be noted, however, that whether it 
is possible to make a human rights claim against companies is particularly 
contentious in its detail. This system of human rights has gained a very dif-
ferentiated reality through public international law and regional organisa-
tions including the Council of Europe, the European Union, the Organisation 
of American States, or the African Union and their respective human rights 
law, all of which more or less satisfactorily complement the constitutional 
protection of basic rights. 
But is this a feasible enterprise? One sometimes encounters the claim that 
cultures are so different that reaching any form of cross- cultural consensus 
about particular norms is unimaginable. After all, is it not true that globally, 
people are deeply divided over questions like the rights of women, the scope 
of religious freedom or the legitimate claims of people with different sexual 
orientations? Some even claim that certain cultures do not have certain con-
cepts which are key elements of what is sometimes considered a “Western” 
conception of the law, e.g. the concept of fundamental rights. These claims 
are frequently spurious and based on a selective reconstruction of the fun-
damental features of the legal system under consideration. Nonetheless, if 
attempting to assess the merits of such claims, it is vital to have a clear sense 
of what one is talking about when one is referring to a concept like “funda-
Ƹƣƹƿƞl ƽiƨƩƿƾ”. eƩǀƾ, ơƺƹơƣƻƿǀƞl ơlƞƽiƿǄè ᅬ Ƣƣƾơƽiƻƿiǁƣ ƞƹƢ ƞƹƞlǄƿiơƞl ƻƽƣơi-
ƾiƺƹèᅬ iƾ ƞ ƻƽƣơƺƹƢiƿiƺƹ Ƥƺƽ ƾǀơơƣƾƾƤǀllǄ Ƹƣƣƿiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƸƞƹǄ ơƩƞllƣƹƨƣƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ 
divided modern world poses for ethics and law. 
5 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948, 217 
A (III).
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ᇴ. Eثأ؟ؔءؔاآإج e؛ؘآإ؜ؘئ
Another subject matter of the philosophy of law is that of explanatory theo-
ries. Explanatory theories formulate a hypothesis about the causal connec-
tion between something requiring explanation and a factor that serves as the 
explanation for the phenomenon under scrutiny. For example, explanatory 
theories of law maintain that law in its concrete form is an expression of the 
economic structure of society, of culture, of the functional necessities of legal 
social systems or even of the climate. These theories have sometimes become 
forces of world history: for example, the aforementioned theory developed 
by Mؔإث connecting law and economics. This theory was an important ele-
ment of the motivation and content of social revolutions, like the Russian 
Revolution which transformed important parts of the world last century. The 
particular stance of pre- Stalinist Marxism with its critique of law, state, and 
human rights cannot be understood without reference to this highly influ-
ential background theory.6 After all, the critique of the concepts like human 
or fundamental rights played a key role in the establishment of dictatorships 
ƿƩƞƿèᅬ ƞ ƿƽƞƨiơ iƽƺƹǄèᅬ ơƺǀƹƿƣƢ ƞƸƺƹƨ ƿƩƣiƽ ǁiơƿiƸƾ ƾƺƸƣ ƻƽƺƸiƹƣƹƿ Mƞƽǃiƾƿ 
theoreticians of law,7 and led some important Marxist authors to embrace the 
idea of human rights.8
Such theories need to be scrutinised for scientific reasons and because of 
such sometimes far- reaching practical consequences. There must be scrutiny 
of whether they are actually defensible and their claims must be backed by 
evidence. Further, it must be considered whether there are preferable alter-
natives: for example, with regard to Marxism, perhaps a more differentiated 
theory of the relationship between the law and the economy, as proposed by 
6 See e.g. Kؔإ؟ Mؔإث/Fإ؜ؘؗإ؜ؖ؛ Eءؘؚ؟ئ, eƩƣ GƣƽƸƞƹ IƢƣƺlƺƨǄ, iƹ Mƞƽǃ/Eƹƨƣlƾ CƺllƣơƿƣƢ 
Works, Vol. V, New York 1976, pp. 46, 315 (German source: Kؔإ؟ Mؔإث, Die deutsche 
Ideologie, Marx- Engels- Werke, Band 3, Berlin 1969, S. 63, 311); Kؔإ؟ Mؔإث/Fإ؜ؘؗإ؜ؖ؛ 
Eءؘؚ؟ئ, eƩƣ MƞƹiƤƣƾƿƺ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ CƺƸƸǀƹiƾƿ aƞƽƿǄ, iƹ Mƞƽǃ/Eƹƨƣlƾ CƺllƣơƿƣƢ hƺƽkƾ, gƺl. 
VI, New York 1976, pp. 477 (German source: Kؔإ؟ Mؔإث/Fإ؜ؘؗإ؜ؖ؛ Eءؘؚ؟ئ, Manifest 
der Kommunistischen Partei, Marx- Engels- Werke, Band 4, Berlin 1959, S. 464).
7 E.g. Eةؘؚءج aؔئ؛ب؞ؔء؜ئ, author of a classical treatise of Marxism and the law, General 
Theory of Law and Marxism, 1924, in Selected Writings on Marxism and Law, Piers 
Bƣiƽƹƣ/cƺƟƣƽƿ dƩƞƽlƣƿ ᄬƣƢƾ.ᄭ, ƿƽƞƹƾlƞƿƣƢ ƟǄ aƣƿƣƽ B. Mƞƨƨƾ, LƺƹƢƺƹ/Nƣǂ jƺƽk ᇳᇻᇺᇲ. 
8 The most interesting is Eإءئا B؟آؖ؛, Natural Law and Human dignity, translated by 
Dennis J. Schmidt, Cambridge 1986 (German source: Eإءئا B؟آؖ؛, Naturrecht und 
menschliche Würde, Berlin 1985).
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Mؔث hؘؘؕإ, including a variety of factors, not just the economy to explain 
the nature and development of the law.9
ᇵ. Nآإؠؔا؜ةؘ e؛ؘآإج
A third element of legal philosophy is normative theories. Kؔءا famously 
formulated three questions that philosophy essentially aims to answer in his 
work the “Critique of Pure Reason”. These questions are: 1. what can we know? 
2. what should we do? and 3. what can we hope for?10 Normative theory ans-
wers the second question: what are we supposed to do? This is a very important 
consideration because itis not only relevant for the agent herself but for others 
as well. What we decide to do affects others in direct or indirect ways. For 
example, when we decide that we have reached the limits of solidarity in the 
framework of the refugee crisis, this is not only a decision about our own life 
but about the lives of those arriving on Italian shores, boarding a rubber boat 
in Libya or stranded in a Pacific camp on the way to Australia. Therefore, the 
kind of answer we formulate to this question is a matter of real consequence. 
In order for normative theory to proceed on this course, it must address 
matters of principle: it considers, for instance, what the content of justice is. Is 
it related to equality as major authors of the theory of justice, from éإ؜ئاآا؟ؘ 
to cؔت؟ئ, have argued? If so, in which sense? What does equality actually 
mean? Who or what is equal and in which respect? What behaviour does the 
idea of equality mandate? 
Normative theory also enquires also into what we owe to each one another. 
Are there such duties of solidarity? If so, towards whom; to personal relations, 
to the members of a group one belongs to or to the group itself, to people 
whom we have formal legal ties with like shared citizenship, or to any human 
being? What is the content of such duties? Are they differentiated depending 
on the level of proximity of the agent towards the addressee? What are their 
limits, what is their minimal content? How are they embodied in the law? 
9 Mؔث hؘؘؕإ, EơƺƹƺƸǄ ƞƹƢ dƺơiƣƿǄ, ƣƢiƿƣƢ ƟǄ GǀƣƹƿƩƣƽ cƺƿƩ/Clƞǀƾ hiƿƿiơƩ, BƣƽkƣlƣǄ/
Lƺƾ éƹƨƣlƣƾ/LƺƹƢƺƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇵ ᄬᇳᇻᇹᇴᄭ, ƻƻ. ᇵᇳᇳ ᄬGƣƽƸƞƹ dƺǀƽơƣ: Mؔث hؘؘؕإ, Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft, 5. Auflage, Tübingen 1972, S. 181 ff.). 
10 Iؠؠؔءبؘ؟ Kؔءا, Critique of Pure Reason, in Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, The 
CƞƸƟƽiƢƨƣ EƢiƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ hƺƽkƾ ƺƤ IƸƸƞƹǀƣl Kƞƹƿ, ƿƽƞƹƾlƞƿƣƢ ƞƹƢ ƣƢiƿƣƢ ƟǄ aƞǀl GǀǄƣƽ/
Allen W. Wood, Cambridge 1999, pp. 677 (German source: Iؠؠؔءبؘ؟ Kؔءا, Kritik der 
ƽƣiƹƣƹ gƣƽƹǀƹƤƿ, ékƞƢƣƸiƣ éǀƾƨƞƟƣ, BƞƹƢèIII, ᇴ. éǀƤlƞƨƣ ᇳᇹᇺᇹ, Bƣƽliƹ ᇳᇻᇳᇳ, d. ᇺᇵᇵᄭ.
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Legal Philosophy asks questions about concrete institutions of the law. 
Some questions have already been mentioned above: it enquires into the 
nature, content, and justification of human rights. What are these rights? 
In what form do they exist? What are their foundations? Are they relative to 
different cultures or religions or are they of universal validity? What is the 
content of true human rights? Are current conceptions of human rights too 
expansive or too limited; if either, in which area? 
eƩƣ lƣƨiƿiƸƞơǄ ƺƤ ƻǀƟliơ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿǄèᅬ ƹƞƿiƺƹƞl, ƾǀƻƣƽ- ƹƞƿiƺƹƞl, ƞƹƢ iƹƿƣƽƹƞ-
ƿiƺƹƞlèᅬ iƾ ƞƹƺƿƩƣƽ ƻƣƽƿiƹƣƹƿ ƿƺƻiơ ƺƤ ƽƣƾƣƞƽơƩ ƟǄ lƣƨƞl ƻƩilƺƾƺƻƩƣƽƾ. eƩƣ ƹƺƽ-
mative structure of the international order is of great importance. Are there 
reasons for robust national egoism or is it preferable to pursue a cooperative 
approach to international relations based on some kind of notion of internati-
onal solidarity, mutual help, and respect? If the latter, then what are the pro-
per institutions to pursue such aims? A World- State? A federation of nations? 
Networks operating beyond the state? What are the prospects of such enter-
prises? Is the hope of “perpetual peace”11 still alive or just the embarrassing 
dream of a bygone epoch?
An important part of the law is its regulation of relations between private 
parties. The theory of private law is consequently another leading topic of 
legal philosophy and legal theory. For example, one can ask questions about 
the foundations of the law of contract or tort in a legal system or about the 
content and limits of private autonomy as a guiding principle of liberal private 
law systems. 
A theory of criminal law raises equally significant questions. Are there prin-
cipled reasons behind the idea that sanctions should be based on concepts of 
guilt and responsibility? What purposes can criminal sanctions justifiably 
pursue: dissuading the criminal from reoffending, re- integration, retribution, 
general prevention or perhaps something else entirely? One may add additi-
onal concrete questions like whether the criminal law can justifiably aim for 
sanctions to have general preventive effects. Further, what are the limits of 
such sanctions: for example, does the concept of human dignity set any? 
Normative theory can also address more concrete questions: e.g. is the ban 
of burqas in Europe legitimate, or is it a violation of the basic principles of 
a liberal order? What privacy rights are justified? Is it true that the modern 
11 Iؠؠؔءبؘ؟ Kؔءا, Toward Perpetual Peace, in Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, 
The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, translated and edited by Mary 
J. Gƽƣƨƺƽ, CƞƸƟƽiƢƨƣ ᇴᇲᇲᇺ, ƻƻ.è ᇵᇳᇳ ᄬGƣƽƸƞƹ ƾƺǀƽơƣ: Iؠؠؔءبؘ؟ Kؔءا, Zum Ewigen 
Frieden, 1795, Akademie Ausgabe, Band VIII, Berlin 1923, S.è341 ff.).
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digital society has fundamentally reshaped the concept of privacy or, to the 
contrary, should notions of human autonomy guide our approach to these far- 
reaching challenges created by digital technologies and their use that have 
been and still are constitutive of constitutional state?
ᇶ. e؛ؘ cؘ؟ؔا؜آءئ؛؜أ آؙ Lؔت ؔءؗ Mآإؔ؟؜اج
Another classical problem of philosophical reflections about the law concerns 
the relationship between law and morality. The question is whether there is a 
necessary connection between the law and morality, as many theorists of law 
have claimed, even arguing that ultimately the law is a part of political mora-
lity: “lawyers and judges are working political philosophers of a democratic sta-
te”.12 Or are positivists correct in their persistent claim that the two realms are 
entirely separate?13 
As a starting point, one should remember that the separation of law and 
morality is a basic element of modern law. Law regulates external behaviour 
and is enforced by sanctions; morality is a normative order that is subjectively 
experienced as mandatory by individuals themselves, and is effective only 
because of the power and influence moral obligations have on agents’ moti-
vation.14 There is no good reason to abandon this basic distinction in current 
reflection.15
However, to underline the distinction between law and morality in this 
sense does not answer the question of whether material ethical principles are 
12 For a recent example see cآءؔ؟ؗ Dتآإ؞؜ء, Jǀƾƿiơƣ Ƥƺƽ HƣƢƨƣƩƺƨƾ, CƞƸƟƽiƢƨƣ/LƺƹƢƺƹ 
2011, p. 414. 
13 See e.g. Hؔءئ Kؘ؟ئؘء, aǀƽƣ eƩƣƺƽǄ ƺƤ Lƞǂ, ƿƽƞƹƾlƞƿƣƢ ƟǄ Mƞǃ KƹiƨƩƿ, BƣƽkƣlƣǄ/Lƺƾ 
Angeles 1967 (German Source: Hؔءئ Kؘ؟ئؘء, Reine Rechtslehre, 2. Auflage, Wien 1960); 
Hؔإا; Jآئؘأ؛ cؔح, The Authority of Law, 2nd edition, Oxford 2009.
14 The most influential statement of the relation stems from Iؠؠؔءبؘ؟ Kؔءا, The 
Metaphysics of Morals, in in Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, The Cambridge 
Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor, 
Cambridge 2008 (cit. Kؔءا, Metaphysics of Morals), pp. 353 (German source: Iؠؠؔءبؘ؟ 
Kؔءا, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 1797, Akademie Ausgabe, Band VI, Berlin 1914, S. 230 
ff.). For a recent restatement of these thoughts see Jüإؘؚء Hؘؔؕإؠؔئ, Between Facts 
and Norms, translated by William Rehg, Cambridge 1996 (German source: Jüإؘؚء 
Hؘؔؕإؠؔئ, Faktizität und Geltung, Berlin 1992, S. 143 ff.).
15 See Mؔاا؛؜ؔئ Mؔ؛؟ؠؔءء, Elemente einer ethischen Grundrechtstheorie, Baden- 
Baden 2008, pp. 27.
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somehow relevant in determining the conditions of validity of law and the 
concrete content of legal norms, in circumstances where the opacity of legal 
texts necessitates interpretative choices. Even if such principles are relevant 
in this regard, this does not change the fact that the law thus identified and 
interpreted regulates external behaviour and does not necessarily demand to 
make a determination of an individual’s conscience. Further, it does not affect 
the fact that law is backed by external sanctions rather than by the subjective 
experience of the mandatory character of norms. 
There is a very rich discussion about this matter: starting in antiquity, pur-
sued in the natural law tradition and continued today. At least the two major 
areas just mentioned demand further reflection: the conditions of the validity 
of norms and the hermeneutics of law. 
The problem of defining the conditions for the legitimacy of law raises the 
following question: is it possible to dissociate legal systems from extra- legal 
grounds of legitimacy? Can one make an argument for democracy, constitu-
tionalism or human rights without referencing principles of justice or human 
respect? If this seems difficult to imagine, a first connection between law and 
morality is established. 
Another area where questions about the connection between law and mora-
lity become pertinent is in the application of the law. Is it possible to apply the 
law without the influence of certain background theories, including ethical 
principles that guide the interpretation of law in concrete cases which require 
the making of interpretative choices? Can one concretise an abstract funda-
mental right, for instance freedom of religion in the case of the prohibition of 
burqas, without the influence of a background theory about the meaning of 
freedom, the kind of restrictions we can impose on others engaged in prima 
facie not harmful behaviour and the conditions under which this may be allo-
wed? Such background theories cannot be fully determined by the text of the 
concrete norm to be interpreted, because these theories are the instrument 
used to concretise the open- textured wording of the norms; the wording that 
made it necessary to take recourse to them in the first place. 
The identification of norms as valid law is another, related issue. Positivists 
maintain that law can be identified simply by reference to a certain social 
fact, some kind of rule of recognition, in a famous formulation;16 but is this 
really the case? Is it not true that for positivists the identification of positive 
law also depends on some kind of extra- legal background assumption; namely 
16 Hؔإا, pp. 97.
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that those norms that have been enacted following a certain procedure for 
example acts of parliament (according to the rule of recognition) ought to be 
regarded as law? The alternative is to deprive any rule of recognition of its 
normative dimension and make it simply a description of the practice of jud-
ges, officials etc. that changes “as we go along”, in h؜ااؘؚءئاؘ؜ء’s words.17 
However, such an understanding clearly fails to capture the actual practice 
of law: judges in a democracy, for instance, regard it as a normative rule that 
one ought to take as law that which has been enacted in the proper way accor-
ding to prescribed procedures and that which does not violate certain mate-
rial standards like fundamental rights. The same is true for the constitution 
of a legal order itself: respecting the constitution is a mandatory rule, not a 
mere habitual disposition of judges and other officials. These are not banal 
findings; on the contrary, they are substantial assumptions about the reasons 
for regarding a norm as valid law. In the case of the constitution, it is clear that 
the obligation to treat it as law cannot be derived from the constitution itself; 
it must stem from other sources. In democratic states it is the idea of popular 
sovereignty that is the ultimate source of legitimacy and thus also of the obli-
gation of judges and officials to treat the constitution as the highest law of the 
land. The question of the authority of the ultimate law giver is therefore the 
precise point where any merely positivist reconstruction of the identification 
of norms as valid law ceases to convince.18
Thus, there are very good reasons to think that the realms of law and mora-
lity are not entirely separate but instead interwoven in intricate ways. Such 
a finding does not mean that law is moralised in any objectionable way. The 
starting point for any interpretation is the positive law: this guides the legal 
understanding in the first place. Respecting positive law means respecting 
democracy, where the positive law is the outcome of democratic processes. 
As indicated above, making the relationship between law and morality 
explicit does not turn law into morality, because the social institution of law 
is not transformed into individuals’ rules of conscience. The problem is rather 
how we are to determine why the positive law is valid, what the positive 
law actually says, and how we can decide what it means in difficult (or even 
sometimes in easy) cases without reference to such background assumptions 
17 Lبؗت؜ؚ h؜ااؘؚءئاؘ؜ء, Philosophische Untersuchungen, n. 83, in Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Tractatus logico- philosophicus, 1984, translation Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Iƹǁƣƾƿiƨƞƿiƺƹƾ, ᇶƿƩ ƣƢiƿiƺƹ, a. M. d. Hƞơkƣƽ/JƺƞơƩiƸ dơƩǀlƿƣ ᄬƣƢƾ.ᄭ, OǃƤƺƽƢ ᇴᇲᇲᇻ, ƹ. ᇺᇵ.
18 This is not a new observation, see e.g. Kؔءا, Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 353.
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regarding morality, for example in the case of current conundrums of reli-
gious freedom. To insist on the connection between law and morality thus 
does not lead to a suspect moralisation of law but to an area of crucial, critical 
transparency where influence that normative theory has on the law and its 
practice is not hidden but rather exposed. 
ᇷ. Eأ؜ئاؘؠآ؟آؚج 
A further important area of legal philosophy concerns the limits of legal 
insight and knowledge. The questions to be answered in this area are ques-
tions about the epistemology of ethics and law. Are we simply exchanging 
opinions when we argue about matters of justice? Is such argument just mutu-
ally shared information about preferences we are entertaining? What is the 
epistemic status of those propositions we make? Are they in one way or ano-
ther comparable to insights in other domains of knowledge, for example, the 
natural sciences or logic? Or are they entirely different, perhaps due to their 
relativity to the tastes of a particular individual? 
These questions are as difficult as they are important because, as indica-
ted above, the law has far- reaching consequences for agents and other human 
beings who are affected by their actions. Therefore, the degree of certainty we 
can gain in this area of human thought is of great significance. We sometimes 
inflict great harm on individuals in the name of normative principles and 
the law, e.g. when we impose sanctions or, even more dramatically, when we 
engage in war. Surely such action can only be legitimate if we have firm epi-
stemological reasons to assume that our judgment is not leading us entirely 
astray.
Whether there are reasons to have some kind of epistemological self- 
assurance must be examined in the context of some more concrete reflec-
tions below.
ᇸ. Oءاآ؟آؚج
Another important question of legal philosophy is that of what exactly norma-
tive propositions refer to. Specifically, are normative propositions, e.g. those 
of the law, comparable to propositions like “in front of my window stands a 
tree”? Are normative propositions referring to entities that exist in the world 
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in the same way that a tree does, or to something else entirely? Are they per-
haps referring to nothing at all, instead simply being chimerical empty con-
cepts without any real meaning, as important voices in the history of ideas 
have argued?19 
These are very contentious questions concerning the stuff the world is 
made of. It is far from clear whether normative entities belong to the fabric of 
the world as many, since a؟ؔاآ, have argued. The question remains unsett-
led today due to the arguments of a forceful stream of so- called moral rea-
lists who think that, in fact, moral entities are as real as any other entity of 
human experience.20 Others, in contrast, object to this kind of theory without 
necessarily denying the rationality of moral and other forms of normative 
argument.21 
ᇹ. Gإآا؜بئ ؔءؗ Mؘا؛آؗآ؟آؚ؜ؖؔ؟ dؘؖب؟ؔإ؜ئؠ
Hبؚآ Gإآا؜بئ, elaborating on a thought formulated in medieval philosophy 
before his time, famously argued that it is a useful exercise to think about the 
foundations of law as if God did not exist.22 This did not imply that Gإآا؜بئ 
did not believe in God. On the contrary, it simply meant that he wanted to 
explore whether religious premises are necessary in order to establish a con-
vincing system of law. He came to the conclusion that this was not the case. In 
his opinion, a natural law theory could be developed on the basis of rational 
insight gained by the exercise of reason that would necessarily lead human 
beings to certain conclusions about the law. He tried to spell out in some detail 
what this could mean concretely in his account of the content of natural law, 
the same account that became a mile stone not only for public international 
19 See e.g. cبؗآ؟ؙ Cؔإءؔأ, The Elimination of Metaphysics through the Logical Analysis of 
Language, translated by Arthur Pap, in Alfred Jules Ayer (ed.), Logical Positivism, Glencoe 
1959, pp. 60 (German Source: cبؗآ؟ؙ Cؔإءؔأ, Die Überwindung der Metaphysik durch 
logische Analyse der Sprache, 1932, S. 219 ff.).
20 See e.g. Dؔة؜ؗ Eءآؖ؛, Taking Morality Seriously, A Defense of Robust Realism, Oxford 
2011.
21 See e.g. e؛آؠؔئ dؖؔء؟آء, Being realistic about reasons, Oxford 2014. On this matter, 
Mؔاا؛؜ؔئ Mؔ؛؟ؠؔءء, Mind and Rights, in Mortimer Sellers (ed.), Law, Reason, and 
Emotion, Cambridge 2017 (cit. Mؔ؛؟ؠؔءء, Mind and Rights), pp. 80, available at www.
ƾƾƽƹ.ơƺƸ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/kkDᇵ- FKjeᄭ.
22 Hبؚآ Gإآا؜بئ, De Iure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres, Vol. I, reproduction of the edition of 1646 
by James Brown Scott, Washington 1913, paragraph 11.
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lƞǂ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƸƺƢƣƽƹ ƞƨƣ Ɵǀƿ Ƥƺƽ ƺƿƩƣƽ ƞƽƣƞƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ ƞƾ ǂƣllèᅬ ƤƽƺƸ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹơƣƻƿ 
of rights to criminal law. 
The project of an inner- worldly ethics and law as a hallmark of Enlightenment 
has been famously summarised by Iؠؠؔءبؘ؟ Kؔءا in the course of his 
philosophy of ethics and law: he stated that human reason needs no higher 
authority above it to determine the content of justified norms, and no other 
motivation than that derived from the command of ethical principles.23 This 
methodological secularism is very important for two reasons. The first reason 
is a pragmatic one: the methodological secularism perspective builds brid-
ges across religious and other ideological divides. If it is possible to argue for 
certain normative principles without taking recourse to such contentious 
background theories, the prospects of reaching consensus across such divi-
des are better. The second reason is a matter of theory. There are simply very 
good reasons to believe that in fact a justificatory theory of ethics and law 
can be outlined satisfactorily without recourse to religious foundations. The 
examples below will give some indications of how this aim may be reached.
ᇺ. e؛ؘ bبؘئا؜آء آؙ fء؜ةؘإئؔ؟؜ئؠ
One important question is whether some normative propositions are uni-
versal.24 This is not to be misunderstood as a denial of the factual variety of 
ethical and legal principles. There is no question about it; ethical and legal sys-
tems vary in many respects. Rather, the question is whether there are reasons 
to believe that there are reflective principles that could command universal 
assent and that are in that sense universally valid, even though they may not 
be fully accepted everywhere today. Universalism should not be mistaken for 
the idea of normative convictions being factually uniform. 
That there are no such universally justified normative propositions is, 
however, far from clear. A bedrock principle of modern legal orders is the 
equal worth of human beings. Certainly, there have been many systems of 
23 Iؠؠؔءبؘ؟ Kؔءا, Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, in: Religion and Rational 
eƩƣƺlƺƽƨǄ, ƣƢiƿƣƢ ƟǄ éllƣƹ hƺƺƢ/Gƣƺƽƨƣ Ƣi Giƺǁƞƹƹi, CƞƸƟƽiƢƨƣ ᇳᇻᇻᇺ, ƻ. ᇷᇹ ᄬGƣƽƸƞƹ 
source: Iؠؠؔءبؘ؟ Kؔءا, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 
1793, Akademie Ausgabe, Band VI, Berlin 1914, S. 3).
24 On this matter see Mؔاا؛؜ؔئ Mؔ؛؟ؠؔءء, Universalism, in Max Planck Encyclopaedia 
of Comparative Constitutional Law, Oxford 2017, available at www.oxcon.ouplaw.com 
ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ᇺgeᇵᅬᇺgᇺᇸᄭ.
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lƞǂèᅬ ƻƞƾƿ ƞƹƢ ƻƽƣƾƣƹƿèᅬ ƿƩƞƿ Ʃƞǁƣ ǁiƺlƞƿƣƢ ƿƩiƾ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ. Bǀƿ ƞƽƣ ƿƩƣƽƣ ƞƹǄ 
good reasons to justify such violations? Is there really an argument for the 
idea that humans in Cape Town are worth less than in Zurich? Is there an 
argument that the worth of women is justifiably less in Islamabad than in 
Paris? What reasons could justify the idea that skin colour is a relevant factor 
for the enjoyment of rights? It seems pretty difficult to formulate any kind of 
argument for such views denying human equality (widespread as they may 
be) that would stand even minimal scrutiny. The same holds true for many 
other such foundational normative principles - a state of affairs which widely 
opens the door for the idea of normative universalism.
Normative universalism is an epistemological point of view, not a politi-
cal doctrine. It defends epistemic egalitarianism by underlining the fact that 
everyone has the potential for insight, whether this person is graduate of the 
University of Zurich or struggling to survive in a slum in Mumbai; of whate-
ver skin colour, religious creed or gender. It takes a stance on the justifica-
tion of basic normative principles and rights, not on the political means for 
developing a social order where such principles count. There is no individual 
or group that enjoys any prerogative in determining the content of univer-
sally justified norms. On the contrary, the elaboration of a universally justi-
fied set of norms is an open- ended process of committed critical thought in 
which nothing but arguments count, as is the case in any other serious intel-
lectual enterprise of humanity. Consequently, to associate universalism with 
euro- or ethnocentrism or even cultural imperialism is way off the mark. To 
defend universalism is not to attempt to impose parochial norms on others: it 
is to defend the possibility of there being an understanding of basic norms of 
human civilisation open to all.
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III.  eƩƣ aƺiƹƿ ƺƤ aƩilƺƾƺƻƩǄ ƺƤ 
Law and Legal Theory
Legal theory and legal philosophy are important in any given legal culture. 
Theoretical insight is important in two key regards. Firstly, it is important for 
successful legal practice. It is impossible to solve difficult (or even simple) pro-
blems of law without a deeper understanding of what the particular issue is 
ƞƟƺǀƿ. é ƾƩƺƽƿ lƺƺk ƞƿ ƿƩƣ ơƩƞllƣƹƨƣƾ ƤƺƽƸǀlƞƿƣƢ ƞƟƺǁƣ ᄬƾƣƣ I.ᄭèᅬ ƤƽƺƸ ƞƹƾǂƣƽƾ 
to the problem of international terrorism to the structure of the international 
lƣƨƞl ƺƽƢƣƽèᅬ illǀƾƿƽƞƿƣƾ ƿƩƞƿ. 
This is not least the case given the internationalisation of law. An under-
standing of the general structure of laws is essential in enabling us to rise 
to the challenges of this new embeddedness of norms in international legal 
ơƺƹƿƣǃƿƾ. eƩƣ Ƣiƾơǀƾƾiƺƹƾ ƞƟƺǀƿ ƩiƣƽƞƽơƩiƣƾ ƺƤ lƞǂèᅬ Ƹǀƹiơiƻƞl, ƾǀƻƽƞƹƞƿiƺƹƞl 
ƺƽ iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞlèᅬ illǀƾƿƽƞƿƣƾ ƿƩiƾ ǁƣƽǄ ơlƣƞƽlǄ
Secondly, theoretical insight is of intrinsic value. Many people in the legal 
profession spend their whole life working with the law, and it seems hard to 
imagine that one devotes one’s life to this particular activity without asking 
some, even passionate, questions about the nature and sense of this kind of 
occupation. Furthermore, the law is a central and constitutive characteristic 
of human culture. There can be no understanding of the human condition 
without sufficiently deep reflection about the law. 
Legal philosophy and legal theory provide critical normative yardsticks for 
the many existential questions we face today. Without such standards, people 
lack reasons to change, and just as importantly, to support and defend signi-
ficant, valuable aspects of a given legal order. Consciousness of the sense and 
meaning of a legal system is a precondition for the survival of some kind of 
decent civilisation of law. 
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Ig. eƩƣƺƽǄ ƺƤ Jǀƾƿiơƣ
The theory of justice is one of the core elements of the theory and philosophy 
of law. The foundations of this theory can be found in the thought of antiquity 
in the work of authors like dآؖإؔاؘئ, éإ؜ئاآا؟ؘ, and a؟ؔاآ; philosophers 
whose ideas are still relevant today. Some important elements of this theory 
stand out: justice, in the view of these thinkers, is a matter of insight. It is not a 
matter of subjective, individual preferences, nor is it related to the fulfilment 
of particular pleasures. Actions are to be regarded as just or unjust, good or 
evil, independently of whether agents actually think this is so. Their deontic 
status is not dependent on the whim of human agents. They are simply just or 
unjust, good or evil, in themselves. 
The content of justice is connected to certain principles, including the princi-
ple that everybody must be given his or her due, which later found its expression 
in Roman law.25 The principle of proportional equality is key in understanding 
why inequality of result may be regarded as just. This is because when proporti-
onal equality is maintained between the criterion of distribution and the good 
distributed, e.g. the grade that a student receives for her work and the quality of 
this work, this distribution is just even though the results are unequal.26 
A controversial issue in this respect is the criterion of distribution. This 
criterion of distribution varies according to the spheres of distribution.27 For 
instance, if we consider the example of grading, performance is crucial in the 
distribution of grades. In other areas, different criteria play a role. Article 12 
of the Constitution28 stipulates that need is an important prerequisite for the 
distribution of at least a basic income that ensures a dignified human life. In 
other areas, “humanity” is central. This is the case, for example, for the distri-
bution of basic rights in a society; this is usually linked to no other precondi-
tion than the humanity of the bearers of such rights. 
25 Corpus Iuris Civilis, Dig. 1.1.10.
26 éإ؜ئاآا؟ؘ, The Nicomachean Ethics, translated by David Ross, edited by Lesley Brown, 
Oxford New York 2009, n. 1129a et seqq.
27 M؜ؖ؛ؘؔ؟ hؔ؟حؘإ, The Spheres of Justice, New York 1983.
28 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 18 April 1999, SR 101; see for an English 
ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/MᇺfJ- dᇵᇸᇻᄭ.
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Since antiquity, justice has been a concept used to evaluate the actions 
of agents. It has also been the foundation for the construction of societies. 
In antique thought, questions about democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, and 
tyranny were wedded to the question of what constitutes a just order. a؟ؔاآ’s 
particular hierarchical vision of a society is certainly not able to command 
much assent today, but one key question he posed in its canonical form still 
persists: what are the consequences for the structure of a decent society if it is 
based on principles of justice?29
Antique thinkers made another important point: they believed that justice 
and goodness are intrinsically linked to a fulfilled, even happy life. dآؖإؔاؘئ 
maintained that it is better to suffer injustice than to do injustice, implying 
that an ethical life is an intrinsic good, more important even than what one 
may have to endure if one prefers not to inflict injustice.30 This leads to the 
idea that there is intrinsic value in a legitimate legal order that mirrors an 
ethical life on the social and institutional level. It seemed to these thinkers, 
and with good reason, that this too is a vital element of a decent human life. 
These questions have been alive through the centuries, circling around 
various issues formulated in the past. A recent example for such reflection 
is the theory of Jآ؛ء cؔت؟ئ: the single most influential theory of justice of 
the second half of the 20th century. He developed behind the so- called “veil of 
ignorance” two principles of justice that he thought rational, risk- averse indi-
viduals would agree upon, if they were unaware of their particular privileges, 
talents, and propensities. The first principle is universal freedom. The second 
principle is that an unequal distribution of material goods can only be justi-
fied if: a) the worst- off still profit absolutely, and b) such a system is based on 
the principle of equal access of everybody to public office. In cؔت؟ئ’ theory 
too, equality is the guiding star of reflections about justice, importantly on 
two levels: on the level of concrete principles and on the level of the const-
ruction of the original position where the imagined agents decide upon the 
principles. The veil of ignorance is nothing other than an expository device 
for the basic intuition of human equality, an intuition that is at the core of 
what justice is about.31 
29 See a؟ؔاآ, Politeia, in Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. V and VI, translated by Chris Emlyn- 
Jƺƹƣƾ, CƞƸƟƽiƢƨƣ/LƺƹƢƺƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇵ.
30 a؟ؔاآ, Gorgias, in Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. III, translated by W.R.M. Lamb, 
Cambridge 1967, n. 469b et seq.
31 Jآ؛ء cؔت؟ئ, é eƩƣƺƽǄ ƺƤ Jǀƾƿiơƣ, CƞƸƟƽiƢƨƣ/LƺƹƢƺƹ ᇳᇻᇹᇳ. Fƺƽ ƞƹ ƞlƿƣƽƹƞƿiǁƣ, ƢƣƽiǁƣƢ 
from a discussion of cؔت؟ئ, see e.g. éؠؔإاجؔ dؘء, The Idea of Justice, Cambridge 2009.
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From this discussion, at least six principles may be derived that are helpful in 
understanding the content of justice. The first one is the necessity of having 
equal standards to be applied to different agents. Second, these standards 
have to be practically applied in an equal way to different agents in concrete 
circumstances. Third, equality forms a default principle of distribution. If 
there is no criterion for an unequal distribution, only an equal distribution is 
just. Fourth, just treatment presupposes the reasonable determination of the 
content of criteria of distribution in the respective sphere of distribution. For 
example, to distribute rights on the basis of skin- colour evidently does not 
meet these sometimes quite demanding standards. Justice demands to main-
tain proportional equality  between the criterion of distribution and the good 
distributed. Fifth, restitutive justice serves the purpose of maintaining a just 
distribution of goods (material and immaterial, like rights) within society. 
Finally, and importantly, there is a baseline of equality that has to be protec-
ted in a just order. This baseline is set by the equal dignity of human beings. 
Certainly there are cases where inequality of results is just, e.g. in the obvious, 
aforementioned case of the distribution of grades. But any inequality has to 
be reconcilable with this basic equality of human beings, a principle rom the 
based on the dignity of autonomous persons.32 
32 See on the debate about dignity Mؔاا؛؜ؔئ Mؔ؛؟ؠؔءء, Human Dignity and Autonomy 
iƹ MƺƢƣƽƹ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl OƽƢƣƽƾ, iƹ MiơƩƣl cƺƾƣƹƤƣlƢ/éƹƢƽǇƾ dǇjó ᄬƣƢƾ.ᄭ, eƩƣ OǃƤƺƽƢ 
Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, Oxford 2012 (cit. Mؔ؛؟ؠؔءء, Human 
Dignity), pp. 370; Mؔاا؛؜ؔئ Mؔ؛؟ؠؔءء, The Good Sense of Dignity: Six Antidotes 
to Dignity Fatigue in Ethics and Law, in Christopher McCrudden (ed.), Understanding 
Human Dignity, Oxford 2013, pp. 594; C؛إ؜ئاآأ؛ؘإ MؖCإبؘؗؗء, In Pursuit of 
Human Dignity: An Introduction to Current Debates, in Christopher McCrudden (ed.), 
Understanding Human Dignity, 2013, pp. 1.
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Rights Idea
Today, human rights are something like a secular Decalogue of our modern 
era. They are not, however, a modern invention: rights and the reflection 
about rights have a very long history, in Natural Law and in social contract 
theory, for example. An important more recent example is the thought con-
cerning rights in the Enlightenment, based on practical reason and the parti-
cular concept of human dignity. 
Kؔءا’s categorical imperative is a crucial expression of this kind of thin-
king. The categorical imperative is at the core of Kؔءا’s ethics and is wedded 
to the idea of universalisation. It holds: 
“Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time 
will that it become a universal law.”33 
This means that any ethical principle followed by an individual has to be 
able to survive the test of universalisation. Only if it is thinkable that such a 
rule could be applied to everybody can it be a legitimate rule. 
The second version of Kؔءا’s categorical imperative is the so- called princi-
ple of humanity: 
“So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any 
other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.“34 
33 Iؠؠؔءبؘ؟ Kؔءا, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in Immanuel Kant, 
Practical Philosophy, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, translated 
and edited by Mary J. Gregor, Cambridge 2008 (cit. Kؔءا, Groundwork), pp. 37 (German 
source: Iؠؠؔءبؘ؟ Kؔءا, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 1785, Akademie 
Ausgabe, Band IV, Berlin 1911, S. 421: “Handle nur nach der Maxime, durch die du zugleich 
wollen kannst, dass sie ein allgemeines Gesetz werde.”).
34 Kؔءا, Groundwork, pp. 37 (German source: “Handle so, dass du die Menschheit, sowohl in 
deiner Person als in der Person eines jeden anderen, jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals 
bloß als Mittel brauchst.”).
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This is an exacting statement; it means that every individual is the ultimate 
limiting condition of actions by individuals and social order. It is thus the 
principle of radical humanism.35 
The idea of universalisation is mirrored in the concept of right: 
“Right is therefore the sum of the conditions under which the choice of one can be 
united with the choice of another in accordance with the universal law of freedom.”36 
There is one natural subjective right under this principle of law that incor-
porates the categorical imperative in legal thinking. This natural subjective 
right is 
“freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it 
can coexist with the freedom of any other in accordance with the universal law, is 
the only original right belonging to every human being by virtue of his humanity.”37 
This is not just a right to freedom; it is the subjective right to universally 
equal freedom, based on the equal dignity of human beings. Kؔءا’s formula-
tion thus weaves together normative elements that continue to be foundatio-
nal for the human rights project today.
35 This principle had a major impact on the case law of different legal systems of the world. 
See for an overview Mؔ؛؟ؠؔءء, Human Dignity, pp. 370.
36 Kؔءا, Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 353 (German source: „Das Recht ist also der Inbegriff 
der Bedingungen, unter denen die Willkür des einen mit der Willkür des anderen nach 
einem allgemeinen Gesetz der Freiheit zusammen vereinigt werden kann.“).
37 Kؔءا, Metaphysics of Morals pp. 353. Please note that the German original is gender 
neutral (Mensch): „Freiheit (Unabhängigkeit von eines anderen nöthigender Willkür), 
sofern sie mit jedes Anderen Freiheit nach einem allgemeinen Gesetz zusammen bestehen 
kann, ist dieses einzige, ursprüngliche, jedem Menschen kraft seiner Menschheit zuste-
hende Recht.“ Therefore, the translation has been adapted.
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gII.  CƺƹƿƣƸƻƺƽƞƽǄ HǀƸƞƹ 
Rights Theory
Questions about the foundations of human rights have not stopped to pro-
foundly engage people. The contemporary human rights theory is a place of 
vivid debate. It draws from the many thoughts in the history of ideas that have 
been formulated beyond those examples mentioned above. One important 
consideration is that of why we actually protect human rights. It is often said 
that human rights are protected by virtue of humanity alone. What does this 
mean? Is it the agency and personhood of human beings that is foundational 
in this regard? Are interests and needs central? Is the protection of capabili-
ties, i.e. the factual ability to lead a complete and flourishing life, the source of 
our rights? Are rights best understood as a political project of the internatio-
nal community? Or, in fact, is human dignity the foundation of human rights? 
These are important questions and there is currently a lively and demanding 
discussion around such matters, engaging a huge variety of people across the 
globe.38 
A starting point for solving some of these implied problems may be to for-
mulate three elements that need to be incorporated into any convincing the-
ory of human rights. First, a theory of human rights has to contain a theory 
of the basic universal human goods which are to be justifiably protected. 
Human rights do not protect everything, only certain qualified goods, e.g. life, 
respect for the person, bodily integrity, freedom, and the legitimate equality. 
Any theory of human rights must account for the importance of these parti-
cular goods and, in particular, for the equal importance of these goods for any 
human being. 
Second, a theory of human rights must include a political theory of the 
social conditions necessary for the enjoyment of these basic universal human 
goods. It is not always obvious that rights are the best means through which 
to obtain even unquestionably crucial human goods. There are certainly such 
goods that cannot be attained through the protection of rights. For example, 
38 For an overview see Mؔ؛؟ؠؔءء, Mind and Rights, pp. 80.
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love is evidently a very important element of human existence, but clearly, a 
right to love could not ensure that everyone would enjoy this particular ele-
ment of a fulfilled human life. 
Third, normative principles are central. There is no theory of human rights 
that does not contain such normative principles. Principles of justice are 
important because they clarify why only a system of equal rights is a legiti-
mate system of rights. In addition, of key relevance are principles of obligatory 
human solidarity and respect for human beings that, in particular, justify our 
concern for others; something which is embodied in human rights themselves 
ƞƹƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƺƟliƨƞƿiƺƹƾ ƿƩƣǄ ƣƹƿƞil Ƥƺƽ ƺǀƽ iƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƾ ƞƹƢèᅬ ǀlƿiƸƞƿƣlǄèᅬ Ƥƺƽ 
all of us. 
Justice, solidarity and respect for human persons, equality, and our concern 
for others are the springs of rights. They are the normative sources at the very 
foundation of the project of creating a national, regional, and international 
legal order where human rights in fact matter and are expressed in institu-
tions of democracy, the constitutional state under the rule of law and public 
iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞl lƞǂèᅬ ƺƹƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Ƹƺƽƣ ƹƺƟlƣ ƞƾƻiƽƞƿiƺƹƾ iƹ ƩǀƸƞƹiƿǄ’ƾ ƺƤƿƣƹ ƾǀƽ-
prisingly tragic history.
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The purpose of this text is to introduce legal sociology in Switzerland. As a 
first step, the location of legal sociology as a discipline within legal science is 
discussed and the methodology of this sub- discipline of the law is explained. 
Thereafter, a case study is employed to exemplify how legal sociology can be 
used to analyse the interrelationship between society, technology, and the 
law in the context of both the proper functioning of the specific form of direct 
democracy that exists in Switzerland and the constitutional safeguards that 
are in place to secure its prerequisites. Techno- economic developments have 
fundamentally changed the media sector. In Switzerland, this has raised the 
question of whether the personalisation of news reporting conflicts with the 
constitutional duties of the Swiss Radio and Television Corporation (SRG), 
ƿƩƣèƸƞiƹ ƻǀƟliơ ƾƣƽǁiơƣ ƟƽƺƞƢơƞƾƿƣƽ. eƩiƾ Ƽǀƣƾƿiƺƹ ƞƽiƾƣƾ ƾƻƣơiƤiơƞllǄ ƺǀƿ ƺƤ 
the formation of Admeira, a joint venture between SRG, Ringier (a media 
company) and Swisscom (the incumbent Swiss telecom company). Admeira 
allows SRG to benefit from Swisscom’s large customer data volumes and 
broad experience in the use of targeting technologies, but raises some con-
cern regarding their constitutional function in Switzerland.
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I. hƩƞƿ iƾ Lƣƨƞl dƺơiƺlƺƨǄ?
ᇳ. D؜ئؖ؜أ؟؜ءؘ
Legal sociology, together with legal history and legal philosophy, constitutes 
one of the foundations of the law as a discipline of scientific study. A com-
mon feature and particularity of these sub- disciplines of the law is their close 
relationship with a neighbouring discipline outside the legal realm. In the 
case of legal sociology, this is obviously the relationship with the discipline 
of sociology. According to Eؠ؜؟ؘ Dبإ؞؛ؘ؜ؠ, one of the discipline’s founders, 
sociology is a science that studies social phenomena as social facts, that is 
manners of acting, thinking, and feeling in society that can be observed from 
an objective perspective.1 Dبإ؞؛ؘ؜ؠ understands sociology as a positivistic 
science. In this context, positivism entails two things: firstly, a particular view 
of social phenomena as objective data and secondly, a value- neutral way of 
examining these phenomena.2 Consequently, the key purpose of sociology is 
to observe social facts as objective data in a value- neutral way. This metho-
dology contrasts with that of the law, which is a normative discipline, opera-
ting in accordance with a societal perception of how things should be. Both 
the law generally and legal doctrine in particular are preoccupied with the 
form of the law, that is to say, they are fundamentally concerned with the 
systematic relationship between various abstract principles, which can then 
be used in order to logically produce decisions in concrete cases. The parti-
cularity of legal language is its performative quality.3 For example, words in a 
statute or a contract do not merely describe a situation or narrate a story; they 
are supposed to have practical effects in the lives of individuals and within 
society.
1 Eؠ؜؟ؘ Dبإ؞؛ؘ؜ؠ, eƩƣ cǀlƣƾ ƺƤ dƺơiƺlƺƨiơƞl MƣƿƩƺƢ, ƿƽƞƹƾlƞƿƣƢ ƟǄ h. D. Hƞllƾ, ƣƢiƿƣƢ 
and with a new introduction by Steven Lukes, New York 2013, p. 20.
2 cآؘؚإ Cآااؘإإؘ؟؟, The Sociology of Law: An Introduction, 2nd edition, Oxford 1992, p. 11.
3 Jآ؛ء L. éبئا؜ء, Hƺǂ ƿƺ Dƺ eƩiƹƨƾ ǂiƿƩ hƺƽƢƾ, ᇴƹƢ ƣƢiƿiƺƹ, OǃƤƺƽƢ ᇳᇻᇹᇷ ᄬᇳᇻᇸᇴᄭ.
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Legal sociology does not belong to the formally closed realm of legal doc-
trine nor does it merely describe legal facts in an objective way. Its paradoxi-
cal location in- between the disciplines of law and sociology is reflected in the 
various different names that are used to describe the field at issue; besides 
legal sociology, the terms sociology of law, sociological jurisprudence, juri-
sprudential sociology, law and society, sociolegal studies, and legal realism 
are also frequently encountered within the academic literature. While most 
of these terms lack precise contours, in this chapter, the term “legal socio-
logy” is used in order to emphasise that the subject we are dealing with is a 
sub- field of the law as opposed to a sub- field of sociology. Legal sociologists 
can be defined as jurists who are particularly interested in studying the law 
from an interdisciplinary perspective. Rather than viewing the law as a for-
mally closed and scientifically self- sufficient system, they observe the law as 
a realm embedded within broader societal dynamics. To properly adhere to 
this methodology, legal sociologists must temporarily externalise their obser-
vation perspective; they must examine the law from a position that is inde-
pendent from the discipline itself. On the other hand, legal sociologists do 
not content themselves with simply observing and describing the law from an 
external, sociological perspective; instead, they look to re- import what they 
have learned back into the law, in order to improve the law’s workings.
The origins of the scientific study of law and society date back to the 
threshold of the 20th century when two lawyers, Eبؘؚء E؛إ؟؜ؖ؛ (in Europe) 
and cآئؖآؘ aآبءؗ (in the United States), together argued that a formalist 
conception of the law (where law is encapsulated in a closed and self- sufficient 
realm of jurisprudence) should be rejected. In order to oppose and overcome 
legal formalism, they invented sociological jurisprudence as a field of research 
that was, as aآبءؗ had famously stated in 1910, more concerned with law 
in action than law in books.4 They claimed that any scientific study of legal 
practice in general is a sub- domain of sociology.ᇷ Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƟlƣƸ ǂiƿƩ 
conceiving legal science as a sub- domain of sociology is that one overlooks the 
fundamental difference between “is” and “ought”. Whereas the statement that 
something “is” the case is a description of observed facts, as sociological stu-
dies do, the statement that something “ought” to be the case, as the law does, 
4 cآئؖآؘ aآبءؗ, Law in Books and Law in Action, in American Law Review, 44, 1910, 
pp. 12.
ᇷ Eبؘؚء E؛إ؟؜ؖ؛, FǀƹƢƞƸƣƹƿƞl aƽiƹơiƻlƣƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dƺơiƺlƺƨǄ ƺƤ Lƞǂ, ƿƽƞƹƾlƞƿƣƢ ƟǄ hƞlƿƣƽ 
L. Mƺll, Nƣǂ Bƽǀƹƾǂiơk ᇴᇲᇲᇴ ᄬᇳᇻᇳᇵᄭ, ƻ. ᇴᇷ; cآئؖآؘ aآبءؗ, eƩƣ dơƺƻƣ ƞƹƢ aǀƽƻƺƾƣ ƺƤ 
dƺơiƺlƺƨiơƞl JǀƽiƾƻƽǀƢƣƹơƣ, iƹ HƞƽǁƞƽƢ Lƞǂ cƣǁiƣǂ, ᇴᇶᄬᇺᄭ, ᇳᇻᇳᇳ, ƻƻ. ᇷᇻᇳ, ƻ. ᇷᇻᇶ.
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prescribes a normative end. Although it was some time ago that the pioneers 
were trying to resolve the paradox of engaging in a sociological analysis of 
the law, the distinction between description (“is”) and prescription (“ought”) 
continues to present a methodological challenge to legal sociology.
ᇴ. Mؘا؛آؗ
While legal sociology is not a sub- discipline of sociology, it has, ever since 
its beginnings, been influenced by the writings of classic sociological theo-
rists including éبؚبئاؘ Cآؠاؘ ᄬᇳᇹᇻᇺᅬᇳᇺᇷᇹᄭ, Kؔإ؟ Mؔإث ᄬᇳᇺᇳᇺᅬᇳᇺᇺᇵᄭ, Eؠ؜؟ؘ 
Dبإ؞؛ؘ؜ؠ ᄬᇳᇺᇷᇺᅬᇳᇻᇳᇹᄭ, Mؔث hؘؘؕإ ᄬᇳᇺᇸᇶᅬᇳᇻᇴᇲᄭ, eؔ؟ؖآاا aؔإئآءئ ᄬᇳᇻᇲᇴᅬ
ᇳᇻᇹᇻᄭ, N؜؞؟ؔئ Lب؛ؠؔءء ᄬᇳᇻᇴᇹᅬᇳᇻᇻᇺᄭ ƞƹƢ Jüإؘؚء Hؘؔؕإؠؔئ (born in 1929), 
to mention just a few. Adopting a sociological perspective enables the legal 
sociologist to take into account social facts which offer important information 
about the law’s causes as well as its effects. Legal sociology is thus an empiri-
cal science of the law, analysing its emergence and functioning. The approach 
is decidedly objectivist; it aims at a value- free observation and description of 
factual developments, without letting normative preconceptions dictate the 
outcome. To better understand the operation and effect of the law, legal socio-
logy builds on or develops theories offering perceptions of the social structure 
and the law’s function within a society of ever- growing complexity. 
What exactly is a theory? A theory is generally defined as an abstract scien-
tific idea or model that is used to describe a certain aspect of reality. Besides 
simply describing this reality, a theory normally also attempts to provide 
explanatory (causal) statements. A social theory, more specifically, aims at 
explaining social phenomena. To meet the ambitions of science, verification 
or falsification through empiric observation is also required. The purpose of 
using theory in the social sciences is primarily complexity management: a 
theory provides for a simplified model of the reality segment that the resear-
cher is attempting to observe, describe and test. Without such simplification, 
the observed segment would be overly complex and the observation would 
not be distinct from noise and therefore be unsuitable to draw meaningful 
conclusions from it. 
Thus, a theory enables a social scientist to make certain assumptions 
about the world and to build analyses, comparisons and predictions from 
this assumption without being permanently required to take account of the 
world’s full complexity in his work. Regarding the ways in which theories 
114 Christoph Beat Graber: Legal Sociology
materialise, it is roughly possible to distinguish between inductive and deduc-
tive approaches. Inductive theories come about through the observation of a 
certain aspect of reality, followed by a subsequent explanation that needs to 
be generalised and then empirically tested. Deductive theories, in contrast, 
build on hypotheses that are designed by a theorist through abstract thin-
king. The persuasiveness of a given hypothesis is then measured in relation to 
the results that its exposure to empiric verification or falsification produces.
As a rule, all types of social theories may find application in legal sociology. 
It should be noted, however, that if several theories are simultaneously used 
to analyse a specific reality, special attention must be paid to their compatibi-
lity with one another. This is one methodological challenge to legal sociology; 
an even bigger challenge, however, relates to the aforementioned distinction 
between “is” and “ought”. The question is how to transfer the knowledge that 
is gained within the descriptive context of social science to the realm of legal 
practice, which is where normative conclusions are drawn and performa-
tive effects result. The impossibility to meld the law and the social sciences 
is a paradox. The way out of this paradox is to construct legal sociology as 
a two- step method of socio- legal analysis. The first step involves an empiric 
observation and description of real legal problems from the perspective of 
social science and social theory. While this is necessary to fully understand 
the social dimension of the legal problems at issue, a second step must follow 
where an attempt is made to re- import the gained insights back into the legal 
system. This second step requires a change of perspective from describing 
social facts to prescribing normative ends and is essential if legal sociology is 
to contribute to the law’s improvement.
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II.  Lƞǂ, dƺơiƣƿǄ ƞƹƢ Diƽƣơƿ 
Democracy 
The political system in Switzerland is characterised by a specific form of direct 
democracy that exists within the framework of the Federal Constitution.ᇸ In 
the following section, I will first analyse the autonomy of the political system 
in Switzerland from a sociological perspective. In a second step, the societal 
preconditions of direct democracy in Switzerland will be identified. Third, 
I will elaborate on how the Constitution enlists mass media in general and 
public service broadcasting in particular to contribute to the effective functi-
oning of democracy in Switzerland. 
ᇳ. aآ؟؜ا؜ؖؔ؟ Aباآءآؠج 
When I refer to political autonomy, something particular is in my mind: the 
understanding of politics as an autonomous sub- system of society in the 
sense of N؜؞؟ؔئ Lب؛ؠؔءء’s theory of autopoietic social systems. Autonomy 
of politics in this sense implies that the system is capable of self- reproduction 
according to its own rules, that is, political rules (not, for example, economic 
or religious rules). Lب؛ؠؔءء conceptualises society itself as an autopoietic 
system; this term is used to describe something that is reproducing its ele-
ments out of its own elements.ᇹ The elements of a social system are com-
munications, as opposed to humans, or actions of humans, or other agents.ᇺ 
Lب؛ؠؔءء defines communication as the synthesis of three selections: the 
selection of “utterance”, the selection of “information”, and the selection of 
ᇸ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ᇳᇺ éƻƽil ᇳᇻᇻᇻ, dc ᇳᇲᇳ; ƾƣƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ EƹƨliƾƩ 
ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/MᇺfJ-dᇵᇸᇻᄭ. 
ᇹ N؜؞؟ؔئ Lب؛ؠؔءء, dƺơiƞl dǄƾƿƣƸƾ, ƿƽƞƹƾlƞƿƣƢ ƟǄ JƺƩƹ BƣƢƹƞƽǅ ǂiƿƩ Diƽk Bƞƣơkƣƽ, 
dƿƞƹƤƺƽƢ ᇳᇻᇻᇷ ᄬᇳᇻᇺᇶᄭ.
ᇺ Hبؚ؛ Bؔثاؘإ, Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Autopoietic Legal Systems, in Annual 
cƣǁiƣǂ ƺƤ Lƞǂ ƞƹƢ dƺơiƞl dơiƣƹơƣ, gƺl. ᇻ, ᇴᇲᇳᇵ, ƻƻ. ᇳᇸᇹ, ƻ. ᇳᇹᇸ; Hؔءئ- Gؘآإؚ Mآؘ؟؟ؘإ, The 
Radical Luhmann, New York 2012, pp. 19.
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“understanding”.9 In a communication process, the distinctions of utterance 
and information of the first communication are understood by the second 
one. While an utterance is an act of expression, information refers to the dis-
tinction between the act and its content. The existence of a system implies a 
distinction between the system and its environment. Every system constitu-
tes itself according to one specific (binary) difference, and everything that 
is not part of the system is in the environment. For the political system, for 
example, the juxtaposition of the (binary) values of “power” and “not power” 
is constitutive. Systems are operatively closed, which implies that for their 
reproduction they simply monitor their own operations and exclude every 
other consideration. Within society, a number of sub- systems have differenti-
ated: they differ from each other in the specific function that they fulfil within 
ƾƺơiƣƿǄ. aƺliƿiơƾ iƾ ƺƹƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƾƺơiƞl ƾǄƾƿƣƸƾ ƿƩƞƿ Lب؛ؠؔءء distinguishes in 
his writings. Other sub- systems of society that he covers in his scholarship 
include the economy, science, art, religion, education, mass media, and family.
The function of the political system is “providing the capacity that is requi-
red for assuring collectively binding decisions”.10 Although the political system 
is distinct from the legal system (whose function it is to generalise normative 
expectations), both legislation (the acts of making and enacting statutes) and 
constitutions provide for important mechanisms of structural coupling bet-
ween the two systems. Statutes are simultaneously important for the law and 
for politics. In legislation, the law prescribes the form that statutes must have. 
aƺliƿiơƾ, ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƺƿƩƣƽ ƩƞƹƢ, ƽƣƼǀiƽƣƾ ƿƩƣ ơƽƣƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƾƿƞƿǀƿƣƾ iƹ ƺƽƢƣƽ ƿƺ Ɵƣ 
able to implement political power. The legal system is internally structured 
through the distinction between its centre and periphery.11 While courts are 
at the centre of the legal system, legislation (and contracts) is located in its 
periphery. It is the periphery which is the contact zone between social sys-
tems. The periphery is thus the place where a democratic impulse coming 
from the political system may trigger changes within the legal system. As an 
example one may think of a newly adopted statute that compels the courts 
to adapt an established case law. A constitution is a second mechanism of 
9 N؜؞؟ؔئ Lب؛ؠؔءء, The Autopoiesis of Social Systems, in R. F. Geyer and Johannes van 
Ƣƣƽ kƺǀǂƣƹ ᄬƣƢƾ.ᄭ, dƺơiƺơǄƟƣƽƹƣƿiơ aƞƽƞƢƺǃƣƾ: OƟƾƣƽǁƞƿiƺƹ, Cƺƹƿƽƺl, ƞƹƢ Eǁƺlǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ 
dƣlƤ- dƿƣƣƽiƹƨ dǄƾƿƣƸƾ, LƺƹƢƺƹ ᇳᇻᇺᇸ, ƻƻ. ᇳᇹᇴ, ƻ. ᇳᇹᇷ.
10 N؜؞؟ؔئ Lب؛ؠؔءء, The Reality of the Mass Media, translated by Kathleen Cross, Stanford 
ᇴᇲᇲᇲ ᄬᇳᇻᇻᇷ; ơiƿ. Lب؛ؠؔءء, eƩƣ cƣƞliƿǄ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Mƞƾƾ MƣƢiƞᄭ, ƻ. ᇺᇶ.
11 Bؔثاؘإ, ƻ. ᇳᇹᇸ.
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structural coupling between the law and politics.12 The constitution of a 
nation state has a double existence as a supreme text of legal authority and 
as a political foundation of society. A nation state constitution thus provides 
“political solutions for the problem of self- reference of the legal system and legal 
solutions for the problem of self- reference of the political system”.13 
The democratic potential of a political system depends on the extent to 
which it is able to maintain its autopoiesis.14 The state itself is defined by 
Lب؛ؠؔءء as the self- description of the political system. It is possible to 
observe the state’s operations and its autopoiesis both from the perspective of 
society and from the perspective of interactions between citizens. From the 
perspective of society, a state itself is autopoietic as long as it is able to shape 
its self- reproduction autonomously both internally (i.e. in relation to the sub- 
systems of politics) and externally (i.e. in relation to the governmental and 
non- governmental entities in its environment). From the perspective of inter-
actions, a state can enhance its autopoiesis by maximising the conditions for 
citizen participation in the political process.ᇳᇷ
HiƾƿƺƽiơƞllǄ, ƿƩƣ ƢiƤƤƣƽƣƹƿiƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƻƺliƿiơƾ ƞƾ ƞƹ ƞǀƿƺƹƺƸƺǀƾ ƾƺơiƞl ƾǄƾ-
tem developed in stages. In the terminology used by Jüإؘؚء Hؘؔؕإؠؔئ, 
these stages can be described as “the bourgeois state”, followed by “the bour-
geois constitutional state” and finally “the democratic constitutional state”. 
Reconstructed within a framework of systems theory, these terms articulate 
self- descriptions of the political system at different junctures in the process 
of societal differentiation. In this sense, the first stage of the bourgeois state 
describes an absolutist rule establishing “a sovereign state power with a mono-
poly on coercive force as the sole source of legal authority”.ᇳᇸ The second stage 
of the bourgeois constitutional state describes a condition of advanced poli-
tical differentiation which enables citizens to claim subjective public rights 
against the sovereign power before an independent authority.ᇳᇹ The division 
12 N؜؞؟ؔئ Lب؛ؠؔءء, Law as a Social System, translated by Klaus Alex Ziegert, Oxford 2004 
(1993; cit. Lب؛ؠؔءء, Lƞǂ ƞƾ ƞ dƺơiƞl dǄƾƿƣƸᄭ, ƻƻ. ᇶᇲᇷ.
13 Lب؛ؠؔءء, Law as a Social System, p. 410.
14 dؔءؗإؔ Bإؔؠؔء, eƩƣ éǀƿƺƻƺiƣƿiơ dƿƞƿƣ: CƺƸƸǀƹiơƞƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ DƣƸƺơƽƞƿiơ aƺƿƣƹƿiƞl iƹ 
ƿƩƣ Nƣƿ, iƹ Jƺǀƽƹƞl ƺƤ ƿƩƣ éƸƣƽiơƞƹ dƺơiƣƿǄ ƺƤ IƹƤƺƽƸƞƿiƺƹ dơiƣƹơƣ, ᇳᇻᇻᇶ, ᇶᇷ ᄬᇸᄭ, ƻƻ. ᇵᇷᇺ, 
ƻ. ᇵᇸᇷ.
ᇳᇷ Bإؔؠؔء, ƻ. ᇵᇸᇷ.
ᇳᇸ Jüإؘؚء Hؘؔؕإؠؔئ, The Theory of Communicative Action: Lifeworld and System: a 
Critique of Functionalist Reason, translated by Thomas MacCarthy, Vol. 2, Cambridge 
ᇴᇲᇲᇹ ᄬᇳᇻᇺᇳᄭ, ƻ. ᇵᇷᇺ.
ᇳᇹ Hؘؔؕإؠؔئ, ƻƻ. ᇵᇷᇻ.
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between executive and judicial powers leads to the taming of the adminis-
trative apparatus as individuals can now go to court to have their liberties 
protected. Finally, the stage of the democratic constitutional state descri-
bes the condition of a fully differentiated political system with far- reaching 
inclusion of citizens in the reproduction of political communication. Within 
a democratically constituted order, citizens possess not only individual liber-
ties which they can enforce against the state (negative freedom) but also the 
right to equally participate in the political discourse (positive freedom).ᇳᇺ The 
separation of power now manifests itself as an institutional differentiation of 
legislative, executive and judicial state functions. 
aƺliƿiơƞl ƞǀƿƺƹƺƸǄ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƸƺơƽƞƿiơ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ƾƿƞƿƣ ƻƽƣƾǀƻƻƺƾƣƾ ƿƩƞƿ 
decisions of governmental authorities are prepared, accompanied and che-
cked as a part of the competition between opinions “in the marketplace of 
ideas”. The marketplace metaphor, particularly popular in the United States, 
was coined by O؟؜ةؘإ hؘءؘؗ؟؟ Hآ؟ؠؘئ, a famous justice of the US Supreme 
Court (and mastermind of the American tradition of legal realism). In a 1919 
dissenting opinion, Justice Hآ؟ؠؘئ wrote “that the ultimate good desired is 
ƟƢƻƻƢƹ)ƹƢƞƠƨƢơ)Ɵǀ)ƣƹƢƢ)ƻƹƞơƢ)ƩƵ)ƩơƢƞƺ –)ƻƨƞƻ)ƻƨƢ)ƟƢƺƻ)ƶƣ)ƻƹƼƻƨ)Ʃƺ)ƻƨƢ)ƷƶƾƢƹ)ƶƣ)ƻƨƢ)
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market”.19
In many existing constitutional democracies, political participation is limi-
ted to the right to participate in the election of the parliament or the president. 
In Switzerland, however, instruments of direct democracy have been broade-
ned over several constitutional reforms over the passage of time (a mandatory 
ƽƣƤƣƽƣƹƢǀƸ ƺƹ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ƞƸƣƹƢƸƣƹƿƾ Ʃƞƾ ƣǃiƾƿƣƢ ƾiƹơƣ ᇳᇺᇶᇺ, ƞ ǁƺlǀƹ-
ƿƞƽǄ ƽƣƤƣƽƣƹƢǀƸ ƺƹ ƾƿƞƿǀƿƺƽǄ ƞƸƣƹƢƸƣƹƿƾ ƾiƹơƣ ᇳᇺᇹᇶ ƞƹƢ ƞ ƻƺƻǀlƞƽ iƹiƿiƞƿiǁƣ 
Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƽƣǁiƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƾiƹơƣ ᇳᇺᇻᇳᄭ. NƺƿƞƟlǄ, ƿƩƣ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ ǁƺƿƣ ƞƹƢ 
to be elected was only extended to women at the federal level after the vote 
ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƣƺƻlƣ ƺƤ ᇹ FƣƟƽǀƞƽǄ ᇳᇻᇹᇳ, ǂƩilƣ ƞƿ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl lƣǁƣl ƿƩiƾ Ʃƞƾ ƺƹlǄ Ɵƣƣƹ 
the case across the country since 1990.
ᇴ. D؜إؘؖا Dؘؠآؖإؔؖج
The model of direct democracy existing in Switzerland depends on socie-
tal preconditions which it cannot guarantee itself, as well as on cultural 
ᇳᇺ Hؘؔؕإؠؔئ, ƻƻ. ᇵᇸᇲ.
19 éƟƽƞƸƾ ǁ fƹiƿƣƢ dƿƞƿƣƾ ᇴᇷᇲ f.d. ᇸᇳᇸ ᄬᇳᇻᇳᇻᄭ, Mƽ.è Jǀƾƿiơƣ HƺlƸƣƾ Diƾƾƣƹƿiƹƨ, ᇸᇵᇲ 
ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/GKᇵg- keᇺLᄭ.
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resources that need to be renewed permanently. Of these required societal 
preconditions, the following are the most important: acceptance of dissen-
ting opinions and a spirit of compromise, tolerance towards others, a sense 
of civic public spirit, a living civil society and plural societal structures. Jآ؛ء 
dابؔإا M؜؟؟, an influential thinker of liberalism, considered the confronta-
tion of dissenting opinions as one of the key preconditions of social progress:
“It is hardly possible to overrate the value, in the present low state of human improve-
ment, of placing human beings in contact with persons dissimilar to themselves, and 
ƾƩƻƨ)ƴƶơƢƺ)ƶƣ)ƻƨƶƼƧƨƻ)ƞƵơ)ƞƠƻƩƶƵ)ƼƵƳƩƲƢ)ƻƨƶƺƢ)ƾƩƻƨ)ƾƨƩƠƨ)ƻƨƢǀ)ƞƹƢ)ƣƞƴƩƳƩƞƹ … SƼƠƨ)
communication has always been, and is peculiarly in the present age, one of the pri-
mary sources of progress.”20
Further, Iؠؠؔءبؘ؟ Kؔءا, the eminent philosopher of the enlightenment, 
ơƺiƹƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƿƣƽƸ “ƣǃƿƣƹƢƣƢ ǂƞǄ ƺƤ ƿƩiƹkiƹƨ” ᄬƣƽǂƣiƿƣƽƿƣ Dƣƹkǀƹƨƾƞƽƿᄭ ƿƺ 
describe an individual’s capability to also consider a problem from the per-
spective of an adversary. In Kؔءا’s words: “Through always impartially look-
ing at my judgements from the perspective of others I hope to get a third point 
which is better than my previous one.”21 
This capability to include the adversary’s perspective in one’s own con-
siderations is a key precondition for rational discourse and any form of 
democratic politics. To ensure the regeneration of cultural resources, educa-
tion is of primary importance. In Switzerland, the frequent elections as well 
as the numerous votes on a wide range of political issues require knowledge 
about the institutions of a democracy and presuppose a minimum under-
standing of the most important financial, economic, environmental, cultu-
ral and social policy implications. Citizens receive the education necessary 
for making competent decisions about such challenging issues from a mini-
mum set of public offers at various levels of education. In this sense, Article 
19 Constitution guarantees the right to an adequate and free primary school 
ƣƢǀơƞƿiƺƹ ƞƾ ƞ ƤǀƹƢƞƸƣƹƿƞl ƽiƨƩƿ ƞƹƢ éƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇸᇳƞ ƿƺ ᇸᇺ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƻƽƺǁiƢƣ 
for the concept of a high quality “Swiss Education Area” that is public, gene-
rally affordable and accessible, and extends to all levels of education. From 
20 Jآ؛ء dابؔإا M؜؟؟, aƽiƹơiƻlƣƾ ƺƤ aƺliƿiơƞl EơƺƹƺƸǄ ǂiƿƩ ƾƺƸƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣiƽ éƻƻliơƞƿiƺƹƾ ƿƺ 
dƺơiƞl aƩilƺƾƺƻƩǄ, ƣƢiƿƣƢ ƟǄ h. J. éƾƩlƣǄ, ᇹth ƣƢiƿiƺƹ, LƺƹƢƺƹ ᇳᇻᇲᇻ ᄬᇳᇺᇶᇺᄭ, ᇵƽƢ Ɵƺƺk, ᇳᇺƿƩ 
chapter.
21 Iؠؠؔءبؘ؟ Kؔءا as quoted in Jöإؚ aؔب؟ Mü؟؟ؘإ, Diƣ ƢƣƸƺkƽƞƿiƾơƩƣ gƣƽƤƞƾƾǀƹƨ, ᇴnd 
edition, Zurich 2009, p. 91 (own translation).
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an objective constitutional perspective, the Swiss system of extensive public 
education is supposed to provide for a type of civil and democratic education 
that will enable every citizen to form an independent opinion on the many 
issues that permanently need to be decided at the ballot box.
In this regard, Article 93 Constitution also recognises that radio and 
television have an important contribution to make to the functioning of 
democracy in Switzerland. Such a democracy- functional understanding 
of electronic mass media in Switzerland is in line with the case law of the 
Eǀƽƺƻƣƞƹ Cƺǀƽƿ ƺƤ HǀƸƞƹ ciƨƩƿƾ ᄬECƿHcᄭ. NƺƿǂiƿƩƾƿƞƹƢiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƾiƨƹiƤi-
ơƞƹƿ ƽiƾƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Iƹƿƣƽƹƣƿ ƞƹƢ ƾƺơiƞl ƸƣƢiƞ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƽƣơƣƹƿ ƻƞƾƿ, ƿƩƣ ECƿHc ƾƿill 
emphasises the continuing importance of television as a mass medium with 
an “immediate and powerful effect” on the decision- making of the public in 
a democratic society.22 Accordingly, the duties of the Swiss radio and tele-
vision system regarding “education”, “cultural development”, “free shaping 
of opinion” and “entertainment” listed in Article 93 II Constitution must be 
interpreted from a democracy- functional perspective. When implementing 
these four goals, radio and television have to pay attention to the “particu-
larities of the country” and the “needs of the Cantons” thus contributing to 
cohesion in Switzerland. The principles of accurate presentation of facts and 
diversity of opinion are mentioned as means to reach these goals in Article 
93 II Constitution. These principles are justiciable and can be enforced, as a 
rule, against any radio and television broadcaster established in Switzerland. 
They are supposed to contribute to securing a generally accessible and diverse 
offering of the high quality information that people need in order to comply 
with their democratic duties as citizens.
There are key challenges to the media’s true fulfilment of its constitutional, 
democratic duties. Hؔءءؔ؛ éإؘءؗا is one of the voices having most clearly 
and eloquently warned of the political dead ends and cultural confusions of 
ƸƺƢƣƽƹiƿǄ. fƹƢƣƽ ƿƩƣ ƞƤƿƣƽ- ƣƤƤƣơƿƾ ƺƤ Nƞƿiƺƹƞl dƺơiƞliƾƸ iƹ GƣƽƸƞƹǄ iƹ ᇳᇻᇸᇳ, 
she asked:
“[I] f, the modern political lies are so big that they require a complete rearrangement 
ƶƣ)ƻƨƢ)ƾƨƶƳƢ)ƣƞƠƻƼƞƳ)ƻƢƿƻƼƹƢ –)ƻƨƢ)ƴƞƲƩƵƧ)ƶƣ)ƞƵƶƻƨƢƹ)ƹƢƞƳƩƻǀ,)ƞƺ)Ʃƻ)ƾƢƹƢ,)ƩƵƻƶ)ƾƨƩƠƨ)
they will fit without seam, crack, or fissure, exactly as the facts fitted into their own 
22 dƣƣ éƹiƸƞl DƣƤƣƹƢƣƽƾ Iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞl ǁ. eƩƣ fƹiƿƣƢ KiƹƨƢƺƸ, éƻƻ ƹƺ ᇶᇺᇺᇹᇸ/ᇲᇺ, ECƿHc 
ᇴᇴ éƻƽil ᇴᇲᇳᇵ, ƻƞƽƞƨƽƞƻƩ ᇳᇳᇻ ƞƹƢ J. Bƽƞƿǅƞ ơƺƹơǀƽƽiƹƨ, ƻƞƽƞƨƽƞƻƩ ᇸ; JƣƽƾilƢ ǁ. DƣƹƸƞƽk, 
éƻƻ ƹƺ ᇳᇷᇺᇻᇲ/ᇺᇻ, ECƿHc ᇴᇵ dƣƻƿƣƸƟƣƽ ᇳᇻᇻᇶ, ƻƞƽƞƨƽƞƻƩ ᇵᇳ; MǀƽƻƩǄ ǁ. IƽƣlƞƹƢ, éƻƻ ƹƺ 
ᇶᇶᇳᇹᇻ/ᇻᇺ, ECƿHc ᇵ DƣơƣƸƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇲᇵ, ƻƞƽƞƨƽƞƻƩƾ ᇸᇻ, ᇹᇶ.
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ƶƹƩƧƩƵƞƳ)ƠƶƵƻƢƿƻ –)ƾƨƞƻ)ƷƹƢƽƢƵƻƺ)ƻƨƢƺƢ)ƵƢƾ)ƺƻƶƹƩƢƺ,)ƩƴƞƧƢƺ,)ƞƵơ)ƵƶƵ-)ƣƞƠƻƺ)ƣƹƶƴ)ƟƢ-
coming an adequate substitute for reality and factuality?”23
Hƣƽ ƞƹƾǂƣƽ: iƿ iƾ, ƞƟƺǁƣ ƞll, ƻƩilƺƾƺƻƩƣƽƾ, ƾơiƣƹƿiƾƿƾ ƞƹƢ ƞƽƿiƾƿƾ iƹ ƿƩƣiƽ iƾƺ-
lation, independent historians and judges as well as journalists adhering to 
facts, working according to an “existential mode of truth- telling”.24 Indeed, 
combating political lies with diligently researched and checked facts is one of 
the most important duties of journalism.ᇴᇷ
For their decision- making, citizens in a direct democracy particularly 
depend on the mass media distinguishing between factual accounts and the 
opinions of the newspaper’s or broadcaster’s own collaborators and guest 
contributors. For éإؘءؗا, facts and opinions are no antagonists as long as 
it is assured that opinions are formed on the basis of facts. There is a rela-
tionship of dependency between the two: effective freedom of expression 
presupposes the availability of sufficient factual information as a basis for 
opinion making.ᇴᇸ The problem for journalism is that facts are expensive to 
research and check; thus, the mass media may be tempted to respond to the 
current economic pressure by replacing hard facts with (cheap) opinions.ᇴᇹ 
When facts are upstaged by unfounded opinions it is inevitable that the cre-
ƢiƟiliƿǄ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Ƹƞƾƾ ƸƣƢiƞ ƾǀƤƤƣƽƾèᅬ ƞƾ ƿƩƣ ƿƽƞƹƾƞƿlƞƹƿiơ Ƥǀƾƾ ƞƟƺǀƿ “Ƥƞkƣ ƹƣǂƾ” 
or “Lügenpresse” demonstrates.ᇴᇺ DƣƤlƞƿƣƢ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ ƽƣƿƽƣƞƿ iƹƿƺ ƿƩƣiƽ ƣơƩƺ 
chambers where any news is trustworthy as long as it is shared between like- 
minded people. 
Although scandals have always played a role in the economy of the mass- 
media, the factual basis of news has ultimately always been the touchstone 
of professional journalism. Is this about to change under conditions of online 
blogs and social media? Selected by personalisation technologies emplo-
yed by social media sites, outrageous or scandalous posts appear on top of 
a Facebook user’s newsfeed because they are most likely to match the type 
23 Hؔءءؔ؛ éإؘءؗا, Bƣƿǂƣƣƹ aƞƾƿ ƞƹƢ Fǀƿǀƽƣ: EiƨƩƿ Eǃƣƽơiƾƣƾ iƹ aƺliƿiơƞl eƩƺǀƨƩƿ, Nƣǂ 
jƺƽk ᇳᇻᇻᇵ ᄬᇳᇻᇸᇳᄭ, ƻ. ᇴᇷᇵ.
24 éإؘءؗا, ƻ. ᇴᇷᇻ.
ᇴᇷ e؜ؠآا؛ج Gؔإاآء éئ؛, Fƽƣƣ dƻƣƣơƩ: eƣƹ aƽiƹơiƻlƣƾ Ƥƺƽ ƞ CƺƹƹƣơƿƣƢ hƺƽlƢ, Nƣǂ Hƞǁƣƹ/
LƺƹƢƺƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇸ, ƻ. ᇴᇲᇴ.
ᇴᇸ éإؘءؗا, ƻ. ᇴᇵᇺ.
ᇴᇹ Gؔإاآء éئ؛, ƻ. ᇳᇻᇷ.
ᇴᇺ See, for example, The Economist, America’s alt- right learns to speak Nazi: “Lügenpresse”, 
ᇴᇲᇳᇸ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ᇵdab- dᇻjiᄭ.
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of information that had previously attracted her attention, based on previ-
ƺǀƾ ƞơƿiǁiƿiƣƾ ƞƹƢ ƾƣƞƽơƩƣƾ. Dǀƽiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ᇴᇲᇳᇸ fd ƣlƣơƿiƺƹ ơƞƸƻƞiƨƹ, ƺƟǁiƺǀƾ 
lies went viral including Dآءؔ؟ؗ eإبؠأ’s claim that Bؔإؔؖ؞ Oؕؔؠؔ was 
the founder of Islamic State and H؜؟؟ؔإج C؟؜ءاآء the co- founder.29 For Cؔئئ 
dبءئاؘ؜ء, ƞ HƞƽǁƞƽƢ lƞǂ ƻƽƺƤƣƾƾƺƽ, ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ ƹƺ ƢƺǀƟƿ ƿƩƞƿ eإبؠأ’s insulting 
tweets about his political adversaries “put him at the centre of what was, for 
ƴƞƵǀ,)ƞƵ)ƢƵƧƩƵƢ)ƣƶƹ)ƧƹƶƼƷ)ƷƶƳƞƹƩǁƞƻƩƶƵ –)ƞƵơ)ƨƢƳƷƢơ)ƽƞƼƳƻ)ƨƩƴ)ƻƶ)ƻƨƢ)ƷƹƢƺƩơƢƵ-
cy”.30 Further, dبءئاؘ؜ء fears that personalisation technologies distort the 
free market of ideas, instead leading to fragmentation of the political dis-
course.31 An inclination towards “post- truth politics” and the turn to a “post- 
factual society” endanger the public sphere, which constitutes a structural 
principle of democratic politics. The “public sphere” is the social space where 
different opinions are expressed and various problems and solutions are dis-
cussed. It is a key premise of the public sphere that Kؔءا’s “extended way of 
thinking” can unfold and that political actors are always aware of their deci-
sions’ contingency. A democratic order presupposes that conflicts are solved 
ƟǄ ǂƞǄ ƺƤ ƻǀƟliơ Ƣiƾơǀƾƾiƺƹ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, iƤ dبءئاؘ؜ء’s fear that personalisation 
technologies distort the free market of ideas and lead to fragmented politi-
cal discourse should prove true, the normative requirements of the public 
sphere are questioned. To be sure, a parallelism of fragmented public sphe-
res where issues are only discussed between like- minded people would not 
be able to establish the shared auditorium necessary for a democratic order. 
Competition between arguments in the political forum would no longer be 
possible and the political system’s cognitive openness and learning ability 
would be challenged.
There have been two important sets of objections against dبءئاؘ؜ء’s the-
ory in the academic literature. A first objection argues that newspapers and 
electronic mass media have always been biased, appealing to certain audi-
ences only; thus, news personalisation is no novel concern. From media 
sociology we know that selectivity is generally one of the key functions of 
mass media.32 Through the selection of specific information, the mass media 
reduce overwhelming social complexity and protect systems and individuals 
29 dƣƣ eƩƣ EơƺƹƺƸiƾƿ, eƩƣ ƻƺƾƿ- ƿƽǀƿƩ ǂƺƽlƢ: jƣƾ, I’Ƣ liƣ ƿƺ Ǆƺǀ, ᇴᇲᇳᇸ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.
ơơ/ᇵNᇵE- MfHéᄭ.
30 Cؔئئ c. dبءئاؘ؜ء, #cƣƻǀƟliơ: DiǁiƢƣƢ DƣƸƺơƽƞơǄ iƹ ƿƩƣ éƨƣ ƺƤ dƺơiƞl MƣƢiƞ, aƽiƹơƣƿƺƹ 
ᇴᇲᇳᇹ, ƻ. ᇺᇵ.
31 dبءئاؘ؜ء, ᇴᇲᇳᇹ, ƻ. ᇵᇴᇲ.
32 See Lب؛ؠؔءء, The Reality of the Mass Media, p. 34.
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from overload. Within a newspaper company, for example, members of the 
editing staff are in charge of selecting the information that will be covered. 
The newspaper’s journalistic policy and internal standards will often strongly 
influence the angle from which facts will be examined or the selection of op- 
ƣƢƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƽƣƞƢƣƽƾ ƸƞǄ ƣƹơƺǀƹƿƣƽ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƿƩƣ ƻƺiƹƿ Ʃƣƽƣ iƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩiƾ ƾƣlƣơƿiƺƹ 
process does not happen blindly and readers will generally know what type 
of journalism and editorial bias they can expect from a particular newspaper, 
eg ơƩƞƹƹƣl ƺƽ ƽƞƢiƺ ƾƿƞƿiƺƹ. cƣƞƢƣƽƾ iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, Ƥƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, kƹƺǂèᅬ ƹƺƿ 
iƹ Ƣƣƿƞil Ɵǀƿ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ǂƩƺlƣèᅬ ǂƩƣƽƣ ƞ ƹƣǂƾƻƞƻƣƽ ƾǀơƩ ƞƾ Nƣǀƣ küƽơƩƣƽ kƣiƿǀƹƨ, 
Tages Anzeiger or Weltwoche stands. This is different in the digital environ-
ment because no Facebook subscriber or Google search user will have any 
idea of the grounds on which the respective algorithms have chosen the news 
they are recommending individual users to read or watch. The key difference 
between traditional news outlets and personalisation technologies online, 
therefore, is transparency of bias.
A second set of objections question the empirical foundation of dبءئاؘ؜ء’s 
thesis that there is not much deliberation beyond echo chambers and that 
group polarisation is an effect of online content personalisation technologies. 
In one of the first data- driven studies on personalised recommender systems, 
Hآئؔءؚؔؔإ et al. argued in 2012 that “the antecedent, that recommenders cre-
ate fragmentation, is ultimately an assumption”.33 This study, however, had a 
very limited scope and did not extend to the effects of personalisation tech-
nologies on news programming. 
One year later, jآؖ؛ؔ؜ Bؘء؞؟ؘإ ƞƹƢ Ʃiƾ ơƺllƣƞƨǀƣƾ ƞƿ ƿƩƣ HƞƽǁƞƽƢ BƣƽkƸƞƹ 
Klƣiƹ Cƣƹƿƣƽ ƞǀƿƩƺƽƣƢ ƞƹ ƣƸƻiƽiơƞl ƞƹƞlǄƾiƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dOaé- aIaé ƢƣƟƞƿƣ ƿƩƞƿ 
also challenged dبءئاؘ؜ء’s thesis to a certain extent.34 This debate followed 
ƻƽƺƻƺƾƞlƾ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ fd Cƺƹƨƽƣƾƾ ƿƺ iƹƿƽƺƢǀơƣ ƿƩƣ dOaé ᄬdƿƺƻ Oƹliƹƣ aiƽƞơǄ éơƿᄭ 
ƞƹƢ aIaé ᄬaƽƺƿƣơƿ Iƹƿƣllƣơƿǀƞl aƽƺƻƣƽƿǄ éơƿᄭ ƞƾ ƹƣǂ Ia ƣƹƤƺƽơƣƸƣƹƿ Ɵillƾ iƹ 
2011. The bills were stalled as a consequence of massive Internet protests 
iƹơlǀƢiƹƨ ƞ ᇴᇶ- Ʃƺǀƽ hikiƻƣƢiƞ Ɵlƞơkƺǀƿ ƺƹ ᇳᇺ/ᇳᇻ JƞƹǀƞƽǄ ᇴᇲᇳᇴ, Ƹilliƺƹƾ ƺƤ 
e- mails and thousands of phone calls addressed to members of US Congress 
33 Kؔإا؜؞ Hآئؔءؚؔؔإ et al., Will the Global Village Fracture into Tribes: Recommender 
dǄƾƿƣƸƾ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣiƽ EƤƤƣơƿƾ ƺƹ CƺƹƾǀƸƣƽƾ, iƹ MƞƹƞƨƣƸƣƹƿ dơiƣƹơƣ, ᇴᇲᇳᇶ, ᇸᇲ ᄬᇶᄭ 
ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/éiaᇻ-bfkDᄭ, ƻ. ᇺᇲᇹ.
34 jآؖ؛ؔ؜ Bؘء؞؟ؘإ ƣƿ ƞl., dƺơiƞl MƺƟiliǅƞƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ NƣƿǂƺƽkƣƢ aǀƟliơ dƻƩƣƽƣ: Mƞƻƻiƹƨ 
ƿƩƣ dOaé- aIaé DƣƟƞƿƣ, HƞƽǁƞƽƢ fƹiǁƣƽƾiƿǄ, BƣƽkƸƞƹ Cƣƹƿƣƽ Ƥƺƽ Iƹƿƣƽƹƣƿ & dƺơiƣƿǄ, 
BƣƽkƸƞƹ Cƣƹƿƣƽ cƣƾƣƞƽơƩ aǀƟliơƞƿiƺƹ Nƺ. ᇴᇲᇳᇵᅬᇳᇸ, ᇴᇲᇳᇵ, ƞǁƞilƞƟlƣ ƞƿ Ʃƿƿƻ://ƾƾƽƹ.ơƺƸ 
ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ᇺᇻhᇸ- éjbMᄭ.
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to raise awareness of the harm that the planned laws would mean for Internet 
freedom. The authors from the Berkman Klein Center argued that their ana-
lytical study of this debate provided a perspective “on the dynamics of the 
networked public sphere that tends to support the more optimistic view of 
the potential of networked democratic participation”.ᇵᇷ 
Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, iƹ ƢƣƤƣƹơƣ ƺƤ dبءئاؘ؜ء and against the arguments of the 
BƣƽkƸƞƹ Klƣiƹ Cƣƹƿƣƽ, ƺƹƣ ƸiƨƩƿ ƞƽƨǀƣ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ dOaé- aIaé ƢƣƟƞƿƣ ǂƞƾ ǁƣƽǄ 
technology- centred and thus was particularly capable of mobilising masses 
of tech- interested people in the US. Therefore, it may not be representative 
of the general population’s attitudes and values in this area. Indeed, a 2013 
book by Eا؛ؔء kبؖ؞ؘإؠؔء seemed to partially confirm dبءئاؘ؜ء’s thesis. 
According to kبؖ؞ؘإؠؔء it is a paradox of technological connection that a 
greater number of people around the globe sharing information and perspec-
tives may lead to narrower representations of the world than in a less connec-
ted world.ᇵᇸ
Research which both confirmed and questioned dبءئاؘ؜ء’s theory was the 
ƽƣơƣƹƿ BƣƽkƸƞƹ Klƣiƹ Cƣƹƿƣƽ ƾƿǀƢǄ ƺƹ ƺƹliƹƣ ƸƣƢiƞ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ᇴᇲᇳᇸ ƻƽƣƾiƢƣƹ-
tial elections in the United States. The researchers worked with an impressive 
sample of more than 2 million stories collected from a broad range of sources 
on the open Internet, including mass media sites, government sites, private 
sites, blogs etc.ᇵᇹ They found a pronounced asymmetry between the structure 
and composition of the media circulated on the right compared to the left. 
Whereas on the right highly partisan pro- eإبؠأ reporting and strong polari-
sation tendencies prevailed, the situation was different on the liberal (in the 
US understanding of the word) side. On the right the centre of gravity was 
clearly Breitbart, while on the left long- standing mass media (such as New 
jƺƽk eiƸƣƾ, hƞƾƩiƹƨƿƺƹ aƺƾƿ, CNN ƣƿơ.ᄭ ǂƣƽƣ ƞlƾƺ ơƺƸƸƺƹlǄ iƹ ơiƽơǀlƞƿiƺƹ, 
allowing such sources to play an important role as intermediaries and defen-
Ƣƣƽƾ ƺƤ ƩiƨƩ ƼǀƞliƿǄ jƺǀƽƹƞliƾƿiơ ƾƿƞƹƢƞƽƢƾ ƞƹƢ ƺƟjƣơƿiǁƣ ƽƣƻƺƽƿiƹƨ. Hƣƹơƣ, 
the public sphere continued to exist. From this important study one can thus 
deduce that dبءئاؘ؜ء’s thesis of group polarisation very much depends on 
ᇵᇷ Bؘء؞؟ؘإ et al., pp. 9.
ᇵᇸ Eا؛ؔء kبؖ؞ؘإؠؔء, cƣǂiƽƣ: Diƨiƿƞl CƺƾƸƺƻƺliƿƞƹƾ iƹ ƿƩƣ éƨƣ ƺƤ Cƺƹƹƣơƿiƺƹ, Nƣǂ jƺƽk 
2013.
ᇵᇹ cآؘؕإا Fؔإ؜ئ ƣƿ ƞl., aƞƽƿiƾƞƹƾƩiƻ, aƽƺƻƞƨƞƹƢƞ, ƞƹƢ DiƾiƹƤƺƽƸƞƿiƺƹ: Oƹliƹƣ MƣƢiƞ ƞƹƢ 
ƿƩƣ ᇴᇲᇳᇸ f.d. aƽƣƾiƢƣƹƿiƞl Elƣơƿiƺƹ, BƣƽkƸƞƹ Klƣiƹ Cƣƹƿƣƽ cƣƾƣƞƽơƩ aǀƟliơƞƿiƺƹ Nƺ. 
ᇴᇲᇳᇹᅬᇸ, ᇴᇲᇳᇹ, ƞǁƞilƞƟlƣ ƞƿ ǂǂǂ.ƾƾƽƹ.ơƺƸ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ᇻᇵBᇵ-kgᇻᇻᄭ, ƻ. ᇴᇳ.
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the state of quality mass media. Where high quality mass media are able to 
reach a wide audience, the danger of group polarisation is clearly minimised.
ᇵ. aبؕ؟؜ؖ dؘإة؜ؘؖ Bإآؔؗؖؔئا؜ءؚ
éƾ ƸƣƹƿiƺƹƣƢ ƞƟƺǁƣ, ƻǀƟliơ ƾƣƽǁiơƣ ƟƽƺƞƢơƞƾƿiƹƨ ᄬadBᄭ iƾ ƢƣƿƣƽƸiƹƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ 
Constitution as being one of the main institutions securing the renewal of 
those resources that are essential for the functioning of the Swiss model of 
direct democracy. The extent to which the Constitution requires broadcas-
ting regulation for the purpose of safeguarding democracy may be striking 
to a foreign, particularly non- European, observer.ᇵᇺ Before elaborating on the 
legal framework of public service broadcasting under Swiss law and discus-
sing potential future developments under conditions of intelligent algorithms 
and personalisation technologies, some empiric data concerning media 
consumption in Switzerland is provided.
ƞᄭ MƣƢiƞ CƺƹƾǀƸƻƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ Iƹƿƣƽƹƣƿ
The most recent empiric research confirms both that media consumption in 
Switzerland primarily takes place on the Internet and that the mass media 
have already been eclipsed by social media. Today, the Internet is the most 
frequently used medium for information sourcing, especially in the age group 
ƺƤ ᇳᇷ ƿƺ ᇵᇶ Ǆƣƞƽ ƺlƢƾ. OƤ ƿƩƣ ƸƣƢiƞ ƺƤƤƣƽƣƢ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ Iƹƿƣƽƹƣƿ, ƿƩƣ ƨlƺƟƞl ƾƣƞƽơƩ 
engines and social media (including Google, YouTube, Facebook, WhatsApp 
and Instagram) on average generate four times more attention than the online 
offers from the established Swiss mass media. Young people in particular 
very much focus their Internet media consumption on those global sources. 
éơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ᇴᇲᇳᇸ MƣƢiƞ bǀƞliƿǄ jƣƞƽƟƺƺk ƺƤ ƿƩƣ cƣƾƣƞƽơƩ Iƹƾƿiƿǀƿƣ Ƥƺƽ 
ƿƩƣ aǀƟliơ dƻƩƣƽƣ ƞƹƢ dƺơiƣƿǄ ƞƿ ƿƩƣ fƹiǁƣƽƾiƿǄ ƺƤ kǀƽiơƩ ᄬ“FƺƽƾơƩǀƹƨƾƟƣƽƣiơƩ 
Öffentlichkeit und Gesellschaft, fög)”,39 online news sites, web portals and 
ƾƺơiƞl ƸƣƢiƞ ƞƽƣ ƿƩƣ Ƹƞiƹ ƾƺǀƽơƣƾ ƺƤ iƹƤƺƽƸƞƿiƺƹ Ƥƺƽ ᇸᇴè% ƺƤ ᇳᇺ ƿƺ ᇴᇶ Ǆƣƞƽ ƺlƢƾ, 
ƞƹƢ Ƥƺƽ ᇴᇴè% ƺƤ ƞll Ǆƺǀƹƨ ƞƢǀlƿƾ ƿƩƣǄ ƞƽƣ ƿƩƣ ƺƹlǄ ƾƺǀƽơƣ ƺƤ iƹƤƺƽƸƞƿiƺƹ. Fƺƽ 
ᇶᇵè% ƺƤ Ǆƺǀƹƨ ƞƢǀlƿƾ ƿƩƣ ƾƸƞƽƿƻƩƺƹƣ iƾ ƿƩƣ Ƹƞiƹ ƿƣơƩƹiơƞl Ƹƣƞƹƾ ƿƺ ƞơơƣƾƾ 
information online. 
ᇵᇺ For the discussion in the United States see C. Eؗت؜ء Bؔ؞ؘإ, Media, Markets, and
DƣƸƺơƽƞơǄ, CƞƸƟƽiƢƨƣ ᇴᇲᇲᇴ, ƻ. ᇳᇻᇵ.
39 See for more information www.foeg.uzh.ch.
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Google (mainly via its ownership of YouTube), Facebook, WhatsApp, 
Instagram, etc. cooperate with the global media corporations and disseminate 
their content on their platforms. In collaboration with the Reuters Institute 
for the Study of Journalism at the University of Oxford, the Research Institute 
Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ aǀƟliơ dƻƩƣƽƣ ƞƹƢ dƺơiƣƿǄ ơƺƹƢǀơƿƣƢ ƞ ƽƣƻƽƣƾƣƹƿƞƿiǁƣ ƾǀƽǁƣǄ iƹǁƺlǁiƹƨ 
Ƹƺƽƣ ƿƩƞƹ ᇴᇲᇲᇲ Iƹƿƣƽƹƣƿ ǀƾƣƽƾ iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ. éơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ ƿƩiƾ ƾǀƽǁƣǄ, ᇵᇸè% 
of the interviewed users already consume their news via Facebook. These 
findings explain why Swiss media companies are now cooperating with the 
social media giant. Commuter newspapers and tabloids rather than quality 
newspapers dominate the range of Swiss- origin media currently available on 
Facebook.
eƩƣ cƣƾƣƞƽơƩ Iƹƾƿiƿǀƿƣ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ aǀƟliơ dƻƩƣƽƣ ƞƹƢ dƺơiƣƿǄ ƾǀƽǁƣǄ ƞlƾƺ ƣƸƻƩƞ-
sised the formidable importance of social networks in the news economy. As 
advertising revenues increasingly migrate to the Internet in general and the 
large platform firms in particular, this source is rapidly vanishing as a means 
for funding the mass media. This development can only lead to increasing 
difficulties for the mass media in developing alternative business models for 
the news market. The gravity of the mass media’s financial problems is epito-
mised across the globe by the large number of quality newspapers that disap-
pear every year.
As research by dبءئاؘ؜ء and others suggests, the extended use of perso-
nalisation technologies by platform firms is reinforcing the already exis-
ting trend towards filter bubbles40 and fragmented public spheres, with the 
ǂƺƽƽǄiƹƨ ƻƽƺƾƻƣơƿ ƿƩƞƿ ơƺƸƸǀƹiơƞƿiƺƹèᅬ iƹơlǀƢiƹƨ ƞƟƺǀƿ ƻƺliƿiơƞl iƾƾǀƣƾèᅬ 
is increasingly taking place only between like- minded parties; a situation 
starkly at odds with M؜؟؟’s pre- conditions for social progress, outlined above. 
These mostly theoretical assumptions about the effects of personalisation 
ƿƣơƩƹƺlƺƨǄ ƞƽƣ, Ʃƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƟƞơkƣƢ ǀƻ ƟǄ cƣƾƣƞƽơƩ Iƹƾƿiƿǀƿƣ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ aǀƟliơ 
Sphere and Society empiric findings that people who primarily consume 
their news via YouTube, Facebook etc. typically have less confidence in the 
media system. Conversely, those people who frequently use public service 
broadcasting for their news consumption have a higher degree of confidence 
in the media system. Confidence in the mass media in turn promotes a gene-
ral interest in news, as well as improving consumers’ willingness to pay for 
iƹƤƺƽƸƞƿiƺƹ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƿƩƣ Ƣƞƿƞ ƞƟƺǀƿ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ƸƣƢiƞ Ƹƞƽkƣƿ ơlƣƞƽlǄ ƾƩƺǂƾ 
that raising consumers’ general awareness that high quality information is 
40 aؔإ؜ئؘإ, 2011.
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expensive will not be able to resolve the grave financial problems of infor-
mation journalism.
As a preventative measure against further migration of advertising to social 
media, Swiss media companies are increasingly investing money in techno-
logies of “behavioural targeting”, allowing the personalisation of advertising 
ƞƹƢ ƹƣǂƾ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ Ɵƞƾiƾ ƺƤ ơƺllƣơƿƣƢ ǀƾƣƽ Ƣƞƿƞ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, Ƹƺƾƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƸƣƢiƞ 
companies in Switzerland are too small to collect large amounts of data (Big 
Dƞƿƞᄭ. FǀƽƿƩƣƽ, ƿƩƣǄ Ƣƺ ƹƺƿ Ʃƞǁƣ ƿƩƣ Ƥiƹƞƹơiƞl Ƹƣƞƹƾ ƺƽ ƿƣơƩƹiơƞl kƹƺǂ- Ʃƺǂ 
ƿƩƞƿ ǂƺǀlƢ Ɵƣ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣƢ Ƥƺƽ Ƣƞƿƞ ƞƹƞlǄƾiƾ ƞƹƢ ƞƨƨƽƣƨƞƿiƺƹ ᄬDƞƿƞ Miƹiƹƨᄭ ƺƽ 
to develop more sophisticated targeting technologies. Thus, as an alternative 
solution, they are seeking to join forces with partner companies; a strategy 
that has led to the creation of Admeira, the recently established joint venture 
between the Swiss Broadcasting Corporation (SRG), Swisscom and Ringier (a 
media company). The purpose of Admeira is to establish an alliance of the 
three companies in the field of online advertising. As a telecom company, 
dǂiƾƾơƺƸ ƻƺƾƾƣƾƾƣƾ ƢƣƿƞilƣƢ iƹƤƺƽƸƞƿiƺƹ ƞƟƺǀƿ iƿƾ ơǀƾƿƺƸƣƽƾ, ƣǃƿƣƹƢiƹƨèᅬ iƹ 
ƿƩƣ ơƞƾƣ ƺƤ ƸƺƟilƣ ƾƣƽǁiơƣƾèᅬ ƿƺ ƿƩƣiƽ ƺƹliƹƣ ƟƣƩƞǁiƺǀƽ. Iƹ ƿƩƣ ƣǄƣƾ ƺƤ dcG, ƿƩƣ 
fact that Swisscom has broad experience of using targeting technologies such 
as Real Time Advertising or Real Time Bidding establishes the company as a 
particularly attractive partner for collecting and analysing data. Swisscom, 
on the other hand, benefits from cooperation with SRG and Ringier because 
they produce costly news and entertainment programmes that Swisscom can 
make available on its own TV and entertainment platforms, as opposed to 
Swisscom having to produce them itself.
Ɵᄭ aƣƽƾƺƹƞliƾƞƿiƺƹ eƣơƩƹƺlƺƨiƣƾ
The establishment of Admeira raises the key question of whether the use of 
personalisation technologies by the SRG in order to target individual users 
would be reconcilable with the broadcaster’s public service remit as defined 
ƟǄ dǂiƾƾ lƞǂ. MƞơƩiƹƣ Lƣƞƽƹiƹƨ ᄬMLᄭ, Dƞƿƞ Miƹiƹƨ, Ƣƞƿƞ ƞƹƞlǄƾiƾ ƞƹƢ ƺƿƩƣƽ 
techniques of Artificial Intelligence (AI), have boosted the development of 
personalisation algorithms that allow companies to produce sophisticated 
user profiles, which can be employed to predict users’ future behaviour.41 The 
more data that is available for training the algorithms, the finer- grained pre-
dictions they are able to make. If a media company knows exactly what kind 
41 M؜إؘ؜؟؟ؘ H؜؟ؘؗؕإؔءؗا, Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law: Novel Entanglements 
ƺƤ Lƞǂ ƞƹƢ eƣơƩƹƺlƺƨǄ, CƩƣlƿƣƹƩƞƸ/NƺƽƿƩƞƸƻƿƺƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇷ, ƻ. ᇳᇲᇻ.
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of person a customer is, it may be tempted to use the personalisation tech-
nology to take person- related decisions not only regarding advertising mes-
sages but also regarding the news and other types of content that a user will 
see on her screen. 
This prospect creates a potential conflict between the SRG’s commercial 
and technological preferences and the legal requirements arising from its 
public service remit. As mentioned, Article 93 II Constitution provides for 
a public service mandate, requiring the system of radio and television as a 
whole to contribute “to education and cultural development, to the free shaping 
of opinion and to entertainment”, thus supporting the renewal of the cultural 
resources necessary for the functioning of democracy and for safeguarding 
cohesion between the different linguistic regions, cultures and mentalities 
in the country. Within a setting defined by the economic and cultural parti-
cularities of Switzerland, different options for implementing this public man-
date are possible. Under the order of a parliamentary committee, the Swiss 
Government in 2014 published a report which reflected on structural change 
in the media sector in Switzerland and asked how this was impacting on the 
fulfilment of the constitutional public service mandate by radio and televi-
sion in particular and the media sector in general. This reflection was paralle-
led by political pressure from right- leaning groups requiring an open debate 
about the institutional implementation of the public service mandate. In a 
ƻƞƽƿiƞl ƽƣƾƻƺƹƾƣ ƿƺ ƿƩƣƾƣ ƻƽƣƾƾǀƽƣƾ, ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿ iƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇸ ƻƽƺƢǀơƣƢ 
a further report reviewing the definition of public service broadcasting and 
analysing the relationship between private electronic media and SRG in the 
fulfilment of the public service mandate. These reports and debates show a 
general awareness amongst those involved in policy- making of the potenti-
ally far- reaching consequences of the ongoing structural change in the media 
ƾǄƾƿƣƸ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ ƹƺ ơƺƹƾƣƹƾǀƾ ƾƺ Ƥƞƽ ƺƹ Ʃƺǂ ƻƺliƿiơƾ ƾƩƺǀlƢ ƽƣƾƻƺƹƢ 
ƿƺ ƿƩiƾ iƾƾǀƣ. Iƹ ƞ ǁƺƿƣ ƺƤ ᇶ MƞƽơƩ ᇴᇲᇳᇺ, ƞ ᇹᇳ.ᇸ % ƸƞjƺƽiƿǄ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ ƞƹƢ ƞll 
Cantons said no to a popular initiative that wanted to abolish the compulsory 
levy which serves to finance the SRG and public broadcasting in Switzerland. 
Although considerable critique was raised against the SRG (including expan-
sionist business practices and too much shallow entertainment) in the run- up 
to the vote, the result was almost unanimously interpreted as a clear political 
commitment to the SRG and to robust public service broadcasting.42
42 See the article ‚Attack on public broadcasting licence fee clearly fails‘ on Swissinfo, 4 
MƞƽơƩ ᇴᇲᇳᇺ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/Lᇴᇺc-jibᇵᄭ.
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Accordingly, there is a strong likelihood that the currently existing institu-
tional setting will continue to prevail for the next couple of years. This setting 
provides for the legal obligation of the SRG (as the public broadcaster) and a 
selected number of private broadcasting companies to contribute to the ful-
filment of the public service mandate. The law places the main responsibility 
for the provision of the public service mandate clearly on the shoulders of the 
SRG. The small number of private broadcasters, which are authorised with a 
licence and partly financed through the broadcasting levy, provide their ser-
vices mainly at local and regional levels.
Article 24 Radio and Television Act43 provides that the SRG has a com-
prehensive public service remit. First, the SRG has to live up to high quality 
standards as regards the news and other content that it is producing. Further, 
in this regard, the SRG must ensure that its programmes are able to reach 
the entire Swiss population. Moreover, the public service broadcaster has 
to advance cohesion between different regions and cultures in Switzerland. 
For this purpose, the SRG is required to contribute to linguistic exchange 
between language regions and to financially equalise economic differences 
between regional media markets. As a consequence, less affluent Italian and 
French speaking regions are cross- subsidised by the wealthier German spe-
aking area to ensure that a similar offer of quality programmes is available 
everywhere in Switzerland. This model secures that the same range of public 
service programmes is supplied in every linguistic region in Switzerland. As 
compensation for fulfilling its broad mandate, the SRG enjoys inter alia finan-
cial privileges as it receives a major part of the broadcasting levy which all 
households in Switzerland are required to pay. The Swiss broadcasting levy 
ơǀƽƽƣƹƿlǄ ƞƸƺǀƹƿƾ ƿƺ CHF ᇵᇸᇷ ƻƣƽ ƩƺǀƾƣƩƺlƢ ƻƣƽ Ǆƣƞƽ, ǂƩiơƩ iƾ ƣǃƻƣƹƾiǁƣ iƹ 
international comparison. As a result of the debate about the SRG’s future 
iƹ ƿƩƣ ƽǀƹ- ǀƻ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ǁƺƿƣ ƺƤ ᇶ MƞƽơƩ ᇴᇲᇳᇺ, ƞ ƽƣƢǀơƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ lƣǁǄ ƿƺ CHF ᇵᇲᇲ 
seems to be a likely consequence.
If Swiss law justifies the privileged position of the SRG by pointing to the 
particular mandate that the broadcaster fulfils in favour of democracy and 
cohesion, then it is of primordial importance that the SRG’s content actu-
ƞllǄ ƽƣƞơƩƣƾ ƿƩƣ ƣƹƿiƽƣ ƻƺƻǀlƞƿiƺƹ. aƣƽƾƺƹƞliƾƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ơƺƹƿƣƹƿ ơƺǀlƢ ƻƺƿƣƹƿi-
ally conflict with these stipulations, and especially considering the risks of 
43 FƣƢƣƽƞl éơƿ ƺƹ cƞƢiƺ ƞƹƢ eƣlƣǁiƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ᇴᇶ MƞƽơƩ ᇴᇲᇲᇸ ᄬcƞƢiƺ ƞƹƢ eƣlƣǁiƾiƺƹ éơƿ, cegéᄭ, 
dc ᇹᇺᇶ.ᇶᇲ; ƾƣƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ EƹƨliƾƩ ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ cƞƢiƺ ƞƹƢ eƣlƣǁiƾiƺƹ éơƿ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ 
(https://perma.cc/9KBY- G4KS). 
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fragmentation and polarisation, as described earlier, it is a rather contradic-
tory course for the SRG to pursue. The SRG should ensure a counterbalance 
to the above- mentioned tendencies of social media and online platforms 
and should provide that high quality content reaches the entire population 
in Switzerland. 
The fundamental challenge for the SRG will be to convince young people in 
particular that its programmes are sources of reliable information, which is 
essential for the future of democracy and cohesion in Switzerland. To achieve 
this, the SRG will need to explore the extent to which personalisation techno-
logies could work for the good of the public service mandate. The key question 
is: how can user targeting be combined with “translation services” to both 
make young audiences aware of perspectives that are qualitatively distinct 
from those encountered on social networks and online platforms and to 
enable them to decipher quality in the media?
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III. dǀƸƸƞƽǄ
Legal sociology is an empiric sub- discipline of the law that is primarily inte-
rested in observing the emergence and functioning of the law from an objec-
tive perspective. It is only in a second step that a change of perspective occurs, 
from objective description to normative prescription. Accordingly, the legal 
sociologist is wearing two hats: the hat of a social scientist who is observing 
the law from an external sociological perspective and the hat of a jurist who 
is pondering the gained insights from a system- internal legal perspective and 
who eventually makes recommendations for improving the law’s workings. 
The law, as an autopoietic sub- system of society, will understand the legal 
sociologist’s recommendations based on its own system- rationality, and then 
autonomously decide what to do with them.
A legal sociology perspective can be useful in analysing how structu-
ral change impacts on the interaction between law and society and the 
functioning of direct democracy in Switzerland. News selection through 
personalisation technologies and other forms of artificial intelligence 
potentially interferes with the concept of direct democracy, which pre-
supposes the existence of citizens who are competent to take informed 
decisions on a diverse range of matters of political interest. The Swiss 
model of direct democracy depends on societal preconditions, which it 
cannot guarantee itself and on cultural resources that need to be renewed 
continuously. The resources that direct democracy needs for its reproduc-
tion are citizens’ capabilities to build their own independent opinions on 
the many political issues they are supposed to take decisions on at the 
ballot box. According to the Constitution, two institutions are primarily 
responsible for enabling citizens to meet the requirements of this task: 
a system of generally accessible public education and a system of public 
service broadcasting. Under current law, the SRG is in charge of the latter. 
The raison d’être of the SRG is the fulfilment of a public service mandate 
requiring it to guarantee high quality and diverse information and to con-
tribute to cohesion between the different cultures in the country. The SRG 
can discharge this duty only if its programmes are able to reach the entire 
ƻƺƻǀlƞƿiƺƹ. aƣƽƾƺƹƞliƾƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ơƺƹƿƣƹƿèᅬ ƞ ƻƺƿƣƹƿiƞllǄ ƿƣƸƻƿiƹƨ Ɵǀƾiƹƣƾƾ 
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strategy in the competition (with transnational platform corporations) 
Ƥƺƽ ǀƾƣƽ ƞƿƿƣƹƿiƺƹèᅬ ǂƺǀlƢ ƻƽƺƟƞƟlǄ ơƺƹƿƽƞƢiơƿ ƿƩiƾ ƞiƸ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƤǀƽƿƩƣƽ 
research on content personalisation and how this technology could be uti-
lised in order to bring high quality information to the attention of younger 
audiences could be useful.
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I. Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ
The Swiss Constitution in force today was introduced as recently as the year 
2000. However, Switzerland’s Constitution has experienced a lengthy his-
tory of adaptation and revision. The first section of this chapter examines 
the history behind the Constitution (1.), before outlining key concepts which 
are encompassed in its text, like the concept of citizenship (2), the protection 
of fundamental rights (3.), the allocation of powers between the federation, 
the cantons and the communes (4.) and the allocation of powers between the 
three branches of government on the federal level (5.).
ᇳ. H؜ئاآإج ؔءؗ Oةؘإة؜ؘت
Until 1848, the ancient Swiss cantons together formed a rather loose con-
federation. The cantons themselves were sovereign states, tied together by 
treaties. A typical example of such a treaty was the Confederate Treaty of 
1815. This was an agreement between the cantons to define a Swiss confe-
deration, agreed by the cantons under pressure from the then predominant 
European powers during the reorganisation of Europe at the Congress of 
Vienna. Simultaneously, at this Congress, the other European states reco-
gnised the borders of the Swiss confederation and its neutrality. In 1847, a 
civil war broke out in which the (predominantly liberal) Protestant cantons 
fought against the (predominantly conservative) Catholic cantons. The con-
flict erupted after the Catholic cantons founded the Sonderbund (“separate 
alliance”); the Protestant cantons considered this alliance as violating the 
Confederate Treaty. The Protestant cantons prevailed, and the Sonderbund 
was dissolved.
In the aftermath of this civil war, the Switzerland we know today was 
founded. In 1848, the new Constitution was put into force, although various 
ơƞƹƿƺƹƾè ᅬ ƸƞiƹlǄ ƿƩƣ CƞƿƩƺliơ ƺƹƣƾ ǂƩiơƩ ƩƞƢ Ɵƣƣƹ ƢƣƤƣƞƿƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ ơiǁil 
ǂƞƽèᅬ ƺƽiƨiƹƞllǄ ƺƻƻƺƾƣƢ iƿƾ ơƺƹƿƣƹƿ ƞƾ ǂƣll ƞƾ ƿƩƣ ơƽƣƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞ ƹƣǂ ƤƣƢƣƽƞ-
tion. The new Constitution created a modern federal state, whereby enume-
rated policy areas fell under the competence of the federal level, leaving the 
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regulation of all other policy areas to the then 25 cantons. It strengthened 
democratic structures and fundamental rights. It also introduced the organi-
sational system of checks and balances on the federal level through the esta-
blishment of three separate branches of government: the Federal Assembly 
(the legislative branch), the Federal Council (the executive branch) and the 
Federal Supreme Court (the judicial branch). In part, the new Constitution 
was visibly inspired by the US Constitution and the achievements of the 
French revolution.1
In 1874, the Constitution of 1848 was subjected to a complete revision. A 
major novelty was the introduction of the optional legislative referendum; 
citizens could request a binding vote on federal acts which the parliament 
planned to enact. Further, it was this revision that established the Federal 
Supreme Court as a permanent court. The army was unified; no longer did 
each canton have its own army. New fundamental rights such as economic 
freedom and the right to free primary school education were introduced. 
Other rights were extended, such as the right of domicile. 
Between 1874 and 1999, the Constitution was revised many times. As this 
occurred, the competences of the federal level were gradually enhanced. 
Moreover, the elements of direct democracy became more pronounced: in 
1891, the right of the citizens to propose a revision of the Constitution was 
introduced. A further development was the creation of the 26th canton: in 
1978, the Canton of Jura was founded. And eventually, as late as 1971, women 
were granted full political rights in federal matters (although some cantons 
took longer to guarantee the same right).2
In 1999, the Constitution was again completely revised. The prime objective 
of this total overhaul was to update and improve the text, without making any 
substantial changes. The new text was put into force in 2000, after a majority 
of the people (59 % of those who voted) and a majority of the cantons (12 
cantons, two half- cantons) approved it.3 It contains all the elements which 
are typical of a federal state’s modern Constitution (short of providing for the 
constitutional review of federal acts):
1 e؛آؠؔئ F؟ؘ؜ءؘإ/é؟ؘثؔءؘؗإ M؜ئ؜ؖ /N؜ؖ آ؟  ؘeöأأؘإت؜ؘء, Constitutional Law in Switzerland, 
2nd edition, Alphen aan den Rijn 2012, n. 13; hؔ؟اؘإ Hؔ؟؟ؘإ, The Swiss Constitution in a 
Comparative Context, 2nd ƣƢiƿiƺƹ, kǀƽiơƩ/dƿ. Gƞllƣƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇸ, ƹ. ᇴ, ƹ. ᇴᇲ ƣƿ. ƾƣƼ.
2 See below, pp. 159.
3 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 18 April 1999, SR 101; see for an English 
ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/MᇺfJ- dᇵᇸᇻᄭ. 
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ᅬ eiƿlƣ ᇳ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᅬᇸ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ ƢƣƤiƹƣƾ ƿƩƣ Ƹƞiƹ Ƥƣƞƿǀƽƣƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ 
confederation. It provides a list of the 26 cantons, which, together with 
the people, form the confederation itself. It also sets out the aims of 
the Swiss confederation, in particular the objectives of protecting the 
rights and liberties of the people and safeguarding the independence 
and security of the country. This part also sets out the national lan-
ƨǀƞƨƣƾ ƺƤ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ ƞƾ Ɵƣiƹƨ GƣƽƸƞƹ ᄬƿƩƣ Ƥiƽƾƿ lƞƹƨǀƞƨƣ ƺƤ ᇸᇵ.ᇷ % 
of the population), French (22.5 %), Italian (8 %) and Romansh (0.5 %). 
Finally, this Title highlights the importance of the rule of law.
 ᅱ eiƿlƣ ᇴ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇹᅬᇶᇳ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ liƾƿƾ ƿƩƣ ƤǀƹƢƞƸƣƹƿƞl ƽiƨƩƿƾ 
that apply in Switzerland and defines the requirements for Swiss 
citizenship.
 ᅱ eiƿlƣ ᇵ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇶᇴᅬᇳᇵᇷ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ ƢiƾƿiƹƨǀiƾƩƣƾ ƿƩƣ ơƺƸƻƣƿƣƹơƣƾ ƺƤ 
the federation from the competences of the cantons and communes, 
by enumerating the competences which the federal level possesses. It 
also defines the financial system, including the rules on taxation. This 
section is by far the most voluminous, encompassing 104 articles.
 ᅱ eiƿlƣ ᇶ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇵᇸᅬᇳᇶᇴ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ ƨƽƞƹƿƾ ƻƺliƿiơƞl ƽiƨƩƿƾ iƹ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl 
matters. In particular, it grants the right to participate in elections to 
the National Council and in popular votes (initiatives and referenda), 
as well as the right to launch or sign popular initiatives and requests 
for referenda.
 ᅱ eiƿlƣ ᇷ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇶᇵᅬᇳᇻᇳơ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣƾ ƿƩƣ ƺƽƨƞƹiƾƞƿiƺƹ 
and competences of the main federal authorities: namely, the Federal 
Assembly, the Federal Council and the federal administration, the 
Federal Supreme Court and the other judicial authorities.
ᅬ eiƿlƣ ᇸ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇻᇴᅬᇳᇻᇹ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ ƾƣƿƾ ƺǀƿ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƽƣ-
vision of the Constitution. One key requirement is that the people and 
the cantons must agree on any proposed revision. A revision can be 
initiated by the federal authorities or the people (popular initiative). 
Title 6 also contains transitional provisions.
In addition to the relevance of the Constitution itself, constitutional law 
and practice in Switzerland is influenced by international law, which often 
encompasses rules of constitutional relevance. A prime example of this is the 
influence of international human rights guarantees, as well as some of the 
bilateral agreements that Switzerland has concluded with the EU. Interpreting 
Swiss law, including the Constitution, in conformity with international law 
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is a well- established method of interpretation, supplementing the classical 
canon of methods of interpretation. However, although Switzerland as a 
country has traditionally taken a friendly, inclusive approach towards inter-
national law, the Constitution continues to follow the introverted tradition of 
constitutionalism and fails to properly reflect Switzerland’s participation in 
global and European organisations and treaty networks.4
ᇴ. aؘآأ؟ؘ
Switzerland has 8’400’000 inhabitants. 6’300’000 of these inhabitants are 
dǂiƾƾ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ. eƩƣ ƺƿƩƣƽƾèᅬ i.e. ᇴᇷ % ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƺƻǀlƞƿiƺƹèᅬ ƞƽƣ Ƥƺƽƣiƨƹ ƹƞƿiƺƹƞlƾ 
(not including asylum seekers); a very significant proportion. Moreover, more 
than 300’000 persons commute across the borders to and from Switzerland, 
often on a daily basis. 770’000 Swiss citizens live abroad.
ƞᄭ CiƿiǅƣƹƾƩiƻ
Citizenship in Switzerland is based on the concept that a citizen has three 
citizenships: communal, cantonal, and Swiss (Article 37 Constitution). These 
citizenships are connected: in particular, cantonal and communal citizen-
ships are prerequisites of Swiss citizenship. It is permitted to have dual citi-
zenship under Swiss law, i.e. to possess Swiss citizenship in addition to the 
citizenship of another country.
Citizenship can be acquired by law or by naturalisation. The prerequisi-
tes for the acquisition are defined partly by federal law (which mainly just 
lƞǄƾ ƺǀƿ ƿƩƣ ƸiƹiƸǀƸ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣƸƣƹƿƾᄭ ƞƹƢ ƻƞƽƿlǄ ƟǄ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl lƞǂ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇵᇺ 
Constitution). With respect to federal law, the Federal Act on Swiss Citizenship 
(Swiss Citizenship Act) is relevant:
ᅬ dǂiƾƾ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾƩiƻ iƾ ƞơƼǀiƽƣƢ ƟǄ lƞǂ, i.ƣ. ƞǀƿƺƸƞƿiơƞllǄ, ƟǄ ơƩil-
Ƣƽƣƹ ǂƩƺ Ʃƞǁƣ ƺƹƣ ƻƞƽƣƹƿ ǂiƿƩ dǂiƾƾ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾƩiƻ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇳ dǂiƾƾ 
Citizenship Act).5 These children also attain the Swiss parent’s can-
ƿƺƹƞl ƞƹƢ ơƺƸƸǀƹƞl ơiƿiǅƣƹƾƩiƻ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇴ dǂiƾƾ CiƿiǅƣƹƾƩiƻ éơƿᄭ. 
4 See the chapter on International Relations, pp. 163.
5 Federal Act on Swiss Citizenship of 20 June 2014 (Swiss Citizenship Act, SCA), SR 141.0; 
ƾƣƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ EƹƨliƾƩ ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CiƿiǅƣƹƾƩiƻ éơƿ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/
GHNᇷ- Hgᇸjᄭ. 
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Thereby, Switzerland follows the principle of ius sanguinis. A child 
who is adopted will also acquire Swiss citizenship, from the adopting 
dǂiƾƾ ƻƞƽƣƹƿ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇶ dǂiƾƾ CiƿiǅƣƹƾƩiƻ éơƿᄭ.
ᅬ dǂiƾƾ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾƩiƻ iƾ ƞơƼǀiƽƣƢ ƟǄ ƹƞƿǀƽƞliƾƞƿiƺƹ, i.ƣ. ƟǄ ƞƹ ƺƤƤiơiƞl Ƣƣ-
cree, when an applicant fulfils the relevant requirements stipulated by 
ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƞƹƢ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl lƞǂ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾè ᇻᅬᇳᇻ dǂiƾƾ CiƿiǅƣƹƾƩiƻ éơƿᄭ. hiƿƩ 
respect to federal law, the requirements are that an applicant must 
demonstrate that he or she has been successfully integrated into the 
Swiss society (requiring, inter alia, to respect the values of the Swiss 
Constitution and to be able to communicate in one of the national lan-
guages), is accustomed to the Swiss way of life and does not endanger 
the internal or external security of Switzerland, and that he or she has 
resided in Switzerland for a certain period of time (ten years for adults). 
For cantons to approve naturalisation, which is also necessary for Swiss 
citizenship, it is usually required that an applicant speaks one of the 
canton’s official languages and that he or she has resided in the canton 
and commune for a certain period of time (which shall not exceed five 
Ǆƣƞƽƾ ƞơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ éƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇺ dǂiƾƾ CiƿiǅƣƹƾƩiƻ éơƿᄭ. Iƹ ǁƞƽiƺǀƾ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ, 
the decision to grant citizenship has traditionally been taken by com-
munal assemblies or, even more problematically in terms of affording 
sufficient respect to such individuals’ fundamental rights, by the elect-
orate in secret ballot votes.6 A simplified procedure for naturalisation 
applies to certain foreign nationals, in particular to spouses of Swiss 
citizens. In 2017, the people and the cantons voted in favour of a new 
constitutional provision which mandates that the federal authorities 
shall enact simplified regulations on the naturalisation of third gener-
ation immigrants (Article 38 III Constitution).
Swiss citizenship is the prerequisite for various rights and duties. On the 
federal level, the following are the most relevant:
ᅬ dǂiƾƾ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ ƺǁƣƽ ƿƩƣ ƞƨƣ ƺƤ ᇳᇺ ƣƹjƺǄ ƹǀƸƣƽƺǀƾ ƻƺliƿiơƞl ƽiƨƩƿƾ. eƩƣǄ 
have the right to participate in elections to the National Council and in 
popular votes (initiatives and referenda) and to launch or sign initiatives 
and requests for referenda (Article 136 Constitution). Swiss citizens benefit 
from the freedom of domicile in Switzerland (Article 24 Constitution), 
6 See pp. 160.
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from the protection against expulsion, extradition and deportation 
(Article 25 Constitution) and from diplomatic protection abroad.
ᅬ dǂiƾƾ Ƹƣƹ Ʃƞǁƣ ƞ ƢǀƿǄ ƿƺ ƽƣƹƢƣƽ ƸiliƿƞƽǄ ƾƣƽǁiơƣ. Fƺƽ ǂƺƸƣƹ, ƸiliƿƞƽǄ 
service is possible but voluntary (Article 59 Constitution).
Swiss citizenship can be lost by law, i.e. automatically, or by official decree. 
It is lost by law, for instance, when a Swiss citizen was born and has lived 
abroad, possesses another citizenship and does not declare that he or she 
wants to maintain the Swiss citizenship by the time he or she reaches the 
ƞƨƣ ƺƤ ᇴᇸ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇹ dǂiƾƾ CiƿiǅƣƹƾƩiƻ éơƿᄭ. Iƿ iƾ lƺƾƿ ƟǄ ƞƹ ƺƤƤiơiƞl Ƣƣơƽƣƣ, Ƥƺƽ 
instance, when a Swiss citizen who also possesses another citizenship seri-
ƺǀƾlǄ ǁiƺlƞƿƣƾ ƿƩƣ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿƾ ƺƽ ƽƣƻǀƿƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇶᇴ dǂiƾƾ 
Citizenship Act). These rules are adherent to the international principle that 
statelessness shall be avoided.
Ɵᄭ Fƺƽƣiƨƹ Nƞƿiƺƹƞlƾ
As briefly mentioned above, Switzerland has traditionally been a country 
with a high percentage of people who live and work in the country but do not 
possess Swiss citizenship. Various factors might explain this. Firstly, the eco-
nomic prosperity of the country has led to a high demand for manpower from 
abroad. Moreover, the fact that EU citizens in Switzerland enjoy substantial 
rights based on the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons between 
Switzerland and the EU reduces the incentive for such people to be natura-
lised. Finally, the restrictive naturalisation policy in Switzerland means that 
even persons who have lived in the country for decades may not necessarily 
meet the requirements for naturalisation.
Article 121 Constitution confers the legislative competence for matters of 
immigration and asylum to the federal authorities. Based upon this conferral, 
the Federal Act on Foreigners regulates entry to, residence in and departure 
from the country.
Over the last few decades, various popular initiatives have aimed at for-
cing the federal authorities to implement a more restrictive policy vis- à- vis 
foreign nationals.7 For example, in 2010, the people and the cantons appro-
ved the initiative “for the expulsion of criminal foreign nationals” (“Für die 
Ausschaffung krimineller Ausländer”). This initiative stated that foreign nati-
ƺƹƞlƾ ǂƩƺ ơƺƸƸiƿ ƺƹƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƣƹǀƸƣƽƞƿƣƢ ơƽiƸƣƾèᅬ ƾǀơƩ ƞƾ ƩƺƸiơiƢƣ, ƽƞƻƣ 
7 See for popular initiatives in general pp. 151.
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ƞƹƢ ƽƺƟƟƣƽǄèᅬ ƺƽ ƣǁƣƹ ƿƩƺƾƣ ǂƩƺ Ʃƞǁƣ iƸƻƽƺƻƣƽlǄ ơlƞiƸƣƢ ƾƺơiƞl iƹƾǀƽƞƹơƣ 
or social assistance benefits will lose the right of residence automatically 
and must be deported (Article 121 III- VI Constitution). The Federal Assembly 
did not implement the initiative literally as such an implementation would 
have been incompatible with international law guarantees; in particular, it 
iƹơlǀƢƣƢ ƞ ƩƞƽƢƾƩiƻ ơlƞǀƾƣèᅬ ƞ ơlƞǀƾƣ ǂƩiơƩ ƞllƺǂƾ Ƥƺƽ ƤlƣǃiƟiliƿǄ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƞƻƻliƣƢ 
when the expulsion would result in a severe personal hardship and the pri-
vate interests of the foreign national to stay in Switzerland prevail over the 
public interests to expulse him or her. In response to this legislation, another 
popular initiative was launched; it was entitled “enforcing the expulsion of 
criminal foreign nationals” (“Zur Durchsetzung der Ausschaffung krimineller 
Ausländer”) and demanded a strict implementation of the original initiative. 
However, the people and the cantons rejected this call for strict implementa-
tion in 2016. Another popular initiative dealing with immigration was enti-
ƿlƣƢ “ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ Ƹƞƾƾ iƸƸiƨƽƞƿiƺƹ” ᄬ“Gƣƨƣƹ MƞƾƾƣƹƣiƹǂƞƹƢƣƽǀƹƨ”ᄭ ƞƹƢ ǂƞƾ 
approved by the people and cantons in 2014. This initiative stipulates that 
Switzerland shall control the immigration of foreign nationals autonomously, 
by introducing annual quotas and granting Swiss citizens priority on the 
job market (Articles 121a ƞƹƢ ᇳᇻᇹ Nƺèᇳᇳ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. eƩƣƾƣ ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹƾ, ƽƣƞƢ 
together, are obviously directed against the Agreement on the Free Movement 
of Persons between the EU and Switzerland, although they do not explicitly 
refer to this agreement, let alone mandate the government to terminate it. 
The Federal Assembly decided to implement the initiative in a way that ensu-
red it would not violate the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons.8
Foreign nationals do not enjoy political rights on the federal level. This is 
ƻƽƺƟlƣƸƞƿiơ, Ɵƣơƞǀƾƣ ƿƩƣƾƣ ƻƣƺƻlƣèᅬ ᇴᇷ % ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƺƻǀlƞƿiƺƹ, ƻƞǄiƹƨ ƿƞǃƣƾ ƞƾ 
dǂiƾƾ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ Ƣƺèᅬ ƞƽƣ ƩƣƹơƣƤƺƽƿƩ ƣǃơlǀƢƣƢ ƤƽƺƸ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƸƺơƽƞƿiơ ƻƽƺơƣƾƾ. Iƿ 
should be noted, however, that some cantons and communes do grant politi-
cal rights to foreign nationals. For example, the cantons of Jura and Neuchâtel 
grant foreign nationals, under certain conditions, the right to vote at cantonal 
and communal levels.
8 See the chapter on International Relations, p. 177.
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ᇵ. Fبءؗؔؠؘءاؔ؟ c؜ؚ؛ائ
The Constitution contains an impressive catalogue of fundamental rights, 
starting with human dignity and followed by all the rights which are usually 
found in modern European constitutions: equality before the law; the prohi-
bition of discrimination on the grounds of, inter alia, origin, race, gender and 
age; the protection against arbitrariness; protection of good faith; civil liber-
ties and freedoms; political rights; basic procedural rights and basic social 
ƽiƨƩƿƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇹᅬᇵᇶ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ.
Article 35 Constitution mandates that fundamental rights must be respec-
ted throughout the entire legal system. Individuals can invoke them against 
state authorities. Further, private persons are bound by fundamental rights 
when they exercise a state function. Finally, fundamental rights must be taken 
into account by the state, where appropriate, in regulating relation ships bet-
ween individuals. This includes the obligation to draft new laws, and interpret 
existing laws, in light of fundamental rights (so- called indirect third- party 
effect). For instance, marriage and family law is to be shaped and interpreted 
in light of the right to marry and to have a family (Article 14 Constitution). 
Article 36 Constitution makes it clear that guaranteed rights do not apply in 
an absolute manner. Restrictions are lawful as long as they fulfil all of the fol-
lowing conditions: they have a legal basis, are justified by a public interest, are 
proportionate and do not violate the essence of the right in question.
In addition to the federal Constitution, fundamental rights are guaranteed 
in cantonal constitutions and in international treaties:
ᅬ eƩƣ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ƞlƾƺ ơƺƹƿƞiƹ ƤǀƹƢƞƸƣƹƿƞl ƽiƨƩƿƾ. 
In some cases, they go beyond what is guaranteed by the federal 
Constitution. For instance, the Constitution of the Canton of Zurich 
guarantees, in Article 15, the right to found, to organise and to attend 
private educational institutions.
ᅬ Iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞl ƿƽƣƞƿiƣƾ ƞƽƣ ƩiƨƩlǄ ƽƣlƣǁƞƹƿ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ ƺƤ Ƥǀƹ-
damental rights in Switzerland. First and foremost, the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has been attributed a quasi- 
constitutional status by the Federal Supreme Court.9 Other inter-
national treaties complement the protection guaranteed by the ECHR, 
such as the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
9 BGE ᇳᇳᇹ IƟ ᇵᇸᇹ.
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the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child and the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Moreover, the 
comparative law method of interpretation has traditionally been in-
strumental in further developing fundamental rights in Switzerland; 
iƹ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽ, lƞǂ ƞƹƢ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣ iƹ GƣƽƸƞƹǄ, ƿƩƣ fƹiƿƣƢ dƿƞƿƣƾ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ 
EU has markedly influenced developments in the protection of funda-
mental rights in Switzerland.
The Federal Supreme Court has not hesitated to recognise fundamen-
tal rights which were not explicitly provided for in the Constitution of 1848 
or 1874, thereby recognising the existence and enforceability of unwritten 
rights. Examples include freedom of expression (now Article 16 Constitution), 
freedom of assembly (now Article 22 Constitution) and the right to assistance 
when in need (now Article 12 Constitution).10 It is conceivable that in the 
future the Federal Supreme Court might again recognise guarantees which 
are not (yet) enshrined in the Constitution, if such a step appears prudent in 
light of new challenges and threats.
Individuals can directly invoke fundamental rights which are guaranteed 
by the federal Constitution before administrative authorities and courts. For 
example, this can be done in cases where cantonal laws and decisions are 
being reviewed. Similarly, it is possible to challenge decisions based on federal 
ordinances as to their compatibility with fundamental rights. However, the 
limit to this review comes in the form of Article 190 Constitution, which 
mandates that the Federal Supreme Court and the other judicial authorities 
apply federal acts and international law. This precludes any possibility for the 
courts to declare federal acts invalid if they are shown to be incompatible 
with fundamental rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution.11
ᇶ. Fؘؘؗإؔا؜آء, Cؔءاآءئ, Cآؠؠبءؘئ
Federalism is a basic constitutional principle in Switzerland. The competences 
and responsibilities are vertically distributed over the three levels of govern-
ment, namely the federation, the cantons and the communes (municipalities). 
10 BGE ᇺᇹ I ᇳᇳᇶ; BGE ᇻᇸ I ᇴᇳᇻ; BGE ᇳᇴᇳ I ᇵᇸᇹ.
11 See pp. 156.
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The latter enjoy considerable autonomy in regulating their own affairs, pro-
fiting from the principle of subsidiarity (Article 5a Constitution), which dic-
tates that the Confederation only interferes with regulation if the cantons or 
communes are unable to regulate a particular matter themselves. It is partly 
thanks to this arrangement that the identity- creating societal, linguistic and 
cultural diversity throughout the country is preserved. The people are also 
encouraged to actively participate in political debates and decision- making 
on the cantonal and communal level. Further, the federal bicameral parlia-
mentary system ensures that the cantons participate in the law- making pro-
cess on the federal level.12 They are also involved in the process of revising the 
federal Constitution; a revision must not only be approved of by a majority of 
the people but also by a majority of the cantons. 
Overall, the above arrangements ensure that the Swiss federal system 
displays a unique “bottom- up” character.13 Simultaneously, however, it is 
acknowledged that the federal level and the cantons shall cooperate and 
support each other in the fulfilment of their duties (Article 44 Constitution). 
An essential element in achieving this goal is the use of national equali-
sation payments, both between the individual cantons and between the 
federation and the cantons. These payments contribute to the promotion 
of internal cohesion (Article 2 II Constitution). In 2017, they amounted to 
ƞlƸƺƾƿ CHF ᇷèƟilliƺƹ.14
The following paragraphs describe characteristic features of the three levels 
of government:
ᅬ eƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ iƾ ơƺƸƻƺƾƣƢ ƺƤ ƟƺƿƩ ƿƩƣ ƻƣƺƻlƣ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇳ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. eƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl lƣǁƣl ƣƹjƺǄƾ ƿƩƣ ơƺƸƻƣƿƣƹơƣƾ 
which are assigned to it by the Constitution (Article 42 Constitution). 
eƩƣǄ ƞƽƣ ƣƹǀƸƣƽƞƿƣƢ lƞƽƨƣlǄ iƹ éƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇷᇶᅬᇳᇴᇷ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ. FƣƢƣƽƞl 
law takes precedence over cantonal and communal law (Article 49 
Constitution). This remains the case even where the Federal Assembly 
passes acts which, according to the Constitution, are not within its 
competence.15
12 See pp. 148.
13 Hؔ؟؟ؘإ, n. 92; s. also F؟ؘ؜ءؘإ/M؜ئ؜ؖ/eöأأؘإت؜ؘء, n. 289.
14 Federal Department of Finance, Factsheet: National Fiscal Equalization (NFA), 2017 
ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/jJEᇴ- dGEᇷᄭ.
15 See pp. 156 for the lack of constitutional review of federal acts.
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 ᅱ The second level of government is formed by the 26 Cantons (23 can-
tons, six half- cantons).16 As mentioned, it was the Canton of Jura that 
became the 26th canton in 1978; its territory had formerly been part of 
the Canton of Bern. Attempts to merge the two half- cantons of Basel 
Stadt and Basel Landschaft into one canton have been unsuccessful; 
in 2014, the people of Basel Stadt voted strongly in favour of such a 
merger, but the people of Basel Landschaft strongly rejected it. Zurich 
is the canton with the biggest population, with 1’460’000 inhabitants, 
while the Canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden is the smallest, counting 
just 16’000 inhabitants. Despite differences in size and population, all 
cantons are equal in respect of their legal status, with the exception 
that half- cantons have only one seat in the Council of Cantons (Article 
150 Constitution) and count only as half a canton when a majority of 
the cantons is required for a revision of the Constitution (Article 142 
Constitution). The cantons possess all competences which have not 
been assigned to the federal level (Articles 3 and 42 Constitution), in-
cluding the implementation of federal law (Article 46 Constitution). 
They enjoy considerable autonomy in organising themselves and regu-
lating their own affairs; the federal level ensures that the cantons 
have sufficient financial resources to do so (Article 47 Constitution). 
Cantons are also able to conclude inter- cantonal agreements between 
themselves (Article 48 Constitution).17
ᅬ eƩƣ ƿƩiƽƢ lƣǁƣl ƺƤ ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿ iƾ ƸƞƢƣ ǀƻ ƺƤ ƾƺƸƣ ᇴ’ᇴᇻᇲ ơƺƸƸǀƹƣƾ. eƩƣ 
number is declining due to an ongoing trend where communes merge 
in order to carry out tasks more efficiently. As with cantons, the popula-
tion and size of the communes differs greatly. The Commune of Zurich 
is the biggest, counting almost 400’000 inhabitants; the Commune of 
Bister (Canton of Valais) is the smallest, counting only 31 inhabitants. 
The autonomy of the communes is explicitly guaranteed, although the 
scope of this autonomy is ultimately determined by the cantons (Article 
50 Constitution). Within the limits of their autonomy, the communes 
ƺƽƨƞƹiƾƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ- Ƹƞkiƹƨ iƹ ơƺƸƸǀƹƞl Ƹƞƿƿƣƽƾèᅬ ƾǀơƩ ƞƾ lƺơƞl ƿƞǃƣƾ, 
lƺơƞl ƻƺliơƣ, ƻƽiƸƞƽǄ ƣƢǀơƞƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ƻlƞƹƹiƹƨ ƺƤ lƞƹƢ ǀƾƣèᅬ ƿƩƣƸƾƣlǁƣƾ.
16 The six half- cantons are Appenzell Ausserrhoden and Appenzell Innerrhoden; Basel 
Stadt and Basel Landschaft; and Obwalden and Nidwalden. They are known as “half- 
cantons” because they originated from internal divisions in three cantons; Appenzell, 
Basel and Unterwalden.
17 See, for example, the chapter on Criminal Procedure, p. 399.
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Over the last few decades, the federal system has increasingly come under 
pressure in various ways. First, there has been an ongoing shift of competen-
ces from the cantons to the federal level, resulting in an increased burden of 
responsibilities for the federation.18 Second, the increasing tendency to take 
recourse to international treaties often results in a tacit neutralisation of can-
tonal competences. Various bilateral agreements with the EU are examples 
of this, such as the harmonisation of the mutual recognition of professional 
qualifications based on the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons. 
Accordingly, consultation and cooperation between the different layers of 
government is even more important today than in the past, in order to ensure 
that the cantons can have some influence over the conclusion of treaties which 
may affect their powers. Third, the principle that all cantons have an equal 
standing in votes on the revision of the Constitution does not quite fit with the 
principle that all Swiss citizens are equal and have only one vote. A citizen of 
the Canton of Uri possesses a voting power which is 35 times weightier than 
the voting power of a citizen of the Canton of Zurich. As problematic as it might 
be, this inequality is an inevitable consequence of the deliberate choice to cre-
ate Switzerland as a federation, consisting of both the people and the cantons.
ᇷ. Fؘؘؗإؔ؟ Aئئؘؠؕ؟ج, Fؘؘؗإؔ؟ Cآبءؖ؜؟, Fؘؘؗإؔ؟ 
Cآبإائ
The federal level is organised in order to guarantee the classic principle of the 
separation of powers between the different branches of government (checks 
and balances). The composition and functions of the Federal Assembly, the 
Federal Council (including the federal administration), and the Federal 
Supreme Court and other federal judicial authorities are as follows:19
ᅬ eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl éƾƾƣƸƟlǄ iƾ ƿƩƣ lƣƨiƾlƞƿǀƽƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇶᇺᅬᇳᇹᇵ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. 
It is a bicameral parliament, consisting of the National Council and the 
Council of States. The National Council has 200 members, representing 
the people. The seats are allocated to the cantons in proportion to their 
18 Hؔ؟؟ؘإ, n. 65.
19 See for two particularities, namely the right of the people to have the last word on federal 
acts and international treaties and the Federal Council’s organisation as a multi- party 
collegiate body, pp. 151 and pp. 155.
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population. Currently, the Canton of Zurich has 35 seats, while six can-
tons, including the Canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden, to name but one, 
have the minimum of one seat. In each canton, the elections operate 
through the system of proportional representation. The Council of States 
consists of 46 members, i.e. two delegates from each canton (whereby 
half- cantons delegate one person), whose role is to represent their can-
tons. The election of the cantonal delegates is governed by cantonal law; 
in most cantons, majority voting applies. The term of office for both 
chambers is four years; re- elections are possible. The two chambers are 
equal and have similar powers. In particular, both chambers must agree 
on the enactment of federal acts and the conclusion of international 
treaties, as well as on the proposed budget. The members of both cham-
bers act together, as the United Federal Assembly, when they elect the 
members of the Federal Council, the members of the Federal Supreme 
Court and, in times of war, the Commander- in- Chief of the armed forces.
 ᅱ The Federal Council is the highest governing and executive authority 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇹᇶᅬᇳᇺᇹ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. Iƿ ơƺƹƾiƾƿƾ ƺƤ ƾƣǁƣƹ ƸƣƸƟƣƽƾ ᄬơƺǀƹ-
cillors) who are elected individually by the Federal Assembly for a 
term of four years. In 2013, the people and the cantons rejected the 
initiative “popular election of the Federal Council” (“Volkswahl des 
Bundesrates”) which tried to demand that councillors be elected 
directly by the people. Re- elections are possible and usually occur 
as a matter of routine; there have only been four instances in which 
councillors have not been re- elected since 1848.20 The various geo-
graphical and linguistic regions of the country should be appro-
priately represented, which usually is the case. Moreover, all major 
political parties are represented, based on a tacit agreement between 
the major parties.21 One of the councillors acts as “President of the 
Confederation”, chairing Federal Council meetings and fulfilling rep-
resentation duties in the country and abroad for a term of one year, 
acting as primus or prima inter pares (first among equals). The Federal 
Council takes its decisions as a collective body, endorsing the prin-
ciple of collegiality. It directs the federal administration whereby 
each councillor heads one of the seven Departments (Department of 
Foreign Affairs; Department of Home Affairs; Department of Justice 
20 Hؔ؟؟ؘإ, n. 300.
21 See pp. 155.
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and Police; Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport; 
Department of Finance; Department of Economic Affairs, Education 
and Research; Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and 
Communications). The Federal Council decides on the objectives of 
government policy, thereby deploying political leadership. It submits 
drafts of federal acts to the Federal Assembly, enacts ordinances and is 
responsible for foreign relations.
ᅬ eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ iƾ ƿƩƣ ƾǀƻƽƣƸƣ jǀƢiơiƞl ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿǄ ƺƤ 
dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇺᇺᅬᇳᇻᇳc Constitution). Currently, it consists of 38 
full- time judges and 19 part- times judges. They are elected by the United 
Federal Assembly for a term of six years; re- election is possible and, 
if attempted, is regularly achieved. The court is divided up into seven 
divisions: two divisions of public law, two divisions of social security 
law, two divisions of private law, and one division of criminal law. It acts 
upon appeal, hearing cases which have been decided either by the high-
est cantonal courts or by other federal courts, i.e. the Federal Criminal 
Court, the Federal Administrative Court and the Federal Patent Court.22 
The independence of the courts is constitutionally guaranteed.
The members of the Federal Assembly, the Federal Council and the Federal 
Supreme Court are generally members of political parties. In the Federal 
Assembly, the most powerful parties are the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) with 
70 seats, the Social Democratic Party (SPS) with 56 seats, the Liberals (FDP) 
with 45 seats and the Christian Democratic People’s Party (CVP) with 40 
seats. These four parties are also represented in the Federal Council.23 The 
federal judges are also elected on the basis of party membership. The combi-
nation of the judges’ party membership with the relatively short term of office 
of six years for federal judges means that they are under more scrutiny than 
judges in other jurisdictions, where judges may have longer terms of office but 
no possibility of facing periodic re- elections.
The city of Bern is the capital of Switzerland. This city is home to numerous 
official activities: the Federal Assembly meets here, and the official seat of the 
Federal Council and the departments is also in Bern. The Federal Supreme 
Court is located in Lausanne, while its two social security law divisions are 
located in the city of Lucerne.
22 See pp. 156 for the limited extent of constitutional review in Switzerland.
23 See pp. 151.
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II. aƽiƹơiƻlƣƾ
The Swiss political system is characterised by various particularities which 
distinguish it from theoretical models of political systems and from those 
systems which exist in other states. The following particularities are most 
noteworthy.
ᇳ. ᄬdؘؠ؜- ᄭ D؜إؘؖا Dؘؠآؖإؔؖج
Swiss citizens are regularly called upon to vote on specific political issues. 
Their decisions are legally binding and cannot be overturned or ignored by 
state authorities. On the federal level, popular initiatives and referenda are 
the relevant instruments. Accordingly, the Swiss system is often termed a 
semi- direct democracy, mixing elements of a representative system with 
strong direct democratic elements.24 In addition, the cantons and communes 
are free to set up their own systems and methods which operate to facilitate 
the direct participation of the people.
ƞᄭ aƺƻǀlƞƽ Iƹiƿiƞƿiǁƣ
A popular initiative is an instrument unique to Switzerland: it allows citi-
ǅƣƹƾ ƿƺ ƽƣƼǀƣƾƿ ƞ ǁƺƿƣ ƺƹ ƞ ƽƣǁiƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇵᇺᅬᇳᇵᇻb 
Constitution). It requires the approval of a majority of the people who vote 
and a majority of the cantons in order to be successful.
The right to launch a popular initiative was introduced in 1891. When it was 
first introduced, 50’000 citizens were required to sign an initiative in order for 
it to be put to the vote of the people and the cantons. Since then, some limit-
ations have been added: in 1976, the time period within which the required 
amount of signatures must be collected was circumscribed to 18 months. In 
1977, i.e. shortly after women’s suffrage had been introduced (as mentioned, 
24 See for the societal preconditions upon which the Swiss model of direct democracy 
depends the chapter on Legal Sociology, pp. 118.
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this was not until 1971), the number of signatures was raised to 100’000. The 
Constitution leaves it to the drafters of an initiative to decide whether to pro-
pose a revision in general terms or to submit a specific draft of a provision or 
several provisions. In practice, specific drafts are the norm. The authors of 
an initiative are free to choose an appropriate title, as long as it is not mislea-
ding. Accordingly, authors tend to label initiatives with lurid titles in order to 
sell them on the political market. An illustrative example was the initiative 
“against rip- off” (“gegen die Abzockerei”) in 2013 which was approved by the 
people and the cantons.
The Constitution does not set any hurdles for proposing new provisions, 
except that peremptory norms of international law must not be violated (ius 
cogens) and, in the case of a proposal for a partial revision, that the principle 
of unity of form and subject- matter is respected (Article 139 III Constitution). 
One example of an initiative which did not meet the former requirement was 
the initiative entitled “enforcing the expulsion of criminal foreign nationals” 
(“Zur Durchsetzung der Ausschaffung krimineller Ausländer”) of 2016, which 
demanded a strict implementation of the original initiative of 2010.25 This 
initiative was declared partially invalid by the Federal Assembly; although 
it acknowledged the supremacy of ius cogens over the proposed provisions, 
it defined ius cogens exhaustively, rather than leaving it to the international 
community to further develop this concept and include new elements over 
time.
Traditionally, popular initiatives have been launched by minorities on 
issues the established political parties do not want to take up in parliament. In 
recent years, political parties have increasingly begun to take recourse to ini-
tiatives themselves, by- passing the classic parliamentary process. Moreover, 
initiatives can be launched by interest groups to bring a specific concern to 
the attention of the public, thereby exerting pressure on the political parties 
to address the issue. The constitution provides for the possibility that the 
Federal Assembly submits a counter- proposal to an initiative; when this is the 
case, the committee responsible for the initiative can withdraw it, and only 
ƿƩƣ ơƺǀƹƿƣƽ- ƻƽƺƻƺƾƞlèᅬ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƣƢ ƿƺ Ɵƣ Ƹƺƽƣ likƣlǄ ƿƺ Ƹƣƣƿ ƞƻƻƽƺǁƞlèᅬ iƾ ƾǀƟ-
mitted to the vote of the people and the cantons. The Federal Assembly might 
also begin efforts to enact a federal act which encompasses the objectives of 
the initiative (indirect counter- proposal); again, in this case, the committee 
who launched the initiative might withdraw it.
25 Previously discussed in the section on Foreign Nationals, pp. 142.
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The people and the cantons have become more willing to approve popular 
initiatives over the last fifteen years or so. Out of the 22 initiatives which were 
approved since the creation of this instrument in 1871, ten were approved of 
after 2002. Amongst these were various initiatives which were incompatible 
with international law. This is problematic.26
Ɵᄭ cƣƤƣƽƣƹƢǀƸ
A referendum allows citizens to vote on a constitutional revision, a federal 
ƞơƿ ƺƽ ƞƹ iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞl ƿƽƣƞƿǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇶᇲᅬᇳᇶᇴ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. eǂƺ ƿǄƻƣƾ ƞƽƣ 
provided for:
ᅬ é ƸƞƹƢƞƿƺƽǄ ƽƣƤƣƽƣƹƢǀƸ: ƿƩiƾ ƿƞkƣƾ ƻlƞơƣƾ ƞǀƿƺƸƞƿiơƞllǄ, i.ƣ. ǂiƿƩƺǀƿ 
the need for any action from the authorities or the people, in the case of 
constitutional revisions initiated by the Federal Assembly, accessions 
to organisations for collective security (e.g. NATO) or to supranational 
communities (e.g. the EU) and in the case of emergency acts not based 
on a constitutional provision. Such referenda require the approval of 
the majority of the people who vote and the majority of the cantons in 
order to be successful.
ᅬ éƹ ƺƻƿiƺƹƞl ƽƣƤƣƽƣƹƢǀƸ: ƿƩiƾ ơƞƹ Ɵƣ ƽƣƼǀƣƾƿƣƢ ƟǄ ᇷᇲ’ᇲᇲᇲ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ 
against, in particular, the enactment of a federal act (introduced in 
1874) and the conclusion of an international treaty which is of unlim-
ited duration and cannot be terminated, provides for accession to an 
international organisation, or contains important legislative provi-
sions or requires the enactment of federal legislation for implemen-
tation (introduced in 1921, extended in 1977 and 2003). Originally, the 
necessary number of signatures was 30’000. In 1977, the number was 
increased to 50’000. The signatures must be collected within 100 days 
of the official publication of the act or treaty. The people’s vote is de-
cisive for the outcome of such a referendum; it is not necessary that a 
majority of the cantons also approve or reject the act or treaty.
Since 1874, there have been 183 cases where optional referenda have been 
held, after citizens have successfully collected the necessary number of signa-
tures. In 79 votes, the people agreed to put in force the act or treaty in ques-
tion; a prominent and to some extent controversial example was the approval 
26 See the chapter on International Relations, pp. 177.
154 Matthias Oesch: Constitutional Law
in 2002 of an act which legalised abortions during the first 12 weeks of preg-
ƹƞƹơǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇳᇻ dǂiƾƾ CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣᄭ. Iƹ ᇳᇲᇶ ǁƺƿƣƾ, ƿƩƣ ƺǀƿơƺƸƣ ǂƞƾ ƹƣƨƞ-
tive, and the act or treaty was not put into force as originally envisaged by the 
Federal Assembly: a prominent example was the rejection of the Federal Act 
on the 2020 Pensions Reform in 2017.
The existence of the referendum in Switzerland modifies the representa-
tive system. It is the main instrument of control of, and opposition against, 
the Federal Assembly. To some extent, providing for the possibility to launch 
an optional referendum compensates for the lack of a fully- f ledged parlia-
mentary opposition.27 The Federal Assembly creates legislation which takes 
into account the concerns of as many political parties and stakeholders as 
possible, thus enhancing the chance that the final product will “survive” a 
possible referendum. Effectively, the citizens of Switzerland themselves 
become a key opposition to the Federal Assembly. Considering all of this, it 
becomes clear why the Swiss “referendum democracy” is often referred to as 
“consensus- oriented democracy”.28
ơᄭ “LƞƹƢƾƨƣƸƣiƹƢƣ” ƞƾ Cƞƹƿƺƹƞl aƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽiƿǄ
The cantons choose their own models for the participation of their citizens in 
the political process. A particularity is provided for in the cantons of Appenzell 
IƹƹƣƽƽƩƺƢƣƹ ƞƹƢ Glƞƽǀƾ, ǂƩiơƩ Ʃƞǁƣ ƞƻƻƺiƹƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ LƞƹƢƾƨƣƸƣiƹƢƣ ƞƾ ƿƩƣiƽ 
main decision- making body. Once a year, the cantonal citizens eligible to vote 
gather on the main town square in the respective capitals, Appenzell and 
Glƞƽǀƾ, ƞƹƢ ƢƣơiƢƣ ƺƹ ƞll ƽƣlƣǁƞƹƿ Ƹƞƿƿƣƽƾ, iƹơlǀƢiƹƨ ƞƹǄ ƽƣǁiƾiƺƹƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹ-
tonal Constitutions, the enactment of cantonal laws and issues surrounding 
elections. Pending issues are openly debated. Votes and elections are held in 
public; the method of voting is the raising of hands. Usually, the votes are 
estimated by the chairman or chairwoman. Votes are only actually counted 
individually in exceptional cases.
From a legal viewpoint, the Landsgemeinde presents various issues. Open 
voting conflicts with the right to submit a secret vote (Article 34 Constitution). 
Ciƿiǅƣƹƾ ǂƩƺ ƞƽƣ ǀƹƞƟlƣ ƿƺ ƞƿƿƣƹƢè ᅬ ƾǀơƩ ƞƾ ƣlƢƣƽlǄ ƺƽ ill ƻƣƺƻlƣ ƺƽ ƻƣƺƻlƣ 
ǂiƿƩ ƻƽƺƤƣƾƾiƺƹƞl ơƺƸƸiƿƸƣƹƿƾèᅬ ƞƽƣ ƣǃơlǀƢƣƢ ƤƽƺƸ ƣǃƣƽơiƾiƹƨ ƿƩƣiƽ ƻƺliƿiơƞl 
rights. This is problematic. Still, the Federal Supreme Court held that these 
27 Hؔ؟؟ؘإ, n. 7.
28 aؔاإ؜ؖ؜ؔ Eؚ؟؜, IƹƿƽƺƢǀơƿiƺƹ ƿƺ dǂiƾƾ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl Lƞǂ, kǀƽiơƩ/dƿ. Gƞllƣƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇸ, ƻ. ᇸᇶ; 
F؟ؘ؜ءؘإ/M؜ئ؜ؖ/eöأأؘإت؜ؘء, n. 26, 98; Hؔ؟؟ؘإ, n. 227.
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restrictions do not amount to a violation of the federal Constitution, “in spite 
of deficiencies inherent in the system”.29
ᇴ. Mب؟ا؜- aؔإاج Gآةؘإءؠؘءا
Most European countries adhere to a parliamentary system of govern-
ment, whereby the prime minister and his or her government depend on 
Parliament’s support.30 The strongest party selects the prime minister and 
forms the government, occasionally together with other parties as a coalition, 
if this is necessary to form a majority.
In Switzerland, a substantially different approach has developed over time. 
During the first decades of the confederation’s existence, the Federal Council 
was composed only of members of the Liberals (FDP). Towards the end of the 
19th century, in the aftermath of the introduction of the referendum and the 
popular initiative for a partial revision of the Constitution, the pressure to 
include members of other political parties grew. Therefore, in 1891, the first 
member of the Christian Democratic People’s Party (CVP) was elected to the 
Federal Council. In 1929, the first member of the Party of Farmers, Traders and 
IƹƢƣƻƣƹƢƣƹƿƾ ᄬBGBᄭ, ǂƩiơƩ ǂƞƾ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƣƢƣơƣƾƾƺƽ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ aƣƺƻlƣ’ƾ aƞƽƿǄ 
(SVP), became councillor. In 1943, the Social Democratic Party (SPS) was repre-
sented in the Federal Council for the first time. Since then, it has been a Swiss 
particularity that all major political parties are represented in the Federal 
Council. To this effect, in 1959, the so- called “magic formula” was firmly esta-
blished in Switzerland. According to this formula, the Federal Council should 
consist of two members of the Liberals (FDP), the Social Democratic Party 
(SPS) and the Christian Democratic People’s Party (CVP) and of one member 
of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP). The distribution reflected, approximately, 
the number of seats which the parties usually won in the general elections. 
In 2003, the formula was slightly modified to reflect changes in the parties’ 
popularity. The Swiss People’s Party (SVP) gained one seat; they now have two 
members in the Federal Council.31 They gained their extra seat at the detri-
ment of the Christian Democratic People’s Party (CVP) which has only had 
29 BGE ᇳᇴᇳ I ᇳᇵᇺ.
30 Hؔ؟؟ؘإ, n. 238 et seq.
31 This was partly interrupted between 2007 and 2015 when elected members of the SVP 
chose to leave the party and join a newly founded party, the Conservative Democratic 
Party (BDP).
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one seat since then. Both the Liberals (FDP) and the Social Democratic Party 
(SPS) still have two seats each.
The magic formula reflects a tacit agreement between the major parties 
that a collegiate system of a multi- party government best suits the interests 
ƺƤ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ. Iƹ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽ, ƿƩiƾ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣèᅬ ǂƩƣƽƣ ƸƣƸƟƣƽƾ ƺƤ ƞll Ƹƞjƺƽ ƻƞƽ-
ƿiƣƾ ơƞƹ iƹƤlǀƣƹơƣ ƿƩƣ ƢƽƞƤƿiƹƨ ƤƽƺƸ ƿƩƣ ǁƣƽǄ ƾƿƞƽƿèᅬ ƣƹƾǀƽƣƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl 
Council prepares legislative drafts in a way that they both achieve a majority 
in the Federal Assembly and also would be likely to “survive” a possible refe-
rendum. The collegiate system of a multi- party government is an essential 
part of the Swiss “concordance democracy”32.
However, there is no legal obligation on the part of the Federal Assembly 
to elect councillors according to the magic formula. As such, with each elec-
tion of a new councillor, the pros and cons of the Swiss model are discussed, 
and the public watches the resulting commotion in the Federal Palace with 
fascination. Nevertheless, despite the recurring debate, it seems likely that 
the magic formula will continue to form the basis for the composition of the 
Federal Council, although perhaps this composition will more readily adapt 
to actual developments than was the case in the previous decades.33
ᇵ. L؜ؠ؜اؘؗ Cآءئا؜ابا؜آءؔ؟ cؘة؜ؘت
Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ƽƣǁiƣǂèᅬ i.ƣ. ơƺǀƽƿ ƽƣǁiƣǂ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƺƸƻƞƿiƟiliƿǄ ƺƤ lƣƨƞl ƞơƿƾ ƞƹƢ 
decisions with the Constitution and their power to declare such acts invalid 
iƤ ƿƩƣǄ ƞƽƣ iƹơƺƸƻƞƿiƟlƣèᅬ iƾ ƞ ơƩƞƽƞơƿƣƽiƾƿiơ ƺƤ Ƹƺƾƿ Eǀƽƺƻƣƞƹ lƣƨƞl ƾǄƾƿƣƸƾ. 
In Switzerland, however, none of the courts are equipped with this function, 
at least with respect to federal acts. This is due to Article 190 Constitution, 
which mandates that the Federal Supreme Court and the other judicial autho-
rities apply the federal acts and international law. Therefore, the courts are 
obliged to apply federal acts even if they are found to violate the Constitution. 
In essence, it is the Federal Assembly which authoritatively interprets 
the Constitution during the process of enacting federal acts. This includes 
making an assessment as to whether federal acts are compatible with funda-
mental rights and whether the Federal Assembly is actually empowered by 
the Constitution to enact legislation in a specific policy field. This particular 
32 Hؔ؟؟ؘإ, n. 227; Eؚ؟؜, p. 95.
33 See also F؟ؘ؜ءؘإ/M؜ئ؜ؖ/eöأأؘإت؜ؘء, n. 210.
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allocation of competence and responsibility is based on a deliberate systemic 
choice, approved of by the people and the cantons. Attempts to introduce the 
right of the judiciary to hear cases on the constitutionality of federal acts, for 
instance by simply deleting Article 190 Constitution, have repeatedly failed to 
gain enough political support.
Thus, the Federal Assembly becomes the final interpreter of the Constitution. 
The problematic aspects of this system are clear; the Federal Assembly is not 
ideally suited, for example, to guarantee fundamental rights, acting as it does 
through majority voting. However, the Federal Assembly is at least well placed 
to take its role as final interpreter of the Constitution seriously: it benefits 
from the advice and assistance of the Federal Council and the legal specialists 
in the federal administration who prepare drafts and assist in the decision- 
making process. Notably, it is not easy to point to federal acts which evidently 
violate the Constitution. Further, the following aspects of the case law of the 
Federal Supreme Court contribute to minimising the deficiencies of the cur-
rent system specifically with respect to the protection of fundamental rights:
ᅬ eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ơƺƹƾiƾƿƣƹƿlǄ iƹƿƣƽƻƽƣƿƾ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƞơƿƾ iƹ liƨƩƿ 
of fundamental rights, thereby adhering to the method of interpreting 
the law in conformity with the Constitution.34
 ᅱ The Federal Supreme Court does not refrain from pointing to existing 
incompatibilities if it is not possible to interpret federal acts in con-
formity with fundamental rights.35 By doing so, the Federal Supreme 
Court calls upon the Federal Assembly to remedy the identified defi-
ciencies; it is a method through which the Federal Supreme Court can 
press the Federal Assembly to at least discuss the issue.
ᅬ eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƞơơƣƻƿƾ ơƞƾƣƾ iƹ ǂƩiơƩ iƿ iƾ ơƞllƣƢ ǀƻƺƹ ƿƺ 
review federal acts in light of the ECHR.36 The possibility for citizens 
to directly invoke the rights under this Convention before the Federal 
Supreme Court somewhat compensates for the lack of constitutional 
review of federal acts: individuals can request that a federal act which 
is not compatible with a right guaranteed in the ECHR does not apply.
34 dƣƣ ƣ.ƨ. BGE ᇳᇵᇹ I ᇵᇷᇳ.
35 dƣƣ ƣ.ƨ. BGE ᇳᇵᇸ I ᇸᇷ.
36 BGE ᇳᇴᇷ II ᇶᇳᇹ ᄬaKKᄭ; ƾƣƣ ƿƩƣ ơƩƞƻƿƣƽ ƺƹ Iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞl cƣlƞƿiƺƹƾ, ƻ. ᇳᇹᇹ.
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The Federal Supreme Court is competent to review the compatibility of can-
tonal laws and decisions with the federal Constitution. Various causes célèb-
res of the Federal Supreme Court concerned such constellations and have 
led to the development of an impressive stream of case law on fundamental 
rights.37 Indirectly, this case law again influences the law- making process at 
the federal level; it becomes clearer to the Federal Assembly what the court 
will regard as constitutionally unacceptable.38 Moreover, it is possible to chal-
lenge decisions based on federal ordinances as to their alleged incompatibi-
lity with the federal Constitution and to request their annulment.
37 See pp. 159.
38 Hؔ؟؟ؘإ, n. 569.
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III. LƞƹƢƸƞƽk Cƞƾƣƾ
The Federal Supreme Court has been discussed throughout this chapter; it 
is the highest court in Switzerland. Although its powers are limited in scope 
by Article 190 Constitution, which precludes any possibility of constitutional 
review of federal acts, it takes an active role in protecting fundamental rights, 
as the following two cases demonstrate.
ᇳ. hآؠؘء’ئ dبؙؙإؘؚؔ
In 1989, e؛ؘإؘئؔ cآ؛ءؘإ requested that the cantonal authorities allow her 
to participate at the Landsgemeinde of the Canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden, 
in order to exercise her political rights. The cantonal authorities rejected her 
application, on the basis that Article 16 of the Constitution of the Canton of 
Appenzell Innerrhoden did not grant political rights to women; only men 
could vote and participate in elections. In 1990, the Landsgemeinde dealt 
with a proposal to change the cantonal Constitution, according to which the 
political rights would have been extended to all Swiss citizens residing in the 
ơƞƹƿƺƹèᅬ iƹơlǀƢiƹƨ ǂƺƸƣƹ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƿƩƣ LƞƹƢƾƨƣƸƣiƹƢƣ, ǂƩƺƾƣ ǁƺƿiƹƨ ƻƺƻǀ-
lation at this time consisted of men alone, rejected the proposal. Several appli-
cants, among them fإئب؟ؔ Bؔبؠؔءء and Mؔإ؜آ dآءؘؗإؘؘؚؚإ, challenged 
the decision of the Landsgemeinde. They requested that the Federal Supreme 
Court annul the decision and oblige the canton to introduce women’s suffrage.
Upon appeal, the Federal Supreme Court agreed with the arguments of the 
applicants.39 It determined that the exclusion of women from the cantonal elec-
torate violated Article 4 II of the federal Constitution of 1874, an article intro-
duced in 1981 providing for equal treatment of men and women (now: Article 
8 II Constitution). The Federal Supreme Court held that the principle of equal 
treatment also applied to political rights at the cantonal level. Thus, the cantonal 
practice which did not allow women to participate at the Landsgemeinde vio-
lated Article 4 II Constitution 1874. Although Article 74 IV Constitution of 1874 
39 BGE ᇳᇳᇸ Iƞ ᇵᇷᇻ.
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(now: Article 39 I Constitution) provided that it was up to the cantons to regu-
late the exercise of political rights at the cantonal level, this Article had no effect 
on the Federal Supreme Court’s decision because it did not explicitly provide for 
an exception from the principle of equal treatment. Consequently, the Canton 
of Appenzell Innerrhoden was required to allow women to participate at the 
Landsgemeinde and to exercise the political rights which were provided for in the 
cantonal law. The Federal Supreme Court concluded that it was possible to inter-
pret Article 16 of the Constitution of the Canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden to this 
effect; it was not necessary for the canton to formally change its Constitution.
The decision rendered by the Federal Supreme Court ended the long fight of 
Swiss women (supported by at least some men) for equal treatment regarding 
political rights. On the federal level, the women had already been granted full 
political rights in 1971, based on a constitutional revision approved of by a 
ƸƞjƺƽiƿǄ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƣƺƻlƣèᅬ ƹƞƸƣlǄ, ᇸᇷè% ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Ƹƣƹ ǂƩƺ ƿǀƽƹƣƢ ǀƻ ƿƺ ǁƺƿƣèᅬ 
and a majority of the cantons (Article 74 I Constitution 1874, now: Article 136 
Constitution). The Canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden was the last canton to 
follow suit. Irritatingly and somewhat depressingly, the (male) electorate of 
the canton was not ready to introduce women’s suffrage itself. Rather, the 
Federal Supreme Court needed to step in.
ᇴ. Nؔابإؔ؟؜ئؔا؜آء ؔءؗ Fبءؗؔؠؘءاؔ؟ c؜ؚ؛ائ
In 2000, the electorate of the Commune of Emmen (Canton of Lucerne) was 
called upon to decide on 23 applications for naturalisation (comprising 56 for-
eign nationals, in some cases applying together as families) in a ballot vote. 
The people voted in favour of the naturalisation of only eight applicants, who 
were all Italian citizens. They rejected all other applications, which were 
ƸƞiƹlǄ ƾǀƟƸiƿƿƣƢ ƟǄ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ ƺƤ ƣǃ- jǀƨƺƾlƞǁiƞƹ ơƺǀƹƿƽiƣƾ ᄬƾƺƸƣ ƺƤ ǂƩƺƸ ƩƞƢ 
been born in Switzerland and had always lived here). Four of these applicants 
challenged the negative vote. The cantonal government council, as the first 
appellate authority, rejected their complaints.
The Federal Supreme Court annulled the decision of the commune on 
appeal.40 It held that the electorate is a state organ and exercises a state fun-
ction when it decides on the naturalisation of foreign nationals and thus on 
their legal status. Therefore, the electorate is obliged to respect fundamental 
rights (Article 35 Constitution). In particular, the prohibition of discrimination 
40 BGE ᇳᇴᇻ I ᇴᇳᇹ.
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ƞƻƻliƣƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇺèII Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. Oƹ ƿƩƣ Ɵƞƾiƾ ƺƤ Ʃƺǂ ƿƩƣ ƣlƣơƿƺƽƞƿƣ ƢƣơiƢƣƢèᅬ 
naturalisation of all Italian applicants, no naturalisation of all applicants from 
ƣǃ- jǀƨƺƾlƞǁiƞƹ ơƺǀƹƿƽiƣƾ ǂiƿƩƺǀƿ ƣǁiƢƣƹƿ ƽƣlƣǁƞƹƿ ƢiƤƤƣƽƣƹơƣƾ Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ ƿƩƣ 
ƞƻƻliơƞƹƿƾèᅬ ƞƹƢ ƻǀƟliơƞƿiƺƹƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƩƞƢ Ɵƣƣƹ ơiƽơǀlƞƿƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƽǀƹ- ǀƻ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ǁƺƿƣ 
(flyers and letters to newspapers calling out to reject the applications of per-
ƾƺƹƾ ƤƽƺƸ ƣǃ- jǀƨƺƾlƞǁiƞƹ ơƺǀƹƿƽiƣƾᄭ, ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƢƣơiƢƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ 
the constitutional prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of origin had 
been violated. Moreover, it held that the right to be heard applies; negative deci-
sions must be backed up with adequate reasoning (Article 29 II Constitution). 
This right to be heard is violated per se in cases in which the electorate deci-
des on naturalisation applications in a secret ballot vote, as here it is logically 
impossible to deliver a proper justification for a negative decision. As such, it is 
no longer permissible to decide on naturalisations through ballot voting. 
Most commentators have welcomed the Federal Supreme Court’s judg-
ment, and rightly so. In a series of later cases, the Federal Supreme Court has 
further clarified the guidelines. It acknowledged that decisions on the natu-
ralisation of foreign nationals may still be taken by the communal electorate 
if this is considered by the commune to be the appropriate forum; however, 
the decision- making process must respect fundamental rights. The most 
obvious rights which must be respected in such a process are the prohibition 
of discrimination (Article 8 II Constitution), the prohibition of arbitrariness 
(Article 9 Constitution), the right to privacy (Article 13 Constitution), the free-
dom of religion and conscience (Article 15 Constitution) and the right to be 
heard (Article 29 II Constitution).41 Today, a significant number of communal 
electorates retain the competence to decide on the naturalisation of foreign 
nationals; the figure has been estimated at approximately 800 communes.
Not everyone was satisfied with the Federal Supreme Court’s judgement: 
in 2008, the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) tried to turn back the wheel. It col-
lected the necessary 100’000 signatures for a popular initiative entitled “for 
democratic naturalisations” (“für demokratische Einbürgerungen”) accor-
ding to which it would have been entirely up to the communes to decide on 
the decision- making process for naturalisations, thus allowing secret ballot 
voting to be reinstated. The people and the cantons overwhelmingly rejected 
the initiative (63 % voting against). Instead, the Federal Assembly codified 
the basic elements of the Federal Supreme Court’s case law in the Federal Act 
ƺƹ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CiƿiǅƣƹƾƩiƻ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾèᇳᇷᅬᇳᇹᄭ.
41 dƣƣ ƣ.ƨ. BGE ᇳᇴᇻ I ᇴᇵᇴ; BGE ᇳᇵᇲ I ᇳᇶᇲ; BEG ᇳᇵᇷ I ᇶᇻ; BGE ᇳᇵᇻ I ᇳᇸᇻ.
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I. eƽƣƞƿiƣƾ
Switzerland traditionally adopts a friendly and respectful attitude towards 
international law. As a relatively small export- driven country, Switzerland 
depends on stable international relations, based on the rule of law. It is no sur-
prise, then, that Switzerland participates in numerous international organisa-
tions and treaty networks. Nowadays, Switzerland’s membership of the United 
Nations (UN) provides the foundation. Also significant is Switzerland’s mem-
bership of other organisations and treaty networks, covering almost any policy 
field conceivable, like trade, investment, monetary issues, taxation, transpor-
tation, telecommunication, environment, development, food, health, educa-
tion, culture, metrology, and weapons control. Switzerland is also a signatory 
to various human rights treaties; amongst them the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), which has been attributed a quasi- constitutional sta-
tus by the Federal Supreme Court.1 It is not a member of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO); at least, it participates in Partnership for Peace 
(PfP). The first section of this chapter examines Switzerland’s participation in 
various organisations and treaty networks.
dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢè ᅬ Ƣƣƾƻiƿƣ iƿƾ lƺơƞƿiƺƹ ƞƿ ƿƩƣ Ʃƣƞƽƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Eǀƽƺƻƣƞƹ ơƺƹƿi-
nent, surrounded by three of the six founding members of the then- named 
Eǀƽƺƻƣƞƹ EơƺƹƺƸiơ CƺƸƸǀƹiƿǄ ᄬEECᄭèᅬ iƾ ƹƺƿ ƞ ƸƣƸƟƣƽ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Eǀƽƺƻƣƞƹ 
Union (EU). Still, it is of prime importance to Switzerland that it maintains 
close and stable relations with the EU and its member states. Swiss member-
ship of the Council of Europe and the bilateral agreements with the EU are 
also discussed below.
ᇳ. fء؜اؘؗ Nؔا؜آءئ ؔءؗ dأؘؖ؜ؔ؟؜ئؘؗ Aؘؚءؖ؜ؘئ
Founded in 1945 in the aftermath of two devastating world wars, the UN’s 
primary aim is to maintain and achieve collective security. As a truly glo-
bal organisation, it provides a unique forum for all nations and other actors 
1 See the chapter on Constitutional Law, p. 144.
166 Matthias Oesch: International Relations
to co- operate on the international plane. Its outreach, both in terms of its 
membership and the variety of subject matters it has competence to deal 
with, is unrivalled by any other international organisation. Currently, its 
membership encompasses 193 member states. Various programmes, funds 
and specialised agencies also operate under the UN, all of which have their 
own memberships and budget. Among the programmes and funds are the 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) and the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP). The specialised agencies are fully- f ledged international organisa-
tions; they include, among others, the World Health Organization (WHO), the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the two Bretton Woods ins-
titutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The 
main seat of the UN in Europe is in Geneva; the headquarters are at the Palais 
des Nations, which was originally built to house the League of Nations, the 
ƻƽƣƢƣơƣƾƾƺƽ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ fN ᄬᇳᇻᇴᇲᅬᇳᇻᇶᇸᄭ.
Regarding Switzerland’s involvement with the UN, it did not actually join 
the organisation until 2002. The accession process was instigated by a popu-
lƞƽ iƹiƿiƞƿiǁƣ; ƿƩƣ ƻƣƺƻlƣ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ƞƻƻƽƺǁƣƢ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƞơơƣƾƾiƺƹèᅬ ƞlƟƣiƿ 
Ƽǀiƿƣ ƹƞƽƽƺǂlǄ, ƟǄ ƺƹlǄ ᇷᇶ.ᇸè%. BƣƤƺƽƣ jƺiƹiƹƨ, dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ ƩƞƢ ƞlƽƣƞƢǄ ƻƞƽ-
ticipated in many of the UN’s specialised agencies, programmes and funds. 
It had been a member of the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund since 1992. Since acceding to the UN, Switzerland has played an 
active role in the organisation. It was involved in the foundation of the new 
HǀƸƞƹ ciƨƩƿƾ Cƺǀƹơil iƹ ᇴᇲᇲᇸ ƞƹƢ Ʃƞƾ ƞơƿiǁƣlǄ ơƺƹƿƽiƟǀƿƣƢ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƟƞƿƣ 
on the potential reform of the Security Council.2 Switzerland has also for-
mally applied to become a member of the Security Council for the period of 
ᇴᇲᇴᇵᅬᇴᇶ; ƣlƣơƿiƺƹƾ ƞƽƣ ƾơƩƣƢǀlƣƢ Ƥƺƽ ᇴᇲᇴᇴ. éơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺǀƹơil, 
membership of the Security Council would not compromise Switzerland’s 
policy of neutrality.3
2 FƣƢƣƽƞl DƣƻƞƽƿƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ Fƺƽƣiƨƹ éƤƤƞiƽƾ ᄬFDFé; Ʃƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/éᇸdj- eijKᄭ.
3 For more detail on Switzerland’s policy of neutrality, see p. 174.
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ᇴ. eإؘؔؗ ؔءؗ Iءةؘئاؠؘءا
The World Trade Organization (WTO) sets out the basic legal framework 
for international trade. It was founded in 1995 as a successor to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947 and largely continued the latter’s 
ƞƻƻƽƺƞơƩ. eƩƣ heO ơǀƽƽƣƹƿlǄ Ʃƞƾ ᇳᇸᇶ ƸƣƸƟƣƽƾ ƞƹƢ iƾ ƾiƿǀƞƿƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ 
Centre William Rappard, Geneva. The WTO Agreement, which established 
the organisation, has three main annexes which legally bind all members: 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (embracing various side- 
agreements, on issues such as technical barriers to trade, agriculture, anti- 
dumping, and countervailing measures), the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS), and the Agreement on Trade- Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs). These agreements provide for the basic principles 
of market access, non- discrimination, and transparency to be respected by 
all members while simultaneously allowing them to pursue equally legiti-
mate policy objectives, like the protection of public morals, the environment 
and human and animal health and life. Another key WTO agreement is the 
plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement, which sets out rules 
for public tendering. The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) provides 
for a fully- f ledged state- to- state dispute resolution mechanism. Panels and, 
upon appeal, the Appellate Body render binding rulings. If a defending party 
does not comply with such a ruling, the complaining party is permitted to 
suspend obligations vis- à- vis the defending party, i.e. to impose retaliatory 
measures. 
Switzerland has a long history of involvement with the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade 1947. It had become a member of the General Agreement 
ƺƹ eƞƽiƤƤƾ ƞƹƢ eƽƞƢƣ iƹ ᇳᇻᇸᇸ ᄬƩƞǁiƹƨ ƞƻƻliƣƢ iƿƾ ƽǀlƣƾ Ƣƣ Ƥƞơƿƺ ƾiƹơƣ ᇳᇻᇸᇲᄭ. 
Subsequently, when the WTO became the successor of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade in 1995, Switzerland was an original member. Since then, 
the WTO has provided the backbone of Swiss external economic relations. 
Swiss companies profit from binding market access rights abroad. To date, 
Switzerland has only once actively participated in WTO dispute settlement 
ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ ƞƾ ƞ ơƺƸƻlƞiƹiƹƨ ƺƽ ƢƣƤƣƹƢiƹƨ ƻƞƽƿǄèᅬ iƿ ƻƞƽƿiơiƻƞƿƣƢ ƞƾ ƞ ơƺƸƻ-
lƞiƹiƹƨ ƻƞƽƿǄ iƹ ƿƩƣ fdèᅬ dƿƣƣl ơƞƾƣ.4
4 See pp. 183.
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Further, aside from WTO agreements, Switzerland has concluded a 
series of free trade agreements with countries all over the globe.5 In addi-
tion to the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the free trade 
agreement with the EU,ᇸ Switzerland currently has a network of 28 free 
trade agreements with 38 partners. Switzerland has usually concluded its 
free trade agreements together with its EFTA partners Norway, Iceland 
and Liechtenstein; examples are the agreements with Macedonia, Serbia, 
Ukraine, Turkey, Israel, Egypt, Mexico, Singapore, Chile, the Republic of 
Kƺƽƣƞ, ƿƩƣ déCf dƿƞƿƣƾ ᄬiƹơlǀƢiƹƨ dƺǀƿƩ éƤƽiơƞᄭ, CƞƹƞƢƞ, ƞƹƢ Hƺƹƨ Kƺƹƨ. 
Recently, Switzerland has also entered into agreements on its own; this has 
been the case with respect to the agreements with Japan and China. The 
main objective of free trade agreements is not only to improve market access 
for Swiss companies per se, but also to ensure that Swiss companies enjoy 
market access conditions which are at least as favourable as those enjoyed 
by its main competitors (in particular those competitors located in the EU). 
In this context, the conclusion of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement between the EU and Canada (CETA) has led Switzerland to try 
to renegotiate specific elements of the free trade agreement with Canada. 
Further, the possible (although currently highly unlikely) conclusion of the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the EU and the US 
(TTIP) would result in even clearer disadvantages for Swiss companies vis- 
à- vis their competitors in the EU; Switzerland would be forced to make new 
attempts to level the playing field.
Switzerland is also a party to other international organisations and tre-
aty networks which complement the multilateral trading system under 
the WTO and free trade agreements. Examples include the World Customs 
Organization (WCO) and the Organization of Economic Co- operation and 
Development (OECD). Furthermore, Switzerland has concluded 130 bilate-
ral investment treaties (BITs), mainly with developing and least- developed 
countries. These treaties allow Swiss firms to request the establishment of 
arbitration tribunals, in particular based on the rules of the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), in order to review 
expropriations.
5 dƿƞƿƣ dƣơƽƣƿƞƽiƞƿ Ƥƺƽ EơƺƹƺƸiơ éƤƤƞiƽƾ ᄬdECO; Ʃƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/JBjᇸ- CcCᇵᄭ.
ᇸ dƣƣ ƻƻ. ᇳᇸᇻ.
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ᇵ. dت؜احؘإ؟ؔءؗ ؔءؗ Eبإآأؘ
ƞᄭ Gƣƹƣƽƞl FƽƞƸƣǂƺƽk
Switzerland was hesitant about joining European organisations and tre-
aty networks after the end of the Second World War, being concerned that 
such action may compromise its position of neutrality, independency and 
autonomy in external trade matters. However, it did join the Organisation 
for European Economic Co- operation (OEEC), whose key purpose was to 
administer the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), as an original 
ƸƣƸƟƣƽ ƞƿ iƿƾ ơƽƣƞƿiƺƹ iƹ ᇳᇻᇶᇺ. Iƹ ᇳᇻᇸᇳ, ƿƩƣ OEEC ǂƞƾ ƽƣƹƞƸƣƢ ƿƩƣ OECD, ƞƹƢ 
both its mandate and membership were substantially broadened. Regarding 
European integration, Switzerland did not participate in the efforts to further 
ƿƩiƾ ƿƩƽƺǀƨƩ jƺiƹiƹƨ ƿƩƣ EEC/EC/Ef. IƹƾƿƣƞƢ, iƹ ᇳᇻᇸᇲ, dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ ƤƺǀƹƢƣƢ 
the EFTA, together with six other European countries. It is still a member of 
EFeé ƿƺ ƿƩiƾ ƢƞǄ, ƿƺƨƣƿƩƣƽ ǂiƿƩ IơƣlƞƹƢ, LiƣơƩƿƣƹƾƿƣiƹ ƞƹƢ NƺƽǂƞǄ. Iƹ ᇳᇻᇸᇵ, 
Switzerland became a member of the Council of Europe, whose prime objec-
tive is to promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Further, in 
1974, it also ratified the ECHR. In 1972, Switzerland and the EEC concluded a 
comprehensive free trade agreement which has been providing the basis for 
bilateral relations with the EU up to this day. In 1975, Switzerland became an 
original member of the Conference on Security and Co- operation in Europe 
ᄬCdCEᄭèᅬ ƽƣƹƞƸƣƢ ƿƩƣ Oƽƨƞƹiƾƞƿiƺƹ Ƥƺƽ dƣơǀƽiƿǄ ƞƹƢ Cƺ- ƺƻƣƽƞƿiƺƹ iƹ Eǀƽƺƻƣ 
(OSCE) in 1994. In 1992, the people and the cantons rejected accession to the 
European Economic Area (EEA). Thereafter, Switzerland focused, faute de 
mieux, on concluding sectoral treaties with the EC/EU, combined with the 
policy of autonomous adaptation of Swiss law to ensure compliance with EU 
law. This approach, the “Swiss model” of European integration, has proven to 
be successful, as will be further outlined below.
Ɵᄭ Bilƞƿƣƽƞl AƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿƾ
Together with the free trade agreement Switzerland concluded with the 
EEC in 1972, the two sets of bilateral agreements of 1999 and 2004 between 
Switzerland and the EU (the “Bilaterals I” and the “Bilaterals II”) provide 
the legal framework for the Swiss- EU relationship. The Bilaterals I consist 
of seven agreements, mainly dealing with market access (free movement of 
persons, public procurement, technical barriers to trade, trade in agricultural 
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products, land transport, air transport, and research). These agreements are 
tied together by a guillotine clause; the termination of one agreement auto-
matically leads to the termination of the others. The EU insisted on such a 
clause in order to prevent “cherry picking” on the part of Switzerland; the 
former feared that the Swiss people would reject the Agreement on the Free 
MƺǁƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ aƣƽƾƺƹƾè ᅬ ƞ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽlǄ ƾƣƹƾiƿiǁƣ iƾƾǀƣ iƹ ƿƩiƾ ơƺǀƹƿƽǄ Ɵǀƿ 
ƞ ơƺƹƢiƿiƺ ƾiƹƣ Ƽǀƞ ƹƺƹ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ Efèᅬ iƹ ƞ ƽƣƤƣƽƣƹƢǀƸ. eƩƣ Bilƞƿƣƽƞlƾ II ơƺƹ-
sist of nine agreements and in some respects go beyond market access: they 
also deal with political issues and co- operation in culture and education 
(Schengen/Dublin, taxation of savings, fight against fraud, trade in processed 
agricultural products, MEDIA, environment, statistics, pensions of former EU 
officials, education and youth programmes). The Bilaterals II do not contain 
a guillotine clause; only the Schengen/Dublin association agreements share 
a common fate. The main agreements are supplemented by over 100 other 
(secondary) agreements. Institutionally, the agreements fail to go beyond the 
classic tools of diplomatic dispute resolution. Dispute resolution under such 
agreements proceeds in agreement- specific mixed committees which decide 
by consensus.
Since 2004, only a few agreements have been concluded, amongst them an 
agreement on customs facilitation and security, which substantially revised 
an older version (1990/2009), and an agreement on the cooperation of com-
petition authorities (2013). Moreover, under further bilateral agreements, 
Switzerland participates in various EU agencies and programmes, including 
Europol, Eurojust, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) 
and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). Such participation allows 
Swiss representatives to be integrated into EU transgovernmental structures. 
Swiss representatives are informed on ongoing action and can influence the 
work, mainly by relying on the power of the pen (decision shaping). Naturally, 
they do not possess voting rights (decision- making).
Currently, Switzerland’s “bilateral way” of cooperating with the EU faces 
two major challenges. The first major challenge has arrived in the form of 
a popular initiative approved by the people and the cantons called “against 
mass immigration” (“Gegen Masseneinwanderung”, 2014). According to 
the initiative’s newly introduced Articles 121a and 197 No 11 Constitution,7 
Switzerland shall control the immigration of foreign nationals autonomously, 
7 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 18 April 1999, SR 101; see for an English 
ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/MᇺfJ- dᇵᇸᇻᄭ.
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by introducing annual quotas and granting Swiss citizens priority on the job 
market. After the approval of the initiative, the EU made it clear in response 
that it was not willing to renegotiate the Agreement on the Free Movement of 
Persons of 1999 to the effect that quotas and a discriminatory priority system 
for Swiss citizens would be permitted. Against this background, the Federal 
Assembly decided to implement the initiative in a way that ensured it would 
not violate the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons. In the context of 
the Swiss policy of cooperation with the EU, this outcome has been welcomed 
by most commentators. The danger posed to the continuation of the current 
bilateral way has been, at least for the time being, dispelled. However, from 
a constitutional law perspective the outcome is problematic. The wording of 
the initiative’s newly introduced constitutional provisions is clear, and the 
implementing legislation fails to reflect this properly. An initiative commit-
tee successfully collected more than 100’000 signatures for their initiative 
“out of the dead end” (“Raus aus der Sackgasse”, RASA), which provided for 
the deletion of Articles 121a and 197 No 11 Constitution, the articles which had 
been created by the “against mass immigration” initiative. However, the ini-
tiative committee withdrew the initiative in late 2017, meaning the people 
and the cantons do not have the possibility to vote on the matter again. This 
is regrettable.
The second major challenge to the bilateral agreement approach is the 
fact that as of 2008, the EU has made it clear that it expects Switzerland to 
conclude an institutional agreement which provides common rules on the 
dynamic updating of the bilateral agreements, the supervision of their cor-
rect interpretation and application, and dispute resolution. An institutional 
agreement would apply to both new and existing market access agreements 
which are based on EU law. In Switzerland, the prospect of such an instituti-
onal agreement is controversial; some see it as a threat to Switzerland’s sover-
eignty. However, it might actually be advantageous for Switzerland to have 
the increasingly complex treaty network established on a new and clearer 
basis: this would enhance legal security, transparency and efficiency. The EU 
and Switzerland would have a right to bring disputes before a juridical body, 
presumably an arbitration panel (which must involve the European Court of 
Justice where a dispute concerns the interpretation of EU law). Switzerland 
would not depend exclusively on the goodwill of the EU in resolving disputes 
as is the case today. Moreover, the EU has made the conclusion of new mar-
ket access agreements (for example an agreement on electricity and on finan-
cial services) conditional upon the conclusion of an institutional agreement. 
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Thus, if Switzerland wants to benefit from such agreements in the future, it 
must act to establish this institutional agreement. The current state of affairs 
regarding the institutional agreement is that Switzerland and the EU are still 
in the negotiation phase.
ơᄭ AǀƿƺƹƺƸƺǀƾ AƢƞƻƿƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ dǂiƾƾ Lƞǂ ƿƺ Ef Lƞǂ
In parallel to the tight network of bilateral agreements Switzerland is party 
to, it has adopted another approach to mitigate the negative consequences of 
not being a member of the EU or the EEA: namely, the policy of autonomous 
adaptation of Swiss law to ensure compliance with EU law. According to the 
Federal Council, Switzerland’s “goal has to be to secure the greatest compatibi-
lity of our legislation with the legislation of our European partners in the areas 
of cross- border significance.”8 Of course, it is entirely possible for Switzerland 
to deviate from EU regulations and directives; however, this shall only be the 
chosen approach if there are cogent political and/or economic reasons for 
doing so. 
Overall, the policy of autonomous adaptation has led to the systematic 
adoption of EU law. Typical examples where autonomous adaptation is emplo-
yed are laws concerning technical regulations and standards, data protection 
ƞƹƢ Ƥiƹƞƹơiƞl Ƹƞƽkƣƿƾ. Iƿ Ʃƞƾ Ɵƣƣƹ ƣƾƿiƸƞƿƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ ᇵᇲᅬᇷᇲè% ƺƤ ƞll ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƞơƿƾ 
and ordinances are influenced by EU law, directly or indirectly: certainly no 
insignificant proportion.
8 Bericht über die Stellung der Schweiz im europäischen Integrationsprozess vom 
24. August 1988, Federal Gazette No 37 of 20 September 1988, pp. 249, p. 380 (own translation).
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II. Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ
The Federal Constitution contains many provisions relevant to Switzerland’s 
international engagement. These provisions regulate a variety of matters from 
the goals to be pursued in international relations to the different competen-
ces of various actors in this area, in particular those of the federation, the can-
tons and the people. Finally, the jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme Court 
has had a strong influence on the position of international law in Switzerland. 
These areas will be discussed in the upcoming paragraphs.
ᇳ. Gآؔ؟ئ ؔءؗ Mؘؔءئ
The Constitution enlists the goals which Switzerland shall pursue in its inter-
national relations. Partly, these goals are of an egoistic nature while partly, they 
direct the authorities to act altruistically (Preamble, Articles 2 IV, 54 II and 101 
I Constitution). They state that the people and the cantons are resolved to act 
in a spirit of solidarity and openness towards the world; the confederation is 
committed to a just and peaceful international order; it shall ensure that the 
independence of the country and its welfare is safeguarded; it shall contribute 
to the alleviation of need and poverty in the world, to the respect for human 
rights and democracy, to the peaceful co- existence of peoples, and to the con-
servation of natural resources; it shall safeguard the interests of the Swiss eco-
nomy abroad. Regrettably, the Constitution does not reflect the true extent of 
Swiss participation in international and European organisations and treaty 
networks. Only Switzerland’s UN membership is mentioned; it, at least, has 
found its way into the transitional provisions (Article 197 No 1 Constitution).
These constitutional goals are framed in rather abstract terms. Thus, 
in essence, it falls under the discretion of the authorities to concretise 
them when they decide on specific foreign policy measures. Moreover, the 
Constitution does not provide for any applicable rules to follow in the event 
of a conflict between these goals. For instance, there might be controversial 
debate over whether and, if so, to what extent the protection of fundamental 
rights should be taken into account in the context of free trade agreements. 
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The Constitution provides no real guidance in this context. There was some 
debate over this issue when Switzerland negotiated and concluded its free 
trade agreement with China in 2014; there were concerns that such an agree-
ment could foster human rights violations if free trade was relied upon too 
heavily as an end in itself. The eventual result of these negotiations was an 
agreement that reaffirms both parties’ commitment to respecting selected 
fundamental rights and “fundamental norms of international relations” in 
the Preamble, supplemented by a side- agreement on labour and employment.
Some argue that the concept of neutrality also amounts to a principle which 
guides Swiss foreign policy. Back in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna, the then 
predominant European powers recognised the neutrality of the Swiss con-
federation. Since then, this status has been reconfirmed several times, and 
Switzerland has adhered to the notion of (armed) neutrality as acknowledged 
in public international law. However, the Constitution does not state that neu-
trality in itself is a goal of Swiss foreign policy.9 Rather, neutrality is to be used 
as one of many instruments in order to achieve the goals set out above.
ᇴ. Cآؠأؘاؘءؘؖئ
ƞᄭ FƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ Cƞƹƿƺƹƾ
Foreign relations fall under the competences and responsibilities of the federa-
tion (Article 54 Constitution). This includes the competence to conclude tre-
aties. This competence for concluding treaties can result in the federation 
dealing with issues that also encompass policy areas which internally fall into 
the cantons’ domain. Thus, the federal authorities are obliged to protect the 
interests of the cantons in such a situation and to ensure that they participate 
in preparing and conducting treaty negotiations in an appropriate manner 
(Article 55 Constitution).
Despite the existence of Article 55 Constitution, the increasing tendency to 
take recourse to treaties has resulted in a tacit neutralisation of cantonal com-
petences. The bilateral agreements Switzerland has established with the EU, 
for instance, deal with matters partly falling into the domain of the cantons, 
9 e؛آؠؔئ F؟ؘ؜ءؘإ/é؟ؘثؔءؘؗإ M؜ئ؜ؖ/N؜ؖآ؟ؘ eöأأؘإت؜ؘء, Constitutional Law in 
Switzerland, 2nd edition, Alphen aan den Rijn 2012, n. 24; hؔ؟اؘإ Hؔ؟؟ؘإ, The Swiss 
Constitution in a Comparative Context, 2nd ƣƢiƿiƺƹ, kǀƽiơƩ/dƿ. Gƞllƣƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇸ, ƹ. ᇹᇳ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ. 
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such as cantonal police, recognition of professional qualifications and public 
procurement. Accordingly, to ensure that the cantons are not being effecti-
vely ignored or undermined, consultation and cooperation between the diffe-
rent layers of government are fundamentally important; more so today than 
in the past. The cantons have also taken their own steps to ensure their inte-
rests are represented: in 1993 they founded the Conference of the Cantonal 
GƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿƾ ᄬKƢKᄭ ǂƩiơƩ Ʃƣlƻƾ ơƺƺƽƢiƹƞƿƣ ƿƩƣ ƣƤƤƺƽƿƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ƿƺ ƻƺƺl 
their interests and speak with one stronger voice.
The cantons are competent to independently conclude international tre-
aties in areas which fall under their remit, as long as the federation has not 
ƿƞkƣƹ ƞơƿiƺƹ iƹ ƿƩƞƿ ƾƻƣơiƤiơ ƻƺliơǄ ƤiƣlƢ iƿƾƣlƤ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇷᇸ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. Fƺƽ 
example, treaties between cantons and neighbouring states or sub- levels of 
states, such as the German Bundesländer, concern cross- border issues like 
transportation, infrastructure, waste management, and the protection of the 
environment.
Ɵᄭ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺǀƹơil, FƣƢƣƽƞl AƾƾƣƸƟlǄ, FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺǀƽƿƾ
The fundamental principle of the separation of powers between the different 
branches of government is not just relevant to the Swiss political system in 
general,10 but is also a key principle in Swiss foreign policy. The functions 
of the Federal Council (including the federal administration), the Federal 
Assembly and the Federal Supreme Court within the context of international 
relations are as follows:
ᅬ eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺǀƹơil iƾ ƻƽiƸƞƽilǄ ƽƣƾƻƺƹƾiƟlƣ Ƥƺƽ Ƥƺƽƣiƨƹ ƽƣlƞƿiƺƹƾ, ƾǀƟ-
ject to the right of participation of the Federal Assembly (Article 184 
Constitution). It represents Switzerland abroad. The federal admin-
istration negotiates treaties, based on a mandate established by the 
Federal Council. The Federal Council is competent to conclude treaties 
of limited scope on its own; this is the case, inter alia, when a treaty does 
not create new obligations for Switzerland or when a treaty primarily 
concerns the authorities and involves technical administrative issues 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇹa of the Government and Administration Organisation Act).11
10 See the chapter on Constitutional Law, pp. 151.
11 Government and Administration Organisation Act of 21 March 1997 (GAOA), SR 172.010. 
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ᅬ eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl éƾƾƣƸƟlǄ ƻƞƽƿiơiƻƞƿƣƾ iƹ ƾƩƞƻiƹƨ Ƥƺƽƣiƨƹ ƻƺliơǄ ƞƹƢ ƾǀƻƣƽ-
ǁiƾƣƾ ƿƩƣ Ƹƞiƹƿƣƹƞƹơƣ ƺƤ Ƥƺƽƣiƨƹ ƽƣlƞƿiƺƹƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇸᇸ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. Iƿ 
must agree to the conclusion of treaties (unless the Federal Council 
can do so on its own). However, the Federal Assembly can only approve 
or reject a signed treaty in toto. In particular, in the case of “package 
deals” (such as the accession to the WTO),12 the Federal Assembly 
realistically has no other choice than to “wave” a treaty through. 
From a democratic point of view, this is problematic. It does not allow 
the treaty at issue to be subjected to proper scrutiny by the Federal 
Assembly in order to propose amendments. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the Foreign Affairs Committees of the National Council and 
the Council of States must be consulted before the Federal Council 
adopts a negotiation mandate. Further, these committees are period-
ically informed about ongoing negotiations, to ensure they are able to 
offer relevant and up- to- date advice in this regard.
ᅬ eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƞơƿƾ ƺƹ ƞƻƻƣƞl, Ʃƣƞƽiƹƨ ơƞƾƣƾ ƢƣơiƢƣƢ ƣiƿƩƣƽ 
by the highest cantonal courts or by other federal courts. Thereby, it 
also interprets international law and shapes the relationship between 
international law and Swiss law.13
The ongoing shift in law- making from domestic legislation towards inter-
national treaties has led to a readjustment of the power balance between the 
Federal Assembly and the Federal Council (including the federal administ-
ration). The power of the latter is increased to the detriment of the former. 
Consequently, new procedures should be sought in order to enhance the par-
ticipation of the Federal Assembly as well as that of cantons and civil soci-
ety groups both in the preparatory phase of and throughout negotiations. 
Currently, the aforementioned groups’ participation in the treaty- making 
process is, from a democratic viewpoint, too marginal.
ơᄭ Diƽƣơƿ DƣƸƺơƽƞơǄ
Swiss citizens are regularly called upon to vote on issues which either direc-
tly or indirectly concern foreign relations and Switzerland’s position on the 
iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞl ƻlƞƹƣ. eƩƣ Ƣiƽƣơƿ ƢƣƸƺơƽƞƿiơ ƿƺƺlƾ ƺƹ ƺƤƤƣƽè ᅬ ƻƺƻǀlƞƽ iƹiƿiƞ-
ƿiǁƣƾ ƞƹƢ ƽƣƤƣƽƣƹƢƞè ᅬ Ʃƞǁƣ ƢƣơiƾiǁƣlǄ ƾƩƞƻƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƿƽƣƞƿǄ- Ƹƞkiƹƨ ƻƽƺơƣƾƾ iƹ 
12 dƣƣ ƻƻ. ᇳᇸᇹ.
13 See pp. 179.
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Switzerland.14 The instruments are two distinct creations, but have a simil-
arly strong impact on Swiss international relations:
ᅬ é ƻƺƻǀlƞƽ iƹiƿiƞƿiǁƣ ƞllƺǂƾ ƞ ƸiƹiƸǀƸ ƺƤ ᇳᇲᇲ’ᇲᇲᇲ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ ƿƺ ƢƣƸƞƹƢ 
ƞ ǁƺƿƣ ƺƹ ƞ ƻƽƺƻƺƾƣƢ ƽƣǁiƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇵᇺᅬᇳᇵᇻb 
Constitution). Through popular initiatives, the people can have a sig-
nificant influence on Switzerland’s international relations. A prime ex-
ample of this was the popular initiative for the accession of Switzerland 
to the UN, which was approved of by the people and the cantons in 2002. 
This was a positive step forward in terms of Switzerland’s cooperation 
with the international community. However, over the last decade, an 
increasing number of initiatives have been incompatible with inter-
ƹƞƿiƺƹƞl lƞǂ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽiƹƨ ƿƩƣiƽ ǀƹƞƸƟiƨǀƺǀƾ ǂƺƽƢiƹƨ. KƣǄ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣƾ ƞƽƣ 
the initiative “against the construction of minarets” (“Gegen den Bau von 
Minaretten”, 2009), the initiative “for the expulsion of criminal foreign 
nationals” (“für die Ausschaffung krimineller Ausländer”, 2010) and the 
initiative “against mass immigration” (“Gegen Masseneinwanderung”, 
2014). The implementation of initiatives such as these presents huge 
problems. This is particularly the case when the initiatives violate basic 
norms of international law. The initiative “against the construction 
of minarets” is not compatible with the freedom of religion (Article 9 
ECHR) and the prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 ECHR). The ini-
tiative “for the expulsion of criminal foreign nationals” and the initiative 
“against mass immigration” are both incompatible with the Agreement 
on the Free Movement of Persons with the EU. Moreover, the initiative 
“for the expulsion of criminal foreign nationals” also violates the right to 
ƽƣƾƻƣơƿ Ƥƺƽ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ƞƹƢ ƤƞƸilǄ liƤƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇺ ECHcᄭ. OƤƿƣƹ, iƿ iƾ ƾiƸƻlǄ ƹƺƿ 
possible to fully implement such initiatives. Proposals for reform in this 
problematic area have been put forward; for example, there have been 
calls to introduce a provision according to which a popular initiative 
must comply with basic fundamental rights as guaranteed, for instance, 
in the ECHR in order to be valid. However, it is crucial to note that any 
revision to this effect would itself require the approval of the people and 
the cantons, which may pose a real obstacle.15
14 For more information on these instruments, see the chapter on Constitutional Law, pp. 151.
15 Hؔ؟؟ؘإ, n. 597 et seqq.
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ᅬ é ƽƣƤƣƽƣƹƢǀƸ ƞllƺǂƾ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ ƿƺ ǁƺƿƣ, iƹƿƣƽ ƞliƞ, ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹơlǀƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞƹ 
iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞl ƿƽƣƞƿǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇶᇲᅬᇳᇶᇴ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. é ƸƞƹƢƞƿƺƽǄ ƽƣƤƣƽ-
endum takes places in the case of an accession to an organisation for 
collective security (e.g. NATO) or to a supranational community (e.g. the 
EU); such an accession needs the approval of a majority of the people 
and a majority of the cantons. The vote on the envisaged accession to 
the EEA, eventually rejected by the people and the cantons in 1992, was 
conducted under this title, due to its potential political and economic 
significance. In addition, an optional referendum can be requested by 
50’000 citizens against the conclusion of an international treaty that: is 
of unlimited duration and cannot be terminated; provides for accession 
to an international organisation; contains important legislative provi-
sions or requires the enactment of federal legislation for implementa-
tion. Decisive for the outcome is the vote of the people; a majority of the 
cantons is not required. The bilateral agreements concluded with the EU 
in 1999, the “Bilaterals I”, and the Schengen/Dublin association agree-
ments of 2004 were all approved of in optional referenda.
It should be noted that regarding referendum votes on treaties, the peo-
ple often do not possess a real option (a situation somewhat resembling that 
faced by the Federal Assembly in the case of “package deals”). Practical cons-
traints and opportunity costs can de facto force the people to approve a tre-
aty. Typical examples of this sort of situation are votes on amendments to the 
Schengen/Dublin association agreements in order to keep them in line with 
dynamic EU law; rejecting such amendments would seriously endanger the 
fate of these agreements altogether. Therefore, when the people approved the 
incorporation of the Council Regulation on biometrics in passports and travel 
documentsᇳᇸ iƹƿƺ ƿƩƣ dơƩƣƹƨƣƹ éƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿ ǂiƿƩ ᇷᇲ.ᇳè% ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ǁƺƿƣƾ iƹ ᇴᇲᇲᇺ, 
ƸƞƹǄ ƟƽƣƞƿƩƣƢ ƞ ƾiƨƩ ƺƤ ƽƣliƣƤèᅬ ƞ ƹƣƨƞƿiǁƣ ǁƺƿƣ ơƺǀlƢ Ʃƞǁƣ ƾƣƽiƺǀƾlǄ ƣƹƢƞƹƨƣ-
red the continuation of the Schengen Association Agreement and, by virtue of 
the guillotine clause linking these two treaties, also of the Dublin Association 
Agreement.
ᇳᇸ Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 of 13 December 2004 on standards for security 
features and biometrics in passports and travel documents.
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ᇵ. cؘ؟ؔا؜آءئ؛؜أ Bؘاتؘؘء Iءاؘإءؔا؜آءؔ؟ Lؔت ؔءؗ 
dت؜ئئ Lؔت
The federal authorities and the cantons are obliged to respect international 
law in all their activities (Article 5 IV Constitution). Based thereon and in 
light of the principle of pacta sunt servanda, the Federal Supreme Court has 
developed a rich stream of case law concerning the validity, rank and effect of 
international law in Switzerland:
ᅬ dǂiƾƾ lƞǂ Ƥƺllƺǂƾ ƿƩƣ Ƹƺƹiƾƿ ƿƽƞƢiƿiƺƹ. eƩƣƽƣƤƺƽƣ, ƿƽƣƞƿiƣƾ ǂƩiơƩ Ʃƞǁƣ 
been duly entered into force automatically become part of domestic 
law. An act of transformation is not needed.17
ᅬ Iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞl lƞǂ ƨƣƹƣƽƞllǄ ƿƞkƣƾ ƻƽƣơƣƢƣƹơƣ ƺǁƣƽ ƹƞƿiƺƹƞl lƞǂ. eƩiƾ 
is unequivocally the case for peremptory norms of international law 
(ius cogens); such norms always overrule any conflicting provisions of 
national law. Moreover, treaties concluded by Switzerland supersede 
federal acts in the case of a conflict, unless the Federal Assembly has 
intentionally enacted legislation which violates the treaty obligation; 
in such a case, the authorities shall apply the federal act (Schubert case 
law).18 However, this Schubert exception is subject to two key limita-
tions: treaties which guarantee fundamental rights, such as the ECHR, 
and the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons with the EU19 
must be respected in all cases; the Schubert exception does not apply.20 
The Federal Supreme Court has not yet explicitly decided whether 
these considerations equally apply in the case of a conflict between a 
treaty and the Constitution.21
ᅬ é ƻƺǂƣƽƤǀl iƹƾƿƽǀƸƣƹƿ Ƥƺƽ ƞǁƣƽƿiƹƨ ơƺƹƤliơƿ iƾ ƿƩƣ ƸƣƿƩƺƢ ƺƤ iƹƿƣƽƻƽƣƿ-
ing Swiss law in a way that ensures its conformity with international 
law. The Swiss authorities routinely employ this method.22
ᅬ IƹƢiǁiƢǀƞlƾ ơƞƹ iƹǁƺkƣ ƿƽƣƞƿǄ ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹƾ iƹ ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ ƟƣƤƺƽƣ ƻǀƟliơ 
authorities directly if they are self- executing, i.e. if they both confer 
17 See already BGE 7 I 774, a judgment of the Federal Supreme Court of 1881.
18 BGE 99 Ib 39.
19 See pp. 181.
20 BGE 125 II 417; BGE 142 II 35.
21 dƣƣ BGE ᇳᇵᇻ I ᇳᇸ.
22 BGE ᇻᇶ I ᇸᇸᇻ.
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rights on individuals and are sufficiently clear and unconditional to 
preclude any need for implementing legislation.23 Typically, human 
rights treaties as well as the main bilateral agreements with the EU 
are directly applicable. However, a key problem with this principle is 
its vulnerability to interpretation: sometimes the courts refrain from 
applying treaty provisions directly, even though they seem to obviously 
meet the conditions of clarity and unconditionality. WTO agreements, 
for instance, are not considered to be directly applicable.24 The Federal 
Supreme Court has also, time and again, refused to directly apply the 
free trade agreement concluded in 1972 with the EU. This mercantilist 
approach is the subject of controversial debate. There are competing 
interests at stake: for example, ensuring the effectiveness of inter-
national law versus maintaining both balanced international legal 
relations (reciprocity) and the domestic balance of powers. Concerns 
as to the lack of adequate democratic representation in international 
law- making are a key part of the debate.
Iƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇸ, ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ aƣƺƻlƣ’ƾ aƞƽƿǄ ᄬdgaᄭ ƾǀƟƸiƿƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ iƹiƿiƞƿiǁƣ “dǂiƾƾ lƞǂ 
instead of foreign judges (self- determination initiative)” (“Schweizer Recht 
statt fremde Richter [Selbstbestimmungsinitiative]”). According to the pro-
posed text, the Swiss Constitution is the highest source of law in Switzerland. 
In the case of a conflict between the Constitution and a treaty, the former 
prevails (with the exception of ius cogens). In such a circumstance, the treaty 
must be renegotiated; if necessary, it must be terminated. The proposed text 
reflects the concern that the scope for domestic policy- making is becoming 
increasingly limited by international law. However, the way the text addres-
ses this concern is hardly useful. The idea of establishing a rigid hierarchy 
between the Constitution and international law oversimplifies the complex 
interplay between these legal dimensions. Moreover, the wording of the initi-
ative is too ambiguous: for example, under what exact circumstances would 
it become “necessary” to terminate a treaty? Fundamentally, this initiative 
endangers both legal security and Switzerland’s reputation as a reliable part-
ner in international relations. The people will vote on this proposal in due 
course.
23 BGE 124 III 90.
24 e؛آؠؔئ Cآاا؜ؘإ/Mؔاا؛؜ؔئ Oؘئؖ؛, International Trade Regulation: Law and Policy in 
the WTO, the European Union and Switzerland. Comments, Cases, and Materials, Bern/
London 2005, pp. 223.
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III. LƞƹƢƸƞƽk Cƞƾƣƾ
In the following section, two key cases which demonstrate Switzerland’s 
involvement and interaction with the international community will be dis-
cussed. One case, which came before the Federal Supreme Court, clarified the 
position of Swiss law with respect to the Agreement on the Free Movement of 
Persons between the EU and Switzerland (1.). The second case demonstrates 
Switzerland’s participation in an international dispute settlement procedure, 
through its membership of the WTO (2.).
ᇳ. dبأإؘؠؔؖج آؙ ا؛ؘ Aؚإؘؘؠؘءا آء ا؛ؘ Fإؘؘ 
Mآةؘؠؘءا آؙ aؘإئآءئ
AA, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, had been residing in Switzerland 
since 2002. In the same year, she gave birth to a boy, BA. The father of BA was 
C, a German citizen who also lived in Switzerland. Based on these relation-
ships, AA and BA were granted a residence permit in Switzerland, derived 
from C’s right of residence under the Agreement on the Free Movement of 
Persons. In 2013, however, the competent authority in the Canton of Zurich 
refused to prolong AA’s residence permit, on the grounds that she had been 
dependent on social security payments for several years. They did, however, 
grant her son, BA, a residence permit, derived from his father’s right of resi-
dence. The authority argued that the existence of BA did not require that AA 
received a residence permit; AA could take her son with her upon leaving the 
country or alternatively he could remain in Switzerland under his father’s 
care. AA challenged this refusal. She argued that she had a right to reside in 
Switzerland based on the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons.
The substantive outcome of the case was that the Federal Supreme Court 
confirmed the decision of the cantonal authority upon appeal.25 However, 
the most interesting points of the judgement were discussed by the Court 
25 BGE 142 II 35.
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by way of introduction to the case, where two issues which had been hotly 
debated in the aftermath of the approval of the popular initiative “against 
mass immigration” (“Gegen Masseneinwanderung”, 2014) were clarified. 
First, the Federal Supreme Court confirmed that the Agreement on the 
Free Movement of Persons is to be interpreted in light of the case law that 
has been developed by the European Court of Justice in interpreting EU law 
provisions on the free movement of persons. A parallel interpretation of the 
éƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ Fƽƣƣ MƺǁƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ aƣƽƾƺƹƾèᅬ i.ƣ. ƞƹ iƹƿƣƽƻƽƣƿƞƿiƺƹ ǂƩiơƩ 
Ƥƺllƺǂƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣèEǀƽƺƻƣƞƹ Cƺǀƽƿ ƺƤ Jǀƾƿiơƣèᅬ iƾ ƾǀƻƻƺƽƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ aƽƣƞƸƟlƣ 
of the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons’ objective, which is “to 
bring about the free movement of persons between [Switzerland and the EU] on 
the basis of the rules applying in the European Community”. As such, a parallel 
interpretation is also in line with the teleological method of interpretation, 
as provided for in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
There is no explicit obligation on Switzerland to follow European Court of 
Justice judgements, except in the case of those judgements rendered before 
Jǀƹƣ ᇳᇻᇻᇻ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇸ éƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ Fƽƣƣ MƺǁƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ aƣƽƾƺƹƾᄭ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, 
an autonomous interpretation shall only be followed if there are cogent rea-
sons to do so. In this case, the Federal Supreme Court made it clear that the 
new Articles 121a and 197 No 11 Constitution do not constitute such cogent rea-
sons. Thus, they interpreted the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons’ 
provisions in light of the pertinent case law of the EU and, upon this basis, 
confirmed the decision of the cantonal authority to refuse to reissue AA with 
a residence permit.
Second, the Federal Supreme Court clarified the relationship which exists 
between the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons and federal acts. 
In the case of a conflict, the former takes precedence over the latter. This 
remains the case even when the Federal Assembly intentionally violates the 
Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons in full knowledge of the legal 
and/or political consequences of such an action. Thus, it can be seen that the 
Schubert exception does not apply within the scope of the Agreement on the 
Free Movement of Persons.ᇴᇸ The Federal Supreme Court based this finding on 
the observation that the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons leads 
to a harmonisation of the legal order (sectoral participation in the common 
market) through the realisation of a basic freedom, as well as on the fact that 
EU law is directly applicable in EU member states and claims supremacy over 
ᇴᇸ See pp. 179.
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national laws. With respect to the case at hand, however, it was not apparent 
whether these considerations were relevant in order to decide the case (thus 
forming part of its ratio decidendi) or whether they were obiter dicta.
The message sent out by the Federal Supreme Court is clear: legislation 
implementing Articles 121a and 197 No 11 Constitution which violates the 
Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons would have no practical effect. 
EU citizens could still directly rely on the Agreement on the Free Movement 
of Persons; the Federal Supreme Court would continue to uphold these rights. 
In fact, since this ruling the Federal Assembly has implemented the new pro-
visions in an Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons- consistent way.27 
Unsurprisingly, the judgment of the Federal Supreme Court has been received 
controversially. Some see it as the Federal Supreme Court ignoring the voice 
of the people, who voted in favour of Articles 121a and 197 No 11 Constitution 
but have found that there continues to be no real practical enforcement of 
these new articles. One key positive aspect of the judgement is that it enhan-
ces legal security and contributes to the reliability of Switzerland in the realm 
of external relations.
ᇴ. fd dؘؙؚؔبؔإؗ Mؘؔئبإؘئ آء dاؘؘ؟ aإآؗبؖائ
In 2002, the then President of the United States, Gؘآإؘؚ h. Bبئ؛, imposed 
definitive safeguard measures on various steel products. The measures con-
ƾiƾƿƣƢ ƺƤ ƞƢƢiƿiƺƹƞl ƿƞƽiƤƤƾ ƽƞƹƨiƹƨ ƤƽƺƸ ᇺ % ƿƺ ᇵᇲ % ƞƹƢ ǂƣƽƣ iƹƿƣƹƢƣƢ “to 
facilitate positive adjustment to competition from imports of certain steel pro-
ducts”.28 Consequently, some products of foreign steel producers were kept 
out of the US market; the prices of others were artificially increased. Swiss 
companies were amongst the affected producers. As a direct response to the 
US measures, the EU adopted its own safeguard measures on steel products: it 
imposed a tariff quota system in order to limit trade diversion resulting from 
US protectionism. The EU measures were even more problematic for the Swiss 
steel industry than the original US ones.
EiƨƩƿ heO ƸƣƸƟƣƽƾèᅬ ƿƩƣ Ef, Jƞƻƞƹ, Kƺƽƣƞ, CƩiƹƞ, dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, NƺƽǂƞǄ, 
Nƣǂ kƣƞlƞƹƢ ƞƹƢ Bƽƞǅilè ᅬ ơƩƞllƣƹƨƣƢ ƿƩƣ fd ƾƞƤƣƨǀƞƽƢ Ƹƣƞƾǀƽƣƾ ƟƣƤƺƽƣ 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), arguing that the measures were 
27 See pp. 170.
28 US Presidential Proclamation No. 7529 of 5 March 2002.
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iƹơƺƹƾiƾƿƣƹƿ ǂiƿƩ éƽƿiơlƣ iIi Gƣƹƣƽƞl éƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƹ eƞƽiƤƤƾ ƞƹƢ eƽƞƢƣ ᇳᇻᇻᇶ 
and the Agreement on Safeguards. According to long- standing case law, 
these rules permit WTO members to apply safeguard measures only when, 
as a result of unforeseen developments, a product is being imported in such 
increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to 
cause serious injury to the domestic industry producing like or directly com-
petitive products. After unfruitful consultations, a panel was established to 
examine the matter. The panel determined that the conditions for the impo-
sition of safeguard measures were not met in the case of the United States 
for any steel product at issue. On appeal, the Appellate Body confirmed the 
ruling.29
After the Appellate Body had issued its report, President Bبئ؛ terminated 
the safeguard measures. A combination of some of the following four reasons 
might have been decisive in making him do so:
ᅬ Fiƽƾƿ, ƿƩƣ éƻƻƣllƞƿƣ BƺƢǄ ƢƣƿƣƽƸiƹƣƢ ǀƹƣƼǀiǁƺơƞllǄ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ Ƹƣƞƾǀƽƣƾ 
violated WTO law. From a legal perspective, the United States were 
hence obliged to withdraw the measures; respect for the rule of law 
demanded this.
ᅬ dƣơƺƹƢ, aƽƣƾiƢƣƹƿ Bبئ؛ was anxious to please constituencies in the 
States which had traditionally been home to many steel- industry jobs, 
such as Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia. From a political per-
spective, he had already accomplished what he had intended through 
the initial imposition of the measures.
ᅬ eƩiƽƢ, iƿ ƩƞƢ ƟƣơƺƸƣ iƹơƽƣƞƾiƹƨlǄ ƞƻƻƞƽƣƹƿ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ Ƹƣƞƾǀƽƣƾ ǂƣƽƣ 
having a negative effect on the US industry as a whole. The safeguard 
measures did more harm to the steel- using industries than good to the 
steel-producing industry. Thus, from an economic viewpoint, the ter-
mination of the measures was somewhat logical.
ᅬ FƺǀƽƿƩ, heO lƞǂ ƻƣƽƸiƿƾ ƸƣƸƟƣƽƾ ƞƤƤƣơƿƣƢ ƟǄ heO lƞǂ- iƹơƺƸƻƞƿiƟlƣ 
safeguard measures to apply re- balancing measures.30 As such, various 
co- complainants who participated in the WTO dispute settlement 
29 fdèᅬ DƣƤiƹiƿiǁƣ dƞƤƣƨǀƞƽƢ Mƣƞƾǀƽƣƾ ƺƹ IƸƻƺƽƿƾ ƺƤ Cƣƽƿƞiƹ dƿƣƣl aƽƺƢǀơƿƾ, he/Ddᇴᇷᇵ/
AB, issued 10 November 2003 (complaint of Switzerland).
30 Under the Agreement on Safeguards, an affected member is permitted to apply re- 
balancing measures, whereas the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) allows a 
complaining party to suspend obligations vis- à- vis the defending party if the latter does 
not comply with a panel or Appellate Body ruling.
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proceedings were planning to impose re- balancing measures against 
the United States. The EU, the complainant by far the most affected 
by the safeguard measures, had already adopted a regulation setting 
out potentially targeted products, such as fruits and vegetables, textile 
products and Harley Davidson motorcycles.31 Japan, China, Norway and 
Switzerland followed suit and threatened to adopt similar re- balancing 
measures. By terminating the US safeguard measures, President Bبئ؛ 
could avoid the adoption of potentially very harmful re- balancing 
Ƹƣƞƾǀƽƣƾ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ ƿƩƣèfd.
This has been the only WTO case in which Switzerland has actively par-
ticipated, as a complaining or defending party, to date. In the end, the Swiss 
delegation was content with the final outcome: it successfully relied on WTO 
law and prevailed over the United States, resulting in the termination of the 
harmful safeguard measures. However, at the same time, their satisfaction 
was not absolute. Although the US measures were declared unlawful eventu-
ally, in the meantime, Swiss steel producers suffered real damage due to the 
trade- restrictive measures imposed by both the US and the EU and the loss 
of market shares, which they then had to regain tediously. In this context, it 
is problematic that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism does not provide 
for compensation for damages suffered due to unlawful actions.
31 Council Regulation (EC) No 1031/2002 of 13 June 2002 establishing additional customs 
duties on imports of certain products originating in the United States of America; see 
also WTO Document G/C/10, G/SG/43 of 15 May 2002.
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I. CƺƢƣƾ
Iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢèᅬ iƹ ơƺƸƻƞƽiƾƺƹ ƣ.ƨ. ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ NƣƿƩƣƽlƞƹƢƾèᅬ ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ ƹƺ ƨƣƹƣ-
ƽƞl ơƺƢƣ ƺƹ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ lƞǂ. éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ iƾ ƟƺƿƩ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣƢ 
ƟǄ ƾƻƣơiƤiơ ƞơƿƾ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƞƹƢ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl lƣǁƣl. MƞƹǄ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƨƣƹƣ-
ƽƞl ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣƾ ƞƹƢ iƢƣƞƾ ƺƤ dǂiƾƾ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ lƞǂ ƞƽƣ ƢƣƽiǁƣƢ ƤƽƺƸ ƿƩƣ 
Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ƤƺƽƸƣƢ ƟǄ ơƞƾƣ lƞǂ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ơƺǀƽƿƾ, ƸƞiƹlǄ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ 
FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ.
Iƹ ơƺƹƿƽƞƾƿ, ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ lƞǂ iƹơƺƽƻƺƽƞƿƣƾ ƞ ƸǄƽiƞƢ ƺƤ ƾǀƟjƣơƿ Ƹƞƿƿƣƽ 
lƞǂƾ ƾǀơƩ ƞƾ lƞǂƾ ƺƹ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾƩiƻ, ƻƺliƿiơƞl ƽiƨƩƿƾ, ƣƢǀơƞƿiƺƹ, ƾơiƣƹơƣ, ƞƹƢ 
ơǀlƿǀƽƣ, ƹƞƿiƺƹƞl ƢƣƤƣƹơƣ, Ƥiƹƞƹơiƞl iƾƾǀƣƾ, ƻǀƟliơ ǂƺƽkƾ, ƣƹƣƽƨǄ, ƿƽƞƹƾƻƺƽ-
ƿƞƿiƺƹ, ƩƣƞlƿƩ, ƣƸƻlƺǄƸƣƹƿ, ƾƺơiƞl ƾƣơǀƽiƿǄ, ƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƣơƺƹƺƸǄ ƞƹƢ ƿƣơƩƹiơƞl 
ơƺƺƻƣƽƞƿiƺƹ. éơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ ƞ ᇴᇲᇳᇵ ƾǀƽǁƣǄ, ƿƩƣƽƣ ƞƽƣ ᇶ’ᇹᇸᇺ lƞǂƾ ᄬƺǁƣƽ ᇸᇷ’ᇲᇲᇲ 
ƻƞƨƣƾᄭ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl lƣǁƣl ƞlƺƹƣ. Iƹ ƞƢƢiƿiƺƹ, ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ ƞƹ ƞƟǀƹƢƞƹơƣ ƺƤ ơƞƹ-
ƿƺƹƞl lƞǂƾ ᄬƞlƿƩƺǀƨƩ ƿƩƣ ƞƸƺǀƹƿ iƾ Ƽǀiƿƣ Ƣiǁƣƽƾƣ ƤƽƺƸ ơƞƹƿƺƹ ƿƺ ơƞƹƿƺƹᄭ. 
eƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ƣǃƣƽơiƾƣ ƞll ƽiƨƩƿƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƞƽƣ ƹƺƿ ǁƣƾƿƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇵèCƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ;ᇳ Ʃƣƹơƣ ƿƩƣƽƣ ƞƽƣ ƞ ƨƽƣƞƿ ƹǀƸƟƣƽ ƺƤ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ƾƿƞƿǀƿƣƾ. 
Cƞƹƿƺƹƞl ƞơƿƾ ƿǄƻiơƞllǄ Ƣƣƞl ǂiƿƩ ƾǀƟjƣơƿƾ likƣ ƻƺliơƣ, ƻlƞƹƹiƹƨ ƞƹƢ ƟǀilƢiƹƨ, 
ƾơƩƺƺlƾ, ƺƽ ƩƣƞlƿƩ ơƞƽƣ. 
ᇳ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ᇳᇺ éƻƽil ᇳᇻᇻᇻ, dc ᇳᇲᇳ; ƾƣƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ EƹƨliƾƩ 
ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/MᇺfJ- dᇵᇸᇻᄭ.
190
II.  aƽiƹơiƻlƣƾ ƺƤ AƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ 
Action 
ᇳ. Cآءئا؜ابا؜آءؔ؟ aإ؜ءؖ؜أ؟ؘئ ؜ء 
Aؗؠ؜ء؜ئاإؔا؜ةؘ Lؔت
eƩƣ ƽƣlƞƿiƺƹƾƩiƻ Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ƞƹƢ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ lƞǂ ƸƞǄ Ɵƣ ơƩƞ-
ƽƞơƿƣƽiǅƣƢ ƞƾ ƺƹƣ ƺƤ mutual influence. éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ lƞǂ ƞƹƢ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣ ƨiǁƣ ƽƣƞl 
ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹơƣ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ Ƹƣƞƹiƹƨ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ. dƺƸƣ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹƾ 
ơƞƹ Ɵƣ Ɵƣƾƿ ǀƹƢƣƽƾƿƺƺƢ ƿƩƽƺǀƨƩ ƿƩƣ lƣƹƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƽƣlƣǁƞƹƿ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƾƿƞƿǀƿƣƾ, 
ƣƾƻƣơiƞllǄ iƹ ƞƽƣƞƾ ǂƩƣƽƣ iƹƢƣƻƣƹƢƣƹƿ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ƿƩiƹkiƹƨ ƽƣƸƞiƹƾ ǀƹƢƣƽ-
ƢƣǁƣlƺƻƣƢ, Ƥƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ ƿƩƣ ƞƽƣƞ ƺƤ ƾƿƞƿƣ liƞƟiliƿǄ. Oƹ ƿƩƣ ƺƿƩƣƽ ƩƞƹƢ, ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀ-
ƿiƺƹƞl ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣƾ ƞƽƣ ƣƾƾƣƹƿiƞl Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƻƣƽ ƞƻƻliơƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ lƞǂ.
eƩƣ kƣǄ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣƾ ƺƤ lƣƨƞliƿǄ, ƻǀƟliơ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿ, ƞƹƢ ƻƽƺƻƺƽƿiƺƹƞliƿǄ ƞƽƣ lƞiƢ 
Ƣƺǂƹ iƹ éƽƿèᇷ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇵᇸ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ iƹ ƽƣƾƻƣơƿ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƾƿƽiơ-
ƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƤǀƹƢƞƸƣƹƿƞl ƽiƨƩƿƾᄭ.ᇴ éƽƿiơlƣèᇻ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿƣƾ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ 
ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ ƞƽƟiƿƽƞƽǄ ơƺƹƢǀơƿ ƞƹƢ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ ƨƺƺƢ ƤƞiƿƩ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣƽƣǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ Ɵƞƾiƾ 
Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ Ƣƺơƿƽiƹƣ ƺƤ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ.
ᇴ. aإ؜ءؖ؜أ؟ؘ آؙ Lؘؚؔ؟؜اج 
ƞᄭ Lƣƨƞl Bƞƾiƾ Ƥƺƽ AƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Aơƿiƺƹ
eƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ lƣƨƞliƿǄ ᄬƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƽǀlƣ ƺƤ lƞǂᄭ iƾ ƻƽƺƹƣ ƿƺ ƸƞƹǄ ƢiƤƤƣƽƣƹƿ ǀƹƢƣƽ-
ƾƿƞƹƢiƹƨƾ ƞƹƢ, Ƹƺƽƣ ƻƽƺƟlƣƸƞƿiơƞllǄ, ƸƞƹǄ ƸiƾǀƹƢƣƽƾƿƞƹƢiƹƨƾ. Mƺƾƿ lƣƨƞl 
ƿƽƞƢiƿiƺƹƾ Ƥƺƾƿƣƽ Ƣiƾƿiƹơƿ ƿƽƞiƿƾ ƺƤ ƿƩiƾ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ, ƞƹƢ ƣǁƣƹ ǂƩƣƹ iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞllǄ 
ᇴ See e؛آؠؔئ F؟ؘ؜ءؘإ/é؟ؘثؔءؘؗإ M؜ئ؜ؖ/N؜ؖآ؟ؘ eöأأؘإت؜ؘء, Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl Lƞǂ iƹ 
dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, élƻƩƣƹ ƞƞƹ Ƣƣƹ cijƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇴ, ƻƻ.èᇴᇲᇻ, aؔاإ؜ؖ؜ؔ Eؚ؟؜, IƹƿƽƺƢǀơƿiƺƹ ƿƺ dǂiƾƾ 
Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl Lƞǂ, kǀƽiơƩ/dƿ. Gƞllƣƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇸ, ƻƻ.èᇳᇲᇹ.
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ǀƹƢƣƽƾƿƺƺƢ ƿƣƽƸƾ likƣ “ƿƩƣ ƽǀlƣ ƺƤ lƞǂ” ƞƽƣ ǀƾƣƢ, ƿƩƣ ƻƽƣơiƾƣ Ƹƣƞƹiƹƨ ƺƤƿƣƹ 
ƢiƤƤƣƽƾ ƤƽƺƸ ơƺǀƹƿƽǄ ƿƺ ơƺǀƹƿƽǄ. Iƹ ƣƾƾƣƹơƣ, ƿƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ lƣƨƞliƿǄ ƽƣƤƣƽƾ ƿƺ 
ƿƩƣ iƢƣƞ ƺƤ ƽƣƾƿƽƞiƹiƹƨ ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿƞl ƻƺǂƣƽ ƿƩƽƺǀƨƩ lƞǂ.
Iƿ ƾƣƣƸƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ lƣƨƞliƿǄ iƾ Ƹƺƽƣ ơƺƸƻƽƣƩƣƹƾiǁƣlǄ ƞƻƻliƣƢ iƹ 
dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ ƿƩƞƹ iƹ ƺƿƩƣƽ ơƺǀƹƿƽiƣƾ, ƿƩƺǀƨƩ iƹ ƞ ƽƞƿƩƣƽ ƤlƣǃiƟlƣ Ƹƞƹƹƣƽ. eƩƣ 
ơƺƽƹƣƽƾƿƺƹƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ơƺƹơƣƻƿ ƺƤ lƣƨƞliƿǄ iƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƣǁƣƽǄ ƤƺƽƸ ƺƤ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞ-
ƿiǁƣ ƞơƿiƺƹ Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ ƿƽƞơƣƞƟlƣ Ɵƞơk ƿƺ ƞ ƾƿƞƿǀƿƺƽǄ ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹ: “All activities of the 
state are based on and limited by law” ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇷ I Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. eƩiƾ ƻƽƺǁiƾi-
ƺƹ’ƾ ƣƸƻƩƞƾiƾ iƾ ƺƹ ƤiƹƢiƹƨ ƞ Ɵƞƾiƾ ƿƩƞƿ jǀƾƿiƤiƣƾ ƾƿƞƿƣ ƞơƿiƺƹƾ within the law.ᇵ 
Ɵᄭ LƣƨƞliƿǄ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Lƞǂ
Iƿ iƾ iƸƻƺƽƿƞƹƿ ƿƺ ƽƣƞliǅƣ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ lƣƨƞliƿǄ iƾ ƹƺƿ ƺƹlǄ ƞ ơƩƞllƣƹƨƣ 
ƿƺ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞơƿiƺƹ ǂiƿƩƺǀƿ ƞ ƾǀƤƤiơiƣƹƿ lƣƨƞl Ɵƞƾiƾ Ɵǀƿ iƾ ƞlƾƺ ƞ ƻƺǂƣƽƤǀl 
ƿƺƺl ƢiƽƣơƿƣƢ against the law iƿƾƣlƤ. eƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ lƣƨƞl Ɵƞƾiƾ 
ƾƞƿiƾƤiƣƾ minimal qualitative requirements.ᇶ eƩƣƽƣ ƞƽƣ ƿǂƺ kƣǄ Ƽǀƞliƿƞƿiǁƣ 
ƽƣƼǀiƽƣƸƣƹƿƾ iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ: Ƥiƽƾƿ, ƿƩƣ lƣƨƞl Ɵƞƾiƾ ƸƞǄ ƹƺƿ Ɵƣ unduly vague 
ƞƹƢ ƾƣơƺƹƢ, important decisions Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ ƿƞkƣƹ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ legislator.
eƩƣ Ƥiƽƾƿ ƻƽƺƩiƟiƿiƺƹ ǂƩiơƩ ƻƽƣǁƣƹƿƾ ƿƩƣ ơƽƣƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ unduly vague lƞǂ ǀƹƢƣƽ 
ƿƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ lƣƨƞliƿǄ iƾ ƞ ơƺƸƸƺƹlǄ ƞơơƣƻƿƣƢ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ. eƩƣ dǂiƾƾ FƣƢƣƽƞl 
dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ ƻƽƣơiƾƣ ƣƹƺǀƨƩ ƿƺ ƞllƺǂ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ 
ƿƺ ƞƢjǀƾƿ ƿƩƣiƽ ƟƣƩƞǁiƺǀƽ ƞơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ lƣƨƞl ƽƣƼǀiƽƣƸƣƹƿƾ ƞƹƢ ƿƺ Ƥƺƽƣƾƣƣ 
ƿƩƣ lƣƨƞl ơƺƹƾƣƼǀƣƹơƣƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣiƽ ƟƣƩƞǁiƺǀƽ.ᇷ MƞǄ ƿƩƣ lƣƨiƾlƞƿƺƽ, ƣ.ƨ., jǀƾƿ ƾƿiƻǀ-
lƞƿƣ ƿƩƞƿ ƟillƟƺƞƽƢƾ ƺƹ Ʃƺǀƾƣƾ Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ “ƞƣƾƿƩƣƿiơƞllǄ ƾƞƿiƾƤǄiƹƨ” ƞƹƢ lƣƞǁƣ ƿƩƣ 
ơƺƹơƽƣƿiǅƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩiƾ ƽǀlƣ ƿƺ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞƨƣƹơiƣƾ ƞƹƢ ơƺǀƽƿƾ? eƩƣ dǂiƾƾ 
dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ Ʃƞƾ ƞơơƣƻƿƣƢ ƾǀơƩ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ, ƞơkƹƺǂlƣƢƨiƹƨ ƿƩƞƿ ƣǁƣƽǄ lƞǂ 
ƹƣơƣƾƾƞƽilǄ ơƺƹƿƞiƹƾ ƾƺƸƣ ǁƞƨǀƣƹƣƾƾ Ƣǀƣ ƿƺ iƿƾ ƞƟƾƿƽƞơƿ ƹƞƿǀƽƣ, ƞƾ ǂƣll ƞƾ 
ƺƿƩƣƽ Ƥƞơƿƺƽƾ likƣ ƿƩƣ liƸiƿƞƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ lƞƹƨǀƞƨƣ, ƿƩƣ iƸƻƺƾƾiƟiliƿǄ ƺƤ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿiƹƨ 
ƣǁƣƽǄ ƻƺƿƣƹƿiƞl Ƥǀƿǀƽƣ ƾiƿǀƞƿiƺƹ, ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ƹƣƣƢ ƿƺ ƞllƺǂ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣiƾơƽƣ-
ƿiƺƹ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƻƣƽƤƺƽƸƞƹơƣ ƺƤ ƺƤƤiơiƞl ƞơƿƾ ƺƽ Ƣǀƿiƣƾ.ᇸ eƩƣ ƾƿƞƹƢƞƽƢ ƺƤ ƽƣǁiƣǂ iƾ 
ƩiƨƩƣƽ iƹ ơƞƾƣƾ ǂƩƣƽƣ ƿƩƣƽƣ Ʃƞǁƣ Ɵƣƣƹ ƾiƨƹiƤiơƞƹƿ ƽƣƾƿƽiơƿiƺƹƾ, ƿǄƻiơƞllǄ ƿƩƺƾƣ 
ᇵ f؟إ؜ؖ؛ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Gؘآإؚ Mü؟؟ؘإ/Fؘ؟؜ث f؛؟ؠؔءء, éllƨƣƸƣiƹƣƾ gƣƽǂƞlƿǀƹƨƾƽƣơƩƿ, 
ᇹƿƩèƣƢiƿiƺƹ, kǀƽiơƩ/dƿ.èGƞllƣƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇸ, ƹ.èᇵᇴᇷ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ.; a؜ؘإإؘ eئؖ؛ؔءءؘء/f؟إ؜ؖ؛ k؜ؠؠؘإ؟؜/
Mؔإ؞بئ Mü؟؟ؘإ, éllƨƣƸƣiƹƣƾ gƣƽǂƞlƿǀƹƨƾƽƣơƩƿ, ᇶƿƩ ƣƢiƿiƺƹ, Bƣƽƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇶ, §èᇳᇻ ƹ.èᇳ ƣƿèƾƣƼ.; 
Eؚ؟؜, ƻƻ.èᇴᇶ. 
ᇶ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇵᇵᇺ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ.; eئؖ؛ؔءءؘء/k؜ؠؠؘإ؟؜/Mü؟؟ؘإ, §èᇳᇻ ƹ.èᇳᇶ 
ƣƿ ƾƣƼ.
ᇷ BGEèᇳᇵᇻèIèᇴᇺᇲ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇷ.ᇳ.
ᇸ BGEèᇳᇵᇻèIIèᇴᇶᇵ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇳᇲ; Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇵᇶᇶ. 
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ǂƩiơƩ ƣƹƨƞƨƣ ƤǀƹƢƞƸƣƹƿƞl ƽiƨƩƿƾ.ᇹ é Ƹƺƽƣ ƢƣƤƣƽƣƹƿiƞl ƾƿƞƹƢƞƽƢ ƺƤ jǀƢiơiƞl 
ƽƣǁiƣǂ iƾ ƿǄƻiơƞl iƹ ơƞƾƣƾ ǂƩiơƩ ơƺƹơƣƽƹ ƿƣơƩƹiơƞl ƞƽƣƞƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ ƞƹƢ ǂƩƣƽƣ 
lƣƨƞl ƞƽƣƞƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƞƽƣ ƹƺƿƺƽiƺǀƾlǄ ƢiƤƤiơǀlƿ ƿƺ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣ ƞƽƣ ƞƿ iƾƾǀƣ, ƾǀơƩ ƞƾ Ƥƺƽ-
ƣiƨƹ ƻƺliơǄ.ᇺ 
eƩƣ ƾƣơƺƹƢ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣƸƣƹƿ iƾ ƿƩƞƿ iƸƻƺƽƿƞƹƿ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ ƿƞkƣƹ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ 
lƣƨiƾlƞƿƺƽ. eƩƣ lƣƨiƾlƞƿƺƽ Ƹǀƾƿ ƢƣơiƢƣ ƺƹ ƣǁƣƽǄ iƸƻƺƽƿƞƹƿ ƞƾƻƣơƿ ƺƤ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿiƺƹ, 
ƞƾ ƺƻƻƺƾƣƢ ƿƺ ƞllƺǂiƹƨ ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿ ƺƽ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƟƺƢiƣƾ ƿƺ Ƣƺ ƾƺ: “All 
significant provisions that establish binding legal rules must be enacted in the 
form of a Federal Act” ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇸᇶ I Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. E.ƨ., ơƺǀƽƿ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣ Ʃƞƾ ƣƾƿƞ-
ƟliƾƩƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ Ƥƣƣƾ ƞƹƢ lƣǁiƣƾ Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ, ǂƩiơƩ Ƹǀƾƿ ơlƣƞƽlǄ 
iƢƣƹƿiƤǄ ǂƩƺ Ƹǀƾƿ ƻƞǄ ǂƩƞƿ ƞƸƺǀƹƿ iƹ ƽƣƾƻƣơƿ ƺƤ ǂƩiơƩ ƾƣƽǁiơƣ.ᇻ
Hƣƹơƣ, ƿƩƣ lƣƨƞl Ɵƞƾiƾ ƺƤ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞơƿiƺƹ ƸƞǄ Ɵƣ ơƩƞllƣƹƨƣƢ ƣiƿƩƣƽ 
Ɵƣơƞǀƾƣ ƺƤ ƺǁƣƽ- ǁƞƨǀƣƹƣƾƾ ƺƽ ƿƩƣ lƞơk ƺƤ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiǁƣ Ɵƞƾiƾ ƽƣƨƞƽƢiƹƨ ƞ ơƣƽƿƞiƹ 
ƻƺiƹƿ ƺƤ lƞǂ. IƤ ƿƩƣ ƽǀlƣ ƞƻƻliơƞƟlƣ iƹ ƞ ơƣƽƿƞiƹ ơƞƾƣ ơƺǁƣƽƾ ƞƹ iƸƻƺƽƿƞƹƿ Ƽǀƣƾ-
ƿiƺƹ Ǆƣƿ ǂƞƾ ƹƺƿ ƣƹƞơƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ lƣƨiƾlƞƿƺƽ iƿƾƣlƤ, ƿƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ lƣƨƞliƿǄ iƾ ǁiƺ-
lƞƿƣƢ, ƣǁƣƹ iƤ ƿƩƣ ƽǀlƣ ǂƞƾ ƻƽƣơiƾƣ ƣƹƺǀƨƩ ƞƹƢ ơƺƽƽƣơƿlǄ ǀƹƢƣƽƾƿƺƺƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ 
ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ.ᇳᇲ Iƿ iƾ ƺƟǁiƺǀƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƾƣơƺƹƢ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣƸƣƹƿ iƾ ơlƺ-
ƾƣlǄ ơƺƹƹƣơƿƣƢ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ Ƹƞƿƿƣƽ ƺƤ ƢƣlƣƨƞƿƣƢ ƺƽ ƾƣơƺƹƢƞƽǄ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ, ǂƩiơƩ ǂill 
ƹƺǂ Ɵƣ ƢiƾơǀƾƾƣƢ iƹ ƤǀƽƿƩƣƽ ƢƣƻƿƩ. 
ơᄭ DƣlƣƨƞƿƣƢ Lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ
DƣlƣƨƞƿƣƢ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ iƾ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƻƞƽliƞƸƣƹƿ Ʃƞƾ ơƺƹƤƣƽƽƣƢ ƿƺ 
ƿƩƣ ƣǃƣơǀƿiǁƣ ƟƽƞƹơƩ. Iƿ ơƺƸƣƾ iƹ ƿǂƺ ƤƺƽƸƾ: ᇳ. ƻǀƽƣlǄ ƣǃƣơǀƿiǁƣ ƞƹƢ ᇴ. 
Ƽǀƞƾi- lƣƨiƾlƞƿiǁƣ. 
Iƹ ƿƩƣ Ƥiƽƾƿ ơƞƾƣ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ ƸƣƽƣlǄ “Ƥillƾ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƨƞƻƾ” iƹ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ ƺƽ ƾiƸƻlǄ 
ƢƣƤiƹƣƾ ƞ ƟƽƺƞƢ ƿƣƽƸ iƹ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ Ƹƺƽƣ ƻƽƣơiƾƣlǄ; Ʃƣƽƣ, ƹƺ Ƣƣlƣƨƞƿiƺƹ ơlƞǀƾƣ iƾ 
ƹƣƣƢƣƢ. eƩƣ ƻƺǂƣƽ ƿƺ ƣƹƞơƿ ƾƣơƺƹƢƞƽǄ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ ƾƿƣƸƾ ƢiƽƣơƿlǄ ƤƽƺƸ ƿƩƣ 
ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ƸƞƹƢƞƿƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿ ƿƺ iƸƻlƣƸƣƹƿ ƞƹƢ ƣǃƣơǀƿƣ lƣƨiƾlƞ-
ƿiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇺᇴ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ.ᇳᇳ 
dƣơƺƹƢƞƽǄ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ iƾ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƣƢ Ƽǀƞƾi- lƣƨiƾlƞƿiǁƣ iƤ iƿ ơƽƣƞƿƣƾ ƹƣǂ ƺƟliƨƞ-
ƿiƺƹƾ ƺƽ Ƣƣǁiƞƿƣƾ ƤƽƺƸ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ; iƹ ƿƩƣƾƣ ơƞƾƣƾ, ƞ Ƣƣlƣƨƞƿiƺƹ ơlƞǀƾƣ iƾ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣƢ.ᇳᇴ 
ᇹ BGEèᇳᇵᇲèIèᇵᇸᇲ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇳᇶ.ᇴ.
ᇺ CƤ. Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇵᇺᇻ.
ᇻ CƤ.èBGEèᇳᇵᇷèIèᇳᇵᇲ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇹ.ᇴ.
ᇳᇲ CƤ.èHäؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇵᇷᇳ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ.
ᇳᇳ CƤ. BGEèᇳᇶᇳèIIèᇳᇸᇻ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ᇵ.ᇵ; Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇳᇲᇲ.
ᇳᇴ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇻᇸ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ.
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eƩƣ Ƣƣlƣƨƞƿiƺƹ ơlƞǀƾƣ Ƹǀƾƿ ƤǀlƤil ƿƩƣ Ƥƺllƺǂiƹƨ ƻƽƣƽƣƼǀiƾiƿƣƾ: ᇳ. eƩƣ Ƣƣlƣƨƞ-
ƿiƺƹ Ƹǀƾƿ ƹƺƿ Ɵƣ ƣǃơlǀƢƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ. ᇴ. eƩƣ Ƣƣlƣƨƞƿiƺƹ ơlƞǀƾƣ Ƹǀƾƿ 
Ɵƣ ƤƺǀƹƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ iƿƾƣlƤ. ᇵ. DƣlƣƨƞƿƣƢ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ ơƞƹ ƺƹlǄ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣ ƻƽƣơiƾƣlǄ 
ƻƽƣƢƣƤiƹƢƣƢ ƞƹƢ liƸiƿƣƢ ƞƾƻƣơƿƾ. Fƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, ƿƩƣ lƣƨiƾlƞƿƺƽ ƸƞǄ ƹƺƿ lƣƞǁƣ iƿ 
ǀƻ ƿƺ ƞƹ ƞǀƿƺƹƺƸƺǀƾ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƟƺƢǄ ƿƺ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣ ƿƩƣ ǂƞǄ iƿ ƣƸƻlƺǄƾ iƿƾ 
ǂƺƽkƣƽƾ: ƾǀơƩ ƞ ơƺƸƻƣƿƣƹơƣ iƾ ƾiƸƻlǄ ƿƺƺ ƟƽƺƞƢ. ᇶ. FiƹƞllǄ, ƿƩƣ lƣƨiƾlƞƿƺƽ Ƹǀƾƿ 
ƺǀƿliƹƣ ƿƩƣ ƟƽƺƞƢ ƾƿƽƺkƣƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿiƺƹ. eƩƣ lƣƨiƾlƞƿƺƽ Ƹǀƾƿ ƢƣơiƢƣ ǀƻƺƹ 
ƿƩƣ iƸƻƺƽƿƞƹƿ iƾƾǀƣƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƢƣlƣƨƞƿƣƢ Ƹƞƿƿƣƽ. IƤ ƞƹǄ ƺƤ ƿƩƣƾƣ Ƥƺǀƽ ƻƽƣƽƣƼǀiƾiƿƣƾ 
iƾ ƹƺƿ Ƹƣƿ, ƿƩƣƹ ƿƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ lƣƨƞliƿǄ iƾ ǁiƺlƞƿƣƢ.ᇳᇵ
Ƣᄭ JǀƢiơiƞl cƣǁiƣǂ
Iƿ iƾ ơƽǀơiƞl ƿƺ ƹƺƿƣ ƿƩƞƿ ƞll ƞƾƻƣơƿƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ lƣƨƞliƿǄ ƸƞǄ ƤƺƽƸ ƿƩƣ 
Ɵƞƾiƾ ƺƤ ƞƹ ƞƻƻliơƞƿiƺƹ Ƥƺƽ Ƥǀll jǀƢiơiƞl ƽƣǁiƣǂ. Fƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, ƞ ƾơƩƺƺl- ƟƺǄ 
ƣǃƻƣllƣƢ Ƥƺƽ ƟƞƢ ƟƣƩƞǁiƺǀƽ ƸƞǄ ơlƞiƸ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ Ʃƞǁƣ ƹƺ Ɵƞƾiƾ Ƥƺƽ 
ƣǃƻǀlƾiƺƹ iƹ Ʃiƾ ơƞƾƣ ƞƹƢ ƿƩǀƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣǄ Ʃƞǁƣ ƺǁƣƽƾƿƣƻƻƣƢ ƿƩƣiƽ ơƺƸƻƣƿƣƹ-
ơƣƾ. eƩiƾ iƾ ƞ ơƩƞllƣƹƨƣ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƞƻƻliơƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ. eƩƣ ƾơƩƺƺl- ƟƺǄ ƸƞǄ ƞlƾƺ 
ơƺƹƿƣƹƢ ƿƩƞƿ Ʃiƾ ƢiƾƸiƾƾƞl iƾ ǀƹlƞǂƤǀl Ɵƣơƞǀƾƣ ƿƩƣ ƾƿƞƿǀƿƣ iƿ iƾ ƟƞƾƣƢ ƺƹ iƾ 
ƿƺƺ ǁƞƨǀƣ, ƞllƺǂiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ ǀƹƤƣƿƿƣƽƣƢ Ƣiƾơƽƣƿiƺƹ.ᇳᇶ élƿƣƽƹƞƿiǁƣlǄ, ƿƩƣ 
ƾơƩƺƺl- ƟƺǄ ƸƞǄ ƢƣƤǄ ƿƩƣ lƣƨƞl Ɵƞƾiƾ ơlƞiƸiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƣǃƻǀlƾiƺƹ ƾƩƺǀlƢ Ʃƞǁƣ Ɵƣƣƹ 
ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ iƿƾƣlƤ ƞƹƢ ƹƺƿ ƟǄ ƾƣơƺƹƢƞƽǄ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ Ƣǀƣ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ iƸƻƺƽƿ-
ƞƹơƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ iƾƾǀƣèᅬ ƞ ơƩƞllƣƹƨƣ ƿƩƞƿ ǂƞƾ ƾǀơơƣƾƾƤǀllǄ ƟƽƺǀƨƩƿ ƤƺƽǂƞƽƢ iƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇵ 
ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ ƞ ƾơƩƺƺl ƽƣƨǀlƞƿiƺƹ ƿƞƽƨƣƿiƹƨ ƩƣƞƢƾơƞƽǁƣƾ.ᇳᇷ
ᇵ. aبؕ؟؜ؖ Iءاؘإؘئا 
eƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣƾ ƿƩƞƿ “state activities must be conducted in the public 
interest” ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇷ II Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. Iƿ iƾ Ƹƺƾƿ ƽƣlƣǁƞƹƿ ǂƩƣƹ ƿƞkƣƹ iƹ ơƺƹƾi-
Ƣƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ƿƺƨƣƿƩƣƽ ǂiƿƩ ƺƿƩƣƽ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣƾ ƺƽ ƽiƨƩƿƾ, ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽlǄ ƽƣƨƞƽƢiƹƨ pro-
portionality. eƩƣ ƻǀƟliơ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƣƾƾƣƹƿiƞllǄ ƾƣƿƾ ƿƩƣ ƟƣƹơƩƸƞƽk Ƥƺƽ 
ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƻƺƽƿiƺƹƞliƿǄ ƿƣƾƿ, ƟǄ iƹƿƽƺƢǀơiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣƸƣƹƿ ƿƺ ƞơƩiƣǁƣ ƞ ƻƽƺƻƣƽ 
Ɵƞlƞƹơƣ Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ ƻǀƟliơ ƞƹƢ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿƾ.ᇳᇸ 
ᇳᇵ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇵᇸᇺ; eئؖ؛ؔءءؘء/k؜ؠؠؘإ؟؜/Mü؟؟ؘإ, §èᇳᇻ ƹ.èᇵᇺ.
ᇳᇶ BGE ᇳᇴᇻ I ᇵᇷ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹƾèᇹ.ᇺ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ.
ᇳᇷ BGEèᇳᇵᇻèIèᇴᇺᇲ.
ᇳᇸ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.è ᇶᇸᇳ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ.; eئؖ؛ؔءءؘء/k؜ؠؠؘإ؟؜/Mü؟؟ؘإ, §è ᇴᇲ ƹ.è  
ᇳ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ.
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ᇶ. aإآأآإا؜آءؔ؟؜اج 
eƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ ƻƽƺƻƺƽƿiƺƹƞliƿǄ iƾ ƞ ƨƣƹƣƽƞl ƽƣƼǀiƽƣƸƣƹƿ ƿƩƞƿ ƞll ƾƿƞƿƣ ƞơƿiƺƹ 
Ƹǀƾƿ Ƹƣƣƿ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇷ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ ƞƹƢ ƞ ƾƻƣơiƤiơ ƻƽƣƽƣƼǀiƾiƿƣ iƹ iƹƾƿƞƹơƣƾ 
ǂƩƣƽƣ ƤǀƹƢƞƸƣƹƿƞl ƽiƨƩƿƾ ƞƽƣ ƽƣƾƿƽiơƿƣƢ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇵᇸ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. 
éƾ iƾ ƿƩƣ ơƞƾƣ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ GƣƽƸƞƹ ǀƹƢƣƽƾƿƞƹƢiƹƨ ƺƤ ƻƽƺƻƺƽƿiƺƹƞliƿǄ, iƹ 
dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƣƹơƺƸƻƞƾƾƣƾ ƞ threefold test ƟƞƾƣƢ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞ-
ƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƟƺƿƩ ƿƩƣ ƣƹƢ ƻǀƽƾǀƣƢ ᄬǂƩiơƩ ƿǄƻiơƞllǄ Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƻǀƟliơ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿᄭ ƞƹƢ 
ƿƩƣ Ƹƣƞƹƾ ƣƸƻlƺǄƣƢ. eƩƣ Ƹƣƞƹƾ Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ: ᄬᇳᄭ ƾǀiƿƞƟlƣ ᄬgeeignetᄭ ƿƺ ƞơƩiƣǁƣ ƿƩƣ 
ƣƹƢ; ᄬᇴᄭ ƹƣơƣƾƾƞƽǄ ᄬerforderlichᄭ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƾƣƹƾƣ ƿƩƞƿ ƸilƢƣƽ Ƹƣƞƹƾ ƻƽƺǁƣ iƹƣƤƤiơiƣƹƿ 
ƞƹƢ ƤiƹƞllǄ, ᄬᇵᄭ ƟƣƞƽƞƟlƣ ᄬzumutbarᄭ, i.ƣ. ƿƩƣ ƣƹƢ ƾƺǀƨƩƿ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƻǀƟliơ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿ 
Ƹǀƾƿ ƺǀƿǂƣiƨƩ ƿƩƣ ơƺƸƻƽƺƸiƾƣƢ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl. éll ƿƩƽƣƣ 
ƽƣƼǀiƽƣƸƣƹƿƾ Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ ƾƞƿiƾƤiƣƢ, ƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞơƿiƺƹ ᄬƺƽ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ iƿƾƣlƤᄭ 
ǂill Ƥƞil ƿƩƣ ƿƣƾƿ. Fƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, ƽƣƾƿƽiơƿiƹƨ Ʃƣliơƺƻƿƣƽ ƤliƨƩƿƾ ƤƽƺƸ ƾƺƸƣ ƻƺƽƿƾ ƿƺ 
ƻƽƺƿƣơƿ ƞ ơƣƽƿƞiƹ ƞƽƣƞ iƹ ƿƩƣ Ƹƺǀƹƿƞiƹƾ ƻƽƺǁƣƾ “ǀƹƾǀiƿƞƟlƣ” ƿƺ ƞơƩiƣǁƣ ƿƩƣ ƞiƸ 
iƤ ƿƩƞƿ ƞƽƣƞ ƸƞǄ ƣƞƾilǄ Ɵƣ ƞơơƣƾƾƣƢ ƿƩƽƺǀƨƩ ƺƿƩƣƽ ƻƺƽƿƾ ƹƺƿ Ƥƞlliƹƨ ǀƹƢƣƽ ƿƩƣ 
ƽƣƾƿƽiơƿiƺƹ;ᇳᇹ ƞ ƨƣƹƣƽƞl ƻƽƺƩiƟiƿiƺƹ ƺƹ ƾƿƺƽiƹƨ ƸƣƢiơƞƿiƺƹ ƞƟƽƺƞƢ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƨƽƺǀƹƢƾ 
ƺƤ Ɵƣƿƿƣƽ ƼǀƞliƿǄ ƞƾƾǀƽƞƹơƣ iƾ ƹƺƿ “ƹƣơƣƾƾƞƽǄ” ǂƩƣƹ ƞ ƼǀƞliƿǄ ƨǀƞƽƞƹƿƣƣ ơƞƹ Ɵƣ 
ƞơƩiƣǁƣƢ ƾiƸƻlǄ ƟǄ Ʃƞǁiƹƨ ƿƩƣ Ƥƺƽƣiƨƹ ơƺƸƻƣƿƣƹƿ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ ơƺƹƢǀơƿ iƹƾƻƣơ-
ƿiƺƹƾ ᄬƞƾƾǀƸiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƻƣƿiƿiƺƹƣƽ’ƾ ǂilliƹƨƹƣƾƾ ƿƺ Ɵƣƞƽ ƿƩƣ ƞƢƢiƿiƺƹƞl ơƺƾƿƾᄭ.ᇳᇺ 
FiƹƞllǄ, ƞlƿƩƺǀƨƩ ƿƩƣ ƻǀƟliơ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƞ ƹƞƿǀƽƞl ƽƣƾƣƽǁƣ 
ƸƞǄ ƺǀƿǂƣiƨƩ ƿƩƣ ƺǂƹƣƽ’ƾ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿ iƹ ƟǀilƢiƹƨ Ʃƺǀƾƣƾ iƹ ƿƩƣ ơƣƹƿƽƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ 
ƽƣƾƣƽǁƣ, iƿ ƸƞǄ Ɵƣ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƣƢ “ǀƹƟƣƞƽƞƟlƣ” Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƺǂƹƣƽƾ ƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƟƺƽƢƣƽ ƺƤ iƿ.ᇳᇻ
ᇷ. Lؘؚ؜ا؜ؠؔاؘ Eثأؘؖاؔا؜آءئ 
ƞᄭ Bƞƾiƾ
eƩƣ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ ƺƤ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ iƾ ƻƽiƸƞƽilǄ ƟƞƾƣƢ ƺƹ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇻ 
Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ. eƩƣ ơƽǀơiƞl ƾƿƞƽƿiƹƨ ƻƺiƹƿ iƹ ƢƣƿƣƽƸiƹiƹƨ ǂƩƣƿƩƣƽ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ 
ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ Ʃƞǁƣ Ɵƣƣƹ ơƽƣƞƿƣƢ ƞƹƢ ƿƩǀƾ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ iƾ ƿƺ ƣǁƞlǀƞƿƣ 
ƿƩƣ basis ƿƩƞƿ ƿƽiƨƨƣƽƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹ. eƩƣ ƾƿƽƺƹƨƣƽ ƿƩƣ Ɵƞƾiƾ, ƿƩƣ ƩiƨƩƣƽ 
ƿƩƣ lƣǁƣl ƺƤ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ ǂill Ɵƣ. Fƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, ƞ ᄬƤƺƽƸƞlᄭ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞơƿ iƾ ƞ 
ᇳᇹ BGE ᇳᇴᇺ II ᇴᇻᇴ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇷ.ᇳ.
ᇳᇺ BGE ᇳᇵᇳ II ᇶᇶ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇶ.ᇶ.
ᇳᇻ BGE ᇻᇶ I ᇷᇴ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇵ.
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ƾƿƽƺƹƨƣƽ Ɵƞƾiƾ ƿƩƞƹ iƹƤƺƽƸƞƿiƺƹ ƻƽƺǁiƢƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ ƞƟƺǀƿ ƞƹ ƞƢƸi-
ƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ iƾƾǀƣ.ᇴᇲ 
Oƹƣ ƸƞǄ ƽƺǀƨƩlǄ ƽƞƹk ƿƩƣ Ɵƞƾƣƾ iƹ ƺƽƢƣƽ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ lƣǁƣl ƺƤ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ ƿƩƣǄ ǂill 
iƹơǀƽ ƤƽƺƸ ơƺǀƽƿƾ. eƩƣ Ƹƺƾƿ ơƺƨƣƹƿ Ɵƞƾiƾ Ƥƺƽ ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩiƹƨ ƞ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƣǃƻƣơ-
ƿƞƿiƺƹ iƾ ƞƹ administrative contract, ǂƩiơƩ iƤ ƻƣƽƸiƾƾiƟlǄ ơƺƹơlǀƢƣƢ ƸƞǄ ƣǁƣƹ 
ƻƽƺƿƣơƿ ƿƩƣ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ƻƞƽƿǄ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ ƞ ƾǀƟƾƣƼǀƣƹƿ ƞƢƞƻƿƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ. ciƨƩƿƾ 
ƨƽƞƹƿƣƢ ǀƹƢƣƽ ƞƹ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ơƺƹƿƽƞơƿ ƸƞǄ Ɵƣ “ǁƣƾƿƣƢ ƽiƨƩƿƾ” ᄬwohlerwor-
bene Rechteᄭ, likƣ ƿƩƣ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ ƻƽƺƻƣƽƿǄ.ᇴᇳ eƩiƾ Ƹƣƞƹƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣǄ ƸƞǄ ƺƹlǄ Ɵƣ 
ƽƣǁƺkƣƢ ǂƩƣƽƣ Ƣǀƣ ơƺƸƻƣƹƾƞƿiƺƹ iƾ ƺƤƤƣƽƣƢ.ᇴᇴ
dǀƟƾƿƞƹƿiƞl ƻƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ iƾ ƞlƾƺ ƺƤƤƣƽƣƢ iƤ ƞ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ƻƞƽƿǄ Ʃƞƾ ƽƣliƣƢ ƺƹ ƞƹ 
ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞơƿ ᄬVerfügungᄭ. éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞơƿƾ ƞƽƣ ƿƩƣ ơƺƽƹƣƽƾƿƺƹƣ ƺƤ 
ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞơƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ƞƽƣ ƞƹƞlǄƾƣƢ iƹ Ƣƣƿƞil Ɵƣlƺǂ. eƩƣǄ Ʃƞǁƣ ƿƽiƨƨƣƽƣƢ 
ƹǀƸƣƽƺǀƾ ơƞƾƣƾ ƺƹ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ ƞƹƢ ƞ Ƣƺơƿƽiƹƣ ƺƤ non- revocable 
administrative acts Ʃƞƾ Ɵƣƣƹ ƢƣǁƣlƺƻƣƢ.ᇴᇵ éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞơƿƾ ƟǄ ƿƩƣiƽ ǁƣƽǄ 
ƢƣƤiƹiƿiƺƹ ƾƣƽǁƣ ƿƺ ơlƞƽiƤǄ ƞƹƢ ƾƣƿƿlƣ ƞ lƣƨƞl ƾiƿǀƞƿiƺƹ. eƩƣǄ ƺƤƿƣƹ ƨƺǁƣƽƹ ƞ lƣƨƞl 
ƽƣlƞƿiƺƹƾƩiƻ, ǂƩiơƩ ƣǃiƾƿƾ ƺǁƣƽ ƿiƸƣ. Iƹ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣ iƿ ƸƞǄ ƺƤƿƣƹ ƟƣơƺƸƣ ƹƣơƣƾ-
ƾƞƽǄ ƿƺ ƞƢƞƻƿ ƿƩƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞơƿ iƤ ƿƩƣ lƣƨƞl ƺƽ Ƥƞơƿǀƞl ƾiƿǀƞƿiƺƹ ơƩƞƹƨƣƾ. 
Iƹ ƾǀơƩ ƞ ơiƽơǀƸƾƿƞƹơƣ, Ʃƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƿƩƣ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ơƞƹ Ɵƣ 
iƹǁƺkƣƢ.ᇴᇶ
MƞƹǄ ơƞƾƣƾ iƹǁƺlǁiƹƨ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ ƾƿƣƸ ƤƽƺƸ ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿ ƻƽƺ-
ǁiƾiƺƹ ƺƤ misinformation ƺƽ incorrect advice.ᇴᇷ eƩiƾ Ɵƞƾiƾ iƾ ƻƺƿƣƹƿ ƣƹƺǀƨƩ ƿƺ 
lƣƞƢ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƹƺƹ- ƞƻƻliơƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ iƹ ƞ ƾƻƣơiƤiơ ơƞƾƣ ƞƹƢ Ƹƺƽƣ ƨƣƹƣƽƞllǄ, 
ƣǁƣƹ ǂƩƣƹ ƿƩiƾ Ʃƞƾ ƿƩƣ ƣƤƤƣơƿ ƺƤ ƾƣƽiƺǀƾlǄ ǀƹƢƣƽƸiƹiƹƨ ƟƺƿƩ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ 
ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿ iƿƾƣlƤ. eƩiƾ ƸƞǄ Ɵƣ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƞƾƺƹ ǂƩǄ ƿƩƣ ơƺǀƽƿƾ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣ ƿƩƞƿ ƾǀơƩ 
ƞƢǁiơƣ iƾ ƻƽƺǁiƢƣƢ ƺƹ ƞƹ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl Ɵƞƾiƾ; ƨƣƹƣƽƞl iƹƤƺƽƸƞƿiƺƹ ƢiƾƻlƞǄƣƢ ƺƹ 
ƿƩƣ ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿƞl ǂƣƟƾiƿƣ ƸƞǄ ƹƺƿ Ɵƣ ƾǀƤƤiơiƣƹƿ ƿƺ ơƽƣƞƿƣ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞ-
ƿiƺƹƾ.ᇴᇸ eƩiƾ ƞƻƻƽƺƞơƩ iƾ ǀƹƢƣƽƾƿƞƹƢƞƟlƣ iƹ ƻƽƞơƿiơƞl ƿƣƽƸƾ ƞƾ ƻƽƣǁƣƹƿiƹƨ ƿƩƣ 
ơƩƞƺƾ ƿƩƞƿ ơƺǀlƢ ƣƹƾǀƣ ƤƽƺƸ Ƹǀlƿiƻlƣ ơlƞiƸƾ Ɵƣiƹƨ ƸƞƢƣ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ Ɵƞƾiƾ ƺƤ ƻǀƟ-
liơlǄ ƞǁƞilƞƟlƣ iƹƤƺƽƸƞƿiƺƹ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, lƺƨiơƞllǄ iƿ iƾ ƢiƤƤiơǀlƿ ƿƺ jǀƾƿiƤǄ ǂƩǄ ƺƹƣ 
ƾƩƺǀlƢ Ʃƞǁƣ Ƹƺƽƣ ƿƽǀƾƿ iƹ ƞ ƾiƹƨlƣ ƻƩƺƹƣ ơƞll ƿƺ ƞ ơiǁil ƾƣƽǁƞƹƿ ƿƩƞƹ iƹ iƹƤƺƽƸƞ-
ƿiƺƹ ƤƺǀƹƢ iƹ ƞƹ ƺƤƤiơiƞl ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿƞl ƞƹƹƺǀƹơƣƸƣƹƿ. FǀƽƿƩƣƽ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣƸƣƹƿƾ 
ᇴᇲ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇸᇸᇺ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ.
ᇴᇳ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇳᇴᇵᇹ.
ᇴᇴ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇳᇴᇶᇴ ƞƹƢ ᇳᇴᇶᇶ.
ᇴᇵ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇸᇴᇺ ƞƹƢ ᇳᇴᇵᇳ.
ᇴᇶ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇳᇴᇴᇺ.
ᇴᇷ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇸᇸᇹ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ.
ᇴᇸ CƤ. Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇸᇸᇻ.
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ƢƣǁƣlƺƻƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ơƺǀƽƿƾ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ iƹ 
ƿƩiƾ Ƹƞƹƹƣƽ ƞƽƣ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƞƢǁiơƣ ǂƞƾ ƨiǁƣƹ ǂiƿƩƺǀƿ ƽƣƾƣƽǁƞƿiƺƹ, ƿƩƞƿ iƿ ǂƞƾ 
ƨiǁƣƹ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ơƺƸƻƣƿƣƹƿ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿǄ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ Ƥƞơƿǀƞl ƞƹƢ lƣƨƞl ƾiƿǀƞƿiƺƹ Ʃƞƾ 
ƹƺƿ ơƩƞƹƨƣƢ ƾiƹơƣ ƿƩƣ ƞƢǁiơƣ ǂƞƾ ƨiǁƣƹ.ᇴᇹ
FiƹƞllǄ, ƹƺ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ ƾƿƣƸƾ ƤƽƺƸ administrative passivity.ᇴᇺ Iƹ ƿƩƣƺƽǄ, ƿƩiƾ 
Ƣƺơƿƽiƹƣ Ƹƣƞƹƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƞƹ illƣƨƞl ƾiƿǀƞƿiƺƹ ƸƞǄ ƹƣǁƣƽ ƟƣơƺƸƣ lƣƨƞl ǀƹƢƣƽ ƿƩƣ 
Ƣƺơƿƽiƹƣ ƺƤ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ. Iƹ ƾǀơƩ ơiƽơǀƸƾƿƞƹơƣƾ, ƿƩƣ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ 
ơƞƹ ƾƿill iƹƿƣƽǁƣƹƣ ƞƿ ƞƹǄ ƿiƸƣ, ƣǁƣƹ iƤ ƿƩƣǄ ƿƺlƣƽƞƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ illƣƨƞl ƾiƿǀƞƿiƺƹ Ƥƺƽ 
ƢƣơƞƢƣƾ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ƻƣƽƾƺƹ ƽƣƸƞiƹƣƢ iƹ ƨƺƺƢ ƤƞiƿƩ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ Ƣǀƽƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ 
ƿƩiƾ ƿiƸƣ. diƸǀlƿƞƹƣƺǀƾlǄ, iƿ ƾƣƣƸƾ ƺƟǁiƺǀƾ ƿƩƞƿ ơƺǀƽƿƾ ƸƞǄ Ɵƣ ƽƣlǀơƿƞƹƿ ƿƺ 
ǀƻƩƺlƢ ƾǀơƩ ƞƹ iƹƿƣƽǁƣƹƿiƺƹ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ; iƿ ƸƞǄ ƣǁƣƹ Ɵƣ ƽƣlƞƿiǁƣlǄ ƾƞƤƣ 
ƿƺ ƞƾƾǀƸƣ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ơƺǀƽƿ ƸiƨƩƿ ƤiƹƢ ƞ ƾƺlǀƿiƺƹ iƹ Ƥƞǁƺǀƽ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ƻƞƽƿǄ 
ᄬƻƺƾƾiƟlǄ ƽƣlǄiƹƨ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹơƣƻƿǀƞllǄ ƾiƸilƞƽ Ǆƣƿ Ƣiƾƿiƹơƿ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ ƨƺƺƢ 
ƤƞiƿƩ, ǂƩiơƩ ǂill Ɵƣ ƢiƾơǀƾƾƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ Ƥƺllƺǂiƹƨ ƻƞƽƞƨƽƞƻƩƾᄭ.
Ɵᄭ LƣƨiƿiƸƞơǄ ƺƤ Eǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ
cƣƨƞƽƢlƣƾƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƢiƤƤƣƽƣƹƿ ƻƺƿƣƹƿiƞl Ɵƞƾƣƾ ƺƤ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ, ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ 
ƺƹƣ kƣǄ ƻƽƣƽƣƼǀiƾiƿƣ ǂƩiơƩ ƽƣƸƞiƹƾ ơƺƹƾƿƞƹƿ: ƿƩƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ Ƹǀƾƿ ƞlǂƞǄƾ 
Ɵƣ legitimate. eƩiƾ ǂill ƹƺƿ Ɵƣ ƿƩƣ ơƞƾƣ iƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ƻƞƽƿǄ ǂƞƾ ƞǂƞƽƣ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ 
Ɵƞƾiƾ ǂƞƾ ǀƹƾƺǀƹƢ ƺƽ ƣƽƽƺƹƣƺǀƾ. Fƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, ƞ ƿƽƞiƹƣƢ lƞǂǄƣƽ ƸƞǄ ƹƺƿ ƽƣlǄ 
ƺƹ ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿƞl iƹƤƺƽƸƞƿiƺƹ iƤ ƞ ƾiƸƻlƣ ƽƣǁiƣǂ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ ǂƺǀlƢ Ʃƞǁƣ ƻƽƺǁƣƢ 
iƿ iƹơƺƽƽƣơƿ, ƞlƿƩƺǀƨƩ ƿƩiƾ ƸƞǄ ƹƺƿ Ɵƣ ƾƺ ơlƣƞƽ- ơǀƿ iƹ ƿƩƣ ơƞƾƣ ƺƤ ƞ lƞǄƸƞƹ ǂƩƺ 
ƽƣliƣƾ ƺƹ ƾǀơƩ iƹƤƺƽƸƞƿiƺƹ.ᇴᇻ Hƣƹơƣ, ƞƹ ƞƹƞlǄƾiƾ ƺƤ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ iƾ 
ƞlǂƞǄƾ ơƺƹƢǀơƿƣƢ ƺƹ ƞ ơƞƾƣ- ƟǄ- ơƞƾƣ Ɵƞƾiƾ ƞƹƢ iƹǁƺlǁƣƾ ƞ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞll 
ƿƩƣ Ƣƣƿƞilƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl ƾiƿǀƞƿiƺƹ.ᇵᇲ
ơᄭ aƽiǁƞƿƣ AƽƽƞƹƨƣƸƣƹƿƾ
Oǁƣƽƞll, lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ iƹơlǀƢƣ ƾiƿǀƞƿiƺƹƾ ǂƩƣƽƣ, ƺƹ ƿƩƣ Ɵƞƾiƾ ƺƤ 
ƾƺƸƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹ, ƞƹ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl Ƹƞkƣƾ arrangements ǂƩiơƩ ơƺƹƤliơƿ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ 
ơƺƽƽƣơƿ ƞƻƻliơƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ. dǀơƩ ƞƽƽƞƹƨƣƸƣƹƿƾ ƸƞƢƣ ƟǄ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞlƾ ƸƞǄ 
Ɵƣ ǀƹƢƣƽƾƿƺƺƢ ƞƾ ƿƩƣ ƸƞƹiƤƣƾƿƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ.ᇵᇳ eƩƣ ƻƽƺƿƣơ-
ƿiƺƹ iƾ ǀƾǀƞllǄ ƾƿƽƺƹƨƣƽ iƤ, Ƥƺƽ iƹƾƿƞƹơƣ, ƞ Ʃƺǀƾƣ Ʃƞƾ ƞlƽƣƞƢǄ Ɵƣƣƹ Ɵǀilƿ ƟƞƾƣƢ 
ᇴᇹ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇸᇹᇸ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ.
ᇴᇺ CƤ. Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇸᇷᇳ.
ᇴᇻ CƤ. Ƥƺƽ Ƥƞlƾƣ iƹƾƿƽǀơƿiƺƹƾ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ ƞƻƻƣƞl BGEèᇳᇵᇷ III ᇵᇹᇶ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇳ.ᇴ.ᇴ.ᇴ.
ᇵᇲ dƣƣ ƣ.ƨ. BGE ᇳᇵᇹ I ᇸᇻ.
ᇵᇳ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇸᇷᇻ.
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ǀƻƺƹ ƟǀilƢiƹƨ ƻƣƽƸiƿ, i.ƣ. ƞƹ administrative act ᄬVerfügungᄭ, iƹ ƞ ǅƺƹƣ ƹƺƿ 
ƾǀiƿƞƟlƣ Ƥƺƽ ƟǀilƢiƹƨƾ ƞƹƢ Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ ƢƣƸƺliƾƩƣƢ. Oƹ ƿƩƣ ƺƿƩƣƽ ƩƞƹƢ, ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺ-
ƿƣơƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl‘ƾ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿƾ ƸƞǄ Ɵƣ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƣƢ lƣƾƾ ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹƿiƞl iƤ ƺƹlǄ 
iƹƾiƨƹiƤiơƞƹƿ ƻƽƣƻƞƽƞƿƺƽǄ ǂƺƽk Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ Ʃƺǀƾƣ Ʃƞƾ Ɵƣƣƹ ƣǃƣơǀƿƣƢ.ᇵᇴ ClƣƞƽlǄ, iƤ 
ƹƺ ƞƽƽƞƹƨƣƸƣƹƿƾ Ʃƞǁƣ Ɵƣƣƹ ƸƞƢƣ ǀƹƢƣƽ ƞ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹ, ƿƩƣ ƻƽiƹơi-
ƻlƣ iƾ ƿǄƻiơƞllǄ ƹƺƿ ƞƻƻliơƞƟlƣ.
Ƣᄭ CƞǀƾƞliƿǄ
é ƤƺǀƽƿƩ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣƸƣƹƿ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ ƺƤ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ iƾ ƞ causal 
link Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ ƿƩƣ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ Ɵƞƾiƾ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ƞƽƽƞƹƨƣƸƣƹƿƾ.ᇵᇵ IƤ ƿƩƣ Ʃƺǀƾƣ iƹ ƿƩƣ 
ƻƽƣǁiƺǀƾ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ ƩƞƢ Ɵƣƣƹ Ɵǀilƿ ƟƣƤƺƽƣ ƿƩƣ ƤƞǀlƿǄ ƻƣƽƸiƿ ǂƞƾ ƨiǁƣƹ, ƺƟǁiƺǀƾlǄ 
ƿƩƣƽƣ ǂƺǀlƢ ƹƺƿ Ɵƣ ƞƹǄ ơƞǀƾƞl liƹk Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ ƿƩƣ ƻƣƽƸiƿ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ƞƽƽƞƹƨƣƸƣƹƿƾ; 
ƿƩǀƾ, ƿƩƣƽƣ ƞƽƣ ƹƺ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿƣƢ.
ƣᄭ Bƞlƞƹơiƹƨ eƣƾƿ
eƩƣ Ƥiƹƞl ƾƿƣƻ ƞ ơƺǀƽƿ ǂill ƿƞkƣ iƹ ƢƣƿƣƽƸiƹiƹƨ ǂƩƣƿƩƣƽ ƞ ơlƞiƸ ƺƤ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ 
ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ ƾƩƺǀlƢ Ɵƣ ƣƹƤƺƽơƣƢ iƾ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƢǀơƿiƹƨ ƺƤ ƞ balancing test Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ 
ƿƩƣ lƣƨƞliƿǄ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ. Iƿ ƸƞǄ Ɵƣ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ Ɵƞƾiƾ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞ-
ƿiƺƹƾ iƾ ƾƺǀƹƢ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ᄬơƞǀƾƞlᄭ ƞƽƽƞƹƨƣƸƣƹƿƾ ƞƽƣ ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹƿiƞl Ɵǀƿ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣǄ Ƣƺ 
ƹƺƿ ƺǀƿǂƣiƨƩ ƿƩƣ ƞƢǁƞƹƿƞƨƣƾ ƺƤ ƣƹƾǀƽiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƻƣƽ ƞƻƻliơƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ ƺƽ, 
ƻƣƽƩƞƻƾ Ƹƺƽƣ ƻƽƣơiƾƣlǄ, ƿƩƣ ǁƞlǀƣƾ ƞƹƢ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿƾ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƞƿ lƞǂ.ᇵᇶ Fƺƽ 
ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, ƞ ƻƣƽƾƺƹ ǂƩƺ Ʃƞƾ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣlǄ Ɵǀƿ ƤƞlƾƣlǄ ƽƣliƣƢ ƺƹ ƞ ƟǀilƢiƹƨ ƻƣƽƸiƿ 
ǂill Ʃƞǁƣ ƿƺ ƢƣƸƺliƾƩ Ʃiƾ ƺƽ Ʃƣƽ Ʃƺǀƾƣ iƤ ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ ƞ ƩiƨƩ ƽiƾk ƺƤ ƞǁƞlƞƹơƩƣƾ 
iƹ ƿƩƣ ƞƽƣƞ: ƿƩƣ ƻǀƟliơ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿ ơlƣƞƽlǄ ƿƽǀƸƻƾ ƿƩƣ Ƥiƹƞƹơiƞl iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ 
ƺǂƹƣƽ.ᇵᇷ Oƹ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƿƽƞƽǄ, iƤ ƿƩƣ ƟǀilƢiƹƨ ƻƣƽƸiƿ ƤƞlƾƣlǄ ƞllƺǂƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƟǀilƢiƹƨ 
ƺƤ ƾiǃ ƾƿƺƽiƣƾ iƹ ƞ ǅƺƹƣ ǂƩƣƽƣ ƿƩƣ ƸƞǃiƸǀƸ ƩƣiƨƩƿ iƾ Ƥiǁƣ ƾƿƺƽiƣƾ, ƺƹƣ ƸƞǄ 
ƨƣƹƣƽƞllǄ ƞƾƾǀƸƣ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ Ʃƺǀƾƣ ǂƺǀlƢ Ʃƞǁƣ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƸƞiƹƿƞiƹƣƢ, ƻƽƺǁiƢƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ 
ƿƩƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ ǂƣƽƣ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ iƹ ƞll ƺƿƩƣƽ ƽƣƨƞƽƢƾ. 
eƩƣ lƞƾƿ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ illǀƾƿƽƞƿƣƾ ƿƩƣ ƻƺƿƣƹƿiƞl power ƿƩƣ Ƣƺơƿƽiƹƣ ƺƤ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ 
ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ ƻƺƾƾƣƾƾƣƾ: iƿ ƸƞǄ ƺǁƣƽƽǀlƣ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƻƣƽ ƞƻƻliơƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ, 
Ɵƣơƞǀƾƣ iƤ ƞllƺǂiƹƨ ƞƹ ƣǃơƣƻƿiƺƹ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ iƾ ƿƩƣ Ƹƺƽƣ ƾǀiƿƞƟlƣ ƾƺlǀƿiƺƹ, ơƺǀƽƿƾ 
ǂill ƽƞƿƩƣƽ ƹƺƿ ƞƻƻlǄ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ iƹ ƺƽƢƣƽ ƿƺ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿ ƿƩƣ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ. 
ᇵᇴ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇳᇴᇷᇴ.
ᇵᇵ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇸᇸᇵ.
ᇵᇶ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇸᇸᇶ.
ᇵᇷ dƣƣèFƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ ᇳC_ᇷᇸᇹ/ᇴᇲᇳᇶ ƺƤ ᇳᇶ JǀlǄ ᇴᇲᇳᇶ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇷ.ᇴ.
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eƩƣ ƞƻƻliơƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ iƾ ƤlƣǃiƟlƣ, Ʃƺǂƣǁƣƽ. élƿƣƽƹƞƿiǁƣ Ƹƣƞƾǀƽƣƾ ơƞƹ 
Ɵƣ ƣƸƻlƺǄƣƢ iƹƾƿƣƞƢ: Ƥƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, ƞllƺǂiƹƨ Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ ƞƢƢiƿiƺƹƞl ƢƣƞƢliƹƣ iƹ ơƞƾƣƾ 
ǂƩƣƽƣ iƹơƺƽƽƣơƿ iƹƾƿƽǀơƿiƺƹƾ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ ƞƻƻƣƞl Ʃƞǁƣ Ɵƣƣƹ ƻƽƺǁiƢƣƢ ƺƽ ƿƽƞƹ-
ƾiƿiƺƹ ƻƣƽiƺƢƾ iƹ ơƞƾƣƾ ƺƤ ƞƟƽǀƻƿ ƞƹƢ ǀƹƣǃƻƣơƿƣƢ ơƩƞƹƨƣƾ ƿƺ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ 
ƻƽƞơƿiơƣ.ᇵᇸ CƺƸƻƣƹƾƞƿiƺƹ iƾ ƞƹƢ ƾƩƺǀlƢ Ɵƣ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƣƢ ƞƾ ƞ ƻƺƿƣƹƿiƞl ƽƣƸƣƢǄ, 
ƣƾƻƣơiƞllǄ iƹ ƿƩƺƾƣ ơiƽơǀƸƾƿƞƹơƣƾ ǂƩƣƽƣ iƹ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƿƩƣ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞ-
ƿiƺƹƾ ƞƽƣ jǀƾƿiƤiƣƢ Ɵǀƿ ơƞƹƹƺƿ Ɵƣ ǀƻƩƣlƢ iƹ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣ Ƣǀƣ ƿƺ ƞ Ƹƺƽƣ ơƺƸƻƣlliƹƨ 
ƻǀƟliơ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿ ᄬƤƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, ƿƩƣ ƞƤƺƽƣƸƣƹƿiƺƹƣƢ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƟǀilƢiƹƨ iƹ ƞ 
Ƣƞƹƨƣƽ ǅƺƹƣᄭ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ơƺǀƽƿƾ ƞƽƣ ƽƣlƞƿiǁƣlǄ ƽƣlǀơƿƞƹƿ ƿƺ ƺƤƤƣƽ ơƺƸƻƣƹƾƞƿiƺƹ. 
eƩƣ ơƞƾƣƾ ơƞƹ Ɵƣ ǀƹƢƣƽƾƿƺƺƢ ƞƾ ƞ ƾƻƣơiƞl ƤƺƽƸ ƺƤ ƾƿƞƿƣ liƞƟiliƿǄ.ᇵᇹ
Ƥᄭ dƻƣơiƞl Dƺơƿƽiƹƣƾ: AƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƞơƿiơƣ ƞƹƢ 
cƣƿƽƺƞơƿiǁiƿǄ
LƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ ơƞƹ ƞlƾƺ ƾƿƣƸ ƤƽƺƸ court or administrative practice, 
ƹƺƿ jǀƾƿ ƤƽƺƸ ƞơƿiƺƹ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiǁƣ ƺƽ ƣǃƣơǀƿiǁƣ ƟƽƞƹơƩ. IƹƢƣƣƢ, ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ 
ƞ ơƺƸƻƞƽƞƿiǁƣlǄ ƾƿƽƺƹƨ ƟǀƽƢƣƹ ƺƹ ơƺǀƽƿƾ ƞƹƢ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ ƿƺ 
Ƹƞiƹƿƞiƹ ơƺƹƾiƾƿƣƹƿ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣ. eƽƞƢiƿiƺƹƞllǄ, ƿƩiƾ ƽƺlƣ Ʃƞƾ Ɵƣƣƹ ƞƿƿƽiƟǀƿƣƢ ƿƺ 
ƿƩƣ ƣƼǀƞl ƻƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ ơlƞǀƾƣ Ɵǀƿ lƺƨiơƞllǄ iƿ ƾƣƣƸƾ ƿƺ Ƥiƿ Ɵƣƿƿƣƽ iƹƿƺ ƿƩƣ Ƣƺơƿƽiƹƣ 
ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ ƺƤ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ. eƩƣ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ ƤƽƺƸ ơƩƞƹƨƣƾ iƹ 
ơƺǀƽƿ ƺƽ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣ iƾ ƿǂƺ- ƢiƸƣƹƾiƺƹƞl, ƟƞƾƣƢ ƺƹ ƞ ƤƺƽƸƞl ƞƹƢ 
ƞ ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹƿiǁƣ ơƺƸƻƺƹƣƹƿ. eƩƣ ƤƺƽƸƞl ơƺƸƻƺƹƣƹƿ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƞƹǄ ơƩƞƹƨƣ 
ƺƤ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣ ƾƩƺǀlƢ Ɵƣ ƢǀlǄ ƞƹƹƺǀƹơƣƢ ƾƺ ƿƩƞƿ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ƻƞƽƿiƣƾ ơƞƹ ƞƢƞƻƿ ƿƩƣiƽ 
ƟƣƩƞǁiƺǀƽ ƞơơƺƽƢiƹƨlǄ. Iƹ ƿƩiƾ ƽƣƾƻƣơƿ, ƞ ơƩƞƹƨƣ ƺƤ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣ ƨƣƹƣƽƞƿƣƾ ƞƹ ƺƟli-
ƨƞƿiƺƹ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ơƺǀƽƿƾ ƺƽ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiƺƹ ǂƩiơƩ iƾ ơƺƸƻƞƽƞƟlƣ ƿƺ ƿƩƞƿ iƸƻƺƾƣƢ 
ƺƹ ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿ ƿƺ ƻƽƺƻƣƽlǄ ƻǀƟliƾƩ ƞ ƹƣǂ lƞǂ ƿƩƞƿ iƾ ƿƺ Ɵƣ iƹƿƽƺƢǀơƣƢ.ᇵᇺ IƤ ƿƩiƾ 
ơƺƹƢiƿiƺƹ iƾ ƤǀlƤillƣƢ, ơƺǀƽƿƾ ƞƹƢ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ ƸƞǄ ơƩƺƺƾƣ ƞƹǄ 
ƾǀiƿƞƟlƣ Ƹƣƞƹƾ ƿƩƽƺǀƨƩ ǂƩiơƩ ƿƺ iƹƿƽƺƢǀơƣ ƿƩƣ ơƩƞƹƨƣ ƺƤ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣ. dƺƸƣǂƩƞƿ 
iƹ ơƺƹƿƽƞƾƿ, ƿƩƣ ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹƿiǁƣ ơƺƸƻƺƹƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƿƣƾƿ ƻƽƣƾƣƹƿƾ ƞƹ ƺƻƻƺƽƿǀƹiƿǄ ƿƺ 
Ƹƺǀƹƿ ƞ ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹƿiƞl ơƩƞllƣƹƨƣ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ơƩƞƹƨƣ ƺƤ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣ, ƾiƹơƣ ơƩƞƹƨƣ iƾ ƺƹlǄ 
ƻƣƽƸiƾƾiƟlƣ iƤ ƿƩƽƣƣ ơƺƹƢiƿiƺƹƾ ƞƽƣ Ƹƣƿ: ƹƞƸƣlǄ, ƿƩƣƽƣ ƞƽƣ ǁƞliƢ ƽƣƞƾƺƹƾ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ 
ơƩƞƹƨƣ, ƿƩƣ ơƩƞƹƨƣ iƾ ơƞƿƣƨƺƽiơƞl, ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿ iƹ ƿƩƣ ơƺƽƽƣơƿ ƞƻƻliơƞƿiƺƹ 
ƺƤ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ ƺǀƿǂƣiƨƩƾ ƿƩƣ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿ iƹ lƣƨƞl ơƣƽƿƞiƹƿǄ.ᇵᇻ 
ᇵᇸ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇹᇲᇶ.
ᇵᇹ See Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇹᇲᇸ; a؜ؘإإؘ eئؖ؛ؔءءؘء, dǄƾƿƣƸƣ Ƣƣƾ éllƨƣƸƣiƹƣƹ 
gƣƽǂƞlƿǀƹƨƾƽƣơƩƿƾ, Bƣƽƹ ᇴᇲᇲᇺ, ƹ.èᇴᇻᇳ.
ᇵᇺ CƤ. Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇷᇻᇷ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ.
ᇵᇻ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇷᇻᇳ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ.; eئؖ؛ؔءءؘء/k؜ؠؠؘإ؟؜/Mü؟؟ؘإ, §èᇴᇵ ƹ.èᇳᇸ.
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OƹlǄ liƸiƿƣƢ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ ƞƽƣ ơƽƣƞƿƣƢ ƿƩƽƺǀƨƩ ƿƩƣ law iƿƾƣlƤ. eƩƣ dǂiƾƾ 
FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ Ʃƞƾ lƞơƺƹiơƞllǄ ƣǃƻƽƣƾƾƣƢ ƿƩƣ ǁiƣǂ ƿƩƞƿ ƺƹƣ Ƹǀƾƿ 
ƞlǂƞǄƾ ƣǃƻƣơƿ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ ƿƺ ơƩƞƹƨƣ.ᇶᇲ hƩilƣ ƿƩiƾ iƾ ƿƽǀƣ, ƾǀƽƣlǄ ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ ƞlƾƺ 
ƞƹ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹ ƿƩƞƿ ƞƹǄ ơƩƞƹƨƣ iƹ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ ǂill ƹƺƿ Ɵƣ ƾǀƢƢƣƹ ƞƹƢ ƣǃƿƽƣ-
ƸƣlǄ ƢiƾƞƢǁƞƹƿƞƨƣƺǀƾ ƿƺ ƿƩƺƾƣ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞlƾ ƞƤƤƣơƿƣƢ ƟǄ iƿ. eƩƣƽƣƤƺƽƣ, ơƺǀƽƿƾ 
ƾƺƸƣƿiƸƣƾ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣ ƿƩƣ lƣƨiƾlƞƿƺƽ ƿƺ ƻƽƺǁiƢƣ Ƥƺƽ ƿƽƞƹƾiƿiƺƹƞl ƻƣƽiƺƢƾ ǂƩƣƹ 
iƹƿƽƺƢǀơiƹƨ ƹƣǂ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ; ƿƩiƾ iƾ ƞƹ ƣƤƤƺƽƿ ƿƺ Ƹiƿiƨƞƿƣ ƿƩƣ ƞƾƾƺơiƞƿƣƢ ƽiƾkƾ 
ƞƹƢ ƹƣƨƞƿiǁƣ ƣƤƤƣơƿƾ. diƹơƣ ƾǀơƩ ƞƹ ƺƻƿiƺƹ iƾ ƞǁƞilƞƟlƣ ƿƺ ơƺǀƽƿƾ, iƿ iƾ ƞ ƽƣlƞƿi-
ǁƣlǄ ƽƞƽƣ ƺơơǀƽƽƣƹơƣ Ƥƺƽ ơƞƾƣƾ ơlƞiƸiƹƨ ƞ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹ ơƽƣƞƿƣƢ ƟǄ 
ƿƩƣ lƞǂ iƿƾƣlƤ ƿƺ ƞƽiƾƣ.ᇶᇳ
Mƺƽƣ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ ƤƽƺƸ ƞ ơƩƞƹƨƣ iƹ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ iƾ ƞǁƞilƞƟlƣ ƿƺ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞlƾ ǀƹƢƣƽ 
ƿƩƣ doctrine of non- retroactivity, ƞ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƿƩƞƿ Ʃƞƾ ƢƣǁƣlƺƻƣƢ iƹƢƣƻƣƹƢƣƹƿlǄ 
ƤƽƺƸ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ ƺƤ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿƾ Ɵǀƿ ƸƞǄ, iƹ ƸǄ ƺƻiƹiƺƹ, ƞlƾƺ ƤiƹƢ 
iƿƾ Ƹƺƾƿ ƞƻƻliơƞƟlƣ Ɵƞƾiƾ iƹ éƽƿiơlƣèᇻ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ.ᇶᇴ Cƺǀƽƿƾ Ʃƞǁƣ iƹƿƣƽǁƣƹƣƢ 
ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ ƿƩƣ “ƻƽƺƻƣƽ ƽƣƿƽƺƞơƿiǁiƿǄ” ᄬ“ƣơƩƿƣ cüơkǂiƽkǀƹƨ”ᄭ ƺƤ ƾǀƻƣƽǁƣƹiƹƨ lƞǂƾ 
ƽƣƨǀlƞƿiƹƨ Ƥƞơƿƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƣǁƺlǁƣƢ ƣƹƿiƽƣlǄ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƻƞƾƿ, ƣ.ƨ. ơƺƸƻƣƹƾƞƿiƺƹ Ƥƺƽ ǀƹlƞ-
ǂƤǀl ƻƺliơƣ ƞơƿiƺƹ ƞƿ ƞ ơƣƽƿƞiƹ ƻƺiƹƿ iƹ ƿiƸƣ. eƩƣǄ Ʃƞǁƣ ƺƹlǄ ƽǀlƣƢ iƹ Ƥƞǁƺǀƽ 
ƺƤ ƾǀơƩ lƞǂƾ ǂƩƣƹ ƿƩƣǄ Ʃƞǁƣ iƢƣƹƿiƤiƣƢ ƞ ơlƣƞƽ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiǁƣ iƹƿƣƹƿ, ƞ ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹƿiƞl 
ƻǀƟliơ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿ, ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ iƹƿƣƹƿiƺƹ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƸƺƢƣƽƞƿƣ ƞƻƻliơƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƽƣƿƽƺƞơƿi-
ǁiƿǄ.ᇶᇵ Mƺƽƣ ƢƣƤƣƽƣƹơƣ iƾ ƨiǁƣƹ ǂƩƣƽƣ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ ƞƿƿƣƸƻƿƾ ƿƺ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣ ƺƹƨƺiƹƨ 
ơiƽơǀƸƾƿƞƹơƣƾ, ƿƩƣ ƾƺ- ơƞllƣƢ ƻƾƣǀƢƺ- ƽƣƿƽƺƞơƿiǁiƿǄ ᄬunechte Rückwirkungᄭ.ᇶᇶ 
Fƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, ƿƩƣ lƣƨiƾlƞƿƺƽ ƸƞǄ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣlǄ lƺǂƣƽ ƿƩƣ ƾƞlƞƽǄ ƺƤ ƞ ơiǁil ƾƣƽ-
ǁƞƹƿ ǂƩƺ iƾ ƣƸƻlƺǄƣƢ Ƥƺƽ ƞ Ǆƣƞƽ ƞƤƿƣƽ ƿƩƣ Ƥiƽƾƿ ƾiǃ ƸƺƹƿƩƾ ƺƤ ƣƸƻlƺǄƸƣƹƿ. 
Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƣǁƣƹ iƹ ƾǀơƩ ƞ ơƞƾƣ, ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ ƺƤ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ ƸƞǄ 
ƽƣƼǀiƽƣ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ơǀƿ iƾ ƹƺƿ ƺǁƣƽlǄ ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹƿiƞl ƞƾ ƿƩƣ ƣƸƻlƺǄƣƣ iƾ likƣlǄ ƿƺ Ʃƞǁƣ 
ƻlƞƹƹƣƢ Ʃiƾ ƺƽ Ʃƣƽ ƣƹƨƞƨƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƞƾƾǀƸƻƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞ ƩiƨƩƣƽ ƾƞlƞƽǄ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ 
ǂƩƺlƣ ƻƣƽiƺƢ.ᇶᇷ 
ᇶᇲ CƤ. BGE ᇳᇵᇶ I ᇴᇵ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇹ.ᇷ.
ᇶᇳ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇸᇶᇳ.
ᇶᇴ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇴᇸᇸ.
ᇶᇵ dƣƣ, iƹƿƣƽ ƞliƞ, BGEèᇳᇵᇺèIèᇳᇺᇻ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇵ.ᇶ.
ᇶᇶ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇴᇺᇶ; eئؖ؛ؔءءؘء/k؜ؠؠؘإ؟؜/Mü؟؟ؘإ, §èᇴᇶ ƹ.èᇴᇺ.
ᇶᇷ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ᇳᇷ DƣơƣƸƟƣƽ ᇳᇻᇹᇸ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹè ᇶ ᄬƻƽiƹƿƣƢ iƹ 
dơƩǂƣiǅƣƽiƾơƩƣƾ kƣƹƿƽƞlƟlƞƿƿ Ƥüƽ dƿƞƞƿƾ- ǀƹƢ gƣƽǂƞlƿǀƹƨƾƽƣơƩƿèᇹᇺ [ᇳᇻᇹᇹ], ƻƻ.èᇴᇸᇹᄭ.
200 Felix Uhlmann: Administrative Law
ᇸ. Gآآؗ Fؔ؜ا؛
eƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ ƨƺƺƢ ƤƞiƿƩ Ʃƞƾ ƞ lƺƹƨ ƿƽƞƢiƿiƺƹ iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ. Iƿƾ ƺƽiƨiƹƞl 
ƾƺǀƽơƣ ǂƞƾ éƽƿiơlƣè ᇴ dǂiƾƾ Ciǁil CƺƢƣ,ᇶᇸ ǂƩiơƩ ƿƞƽƨƣƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƨƽƺƾƾlǄ ǀƹƤƞiƽ 
ƟƣƩƞǁiƺǀƽ ƺƤ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ƻƞƽƿiƣƾ: “Every person must act in good faith in the exercise 
of his or her rights and in the performance of his or her obligations. The manifest 
abuse of a right is not protected by law.” Lƞƿƣƽ, ƿƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ ƨƺƺƢ ƤƞiƿƩ ǂƞƾ 
ƣǃƿƣƹƢƣƢ ƿƺ ơƺǁƣƽ ƟƣƩƞǁiƺǀƽ ƟƺƿƩ ƤƽƺƸ ƞƹƢ ƿƺǂƞƽƢƾ ƿƩƣ ƾƿƞƿƣ.ᇶᇹ NƺǂƞƢƞǄƾ, 
ƿƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ iƾ ƤƺǀƹƢ iƹ éƽƿiơlƣèᇷ III Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ᄬǂƩiơƩ ƟiƹƢƾ ƟƺƿƩ ƿƩƣ ƾƿƞƿƣ 
ƞƹƢ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ƻƞƽƿiƣƾᄭ ƞƹƢ iƹ éƽƿiơlƣèᇻ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƞƾ ƞ ƤǀƹƢƞƸƣƹƿƞl ƽiƨƩƿ.
eƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ ƨƺƺƢ ƤƞiƿƩ ƤƺƽƟiƢƾ ƟƺƿƩ ơƺƹƿƽƞƢiơƿƺƽǄ ƟƣƩƞǁiƺǀƽ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ 
ƞƟǀƾƣ ƺƤ ƽiƨƩƿƾ. eƩƣ prohibition of contradictory behaviour ƩiƨƩliƨƩƿƾ ƿƩƣ ơlƺ-
ƾƣƹƣƾƾ ƺƤ ƨƺƺƢ ƤƞiƿƩ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ ƺƤ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ: Ƥƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, 
ƞƹ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿǄ ǂƩiơƩ ƽƣƼǀƣƾƿƾ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƸƺliƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞ ƻƽƺƻƣƽƿǄ ƽƣǁƺkiƹƨ ƞƹ ƺƿƩƣƽ-
ǂiƾƣ ƤƞlƾƣlǄ iƾƾǀƣƢ ƟǀilƢiƹƨ ƻƣƽƸiƿ ƸƞǄ ǁiƺlƞƿƣ ƿƩƣ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl’ƾ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ 
ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ ǂƩilƣ ƞlƾƺ ƞơƿiƹƨ iƹ ƞ ƸƞƹiƤƣƾƿlǄ ơƺƹƿƽƞƢiơƿƺƽǄ Ƹƞƹƹƣƽ.ᇶᇺ 
eƩƣ ƞllƣƨƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞƟǀƾƣ ƺƤ ƞ ƽiƨƩƿ iƾ ƺƤƿƣƹ ƿƩƣ ƞƻƻliơƞƹƿ’ƾ lƞƾƿ ƽƣơƺǀƽƾƣ Ƥƺƽ 
ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹƿiƞƿiƹƨ ƞ ơlƞiƸ. éƹ ƺlƢƣƽ ơƞƾƣ iƹǁƺlǁiƹƨ ƞ ǂƺƸƞƹ ǂƩƺ ǂƞƾ ơƺƹǁiơƿƣƢ 
Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƸƞƹƾlƞǀƨƩƿƣƽ ƺƤ Ʃƣƽ ƩǀƾƟƞƹƢ ƾƩƣƢƾ ƾƺƸƣ liƨƩƿ ƺƹ ƿƩiƾ ƻƽƺƻƺƾiƿiƺƹ. 
fƻƺƹ Ɵƣiƹƨ ƽƣlƣƞƾƣƢ ƤƽƺƸ ƻƽiƾƺƹ ƞƤƿƣƽ ƾƣƽǁiƹƨ Ʃƣƽ ƾƣƹƿƣƹơƣ, ƾƩƣ ƞƻƻƣƞƽƣƢ 
ƞƨƞiƹ ƟƣƤƺƽƣ ƿƩƣ ơƺǀƽƿƾ, ơlƞiƸiƹƨ ƿƩƞƿ ƾƩƣ ǂƞƾ ƣƹƿiƿlƣƢ ƿƺ ƞ ǂiƢƺǂ’ƾ ƻƣƹƾiƺƹ. 
éƻƻƞƽƣƹƿlǄ, ƾƩƣ ƤǀlƤillƣƢ ƞll ƿƩƣ ƹƣơƣƾƾƞƽǄ ƼǀƞliƤiơƞƿiƺƹƾ ƞƹƢ ƹƺƿƩiƹƨ iƹ ƿƩƣ 
ƽƣlƣǁƞƹƿ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ ƻƽƣơlǀƢƣƢ Ʃƣƽ ƤƽƺƸ ƨƣƿƿiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƻƣƹƾiƺƹ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ,è ƿƩƣ 
dǂiƾƾ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƩƞƢ ƹƺ ƢiƤƤiơǀlƿǄ iƹ ƽƣjƣơƿiƹƨ Ʃƣƽ ơlƞiƸ Ƥƺƽ 
ƿƩƣèƻƣƹƾiƺƹ ƞƾ “legal protection is only given to rights obtained in good faith”.ᇶᇻ 
eƩƣèlƣƨiƾlƞƿƺƽ lƞƿƣƽ ƞƸƣƹƢƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƽƣlƣǁƞƹƿ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ, ƟƽiƢƨiƹƨ ƞƹ ƣǃiƾƿiƹƨ ƨƞƻ 
ƿƩƞƿ ǀƻ ǀƹƿil ƿƩƣƹ ƩƞƢ Ɵƣƣƹ ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹƞllǄ ƤillƣƢ ƟǄ ơƺǀƽƿ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣ ƽƣlǄiƹƨ ƺƹ 
ƿƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ ƨƺƺƢ ƤƞiƿƩ.ᇷᇲ 
ᇶᇸ dǂiƾƾ Ciǁil CƺƢƣ ƺƤ ᇳᇲ DƣơƣƸƟƣƽ ᇳᇻᇲᇹ, dc ᇴᇳᇲ; ƾƣƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ EƹƨliƾƩ ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Ciǁil CƺƢƣ 
ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/DgᇺN- FFeᇴᄭ.
ᇶᇹ dƣƣ BGEèᇹᇸèIèᇳᇺᇹ; BGEèᇹᇺèIèᇴᇻᇶ; BGEèᇹᇻèIIIèᇸᇵ.
ᇶᇺ See Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇹᇳᇵ.
ᇶᇻ Dƣơiƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƤƺƽƸƣƽ FƣƢƣƽƞl Iƹƾǀƽƞƹơƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ᄬƹƺǂ iƹƿƣƨƽƞƿƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ 
Cƺǀƽƿᄭ EgGEèᇳᇻᇷᇳ, ƻ.èᇴᇲᇷ, ƻƻ.èᇴᇲᇸ. ᄬơiƿƣƢ ƞƤƿƣƽ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇹᇴᇷᄭ.
ᇷᇲ CƤ. Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇹᇴᇷ.
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ᇹ. aإآ؛؜ؕ؜ا؜آء آؙ Aإؕ؜اإؔإ؜ءؘئئ ᄬcؘؔئآءؔؕ؟ؘءؘئئᄭ 
eƩƣ ƻƽƺƩiƟiƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞƽƟiƿƽƞƽiƹƣƾƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇻ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ iƾ ƞ ǁƣƽǄ ƾƻƣơiƞl, 
ƻƽƺƟƞƟlǄ ǀƹiƼǀƣ, Ƥƣƞƿǀƽƣ ƺƤ dǂiƾƾ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞƹƢ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl lƞǂ. Iƹ 
ƞ ƹǀƿƾƩƣll, iƿ ƻƽƺƩiƟiƿƾ ƨƽƺƾƾlǄ ƣƽƽƺƹƣƺǀƾ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞơƿiƺƹ, iƽƽƣƾƻƣơƿiǁƣ 
ƺƤ ǂƩƣƿƩƣƽ ƿƩƣ Ƥƞǀlƿ ǂƞƾ lƣƨƞl ƺƽ Ƥƞơƿǀƞl. é ơlƞiƸ ƺƤ ƞƽƟiƿƽƞƽiƹƣƾƾ ƸƞǄ Ɵƣ 
iƹǁƺkƣƢ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ ƿƩƣ ƞƟǀƾƣ ƺƤ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣiƾơƽƣƿiƺƹ ƺƽ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ ƿƩƣ ǁiƺlƞ-
ƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞơơƣƻƿƣƢ lƣƨƞl ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣƾ, ƺƤ ƽƣƞƾƺƹƞƟlƣƹƣƾƾ, ƺƽ ƺƤ ƹƞƿǀƽƞl jǀƾƿiơƣ.ᇷᇳ In 
ƞƹǄ ơƞƾƣ, ƿƩƣ ƣƽƽƺƽ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiƺƹ Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ manifestèᅬ ƞlƿƩƺǀƨƩ, ƞƾ ƞ 
ƤƺƽƸƣƽ dǂiƾƾ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ jǀƢƨƣ ơǀƹƹiƹƨlǄ ƻǀƿ iƿ, ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ ƹƺƿƩiƹƨ 
Ƹƺƽƣ ƞƽƟiƿƽƞƽǄ ƿƩƞƹ ƿƩƣ Ƣƺơƿƽiƹƣ ƺƤ ƞƽƟiƿƽƞƽiƹƣƾƾ iƿƾƣlƤ. eƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ iƾ ƺƤƿƣƹ 
iƹǁƺkƣƢ ǂƩƣƹ ƿƩƣƽƣ ƞƽƣèᅬ ƿǄƻiơƞllǄ Ƥƺƽ ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƞl ƽƣƞƾƺƹƾèᅬ ƹƺ Ƹƺƽƣ ƾƻƣơiƤiơ 
ƨƽƺǀƹƢƾ ƞƿ ƩƞƹƢ ƿƺ ơƩƞllƣƹƨƣ ƾƿƞƿƣ ƞơƿiƺƹ.
ᇷᇳ BGEèᇳᇶᇳèIèᇹᇲ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇴ.ᇴ.
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III.  FƺƽƸƾ ƺƤ AƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ 
Action
ᇳ. Aؗؠ؜ء؜ئاإؔا؜ةؘ Dؘؖ؜ئ؜آءئ
ƞᄭ OƸƹiƻƽƣƾƣƹơƣ ƺƤ AƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Dƣơiƾiƺƹƾ
éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ ơƞƹ Ɵƣ jƺơǀlƞƽlǄ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƣƢ ƿƩƣ aǄƿƩƞƨƺƽƣƞƹ 
eƩƣƺƽƣƸ ƺƤ dǂiƾƾ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ lƞǂ. éƢƸiƿƿƣƢlǄ, ƿƩƣǄ ƞƽƣ ƹƺƿ ƻƞƽƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƾǀƟ-
jƣơƿ ƺƤ ƞƢǁƞƹơƣƢ ƸƞƿƩƣƸƞƿiơƾ ƹƺƽ ơƞƹ ƿƩƣǄ Ɵƣ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƣƢ ƞƾ Ɵƣiƹƨ ƣǁƣƹ ơlƺƾƣ 
iƹ Ɵƽilliƞƹơƣ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƿƩƣƺƽƣƸ. Dƣƾƻiƿƣ ƿƩiƾ, iƿ iƾ ơƣƽƿƞiƹlǄ ƿƽǀƣ ƿƩƞƿ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿ-
ƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ ƾƿƞƹƢ ƞƿ ƿƩƣ ơƣƹƿƽƣ ƺƤ ƸƞƹǄ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƺơƿƽiƹƣƾ. IƤ ƺƹƣ 
ǀƹƢƣƽƾƿƞƹƢƾ ƿƩƣ ƹƺƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞƹ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ, ƺƹƣ Ʃƞƾ ƾƣơǀƽƣlǄ Ƹƞƾ-
ƿƣƽƣƢ ƞƹ ǀƹƢƣƽƾƿƞƹƢiƹƨ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ- ƻǀƟliơ lƞǂ ƢiǁiƢƣ, ƿƩƣ ƾƩƞllƺǂ ǂƞƿƣƽƾ 
ƺƤ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ơƺƹƿƽƞơƿƾ, ƽƣƨǀlƞƿiƺƹƾ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣiƽ ƺơơƞƾiƺƹƞl ơƽƺƾƾƺǁƣƽ iƹƿƺ 
iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl ƞơƿƾ, ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ƣƾƾƣƹơƣ ƺƤ ƞ ƽiƨƩƿ ƺƽ ƢǀƿǄ iƹ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ lƞǂ.
éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ ƞƽƣ intrinsically linked ƿƺ judicial protection and 
procedural rights; ƿƩƣǄ ƨǀƞƽƞƹƿƣƣ ƿƩƣiƽ ƣǃiƾƿƣƹơƣ.ᇷᇴ Oƹƣ ƾƩƺǀlƢ ƤǀƽƿƩƣƽ ƹƺƿƣ 
ƿƩƞƿ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ ƞƽƣ ƿƩƣ common form of administrative action. 
“The power to administer includes the power to issue administrative decisions”.ᇷᇵ 
éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ ƞƽƣ ƞƿƿƽƞơƿiǁƣ Ɵƣơƞǀƾƣ ƿƩƣǄ ơƽƣƞƿƣ legal certainty. 
eƩƣǄ ƞƽƣ ƞlƾƺ ƿƩƣ ƟƽiƢƨƣ ƿƺèᅬ ƞƹƢ ƞ ƻƽƣƽƣƼǀiƾiƿƣ Ƥƺƽèᅬ enforcement.ᇷᇶ ciƨƩƿƾ 
ƨƽƞƹƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ ơƞƹƹƺƿ Ɵƣ ƣƞƾilǄ ƽƣǁƺkƣƢ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣǄ ƞƽƣ 
ƻƽƺƿƣơƿƣƢ ǀƹƢƣƽ ƿƩƣ Ƣƺơƿƽiƹƣ ƺƤ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ. Iƹ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣ, ơƺǀƽƿƾ 
ƞllƺǂ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƸƺƢiƤiơƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ iƤ ƿƩƣ Ƥƞơƿƾ ƺƽ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ 
ƿƩƞƿ ƤƺƽƸƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƺƽiƨiƹƞl Ɵƞƾiƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ Ʃƞǁƣ ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹƿiƞllǄ ơƩƞƹƨƣƢ. 
ᇷᇴ dƣƣ ƞlƾƺ eئؖ؛ؔءءؘء, ƹ.èᇵᇵᇻ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ.
ᇷᇵ BGEèᇳᇳᇷ gèᇵᇹᇷ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇵƟ; eئؖ؛ؔءءؘء/k؜ؠؠؘإ؟؜/Mü؟؟ؘإ, §èᇴᇻ ƹ.èᇳᇻ.
ᇷᇶ cؘؚ؜ءؔ K؜ؘءؘإ/Bؘإء؛ؔإؗ cüائؖ؛ؘ/Mؔا؛؜ؔئ Kب؛ء, yƤƤƣƹƿliơƩƣƾ gƣƽƤƞƩƽƣƹƾƽƣơƩƿ, 
ᇴnd ƣƢiƿiƺƹ, kǀƽiơƩ/dƿ.èGƞllƣƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇷ, ƹ. ᇺᇷᇴ.
Felix Uhlmann: Administrative Law 203
Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƿƩƣǄ ǂill ƹƺƿ ƸƺƢiƤǄ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ iƤ, Ƥƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, ƞ ƻƽi-
ǁƞƿƣ ƻƣƽƾƺƹ Ʃƞƾ jǀƾƿ ƸiƾƾƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƿiƸƣ liƸiƿ ƿƺ Ƥilƣ ƞƹ ƞƻƻƣƞl.ᇷᇷ Iƹ ƿƩiƾ ƽƣƾƻƣơƿ, 
ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ Ʃƞǁƣ ƞ ƾiƸilƞƽ ƣƤƤƣơƿ ƿƺ ơƺǀƽƿ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ. IƤ ƿƩƣǄ ƨƺ 
ǀƹơƩƞllƣƹƨƣƢ, ƿƩƣǄ ƣƹƿƣƽ iƹƿƺ lƣƨƞl Ƥƺƽơƣ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƿƩiƾ iƾ ơƣƽƿƞiƹlǄ ƹƺƿ ƿƺ ƾƞǄ 
ƿƩƞƿ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ Ʃƞǁƣ ƞƟƾƺlǀƿƣ lƣƨƞl Ƥƺƽơƣ. Cƺǀƽƿ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣ ƞƹƢ 
lƣƨƞl Ƣƺơƿƽiƹƣ ƢƣƸƺƹƾƿƽƞƿƣ ƿƩiƾ ƿƩƽƺǀƨƩ ƿƩƣiƽ ƩƞƹƢliƹƨ ƺƤ, Ƥƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, ƞƢƸi-
ƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ ǂiƿƩ ƞƹ iƹƢƣƤiƹiƿƣ lƣƨƞl ƣƤƤƣơƿ. Fƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ Ƣƽi-
ǁƣƽ’ƾ liơƣƹƾƣ Ƣƺƣƾ ƹƺƿ Ʃƞǁƣ ƞƹ ƣǃƻiƽƞƿiƺƹ Ƣƞƿƣ Ɵǀƿ ƺƟǁiƺǀƾlǄ iƿ ơƞƹ Ɵƣ ƽƣǁƺkƣƢ 
iƹ ƿƩƣ ơƞƾƣ ƺƤ ƾƣƽiƺǀƾ ƿƽƞƤƤiơ ƺƤƤƣƹƾƣƾ.ᇷᇸ 
Ɵᄭ DƣƤiƹiƿiƺƹ ƺƤ AƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Dƣơiƾiƺƹƾ
eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl éơƿ ƺƹ éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣᇷᇹ ƻƽƺǁiƢƣƾ Ƥƺƽ ƞ ƢƣƤiƹiƿiƺƹ ƺƤ 
ƞƹ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ. Iƹ iƿƾ ᄬǀƹƺƤƤiơiƞlᄭ EƹƨliƾƩ ƿƽƞƹƾlƞƿiƺƹ, éƽƿiơlƣèᇷ I 
ƽƣƞƢƾ ƞƾ Ƥƺllƺǂƾ:
“Rulings are decisions of the authorities in individual cases that are based on the 
public law of the Confederation and have as their subject matter the following:
a. the establishment, amendment or withdrawal of rights or obligations;
b. a finding of the existence, non- existence or extent of rights or obligations;
c. the rejection of applications for the establishment, amendment, withdrawal or 
finding of rights or obligations, or the dismissal of such applications without enter-
ing into the substance of the case.”
Iƿ iƾ ƢƣƟƞƿƞƟlƣ ǂƩƣƿƩƣƽ ƿƩƣ ƿƣƽƸ “ƽǀliƹƨ” iƾ ƿƩƣ Ƹƺƾƿ ƾǀiƿƞƟlƣ iƹ ƿƩiƾ ơƺƹƿƣǃƿ, 
ƞƾ ƿƩiƾ ƿƣƽƸ iƾ ƞlƾƺ ƺƤƿƣƹ ǀƾƣƢ ƿƺ ƢƣƾơƽiƟƣ ƿƩƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiƺƹ’ƾ ƽƣƾƻƺƹƾƣ ƿƺ 
ƞƹ iƹƼǀiƽǄ ƺƹ ơƣƽƿƞiƹ iƾƾǀƣƾ ƺƤ ƞƹ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƹƞƿǀƽƣ ᄬƣƾƻƣơiƞllǄ iƹ ƿƞǃƞƿi-
ƺƹᄭ.ᇷᇺ Iƿ ƾƣƣƸƾ ƿƩƞƿ iƹ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣ ƿƩƣ ƿƣƽƸ “ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ” ƞƾ iƿ iƾ ǀƾƣƢ 
iƹ ƿƩiƾ Ɵƺƺk iƾ ơlƺƾƣƽ ƿƺ Verfügung iƹ GƣƽƸƞƹ ƺƽ décision iƹ FƽƣƹơƩ. 
IƹƾƿƣƞƢ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƿƣƽƸ “ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ”, ƺƹƣ ƸƞǄ ƞlƾƺ ƿƞlk ƞƟƺǀƿ ƞƹ 
ᇷᇷ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇳᇲᇻᇲ; ƾƣƣ ƞlƾƺ BGEèᇳᇵᇻèIIèᇴᇶᇵ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇳᇳ.ᇴ.
ᇷᇸ dƣƣ éƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇷơèI ƞƹƢ éƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇸơèII FƣƢƣƽƞl cƺƞƢ eƽƞƤƤiơ éơƿ ƺƤ ᇳᇻ DƣơƣƸƟƣƽ ᇳᇻᇷᇺ, dcèᇹᇶᇳ.ᇲᇳ.
ᇷᇹ FƣƢƣƽƞl éơƿ ƺƹ éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ ƺƤ ᇴᇲ DƣơƣƸƟƣƽ ᇳᇻᇸᇺ ᄬéƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ 
aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿ, éaéᄭ, dcè ᇳᇹᇴ.ᇲᇴᇳ; ƾƣƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ EƹƨliƾƩ ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ 
aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ᇴKfᇵ- NLhfᄭ.
ᇷᇺ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇹᇵᇵ; BGE ᇳᇶᇳèIèᇳᇸᇳ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇵ.ᇳ; e؛آؠؔئ F؟ؘ؜ءؘإ/
é؟ؘثؔءؘؗإ M؜ئ؜ؖ/N؜ؖآ؟ؘ eöأأؘإت؜ؘء, ƻ.èᇴᇺᇶ.
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“ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞơƿ”, ǂƩiơƩ ơƺƸƣƾ ơlƺƾƣƽ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ liƿƣƽƞl Ƹƣƞƹiƹƨ ƺƤ ǂƩƞƿ iƾ 
ƢƣƾơƽiƟƣƢ ƞƾ Verwaltungsakt iƹ GƣƽƸƞƹǄ ƺƽ acte administratif iƹ Fƽƞƹơƣ. 
Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƞlƿƩƺǀƨƩ ƿƩƣ FƽƣƹơƩ ƞƹƢ GƣƽƸƞƹ ƿƣƽƸƾ ƾƩƞƽƣ ƸƞƹǄ ƣlƣƸƣƹƿƾ ǂiƿƩ 
ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ơƺƹơƣƻƿ ƺƤ ƞƹ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ ᄬǀƹilƞƿƣƽƞl, iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl, ƽƺƺƿƣƢ 
iƹ ƻǀƟliơ lƞǂᄭ ƺƹƣ ƾƩƺǀlƢ ƹƺƿ ƣƼǀƞƿƣ ƿƩƣƸ ǂiƿƩƺǀƿ Ƣǀƣ ơƞǀƿiƺƹ.
éƾ ƞ Ƥiƹƞl ƽƣƸƞƽk, iƿ ƾƩƺǀlƢ Ɵƣ ƸƣƹƿiƺƹƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ dǂiƾƾ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ Ƣƺ ƹƺƿ ƹƣơƣƾ-
ƾƞƽilǄ Ʃƞǁƣ ƿƺ ƞƢƺƻƿ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƤiƹiƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ 
éơƿ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƿƩƣǄ ƿƣƹƢ ƿƺ Ƣƺ ƾƺ iƹ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣ.ᇷᇻ Eǁƣƹ ǂƩƣƹ ƿƩƣǄ ǀƾƣ ƺƿƩƣƽ Ƣƣƹƺ-
Ƹiƹƞƿiƺƹƾ, iƿ iƾ ƽƣlƞƿiǁƣlǄ ƾƞƤƣ ƿƺ ƞƾƾǀƸƣ ƿƩƞƿ iƹ ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹơƣ ƿƩƣǄ Ƥƺllƺǂ ƿƩƣ 
ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ ƾƣƿ ƺǀƿ ƟǄ éƽƿiơlƣèᇷ éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿ.
ơᄭ AƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Dƣơiƾiƺƹƾ DƣƿƣƽƸiƹiƹƨ ciƨƩƿƾ ƞƹƢ 
OƟliƨƞƿiƺƹƾ
éƹ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ establishes, amends or withdraws rights or obli-
gations. IƹƢƣƣƢ, ƿƩiƾ iƾ ƿƩƣ raison d’être ƺƤ ƞƹ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ.ᇸᇲ 
OƿƩƣƽ ƤƺƽƸƾ ƺƤ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞơƿiƺƹƾ ƸƞǄ Ʃƞǁƣ lƣƨƞl ơƺƹƾƣƼǀƣƹơƣƾ, ǂƩiơƩ 
ƞƽƣ ƹƺƿ iƹƿƣƹƢƣƢ Ɵǀƿ ƞƿ Ƹƺƾƿ ƞơơƣƻƿƣƢ ƞƾ ƹƣơƣƾƾƞƽǄ ơƺllƞƿƣƽƞl ƢƞƸƞƨƣ iƹ ƿƩƣ 
ƤǀlƤilƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞơƿè ᅬ Ƥƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, ƞ ƻƺliơƣ ƞơƿiƺƹ, ǂƩiơƩ 
ƞơơiƢƣƹƿƞllǄ lƣƞƢƾ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƩƞƽƸiƹƨ ƺƤ ƞƹ iƹƹƺơƣƹƿ ƟǄƾƿƞƹƢƣƽ. Iƹ ơƺƹƿƽƞƾƿ, ƞƢƸi-
ƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ ƻǀƽƻƺƾƣƤǀllǄ ƢƣƿƣƽƸiƹƣ, ơƺƹƤiƽƸ, ƞƹƢ ƾƿƞƟiliƾƣ ƞ lƣƨƞl 
ƾiƿǀƞƿiƺƹ. Oƹƣ ƸƞǄ Ʃƞǁƣ ƞ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ ƟǀilƢ ƞ Ʃƺǀƾƣ Ɵǀƿ ƹƺƿ Ɵƣ lƣƨƞllǄ ƻƣƽƸiƿƿƣƢ 
ƿƺ Ƣƺ ƾƺ ƟƣƤƺƽƣ ƞ ƻƣƽƸiƿ Ʃƞƾ Ɵƣƣƹ ƨƽƞƹƿƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƤƺƽƸ ƺƤ ƞƹ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ 
Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ. IƤ ƿƩƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiƺƹ ơƺllƣơƿƾ ƿƞǃƣƾ, iƿ ǂill ƺƤƿƣƹ Ƣƺ ƾƺ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƤƺƽƸ 
ƺƤ ƞƹ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ, ƿƩƣƽƣƟǄ ơƺƹơƽƣƿiƾiƹƨ ƿƞǃ lƞǂ iƹ ƞƹ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl 
ơƞƾƣ, ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ơiƿiǅƣƹ’ƾ ƢǀƿǄ ƿƺ ƻƞǄ ƿƩƣ ƿƞǃ ƞƹƢ ƾiƸǀlƿƞƹƣƺǀƾlǄ ƣƾƿƞƟ-
liƾƩiƹƨ ƿƩƣ Ɵƞƾiƾ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ’ƾ ƣƹƤƺƽơƣƸƣƹƿ ipso jure. éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơi-
ƾiƺƹƾ ơƞƹ ƞlƾƺ Ɵƣ ƹƣƨƞƿiǁƣ iƹ ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹơƣ: iƤ ƞ ơƞƹƢiƢƞƿƣ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ Ɵƞƽ ƣǃƞƸ Ƥƞilƾ, 
ƿƩƣ ơƺƸƸiƾƾiƺƹ ǂill ơƺƹƤiƽƸ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƾǀlƿ ƿƩƽƺǀƨƩ ƞ ƹƣƨƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ ᄬǂƩilƣ 
ƞlƾƺ ƨƽƞƹƿiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ ƞƻƻƣƞlᄭ.ᇸᇳ FiƹƞllǄ, ƞƹ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ ƸƞǄ 
ƾiƸƻlǄ ơƺƹƤiƽƸ ƞƹ ƣǃiƾƿiƹƨ lƣƨƞl ƾiƿǀƞƿiƺƹ ᄬ“Feststellungsverfügung”ᄭᇸᇴ, ƿƩǀƾ 
ƻƽƺǁiƢiƹƨ lƣƨƞl ơƣƽƿƞiƹƿǄ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƻƞƽƿǄ ƽƣƼǀƣƾƿiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƤiƽƸƞƿiƺƹ ᄬƣ.ƨ. ƿƩƣ 
ơƺƹƤiƽƸƞƿiƺƹ ƿƩƞƿ ƞ ơƣƽƿƞiƹ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ Ɵǀƾiƹƣƾƾ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣ iƾ iƹ ƞơơƺƽƢƞƹơƣ ǂiƿƩ 
ᇷᇻ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇺᇷᇴ.
ᇸᇲ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇺᇸᇹ; F؟ؘ؜ءؘإ/M؜ئ؜ؖ/eöأأؘإت؜ؘء, ƻ.èᇴᇺᇷ.
ᇸᇳ CƤ. Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇺᇺᇸ; eئؖ؛ؔءءؘء/k؜ؠؠؘإ؟؜/Mü؟؟ؘإ, §èᇴᇺ ƹ.èᇸᇷ.
ᇸᇴ CƤ. Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇺᇺᇻ; eئؖ؛ؔءءؘء/k؜ؠؠؘإ؟؜/Mü؟؟ؘإ, §èᇴᇺ ƹ.èᇸᇴ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ.
Felix Uhlmann: Administrative Law 205
ƣǃiƾƿiƹƨ ƣƹǁiƽƺƹƸƣƹƿƞl ƽƣƨǀlƞƿiƺƹ, Ʃƣƹơƣ ƣǃơlǀƢiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƽiƾk ƺƤ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞ-
ƿiǁƣ ƾƞƹơƿiƺƹƾ iƹ ƿƩƣ Ƥǀƿǀƽƣᄭ.
fƾǀƞllǄ, ƿƩƣ Ƹƺƾƿ ƢiƤƤiơǀlƿ ƞƾƾƣƾƾƸƣƹƿ iƾ ƿƺ ƢƣƿƣƽƸiƹƣ ǂƩiơƩ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞ-
ƿiǁƣ ƞơƿiƺƹƾ ƞƤƤƣơƿ ƞƹƢ ơƩƞƹƨƣ ƿƩƣ lƣƨƞl ƾiƿǀƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl ƞƹƢ 
ƿƩǀƾ Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ iƾƾǀƣƢ ƤƺƽƸƞllǄ ƞƾ ƞƹ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ, ƞƹƢ ǂƩiơƩ Ƣƺ ƹƺƿ. 
eƩƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiƺƹ ǂƺǀlƢ ƺƤƿƣƹ ƻƽƣƤƣƽ ƿƩƞƿ iƿ ǂƞƾ ƹƺƿ ƹƣơƣƾƾƞƽǄ ƿƺ iƾƾǀƣ ƞƹ 
ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ ƞƾ ƿƩiƾ Ƥƺƽƣơlƺƾƣƾ ƿƩƣ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ ƞƻƻƣƞl ƞƹƢ ƞǁƺiƢƾ ƿƩƣ 
iƹiƿiƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞ ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ, ǂƩiơƩ ǂƺǀlƢ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣ ƞll ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ƨǀƞƽƞƹƿƣƣƾ 
ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƣƹƾǀƽƣƢ ƿƩƽƺǀƨƩƺǀƿ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺơƣƾƾ, ƾǀơƩ ƞƾ ƿƩƣ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƩƣƞƽƢ.ᇸᇵ hiƿƩiƹ 
ƿƩiƾ ƤƽƞƸƣǂƺƽk, ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ Ʃƞƾ ƩƣlƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣƽƣ Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ 
ƞƹ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ ƟƣƤƺƽƣ Ƣiƾƽǀƻƿiƹƨ ƣƹƣƽƨǄ ƾƣƽǁiơƣƾ ƤƽƺƸ ƞ ƻǀƟliơ 
ǀƿiliƿǄᇸᇶ ƺƽ iƹ ơƞƾƣƾ iƹǁƺlǁiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ǀƹƾƺliơiƿƣƢ ƿƽƞƹƾƤƣƽ ƺƤ ƞ ơiǁil ƾƣƽǁƞƹƿ ƿƺ ƞƹƺ-
ƿƩƣƽ ƻƺƾƿ,ᇸᇷ ǂƩƣƽƣƞƾ ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ ƹƺ ƹƣƣƢ Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ ǂƩƣƽƣ ƞ 
ƻƺƾƿ ƺƤƤiơƣ iƾ ơlƺƾƣƢ iƹ ƞ ƾƸƞll ƽǀƽƞl ơƺƸƸǀƹiƿǄ.ᇸᇸ eƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƽǀlƣƢ ƞlƾƺ ƿƩƞƿ 
ƹƺƿ ƺƹlǄ ƿƩƣ ǀƹiǁƣƽƾiƿǄ Ƣƣƨƽƣƣ Ɵǀƿ ƞlƾƺ ƿƩƣ iƾƾǀƞƹơƣ ƺƤ ƾiƹƨlƣ ƨƽƞƢƣƾ ƸƞǄ ơƺƹ-
ƾƿiƿǀƿƣ ƞƹ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ iƤ ƿƩƣ ƞǂƞƽƢ ƺƤ ƞ Ƣiƾƿiƹơƿiƺƹ ƢƣƻƣƹƢƾ ǀƻƺƹ 
ƿƩƣƸ.ᇸᇹ Iƹ ƞll ƿƩƣ ƞƟƺǁƣ ơƞƾƣƾ, ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƩƞƢ ƿƺ ƢƣơiƢƣ 
ǂƩƣƿƩƣƽ ƿƩƣ ƾƿƞƿƣ’ƾ ƞơƿiƺƹƾ ƩƞƢ lƣƨƞl ơƺƹƾƣƼǀƣƹơƣƾ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl. IƤ ƿƩƣ 
Ƽǀƣƾƿiƺƹ ǂƞƾ ƞƹƾǂƣƽƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƞƤƤiƽƸƞƿiǁƣ, ƞƹ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ ǂƞƾ Ƥƺƽ-
ƸƞllǄ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣƢ.
Ƣᄭ AƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Dƣơiƾiƺƹƾ ƞƾ IƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl Aơƿƾ
Iƿ iƾ Ƽǀiƿƣ ơlƣƞƽ ƤƽƺƸ ƿƩƣ lƣƨƞl ƢƣƤiƹiƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ ƞƹƢ ƤƽƺƸ 
ƿƩƣ ƞƤƺƽƣ- ƸƣƹƿiƺƹƣƢ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣƾ ƺƤ ƾǀơƩ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣǄ ơƺƹơƣƽƹ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl 
ơƞƾƣƾ. dǂiƾƾ Ƣƺơƿƽiƹƣ ǂƺǀlƢ ƿǄƻiơƞllǄ lƞƟƣl ƿƩƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ ƞƾ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl ᄬƺƹƣ 
ƻƣƽƾƺƹᄭ ƞƹƢ ơƺƹơƽƣƿƣ ᄬƺƹƣ ƾiƿǀƞƿiƺƹᄭ ᄬindividuell- konkretᄭ, iƹ ơƺƹƿƽƞƾƿ ƿƺ ƽǀlƣ-
Ƹƞkiƹƨ, ǂƩiơƩ iƾ ƻƣƽơƣiǁƣƢ ƞƾ ƨƣƹƣƽƞl ƞƹƢ ƞƟƾƿƽƞơƿ ᄬgenerell- abstraktᄭ.
é ơƽiƿiơƞl Ƹƞƿƿƣƽ ǀƹƢƣƽ dǂiƾƾ lƞǂ ƞƽƣ ƿƩƺƾƣ ơƞƾƣƾ ǂƩiơƩ ơƺƹơƣƽƹ ƞ ơƺƹơƽƣƿƣ 
ƾiƿǀƞƿiƺƹ Ǆƣƿ ǂƩƺƾƣ ƾƣƿƿlƣƸƣƹƿ Ʃƞƾ iƸƻliơƞƿiƺƹƾ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ǂiƢƣƽ ƻǀƟliơ, ƿƩǀƾ 
ƽƣƼǀiƽiƹƨ ƿƩƣ iƾƾǀƞƹơƣ ƺƤ ƞ ƾƺ- ơƞllƣƢ ƨƣƹƣƽƞl Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ ᄬAllgemeinverfügungᄭ. 
eƩƣ ƻƞƽƞƸƺǀƹƿ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ iƾ ƿƽƞƤƤiơ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿiƺƹ, illǀƾƿƽƞƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƞ ǂƣll- kƹƺǂƹ ơƞƾƣ 
ᇸᇵ K؜ؘءؘإ/cüائؖ؛ؘ/Kب؛ء, ƹ.èᇵᇳᇷ.
ᇸᇶ BGEèᇳᇵᇹèIèᇳᇴᇲ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇷ.ᇷ; ƾƣƣ ƞlƾƺ ƻ. ᇴᇵᇺ.
ᇸᇷ BGEèᇳᇵᇸèIèᇵᇴᇵ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇶ.
ᇸᇸ CƤ. BGEèᇳᇲᇻ IƟèᇴᇷᇵ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇳ. 
ᇸᇹ BGEèᇳᇵᇸèIèᇴᇴᇻ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇴ.ᇸ.
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ǂƩiơƩ ƻƽƺƩiƟiƿƣƢ ƽiƢiƹƨ ᄬƞƹƢ Ƣƽiǁiƹƨᄭ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ Ɵƞƹkƾ ƺƤ ƽiǁƣƽ Töss.ᇸᇺ “Gƣƹƣƽƞl 
Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ” ƼǀƞliƤǄ ƞƾ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ Ɵǀƿ ǂiƿƩ ƾƺƸƣ ƸƺƢiƤiơƞƿiƺƹ iƹ 
ƽƣƾƻƣơƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƩƣƞƽƢ ᄬƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƞl ƽiƨƩƿƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƞơơƺƸƻƞƹǄ 
ƿƩiƾ ƽiƨƩƿᄭèᅬ iƹ ƾǀơƩ ơƞƾƣƾ, ƿƩƣƾƣ ƽiƨƩƿƾ ƞƽƣ ƺƹlǄ ƨƽƞƹƿƣƢ ƿƺ ƻƣƽƾƺƹƾ ƾƻƣơiƤiơƞllǄ 
ƞƤƤƣơƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ. Fƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, iƹ ƿƩƣ ƞƤƺƽƣƸƣƹƿiƺƹƣƢ ơƞƾƣ, ƿƩiƾ ǂƺǀlƢ 
Ƹƺƾƿ likƣlǄ Ɵƣ ƞ ƩƺƸƣƺǂƹƣƽ liǁiƹƨ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƽiǁƣƽƟƞƹk. eƩƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ 
ƻǀƟliƾƩƣƢ ƞƹƢ ơƞƹ Ɵƣ ơƩƞllƣƹƨƣƢ ƟǄ ƣǁƣƽǄƟƺƢǄ ƻƺƿƣƹƿiƞllǄ ƞƤƤƣơƿƣƢ ᄬƿǄƻiơƞllǄ 
ƞlƸƺƾƿ ƣǁƣƽǄƟƺƢǄᄭ.ᇸᇻ Iƹ ơƺƹƿƽƞƾƿ ƿƺ ƞ ƽƣƨǀlƞƽ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ ǂƩiơƩ ǂill ƣƹƿƣƽ iƹƿƺ 
Ƥƺƽơƣ iƤ ƹƺƿ ơƩƞllƣƹƨƣƢ iƹ Ƣǀƣ ƿiƸƣ ƞƹƢ ǂƩiơƩ ơƞƹƹƺƿ Ɵƣ ơƩƞllƣƹƨƣƢ ƟƣǄƺƹƢ 
ƿƩiƾ ƻƺiƹƿ, ƞ ƻƣƽƾƺƹ ƞƤƤƣơƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƾiƨƹ ƸƞǄ ơƩƞllƣƹƨƣ iƿƾ ǁƞliƢiƿǄ ƣǁƣƹ ƞƤƿƣƽ 
ƿƩƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ ơƺƸƣƾ iƹƿƺ Ƥƺƽơƣ ᄬƣ.ƨ. ƞƹ ƣƼǀƣƾƿƽiƞƹ ƤƽƺƸ ƞƹƺƿƩƣƽ ơƞƹƿƺƹ ƿƩƞƿ Ʃƞƾ 
Ɵƣƣƹ ƤiƹƣƢ ƞƤƿƣƽ ƽiƢiƹƨ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƽiǁƣƽƟƞƹkᄭ.ᇹᇲ 
ƣᄭ AƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Dƣơiƾiƺƹƾ ƞƾ fƹilƞƿƣƽƞl Aơƿƾ
dǂiƾƾ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ lƞǂ ǀƹƤƺlƢƾ ƞƽƺǀƹƢ ƿƩƣ iƢƣƞ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ “ƾƺǁƣƽƣiƨƹƿǄ” 
ᄬ“Hoheitlichkeit”ᄭ ƺƤ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞơƿiƺƹ. éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞơƿiƺƹ ƣƹƿƞilƾ 
ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƾƿƞƿƣ Ʃƞƾ ƿƩƣ ƻƽiǁilƣƨƣ ƿƺ ƞơƿ ǀƹilƞƿƣƽƞllǄ ƿƺǂƞƽƢƾ iƿƾ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ. Iƹ ƿƩiƾ 
ƾƣƹƾƣ, ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ ƞƽƣ unilateral. jƣƿ, ƹƺƿ ƞll ƾƿƞƿƣ ƞơƿiƺƹ Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ 
ƞƾ ƾǀơƩ.ᇹᇳ IƹƢƣƣƢ, ƿƩƣ ƾƿƞƿƣ ƸƞǄ ǂƞǁƣ iƿƾ ƻƽƣƽƺƨƞƿiǁƣ ƞƹƢ ƞơƿ ƿƩƽƺǀƨƩ ƞƢƸi-
ƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƺƽ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ lƞǂ ơƺƹƿƽƞơƿƾ, ƿƩǀƾ ƣƹƿƣƽiƹƨ ƞ Ɵilƞƿƣƽƞl ƞƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿ ǂiƿƩ 
ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ.
Iƹ ƿƩƣƺƽǄ, Ƣiƾơƣƽƹiƹƨ ƞ ǀƹilƞƿƣƽƞl ƾƿƞƿƣ ƞơƿiƺƹ ƤƽƺƸ ƞƹ ƞơƿiƺƹ ƿƩƞƿ ƺƽiƨiƹƞ-
ƿƣƢ ƤƽƺƸ ƞƹ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƺƽ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ lƞǂ ơƺƹƿƽƞơƿ ƾƣƣƸƾ ƾƿƽƞiƨƩƿƤƺƽǂƞƽƢ. 
Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƿƩiƾ iƾ ƹƺƿ ƿƩƣ ơƞƾƣ iƹ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣ. Oƹƣ Ƹǀƾƿ ƽƣƞliƾƣ ƿƩƞƿ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ 
Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ ƺƤ ƞ ƾƺǁƣƽƣiƨƹ ƾƿƞƿƣ Ƣƺ ƹƺƿ ƾiƸƻlǄ ƽƞiƹ Ƣƺǂƹ ƺƹƿƺ ǀƹƞǂƞƽƣ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ 
ƾǀƟjƣơƿƾ, ƹƺƿ lƣƞƾƿ Ɵƣơƞǀƾƣ ƿƩƣƾƣ ƾǀƟjƣơƿƾ ƞƽƣ ƺƤƿƣƹ ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹƿiƞllǄ iƹǁƺlǁƣƢ iƹ 
ƿƩƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ- Ƹƞkiƹƨ ƻƽƺơƣƾƾ. Oƹƣ iƹƾƿƽǀƸƣƹƿ, ǂƩiơƩ ƣƹƾǀƽƣƾ ƻƽƺƻƣƽ iƹƿƣƽ-
ƻlƞǄ Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ ƿƩƣ ƾƿƞƿƣ ƞƹƢ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞlƾ, iƾ ƿƩƣ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƩƣƞƽƢ, ƞƾ 
ƸƣƹƿiƺƹƣƢ ƞƟƺǁƣ. éƢƸiƿƿƣƢlǄ, ƿƩiƾ ƽiƨƩƿ iƾ ƿƩƣ ơƩƞƹƹƣl par excellence Ƥƺƽ ƞllƺ-
ǂiƹƨ ƞƹ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl ƿƺ ƹƣƨƺƿiƞƿƣ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiƺƹ. FǀƽƿƩƣƽƸƺƽƣ, ƸƞƹǄ 
ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣ ƞƹ ƞƻƻliơƞƿiƺƹ ƤƽƺƸ ƞƹ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ 
ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiƺƹ ƿƺ ex officio ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣ ƿƩƣ ơƞƾƣ.
ᇸᇺ BGEèᇳᇲᇳèIƞèᇹᇵ.
ᇸᇻ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇻᇶᇵ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ.
ᇹᇲ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇻᇶᇸ.
ᇹᇳ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇺᇶᇵ; F؟ؘ؜ءؘإ/M؜ئ؜ؖ/eöأأؘإت؜ؘء, ƻ. ᇴᇺᇷ.
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eƺ ƢƣƿƣƽƸiƹƣ ǂƩƣƿƩƣƽ ƞ ơƺƹƿƽƞơƿ Ʃƞƾ Ɵƣƣƹ ơƺƹơlǀƢƣƢ ƺƹƣ ƾƩƺǀlƢ ƣǃƞƸiƹƣ 
ƿƩƣ level of discretion ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiƺƹ’ƾ ƻƞƽƿ. eƩƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiƺƹ ǂill 
ƩƞƽƢlǄ ƞơƿ ƞƾ iƤ iƿ iƾ ơƺƹƿƽƞơƿǀƞllǄ ƟƺǀƹƢ iƤ ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ ƹƺ ƽƺƺƸ Ƥƺƽ ƹƣƨƺƿiƞƿiƺƹƾ 
Ɵƣơƞǀƾƣ ƺƤ ƢƣƿƞilƣƢ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿiƺƹ; iƿ ǂill, Ʃƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƞơƿ iƹ ƾǀơƩ ƞ ǂƞǄ ǂƩƣƹ iƿ iƾ 
ƻƞƽƿǄ ƿƺ ƞ ơƺƸƻlƣǃ ƽƣlƞƿiƺƹƾƩiƻ ǂiƿƩ ƞ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ƣƹƿƣƽƻƽiƾƣ ᄬƤƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ ƞƹ 
ƺƽƨƞƹiƾƞƿiƺƹ ƿƩƞƿ iƾ ƻƞiƢ ƿƺ ƺƽƨƞƹiƾƣ ƿƽƞiƹiƹƨ Ƥƺƽ ǀƹƣƸƻlƺǄƣƢ ƻƣƽƾƺƹƾᄭ.ᇹᇴ Oƹ 
ƾƺƸƣ ƺơơƞƾiƺƹƾ ƿƩƣ lƣƨiƾlƞƿƺƽ Ʃƞƾ ƞlƽƣƞƢǄ ƻƽƣƾơƽiƟƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƤƺƽƸ ƺƤ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿ-
ƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞơƿiƺƹ. é ƿǄƻiơƞl ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ ƺƤ ƿƩiƾ iƾ ƿƩƣ ƣƸƻlƺǄƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ ơiǁil ƾƣƽǁƞƹƿƾ 
ǂƩƣƽƣ ƿƩƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiƺƹ iƾ lƣƨƞllǄ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣƢ ƿƺ ƞơƿ ƿƩƽƺǀƨƩ ƿƩƣ ƤƺƽƸ ƺƤ ƞƹ 
ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ, iƤ ƾƺ ƢƣơiƢƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ lƣƨiƾlƞƿƺƽ.ᇹᇵ FiƹƞllǄ, ƺƹƣ ƾƩƺǀlƢ 
ƞlƾƺ kƣƣƻ iƹ ƸiƹƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ ƞƽƣ ƿƩƣ ǀƾǀƞl ƤƺƽƸ ƺƤ ƞơƿiƺƹ, 
Ʃƣƹơƣ ƻlƞơiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƟǀƽƢƣƹ Ƥƺƽ jǀƾƿiƤǄiƹƨ ơƺƹƿƽƞơƿƾ ƺƹƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiƺƹ. Iƹ 
Ƥƞơƿ, ƽƣƨƞƽƢiƹƨ ƾǀƟƾiƢiƣƾ ǀƹƢƣƽ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl lƞǂ, ƿƩƣ éơƿ ƺƹ aǀƟliơ dǀƟƾiƢiƣƾᇹᇶ ƣǃƻli-
ơiƿlǄ ƣƸƟƽƞơƣƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƽǀlƣ iƹ éƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇸ.
Ƥᄭ AƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Dƣơiƾiƺƹƾ ƞƾ Aơƿƾ fƹƢƣƽ aǀƟliơ Lƞǂ
éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ ƟƞƾƣƢ ƺƹ ƻǀƟliơ lƞǂ, ƞƾ éƽƿiơlƣè ᇷ 
éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿ ƣǃƻliơiƿlǄ ƾƿƞƿƣƾ. eƩiƾ ƻƽƣƽƣƼǀiƾiƿƣ ƾƣƣƸƾ 
ƾƣlƤ- ƣǁiƢƣƹƿ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, Ƽǀiƿƣ ƿƩƣ ƺƻƻƺƾiƿƣ ƩƺlƢƾ ƿƽǀƣ ǂƩƣƹ ƺƹƣ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƾ ƿƩƣ 
Ƹƞƿƿƣƽ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻǀƟliơ- ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ lƞǂ ƢiǁiƢƣ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ iƾƾǀƞƹơƣ ƺƤ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ 
Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ Ɵƽiƹƨƾ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƤƺƽƣƤƽƺƹƿ. eƩƣ dǂiƾƾ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƿǄƻi-
ơƞllǄ ƞƻƻƽƺƞơƩƣƾ ơƽiƿiơƞl ơƞƾƣƾ ƟǄ ƞƻƻlǄiƹƨ ƢiƤƤƣƽƣƹƿ ƿƩƣƺƽiƣƾ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽiƹƨ 
ƾƺǁƣƽƣiƨƹƿǄ ᄬSubordinationstheorieᄭ, iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿ ƞƹƢ ƸƞƹƢƞƿƣ ᄬInteressentheorie 
and Funktionstheorieᄭ, ƞƹƢè ᅬ ƿƩƣ ƺƹlǄ ƽƣơƣƹƿlǄ ƽƣƞơƿiǁƞƿƣƢè ᅬ ơƺƹƾƣƼǀƣƹơƣƾ 
ᄬModaltheorieᄭ, ƣǁƣƹƿǀƞllǄ ơƩƺƺƾiƹƨ ƿƩƣ Ƹƺƾƿ ƾǀiƿƞƟlƣ ƺƹƣ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ơƞƾƣ ƞƿ 
ƩƞƹƢ.ᇹᇷ eƩiƾ ƣơlƣơƿiơ ƞƻƻƽƺƞơƩ Ʃƞƾ Ɵƣƣƹ ơƽiƿiơiƾƣƢ Ɵǀƿ ƿƩiƹkiƹƨ ƺƤ ƞ Ɵƣƿƿƣƽ 
ƞlƿƣƽƹƞƿiǁƣ ƽƣƸƞiƹƾ ƞ ơƩƞllƣƹƨƣ.ᇹᇸ 
aǀƟliơ lƞǂ ᄬƿƽiƨƨƣƽiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƹƣƣƢ Ƥƺƽ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾᄭ iƾ ƿǄƻiơƞllǄ 
ƞƻƻliơƞƟlƣ iƤ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞơƿiƺƹƾ ƞƽƣ ƢiƽƣơƿlǄ ƤǀlƤilliƹƨ ƻǀƟliơ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿƾ ƺƽ 
ƞ ƻǀƟliơ ƸƞƹƢƞƿƣ.ᇹᇹ Oƹ ƿƩƣ ƺƿƩƣƽ ƩƞƹƢ, ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞơƿiƺƹƾ ƸƞǄ ƼǀƞliƤǄ 
ƞƾ Ƥƞlliƹƨ ǀƹƢƣƽ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ lƞǂ iƤ ƿƩƣ ƞƨƣƹơǄ ƾƣƣkƾ ƻƽƺƤiƿ ƺƽ ƿƺ ƾƞƿiƾƤǄ iƿƾ ƺǂƹ 
ᇹᇴ E.ƨ.èBGEèᇳᇴᇺèIIIèᇴᇷᇲ.
ᇹᇵ E.ƨ.è§èᇳᇴ éơƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ kǀƽiơƩ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ aǀƟliơ aƣƽƾƺƹƹƣl ƺƤ ᇴᇹ dƣƻƿƣƸƟƣƽ ᇳᇻᇺᇺ, ᇳᇹᇹ.ᇳᇲ.
ᇹᇶ éơƿ ƺƹ aǀƟliơ dǀƟƾiƢiƣƾ ƺƤ ᇷ OơƿƺƟƣƽ ᇳᇻᇻᇲ, dcèᇸᇳᇸ.ᇳ.
ᇹᇷ BGEèᇳᇵᇺèIIèᇳᇵᇶ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ᇶ.ᇳ.
ᇹᇸ CƤ. eئؖ؛ؔءءؘء/k؜ؠؠؘإ؟؜/Mü؟؟ؘإ, §èᇳᇺ ƹ. ᇸ.
ᇹᇹ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇴᇴᇷ ƞƹƢ ᇴᇴᇻ.
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ƞƤƤƞiƽƾ ƞƾ ƞ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ƻƞƽƿǄ ǂƺǀlƢ Ƣƺ. IƤ ƿƩƣ ƞƨƣƹơǄ ƟƣƹƣƤiƿƾ ƤƽƺƸ ƾƻƣơiƞl ƻƺǂ-
ƣƽƾ ƺǁƣƽ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞlƾ, ƿƩiƾ ơƞƹ Ɵƣ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƣƢ ƞƾ ƞ ơlƣƞƽ iƹƢiơƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ 
ƻǀƟliơ lƞǂ.ᇹᇺ FiƹƞllǄ, ƹƺƿƣ ƿƩƞƿ iƿ ƸƞǄ Ɵƣ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ lƣƨiƾlƞƿƺƽ Ʃƞƾ ƞlƽƣƞƢǄ lƣƨƞllǄ 
ƢƣƿƣƽƸiƹƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƹƞƿǀƽƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiƺƹ’ƾ ƞơƿiƺƹƾ. Iƹ ƺƹƣ ơƞƾƣ ǂƩƣƽƣ ƿƩƣ 
dǂiƾƾ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƩƞƢ ƿƺ ƢƣơiƢƣ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ Ƽǀƣƾƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ǂƩƣƿƩƣƽ ƿƩƣ 
ƞllƺơƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƢƺƸƞiƹ ƹƞƸƣƾ iƾ ƞ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ƺƽ ƻǀƟliơ lƞǂ ƞơƿiƺƹ, iƿ ƩƣlƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ 
lƣƨƞl ƽƣlƞƿiƺƹƾƩiƻ ǂƞƾ ƺƹƣ ƺƤ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ lƞǂ. élƿƩƺǀƨƩ ƿƩƣƽƣ ǂƞƾ ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹƿiƞl ƻǀƟ-
liơ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿ ƺƽ ƣǁƣƹ ƞ ƻǀƟliơ ƸƞƹƢƞƿƣ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩiƾ ƞơƿiǁiƿǄ, ƿƩƣ lƣƨiƾlƞƿƺƽ ƩƞƢ ƻƽƺ-
ǁiƢƣƢ Ƥƺƽ ƞ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ lƞǂ ƾƣƿƿiƹƨ, ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƢiƢ ƞơơƣƻƿ ƿƩiƾ ƼǀƞliƤiơƞƿiƺƹ.ᇹᇻ 
eƩƣ dǂiƾƾ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ ơƺǀƽƿ ƿƺƺk ƞ ƾiƸilƞƽ ƞƻƻƽƺƞơƩ iƹ ƞ ơƞƾƣ iƹǁƺlǁiƹƨ 
ƿƩƣ iƾƾǀiƹƨ ƺƤ ơƣƽƿiƤiơƞƿƣƾ ƺƤ ơƺƹƤƺƽƸiƿǄ ƻƽƺǁiƢƣƢ ƟǄ ƞ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ƣƹƿƣƽƻƽiƾƣ: ƿƩiƾ 
ƾƻƣơiƤiơ ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ ǂƞƾ ƹƣơƣƾƾƞƽǄ ƿƺ lƞƟƣl ƞ ơƩƣƣƾƣ “GƽǀǄȄƽƣ éOC”. eƩƣ dǂiƾƾ 
FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƢƣƿƣƽƸiƹƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨ ƞƾ ƞƹ ƞơƿiƺƹ ǀƹƢƣƽ ƻǀƟliơ 
lƞǂ, ƽƣƞƾƺƹiƹƨ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƻƺƾƾiƟlƣ ƾƞƹơƿiƺƹƾ iƸƻƺƾƣƢ Ƥƺƽ Ƥƞilǀƽƣ ƿƺ ƺƟƿƞiƹ ƾǀơƩ ƞ 
ơƣƽƿiƤiơƞƿƣ ǂƣƽƣ ơƺƸƻƞƽƞƟlƣ ƿƺ ƽƣƾƿƽiơƿiƺƹƾ ƺƹ ƿƽƞƢƣ.ᇺᇲ
ƨᄭ FƺƽƸ
IƤ ƺƹƣ ƨƺƣƾ ƿƩƽƺǀƨƩ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƣƽƣƼǀiƾiƿƣƾ ƺƤ ƞƹ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ ᄬƞƹ iƹƢi-
ǁiƢǀƞl, ǀƹilƞƿƣƽƞl ƞơƿ ǀƹƢƣƽ ƻǀƟliơ lƞǂ ƢƣƿƣƽƸiƹiƹƨ ƽiƨƩƿƾ ƞƹƢ ƺƟliƨƞƿiƺƹƾᄭ, 
ƺƹƣ ƸƞǄ ƹƺƿƣ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƺƾƣ Ƣƺ ƹƺƿ ƻƽƣƾơƽiƟƣ ƞ ơƣƽƿƞiƹ ƤƺƽƸ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ 
Ƹǀƾƿ Ƹƣƣƿ; iƹƾƿƣƞƢ ƿƩƣǄ ƞƽƣ ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹƿiǁƣ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣƸƣƹƿƾ. IƹƢƣƣƢ, ƿƩƣ ƤƺƽƸ ƺƤ ƞƹ 
ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ iƾ ƞ ơƺƹƾƣƼǀƣƹơƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣƾƣ ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹƿiǁƣ ơƩƞƽƞơƿƣƽiƾƿiơƾ. 
éƹ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ ƩƞƹƢƣƢ Ƣƺǂƹ iƹ ǂƽiƿiƹƨ, Ɵƣ ƹƞƸƣƢ ƞƾ 
ƾǀơƩ, ƨiǁƣ ƽƣƞƾƺƹƾ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ǂƞǄ iƹ ǂƩiơƩ iƿ Ʃƞƾ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣƢ ƞƹ iƾƾǀƣ ƞƹƢ iƹƤƺƽƸ 
ƿƩƣ ƽƣơiƻiƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƞƹǄ ƞǁƞilƞƟlƣ lƣƨƞl ƽƣƸƣƢiƣƾ.ᇺᇳ IƤ ƿƩƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ 
ǂƞƾ ƹƺƿ ƣƤƤƣơƿiǁƣlǄ ƢƣliǁƣƽƣƢ, iƿ ǀƾǀƞllǄ iƾ ơƺƹƿƣƾƿƞƟlƣ ƺƹ ƿƩiƾ ƨƽƺǀƹƢ.
ᇴ. Aؗؠ؜ء؜ئاإؔا؜ةؘ Lؔت Cآءاإؔؖائ
Iƿ Ʃƞƾ ƞlƽƣƞƢǄ Ɵƣƣƹ ƻƺiƹƿƣƢ ƺǀƿ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiƺƹ ƸƞǄ ƞơƿ ƞƾ ƞ ơƺƹ-
ƿƽƞơƿiƹƨ ƻƞƽƿǄ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƞƿ ơƺƹƿƽƞơƿƾ Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ ƢiƾƿiƹƨǀiƾƩƣƢ ƤƽƺƸ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ 
ᇹᇺ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇴᇴᇵ.
ᇹᇻ BGE ᇳᇵᇺ I ᇴᇺᇻ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇴ.ᇳ; BGE ᇳᇵᇳ II ᇴᇸᇴ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇴ.ᇴ.
ᇺᇲ BGEèᇳᇵᇺèIIèᇳᇵᇶ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹƾ ᇶ.ᇷ ƞƹƢ ᇶ.ᇸ.
ᇺᇳ dƣƣ, Ƥƺƽ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ ƟƞƾƣƢ ǀƻƺƹ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl lƞǂ, ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ 
Cƺǀƽƿ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ B- ᇳᇻᇺ/ᇴᇲᇳᇶ ƺƤ ᇷ NƺǁƣƸƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇳᇶ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇴ.ᇵ.ᇴ.
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Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ, ƿƩƣ lƞƿƿƣƽ Ɵƣiƹƨ iƸƻƺƾƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƾƿƞƿƣ ǀƹilƞƿƣƽƞllǄ. éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ 
ơƺƹƿƽƞơƿƾ ƞƽƣ ơƣƽƿƞiƹlǄ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƟlǄ ƽƞƽƣƽ ƿƩƞƹ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ. 
MƞƹǄ ƺƤ ƿƩƣiƽ lƣƨƞl iƸƻliơƞƿiƺƹƾ ƞƽƣ ƢiƾƻǀƿƣƢ ƞƹƢ iƿ iƾ ƹƺƿ ǂiƿƩƺǀƿ ƽƣƞƾƺƹ ƿƩƞƿ 
ƺƹƣ ƾơƩƺlƞƽ Ʃƞƾ ƿƣƽƸƣƢ ƿƩƣƸ ƿƩƣ “liaison dangereuse” ƺƤ dǂiƾƾ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ 
lƞǂ.ᇺᇴ
é ƤƞǁƺǀƽƞƟlƣ ƞƾƻƣơƿ ƺƤ ƞơƿiƹƨ ǀƹƢƣƽ ƞƹ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ơƺƹƿƽƞơƿ iƾ iƿƾ sta-
bility. éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ơƺƹƿƽƞơƿƾ ƸƞǄ ƨƽƞƹƿ “ǁƣƾƿƣƢ ƽiƨƩƿƾ” ᄬ“ǂƺƩlƣƽǂƺƽƟƣƹƣ 
cƣơƩƿƣ”ᄭ ƿƩƞƿ ƣƹjƺǄ ƣlƣǁƞƿƣƢ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ ǀƹƢƣƽ ƿƩƣ Ƣƺơƿƽiƹƣ ƺƤ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ 
ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ. Iƹ Ƥƞơƿ, ǁƣƾƿƣƢ ƽiƨƩƿƾ ƸƞǄ ƹƺƿ Ɵƣ ƞƟƺliƾƩƣƢ ƟǄ Ƥǀƿǀƽƣ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ, 
ƞƿ lƣƞƾƿ ƹƺƿ ǂiƿƩƺǀƿ Ƣǀƣ ơƺƸƻƣƹƾƞƿiƺƹ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƞƤƤƣơƿƣƢ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl.ᇺᇵ gƣƾƿƣƢ 
ƽiƨƩƿƾ ơƽƣƞƿƣ ƾƺƸƣ ƹƺƿiơƣƞƟlƣ ƿƣƹƾiƺƹ Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ ƿƩƣ ƹƣƣƢ Ƥƺƽ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ 
ƾƿƞƟiliƿǄ ƞƹƢ ƾƿƞƿƣ ƾƺǁƣƽƣiƨƹƿǄ. eƩiƾ iƾ Ɵƣơƞǀƾƣ ƿƩƣƾƣ ƽiƨƩƿƾ ƸƞǄ ƽƣƾƿƽiơƿ ƿƩƣ 
ƾƿƞƿƣ’ƾ ƞƟiliƿǄ ƿƺ ƣƹƞơƿ Ƥǀƿǀƽƣ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ, ƞƾ ƿƩƣǄ ƞƽƣ ƺƤƿƣƹ ƨǀƞƽƞƹƿƣƣƢ Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ 
iƹƢƣƤiƹiƿƣ ƺƽ ƞƿ lƣƞƾƿ ƞ ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹƿiƞl ƻƣƽiƺƢ.ᇺᇶ Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, iƤ ƿƩƣ lƣƨiƾlƞƿƺƽ ǂƞƾ ƞƟlƣ 
ƿƺ ǀƹƢƣƽƸiƹƣ ƺƽ ƺǁƣƽƽǀlƣ ƾǀơƩ ơƺƹƿƽƞơƿǀƞl ƽiƨƩƿƾ ƿƩƽƺǀƨƩ ƹƣǂ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ, iƿ 
iƾ ƣƼǀƞllǄ ơlƣƞƽ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩiƾ ǂƺǀlƢ ǀƹƢƣƽƸiƹƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƾƿƞƟiliƿǄ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ 
ǂilliƹƨƹƣƾƾ ƺƤ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ƻƞƽƿiƣƾ ƿƺ ơƺƹơlǀƢƣ ơƺƹƿƽƞơƿƾ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿ. eƩƣ 
dǂiƾƾ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƢƣơiƢƣƢ ƹǀƸƣƽƺǀƾ ơƞƾƣƾ ƽƣƨƞƽƢiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƣǃƿƣƹƿ ƺƤ 
ƽƣƾƻƣơƿ, ǂƩiơƩ Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ ƻƞiƢ ƿƺ ǁƣƾƿƣƢ ƽiƨƩƿƾ;ᇺᇷ ƿƩiƾ ƿƣƹƢƾ ƿƺ ǁƞƽǄ ƢƣƻƣƹƢiƹƨ 
ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹơƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƿƽƞơƿ. Fƺƽ iƹƾƿƞƹơƣ, ƸƞƹǄ ƣƸƻlƺǄƸƣƹƿ ơƺƹƿƽƞơƿƾ ƺƤ 
ơiǁil ƾƣƽǁƞƹƿƾ Ƣƺ ƹƺƿ ơƽƣƞƿƣ ƾǀơƩ ƽiƨƩƿƾ ƞƿ ƞll ƺƽ ƞƿ lƣƞƾƿ Ƣƺ ƹƺƿ ơƽƣƞƿƣ ǀƹơƺƹƢi-
ƿiƺƹƞl ƺƹƣƾ.ᇺᇸ Iƹ ƞ ơƞƾƣ, ǂƩiơƩ iƹǁƺlǁƣƢ ƿƩƣ iƹơƺƽƻƺƽƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ƺǂƹƣƽ’ƾ 
lƞƹƢ iƹƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƞƨƽiơǀlƿǀƽƞl ǅƺƹƣ iƹ ƣǃơƩƞƹƨƣ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ iƹƿƽƺƢǀơƿiƺƹ ƺƤ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ 
ƿƩƞƿ ǂƺǀlƢ iƹơƽƣƞƾƣ ƿƩƣ ǁƞlǀƣ ƺƤ ƺƿƩƣƽ ƻiƣơƣƾ ƺƤ lƞƹƢ Ʃƣ ƺǂƹƣƢ, ƿƩƣ Ƽǀƣƾƿiƺƹ 
ƟƣƤƺƽƣ ƿƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ǂƞƾ ǂƩƣƿƩƣƽ ƿƩƣ ƸǀƹiơiƻƞliƿǄ ơƺǀlƢ ƾǀƟƾƣƼǀƣƹƿlǄ ƽƣǁƺkƣ ƿƩiƾ 
ƤƞǁƺǀƽƞƟlƣ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ ǂiƿƩƺǀƿ ơƺƸƻƣƹƾƞƿiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƺǂƹƣƽ. eƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƞơơƣƻƿƣƢ 
ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƸǀƹiơiƻƞliƿǄ ƽƣƤƽƞiƹƣƢ ƤƽƺƸ iƹƿƽƺƢǀơiƹƨ ƾǀơƩ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ.ᇺᇹ
ᇺᇴ eئؖ؛ؔءءؘء, ƹ.èᇳᇶᇴ.
ᇺᇵ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇳᇵᇳᇷ.
ᇺᇶ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇳᇴᇶᇴ.
ᇺᇷ dƣƣ, iƹƿƣƽ ƞliƞ, BGEèᇳᇴᇸèIIèᇳᇹᇳ; BGEèᇳᇴᇹ IIèᇸᇻ; BGEèᇳᇵᇴèIIèᇶᇺᇷ.
ᇺᇸ dƣƣèFƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ ᇳC_ᇴᇵᇲ/ᇴᇲᇲᇹ ƺƤ ᇳᇳ MƞƽơƩ ᇴᇲᇲᇺ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇶ.ᇳ.
ᇺᇹ BGEèᇳᇴᇴèIèᇵᇴᇺ.
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ᇵ. aإ؜ةؔاؘ Lؔت Cآءاإؔؖائ
Iƿ Ʃƞƾ lƺƹƨ Ɵƣƣƹ ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiƺƹ ƸƞǄ ƞlƾƺ ơƺƹơlǀƢƣ ƻƽi-
ǁƞƿƣ lƞǂ ơƺƹƿƽƞơƿƾ. Bǀƿ ƞƾ iƿ iƾ ƿƩƣ ơƞƾƣ ǂiƿƩ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ lƞǂ ơƺƹƿƽƞơƿƾ, ƿƩƣ 
ƞƢƸiƹƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿǄ Ƹǀƾƿ jǀƾƿiƤǄ iƿƾ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ ƿƺ ƣƹƿƣƽ iƹƿƺ ƞ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ lƞǂ 
ơƺƹƿƽƞơƿ. Dƺơƿƽiƹƣ Ʃƞƾ lƞƽƨƣlǄ Ɵƣƣƹ ƾơƣƻƿiơƞl ƞƟƺǀƿ ƿƩƣ ƻƣƽƸiƾƾiƟiliƿǄ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ 
ƾƿƞƿƣ “ƣƾơƞƻiƹƨ iƹƿƺ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ lƞǂ” ᄬ“FlǀơƩƿ iƹƾ aƽiǁƞƿƽƣơƩƿ”ᄭ.ᇺᇺ IƹƢƣƣƢ, iƿ Ƣƺƣƾ 
ƾƣƣƸ ƿƣƸƻƿiƹƨ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ ƿƺ ƞơƿ ǀƹƢƣƽ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ lƞǂ ơƺƹƿƽƞơƿƾ ƾiƹơƣ iƿ 
ƸƞǄ ƣǁƞƢƣ ƸƞƹǄ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹƿiƞl ƞƹƢ ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƞl ƨǀƞƽƞƹƿƣƣƾ ƺƤ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿ-
ƽƞƿiǁƣ lƞǂ.
Fƺƽ ƿƩƞƿ ƽƣƞƾƺƹ, ơƺǀƽƿ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣ ƞƹƢ Ƣƺơƿƽiƹƣ ƣƾƾƣƹƿiƞllǄ ƞơkƹƺǂlƣƢƨƣ liƸi-
ƿƣƢ ƞƽƣƞƾ ǂƩƣƽƣ ƿƩƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiƺƹ ƸƞǄ ƻƣƽƸiƾƾiƟlǄ ƺƻƣƽƞƿƣ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƤiƣlƢ ƺƤ 
ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ lƞǂ: ƻǀƟliơ ƻƽƺơǀƽƣƸƣƹƿ, ƿƩƣ ƸƞƹƞƨƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ Ƥiƹƞƹơiƞl ƞƾƾƣƿƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ 
ƾƿƞƿƣ, ƞƹƢ ƻƽƺƤiƿ- ƺƽiƣƹƿƣƢ ƾƿƞƿƣ ƞơƿiƺƹ. Iƿ iƾ ƞlƾƺ ƞơơƣƻƿƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ lƣƨiƾlƞƿƺƽ 
ƸƞǄ iƹƿƽƺƢǀơƣ ƿƩiƾ ƤƺƽƸ ƺƤ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞơƿiƺƹ ƿƺ ƺƿƩƣƽ ƤiƣlƢƾ.ᇺᇻ
ᇶ. Iءؙآإؠؔ؟ Aؖائ ؔءؗ dاؔاؘ L؜ؔؕ؜؟؜اج
éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹƾ ƞƹƢ ơƺƹƿƽƞơƿƾ ƾƩƞƽƣ ƞ ơƺƸƸƺƹ ƢƣƹƺƸiƹƞƿƺƽ: ƿƩƣǄ 
ƞƤƤƣơƿ ƿƩƣ legal situation ƺƤ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ. Iƹ ơƺƹƿƽƞƾƿ, iƹƤƺƽƸƞl ƞơƿiƺƹƾ ᄬ“ƽƣƞl ƞơƿƾ”; 
Realakte ƞơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ éƽƿiơlƣèᇴᇷƞ éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿᄭ ƺƤ ƞƢƸiƹiƾ-
ƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƟƺƢiƣƾ Ƣƺ ƹƺƿ − ƞƿ lƣƞƾƿ ƹƺƿ ƢƣliƟƣƽƞƿƣlǄ. eƩƣ “ƢƣliƟƣƽƞƿƣlǄ” ƞƾƻƣơƿ iƾ 
ƞ kƣǄ ƻƺiƹƿ; ƣǁƣƹ iƤ iƹƤƺƽƸƞl ƞơƿiƺƹƾ Ƣƺ ƞơƿǀƞllǄ ƞƤƤƣơƿ ƞ ơiƿiǅƣƹ’ƾ lƣƨƞl ƾiƿǀƞ-
ƿiƺƹ, ƿƩƣǄ ǂill ƾƿill Ɵƣ ơlƞƾƾiƤiƣƢ ƞƾ iƹƤƺƽƸƞl ƞơƿiƺƹƾ. Mƺƾƿ ƞơƿiƺƹƾ ƻƣƽƤƺƽƸƣƢ 
ǂi ƿƩiƹ ƿƩƣ ƤƽƞƸƣǂƺƽk ƺƤ ƾơƩƺƺlƾ ƺƽ Ʃƺƾƻiƿƞlƾ Ƣƺ ƹƺƿ ƞƸƺǀƹƿ ƿƺ lƣƨƞl ƞơƿiƺƹƾ 
ƣǁƣƹ ƿƩƺǀƨƩ ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ ƾƺƸƣƿiƸƣƾ ƞ Ƥiƹƣ liƹƣ.ᇻᇲ é ƻƺliơƣ ơƞƽ ƻƞƿƽƺlliƹƨ iƹ ƞ 
ƹƣiƨƩƟƺǀƽƩƺƺƢ Ƣƺƣƾ ƹƺƿ ƿƽiƨƨƣƽ ƞƹǄ lƣƨƞl ƣƤƤƣơƿ; ƹƺƽ Ƣƺƣƾ ƿƩƣ ƢiƾƾƣƸiƹƞƿiƺƹ 
ƺƤ ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿƞl iƹƤƺƽƸƞƿiƺƹ.ᇻᇳ dǂiƾƾ ơƩƣƣƾƣ ƻƽƺƢǀơƣƽƾ ƾǀƤƤƣƽƣƢ ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹƿiƞl 
lƺƾƾƣƾ ǂƩƣƹ ƿƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƞƨƣƹơǄ ƺƹ ƻǀƟliơ ƩƣƞlƿƩ ǂƞƽƹƣƢ ƞƟƺǀƿ ƻƺƾƾiƟlƣ ơƺƹƿƞ-
Ƹiƹƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ liƾƿƣƽiƺƾiƾ iƹ gƞơƩƣƽiƹ Mƺƹƿ Ƣ’Oƽ.ᇻᇴ 
eƺ ơƩƞllƣƹƨƣ ƾǀơƩ ƞơƿiƺƹ, ƺƹƣ ơƞƹ ƽƣƾƺƽƿ ƿƺ ƞ ƾƿƞƿƣ liƞƟiliƿǄ ơlƞiƸ iƹ ƺƽƢƣƽ 
ƿƺ ơƩƞllƣƹƨƣ iƹƤƺƽƸƞl ƞơƿƾ Ɵǀƿ ƿƩƣƾƣ ơƞƾƣƾ ƞƽƣ ƹƺƿ ƣƞƾilǄ ǂƺƹ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ ƿƩƣ 
ᇺᇺ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇳᇵᇹᇻ.
ᇺᇻ dƣƣ BGE ᇳᇵᇳ II ᇴᇸᇴ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇴ.ᇴ; eئؖ؛ؔءءؘء/k؜ؠؠؘإ؟؜/Mü؟؟ؘإ, §èᇶᇴ ƹ.èᇵ.
ᇻᇲ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇳᇶᇲᇻ.
ᇻᇳ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇳᇶᇳᇵ.
ᇻᇴ BGE ᇳᇳᇺ IƟ ᇶᇹᇵ.
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ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿ ᄬƟǀƽƢƣƹ ƺƤ ƻƽƺƺƤ, ƿƩƣ ƹƣơƣƾƾiƿǄ ƺƤ ƼǀƞliƤiƣƢ illƣƨƞliƿǄ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƾƿƞƿƣ 
ƞơƿiƺƹ ƣƿơ.ᄭ. eƩƣ ơƩƣƣƾƣ ƻƽƺƢǀơƣƽƾ ǂƣƽƣ ƹƺƿ ƾǀơơƣƾƾƤǀl.ᇻᇵ
Dǀƣ ƿƺ ƾǀơƩ ơƺƹơƣƽƹƾ ƞ ƹƣǂ ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹ ǂƞƾ iƹƿƽƺƢǀơƣƢ iƹƿƺ ƿƩƣ 
éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿ: ƞơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ éƽƿiơlƣè ᇴᇷƞ éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ 
aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿ, ƻƣƽƾƺƹƾ ƞƤƤƣơƿƣƢ ƸƞǄ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣ ƿƩƞƿ ƞƹ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ 
iƾ ƿƞkƣƹ ƺƹ iƹƤƺƽƸƞl ƞơƿƾ ƿƩƞƿ ơƺƹơƣƽƹ ƿƩƣƸ ƾƻƣơiƤiơƞllǄ ᄬƾǀơƩ ƞƾ ƿƩƣ ơƩƣƣƾƣ 
ƻƽƺƢǀơƣƽƾᄭ. IƤ ƨƽƞƹƿƣƢ, ƿƩƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ iƾ ƾǀƟjƣơƿ ƿƺ ƞ ơƩƞllƣƹƨƣ 
ƟƣƤƺƽƣ ƿƩƣ ơƺǀƽƿƾ. eƩƣ ƽƣƼǀƣƾƿ ƸƞǄ ƿƞƽƨƣƿ ƻƞƾƿ, ơǀƽƽƣƹƿ, ƺƽ Ƥǀƿǀƽƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞ-
ƿiǁƣ ƞơƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ iƾ ƢiƽƣơƿƣƢ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿǄ ƽƣƾƻƺƹƾiƟlƣ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƞƿ 
ƞơƿiƺƹ.ᇻᇶ éơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ǂƺƽƢiƹƨ ƺƤ éƽƿiơlƣèᇴᇷƞèéƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ 
éơƿ, ƿƺ Ʃƞǁƣ ƿƩƣ lƣƨƞl ƾƿƞƹƢiƹƨ ƿƺ Ƹƞkƣ ƾǀơƩ ƞ ƽƣƼǀƣƾƿ, ƺƹƣ Ƹǀƾƿ ƻƽƺǁƣ ƞƹ 
iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿ ǂƺƽƿƩǄ ƺƤ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ ᄬƞ lƣƨƞl ƿƣƽƸ ƾiƸilƞƽlǄ ƤƺƽƸǀlƞƿƣƢ iƹ ƺƿƩƣƽ ƞƢƸi-
ƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ ƾƿƞƿǀƿƣƾᄭ.ᇻᇷ 
ᇷ. Aؗؠ؜ء؜ئاإؔا؜ةؘ cب؟ؘؠؔ؞؜ءؚ
Iƹ ơƺƹƿƽƞƾƿ ƿƺ ƺƿƩƣƽ ơƺǀƹƿƽiƣƾ, iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƽǀlƣƸƞkiƹƨ iƾ 
ƹƺƿ ƾǀƟjƣơƿ ƿƺ ƾƻƣơiƤiơ ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƞl ƽǀlƣƾ. OƹlǄ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ ƤƽƺƸ aƞƽliƞƸƣƹƿ iƾ 
ƾǀƟjƣơƿ ƿƺ ơƺƸƻǀlƾƺƽǄ ƻǀƟliơ ơƺƹƾǀlƿƞƿiƺƹ.ᇻᇸ Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, iƤ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƽǀlƣ-
Ƹƞkiƹƨ ơƺƸƣƾ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƤƺƽƸ ƺƤ ƢƣlƣƨƞƿƣƢ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ, iƿ Ƹǀƾƿ ƽƣƾƻƣơƿ ƿƩƣ ƻƽiƹơi-
ƻlƣ ƺƤ lƣƨƞliƿǄ.ᇻᇹ 
ᇻᇵ BGE ᇳᇳᇺ IƟ ᇶᇹᇵ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇸ.
ᇻᇶ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇳᇶᇴᇻ.
ᇻᇷ See §èᇳᇲơ éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ kǀƽiơƩ ƺƤ ᇴᇶ MƞǄ ᇳᇻᇷᇻ, ᇳᇹᇷ.ᇴ.
ᇻᇸ éƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇶᇹ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ; éƽƿiơlƣèᇵ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl éơƿ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾǀlƿƞƿiƺƹ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ ƺƤ 
ᇳᇺ MƞƽơƩ ᇴᇲᇲᇷ ᄬCƺƹƾǀlƿƞƿiƺƹ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿ, Caéᄭ, dcè ᇳᇹᇴ.ᇲᇸᇳ; ƾƣƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ EƹƨliƾƩ ǁƣƽ-
ƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾǀlƿƞƿiƺƹ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/HdᇺB- ᇴageᄭ. 
Iƹ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽ, ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ ƹƺ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƩƣƞƽƢ Ƣǀƽiƹƨ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ Ƹƞkiƹƨ ƻƽƺơƣƾƾ, BGEèᇳᇵᇳèIèᇻᇳ, 
ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇵ.ᇳ.
ᇻᇹ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇵᇸᇺ.
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Iƹ ᇳᇻᇺᇹ, ƞƹ ƣƻiƢƣƸiơ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Ɵƞơƿƣƽiƞ “liƾƿƣƽiƞ ƸƺƹƺơǄƿƺƨƣƹƣƾ” ƣƸƣƽƨƣƢ iƹ 
dǂiƾƾ ƾƺƤƿ ơƩƣƣƾƣ ƻƽƺƢǀơƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ gƞǀƢ ᄬVacherin Mont d’Orᄭ. cƞƿƩƣƽ 
ƿƩƞƹ ƻƽƺƩiƟiƿiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƾƣlliƹƨ ƞƹƢ ƢiƾƿƽiƟǀƿiƺƹ, ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ 
iƹƤƺƽƸƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƻǀƟliơ ƞƟƺǀƿ ƻƺƾƾiƟlƣ ƩƣƞlƿƩ ƽiƾkƾ ƽƣlƞƿƣƢ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƾǀƸƻƿiƺƹ 
ƺƤ gƞơƩƣƽiƹ Mƺƹƿ Ƣ’Oƽ. dƣǁƣƹ ƻƽƺƢǀơƣƽƾ ƺƤ ƾƺƤƿ ơƩƣƣƾƣ ƟƽƺǀƨƩƿ ƞƹ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿ-
ƽƞƿiǁƣ ơlƞiƸ ᄬverwaltungsrechtliche Klageᄭ ƟƣƤƺƽƣ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ. 
eƩƣ ƻlƞiƹƿiƤƤƾ ơlƞiƸƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣǄ ƾǀƤƤƣƽƣƢ ƢƞƸƞƨƣƾ ᄬƢƽƺƻ iƹ ƾƞlƣƾᄭ ƿƩƽƺǀƨƩ 
lƣƨƞllǄ ƞƹƢ ƤƞơƿǀƞllǄ ǂƽƺƹƨ, iƹƞƢƣƼǀƞƿƣ, lƞƿƣ, ƞƹƢ iƹƞƻƻƽƺƻƽiƞƿƣ iƹƤƺƽƸƞƿiƺƹ 
ƟǄ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ.
eƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƽƣƞƾƺƹƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƞơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ éƽƿiơlƣèᇵ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl éơƿ ƺƹ dƿƞƿƣ 
LiƞƟiliƿǄᇻᇻ ƿƩƣ ƾƿƞƿƣ ơƞƹ Ɵƣ ƩƣlƢ liƞƟlƣ Ƥƺƽ ƢƞƸƞƨƣ ƞ ơiǁil ƾƣƽǁƞƹƿ ǀƹlƞǂƤǀllǄ 
ơƞǀƾƣƾ iƹ ơƞƽƽǄiƹƨ ƺǀƿ Ʃiƾ ƺƽ Ʃƣƽ ƿƞƾk. eƩƣ ơƺƹƢǀơƿ iƾ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƣƢ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ǀƹlƞǂƤǀl 
iƤ ƣiƿƩƣƽ ơƣƽƿƞiƹ lƣƨƞllǄ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿƣƢ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿƾ ƞƽƣ ǁiƺlƞƿƣƢ, Ƥƺơǀƾiƹƨ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƾǀlƿƾ 
ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƢǀơƿ ᄬErfolgsunrechtᄭ, ƺƽ iƤ iƿ iƾ ơƺƹƿƽƞƽǄ ƿƺ ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƾƿƞƿǀ-
ƿƺƽǄ lƞǂ, ƿƩǀƾ Ƥƺơǀƾiƹƨ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƢǀơƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƿƺƽƿƤƣƞƾƺƽ ᄬVerhaltensunrechtᄭ. 
Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, iƤ ƺƤƤiơiƞl Ƣǀƿiƣƾ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣ ƞ ơƣƽƿƞiƹ ơƺƹƢǀơƿ, ǂƩiơƩ iƾ ƻƣƽƤƺƽƸƣƢ iƹ ƞ 
ƻƽƺƻƣƽ Ƹƞƹƹƣƽ, ƾǀơƩ ơƺƹƢǀơƿ iƾ lƞǂƤǀl.
eƩƣ ƻlƞiƹƿiƤƤƾ ơƺǀlƢ ƹƺƿ iƹǁƺkƣ ƞƹǄ lƣƨƞllǄ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿƣƢ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿƾ ƾiƹơƣ ƻǀƽƣ 
ƞƾƾƣƿƾ ƞƽƣ, ƞƾ ƾǀơƩ, ƹƺƿ lƣƨƞllǄ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿƣƢ ƞƹƢ, ơƺƹƾƣƼǀƣƹƿlǄ, ƻǀƽƣ Ƥiƹƞƹơiƞl lƺƾƾ 
Ƣƺƣƾ ƹƺƿ ƼǀƞliƤǄ ƞƾ Erfolgsunrecht. eƩǀƾ, ƿƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƣƢ ǂƩƣƿƩƣƽ ƿƩƣ 
ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ, ƟǄ iƹƤƺƽƸiƹƨ ƞƟƺǀƿ ƻƺƾƾiƟlƣ ƩƣƞlƿƩ ƽiƾkƾ, ǁiƺlƞƿƣƢ ƾƿƞƿǀ-
ƿƺƽǄ lƞǂ. 
ᇻᇺ BGE ᇳᇳᇺ IƟ ᇶᇹᇵ.
ᇻᇻ FƣƢƣƽƞl éơƿ ƺƹ dƿƞƿƣ LiƞƟiliƿǄ ƺƤ ᇳᇶ MƞƽơƩ ᇳᇻᇷᇺ, dcèᇳᇹᇲ.ᇵᇴ.
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Iƹ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽ, ƿƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƣǃƞƸiƹƣƢ éƽƿiơlƣèᇵ EƻiƢƣƸiơƾ éơƿᇳᇲᇲ, ǂƩiơƩ ƨƺǁƣƽƹƾ 
iƹƤƺƽƸƞƿiƺƹ ƞơƿiǁiƿiƣƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ ƽƣlƞƿƣƢ ƿƺ ơƺƸƟƞƿiƹƨ iƹƤƣơ-
ƿiƺǀƾ Ƣiƾƣƞƾƣƾ. eƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƣƸƻƩƞƾiǅƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ FƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ơƞƹ ƺƹlǄ Ɵƣ 
ƩƣlƢ liƞƟlƣ iƤ ƿƩƣ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ iƹƤƺƽƸƣƢ iƹ ƞƹ ǀƹjǀƾƿiƤiƞƟlǄ ƣƽƽƺƹƣƺǀƾ Ƹƞƹƹƣƽ. 
eƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƤƺǀƹƢ ƹƺ ƾǀơƩ ƣƽƽƺƽƾ. cƞƿƩƣƽ, ƿƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ, ǂƩƣƹ iƹƤƺƽ-
Ƹiƹƨ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƩƣƞlƿƩ ƽiƾkƾ, ƢǀlǄ ƿƺƺk iƹƿƺ ƞơơƺǀƹƿ ƾƿƞƿƣ- ƺƤ- ƿƩƣ- ƞƽƿ ƾơiƣƹƿiƤiơ 
kƹƺǂlƣƢƨƣ ƞƹƢ ƸƞƢƣ Ƣiƾƿiƹơƿiƺƹƾ Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ ƢiƤƤƣƽƣƹƿ ơƩƣƣƾƣƾ ǂƩƣƽƣ ƾǀơƩ Ƣiƾ-
ƿiƹơƿiƺƹ ǂƞƾ ƞƻƻƽƺƻƽiƞƿƣ. eƩǀƾ, ƿƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƤƺǀƹƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ iƹƤƺƽƸƣƢ 
ƿƩƣ ƻǀƟliơ iƹ liƹƣ ƺƤ éƽƿiơlƣèᇵ EƻiƢƣƸiơƾ éơƿ; ƢiƢ ƹƺƿ ǁiƺlƞƿƣ ƾƿƞƿǀƿƺƽǄ lƞǂ; ƞƹƢ, 
ƞơơƺƽƢiƹƨlǄ, ƞơƿƣƢ lƞǂƤǀllǄ. eƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƽƣjƣơƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ ơlƞiƸ.
ᇴ. aإآاؘؖا؜آء آؙ Lؘؚ؜ا؜ؠؔاؘ Eثأؘؖاؔا؜آءئ: a؜ؔءآ 
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i ǂƞƾ ƞ ƾƿǀƢƣƹƿ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƿƽƞiƹiƹƨ ƻƽƺƨƽƞƸ ƞƿ ƿƩƣ CƺƹƾƣƽǁƞƿƺƽǄ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ 
FƽiƟƺǀƽƨ iƹ ƺƽƢƣƽ ƿƺ ƺƟƿƞiƹ ƿƩƣ ƹƣơƣƾƾƞƽǄ ƢiƻlƺƸƞ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƞ ƻiƞƹƺ ƿƣƞơƩƣƽ. Oƹ 
Jǀƹƣ ᇴᇸ, ᇴᇲᇲᇺ, Ʃƣ ƤƞilƣƢ Ʃiƾ Ƥiƹƞl ƣǃƞƸèᅬ ƞ ƻiƞƹƺ ƽƣơiƿƞl ƻƣƽƤƺƽƸƣƢ iƹ Ƥƽƺƹƿ ƺƤ 
ƞƹ ƞǀƢiƣƹơƣèᅬ Ƣǀƣ ƿƺ ƞ ƾƿƞƿƣ ƺƤ ƢiƾơƺƸƤƺƽƿ ƞƹƢ ƣƸƺƿiƺƹƞl Ɵlƺơkƞƨƣ.
eƩƣ ƟƺƞƽƢ ƺƤ ƣǃƞƸiƹƣƽƾ ƞllƺǂƣƢ i ƿƺ ƽƣƻƣƞƿ ƿƩƣ Ƥiƹƞl ƣǃƞƸ iƹ ơƞƸƣƽƞ, i.ƣ. 
ǂiƿƩƺǀƿ ƞǀƢiƣƹơƣ. Oƹ ᇳᇵ OơƿƺƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇲᇺ i ƻƞƾƾƣƢ ƾƞiƢ ƣǃƞƸ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ƟƺƞƽƢ ƺƤ 
ƣǃƞƸiƹƣƽƾ ƩƞƹƢƣƢ ƩiƸ ƿƩƣ ƾiƨƹƣƢ Ƹiƹǀƿƣƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƣǃƞƸ. dǀƟƾƣƼǀƣƹƿlǄ, Ʃƣ ǂƞƾ 
iƹƤƺƽƸƣƢ ƟǄ lƣƿƿƣƽ ƢƞƿƣƢ ᇳᇶ OơƿƺƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇲᇺ ƿƩƞƿ Ʃƣ ƾǀơơƣƾƾƤǀllǄ ơƺƸƻlƣƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ 
ƾƿǀƢǄ ƻƽƺƨƽƞƸ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƿƣƞơƩiƹƨ ƢiƻlƺƸƞ.
eƩƣ Ƣiƽƣơƿƺƽ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ CƺƹƾƣƽǁƞƿƺƽǄ, Ʃƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƽƣƼǀƣƾƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ ơƺƸƻƣƿƣƹƿ 
ƞƨƣƹơǄè ᅬ ƿƩƣ Diƽƣơƿiƺƹ ƺƤ EƢǀơƞƿiƺƹ, Cǀlƿǀƽƣ, ƞƹƢ dƻƺƽƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ 
FƽiƟƺǀƽƨè ᅬ ƹƺƿ ƿƺ iƾƾǀƣ ƞ ƢiƻlƺƸƞ ƾiƹơƣ i ƢiƢ ƹƺƿ ƻƣƽƤƺƽƸ ƻǀƟliơlǄ. Oƹ ᇴ 
MƞƽơƩ ᇴᇲᇲᇻ ƿƩƣ Diƽƣơƿiƺƹ ƽƣƤǀƾƣƢ ƿƺ iƾƾǀƣ ƿƩƣ ƢiƻlƺƸƞ. i’ƾ ƞƻƻƣƞl ƿƺ ƿƩƣ 
éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ FƽiƟƺǀƽƨ ǂƞƾ ƹƺƿ ƾǀơơƣƾƾƤǀl. i ơƩƞl-
lƣƹƨƣƢ ƿƩiƾ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ ƟƣƤƺƽƣ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƞƹƢ ƽƣƼǀƣƾƿƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ 
Diƽƣơƿiƺƹ Ɵƣ ƺƟliƨƞƿƣƢ ƿƺ iƾƾǀƣ ƿƩƣ ƢiƻlƺƸƞ.
eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƽƣƞƾƺƹƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ ơƺƹƢǀơƿiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƻƣƞƿ ƣǃƞƸ 
ǂiƿƩƺǀƿ ƞƹ ƞǀƢiƣƹơƣ ơƺƹƤliơƿƣƢ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ ƽƣlƣǁƞƹƿ ƾƿƞƿǀƿƺƽǄ lƞǂ. Hƣƹơƣ, ƿƩƣ 
ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞơƿ ƽƣƨƞƽƢiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƻƞƾƾiƹƨ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƻƣƞƿ ƣǃƞƸ ǂƞƾ lƣƨƞllǄ 
ᇳᇲᇲ FƣƢƣƽƞl éơƿ ƺƹ Mƣƞƾǀƽƣƾ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ HǀƸƞƹ IƹƤƣơƿiƺǀƾ Diƾƣƞƾƣƾ ƺƤ ᇳᇺ DƣơƣƸƟƣƽ ᇳᇻᇹᇲ, 
dcèᇺᇳᇺ.ᇳᇲᇳ.
ᇳᇲᇳ BGE ᇳᇵᇹ I ᇸᇻ.
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ƣƽƽƺƹƣƺǀƾ. eƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ, ƿƩǀƾ, ƣǃƞƸiƹƣƢ ǂƩƣƿƩƣƽ ƿƩƣ Diƽƣơƿiƺƹ ơƺǀlƢ lƞǂƤǀllǄ 
ƽƣǁƺkƣ ƿƩƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞơƿ ƺƽ ǂƩƣƿƩƣƽ iƹƾƿƣƞƢ i ơƺǀlƢ iƹǁƺkƣ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƿƣơ-
ƿiƺƹ ƺƤ Ʃiƾ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇻ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. 
eƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƣƸƻƩƞƾiǅƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ i ƩƞƢ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ ƿƺ Ɵƣliƣǁƣ ƿƩƞƿ 
ƿƩƣ ƽƣƾƺlǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƟƺƞƽƢ ƺƤ ƣǃƞƸiƹƣƽƾ ƿƺ ƽƣƹƺǀƹơƣ ƿƩƣ ƻǀƟliơ ƞǀƢiƣƹơƣ ǂƞƾ 
lƞǂƤǀl. FǀƽƿƩƣƽ, i ƸƞƢƣ ƞƽƽƞƹƨƣƸƣƹƿƾ ơƞǀƾƞllǄ liƹkƣƢ ƿƺ Ʃiƾ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ ƟǄ 
ƺƟƿƞiƹiƹƨ ƞ ƻƺƾƿ ƞƾ ƻiƞƹƺ ƿƣƞơƩƣƽ. FiƹƞllǄ, ƿƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ơƺƹƢǀơƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ Ɵƞlƞƹơiƹƨ 
ƿƣƾƿ Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ lƣƨƞliƿǄ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ. FƽƺƸ ƞƹ ƺǁƣƽƞll ƻƣƽƾƻƣơƿiǁƣ ƺƹ 
ƿƩƣ ƿƽƞiƹiƹƨ ƻƽƺƨƽƞƸ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ Ƥƞơƿ ƿƩƞƿ ƻiƞƹƺ ƿƣƞơƩƣƽƾ Ƣƺ ƹƺƿ Ʃƞǁƣ ƿƺ ƻƣƽ-
ƤƺƽƸ iƹ ƻǀƟliơ, ƿƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƞƿƿƣƹƢƞƹơƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻǀƟliơ Ƣǀƽiƹƨ ƿƩƣ 
Ƥiƹƞl ƣǃƞƸ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƺƤ Ƹiƹƺƽ iƸƻƺƽƿƞƹơƣ. Oƹ ƿƩƣ ƺƿƩƣƽ ƩƞƹƢ, iƿ ƣƸƻƩƞƾiǅƣƢ ƿƩƣ 
ƞƢǁƣƽƾƣ ơƺƹƾƣƼǀƣƹơƣƾ ƿƩƞƿ i ƤƞơƣƢ iƤ ƿƩƣ ƢiƻlƺƸƞ ǂƺǀlƢ ƹƺƿ Ɵƣ iƾƾǀƣƢ ᄬƽƣƻƣƿi-
ƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞ lƺƹƨ ƾƿǀƢǄ ƻƽƺƨƽƞƸ, Ƥiƹƞƹơiƞl lƺƾƾƣƾ, ƞƹƢ lƺƾƾ ƺƤ ƣƞƽƹiƹƨƾᄭ. eƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ 
ƩƣlƢ ƿƩƞƿ i’ƾ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ ƺǀƿǂƣiƨƩƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƻǀƟliơ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿ iƹ ƣƹƾǀ-
ƽiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƻƣƽ ƞƻƻliơƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ ƞƹƢ, ƞƾ ƞ ơƺƹƾƣƼǀƣƹơƣ, ƿƩƣ Diƽƣơƿiƺƹ 
ǂƞƾ ƹƺƿ ƞllƺǂƣƢ ƿƺ ƽƣǁƺkƣ ƿƩƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞơƿ.
ᇵ. aإ؜ءؖ؜أ؟ؘ آؙ Lؘؚؔ؟؜اج: Hؘؔؗئؖؔإؙ102
é ƞƹƢ C ƞƿƿƣƹƢƣƢ ƻǀƟliơ ƾơƩƺƺl iƹ ƞ ƸǀƹiơiƻƞliƿǄ iƹ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ eƩǀƽƨƞǀ 
ƞƹƢ ǂƺƽƣ IƾlƞƸiơ ƩƣƞƢƾơƞƽǁƣƾ. eƩƣ ƾơƩƺƺl ƽƣƨǀlƞƿiƺƹƾ ơƺƹƿƞiƹƣƢ ƿƩƣ Ƥƺllƺ-
ǂiƹƨ ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹ: “Students attend school neatly dressed. The trustful interac-
tion requires the attendance of school without headgear. Hence, wearing caps, 
headscarves, and sunglasses during class is forbidden.” eƩƣ ƾơƩƺƺl ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ 
ƢiƾƸiƾƾƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƼǀƣƾƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƿǂƺ ƨiƽlƾ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƣǃƣƸƻƿƣƢ ƤƽƺƸ ƾƞiƢ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿiƺƹ 
ƞƹƢ ƟƞƽƽƣƢ ƿƩƣƸ ƤƽƺƸ ǂƣƞƽiƹƨ ƩƣƞƢƾơƞƽǁƣƾ. eƩƣ éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ 
ơƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ eƩǀƽƨƞǀ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƣƢ ƿƩƣ Ɵƞƹ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƟƞƾƣƢ ƺƹ ƞƹ iƹƾǀƤƤiơiƣƹƿ lƣƨƞl 
Ɵƞƾiƾ ƞƹƢ Ƣiƾƻƽƺƻƺƽƿiƺƹƞƿƣ. Hƣƹơƣ, iƿ ƾƿƽǀơk Ƣƺǂƹ ƿƩƣ Ɵƞƹ. eƩƣ ƸǀƹiơiƻƞliƿǄ 
ơƩƞllƣƹƨƣƢ ƿƩiƾ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ ƟƣƤƺƽƣ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ.
eƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƽƣƞƾƺƹƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ ǂƣƞƽiƹƨ ƿƩƣ IƾlƞƸiơ ƩƣƞƢƾơƞƽƤ iƾ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿƣƢ 
ƟǄ éƽƿiơlƣè ᇳᇷ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ᄬFƽƣƣƢƺƸ ƺƤ ƽƣliƨiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ơƺƹƾơiƣƹơƣᄭ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƞƿ 
ƞƹǄ ƽƣƾƿƽiơƿiƺƹ ƺƹ ƤǀƹƢƞƸƣƹƿƞl ƽiƨƩƿƾ Ƹǀƾƿ Ʃƞǁƣ ƞ lƣƨƞl Ɵƞƾiƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇵᇸ I 
Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. dǀơƩ lƣƨƞl Ɵƞƾiƾ ƸƞǄ ƹƺƿ Ɵƣ unduly vague ƞƹƢ, ƾiƹơƣ Ɵƞƹƹiƹƨ 
ƩƣƞƢƾơƞƽǁƣƾ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿƣƾ ƞ severe ƽƣƾƿƽiơƿiƺƹ ƺƹ ƞ ƤǀƹƢƞƸƣƹƿƞl ƽiƨƩƿ, Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ 
iƾƾǀƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ legislator. 
ᇳᇲᇴ BGE ᇳᇵᇻ I ᇴᇺᇲ.
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eƩƣ ƾơƩƺƺl ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ ƞƾƾƣƽƿƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣǄ ǂƣƽƣ ƣƹƿiƿlƣƢ ƿƺ Ɵƞƹ ǂƣƞƽiƹƨ 
IƾlƞƸiơ ƩƣƞƢƾơƞƽǁƣƾ ƟƞƾƣƢ ǀƻƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƻǀƽƻƺƾƣ ơlƞǀƾƣƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ƞơƿ ƺƹ 
ƣlƣƸƣƹƿƞƽǄ ƾơƩƺƺlƾ. eƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƣƢ ƿƩƣƾƣ ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹƾ ƿƺ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿƣ ƹƺ 
ƾǀƤƤiơiƣƹƿ lƣƨƞl Ɵƞƾiƾ Ƥƺƽ Ɵƞƹƹiƹƨ ƩƣƞƢƾơƞƽǁƣƾ ƞƿ ƾơƩƺƺlƾ, ƹƞƸƣlǄ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ ƿƩƣ 
ƟƞơkƨƽƺǀƹƢ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƣƢiơƿƞƟiliƿǄ ƞƹƢ ƤƺƽƣƾƣƣƞƟiliƿǄ ƺƤ ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿƞl ƞơƿiƺƹ.
FǀƽƿƩƣƽ, ƿƩƣ ƾơƩƺƺl ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ ƞƾƾƣƽƿƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ, ƟƞƾƣƢ ǀƻƺƹ ƞ ƾƿƞƿǀƿƺƽǄ dele-
gation clauseèᅬ i.ƣ. ƞƹ ƞơƿ ƸƞƢƣ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ lƣƨiƾlƞƿƺƽ ᅬ, ƿƩƣ ƺƽƨƞƹiǅƞƿiƺƹƞl ƻlƞƹ-
ƹiƹƨ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƾơƩƺƺl iƾ iƹ ƿƩƣiƽ ƾơƺƻƣ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣǄ Ʃƞǁƣ, ƞơơƺƽƢiƹƨlǄ, ƿƩƣ ƽiƨƩƿ 
ƿƺ iƾƾǀƣ ƾơƩƺƺl ƽƣƨǀlƞƿiƺƹƾ. eƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƽƣƞƾƺƹƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƾơƩƺƺl ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ, 
ƟƞƾƣƢ ǀƻƺƹ ƾƞiƢ Ƣƣlƣƨƞƿiƺƹ ơlƞǀƾƣ, ƸƞǄ iƾƾǀƣ ơƣƽƿƞiƹ iƹƿƣƽƹƞl ƽǀlƣƾ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, 
iƿ ƤƺǀƹƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƞƾƾƣƽƿƣƢ Ƣƣlƣƨƞƿiƺƹ ơlƞǀƾƣ Ƣƺƣƾ ƹƺƿ ơƺƹơƣƽƹ iƹ ƞƹǄ ǂƞǄ ƿƩƣ 
ƽƣƾƿƽiơƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƤǀƹƢƞƸƣƹƿƞl ƽiƨƩƿƾ ƾǀơƩ ƞƾ ƿƩƣ ƤƽƣƣƢƺƸ ƺƤ ƽƣliƨiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ơƺƹƾ-
ơiƣƹơƣ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƞƿ, ơƺƹƾƣƼǀƣƹƿlǄ, ƿƩƣ ƣlƣƸƣƹƿƾ ƺƤ ƢƣlƣƨƞƿƣƢ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ ǂƣƽƣ ƹƺƿ 
Ƹƣƿ. eƩǀƾ, ƿƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƩƣlƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣƽƣ ǂƞƾ ƹƺ lƣƨƞl Ɵƞƾiƾ Ƥƺƽ Ɵƞƹƹiƹƨ ƩƣƞƢƾơƞƽ-
ǁƣƾ ƞƿ ƾơƩƺƺlƾ.
ᇶ. aإ؜ءؖ؜أ؟ؘ آؙ aإآأآإا؜آءؔ؟؜اج: Hآآ؟؜ؚؔءئ103
Iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩƣƢ ƿƩƣ CƺƹơƺƽƢƞƿ ƺƹ Mƣƞƾǀƽƣƾ ƿƺ CƺƸƟƞƿ 
giƺlƣƹơƣ Ƣǀƽiƹƨ dƻƺƽƿƾ Eǁƣƹƿƾ ᄬƾƺ- ơƞllƣƢ “Hƺƺliƨƞƹ- CƺƹơƺƽƢƞƿ”ᄭ ǂƩiơƩ Ʃƞƾ 
Ɵƣƣƹ iƹ Ƥƺƽơƣ iƹ ƞll ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ƾiƹơƣ ᇳᇷ NƺǁƣƸƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇲᇹ. Oƹ ᇴ FƣƟƽǀƞƽǄ ᇴᇲᇳᇴ, ƿƩƣ 
Hƺƺliƨƞƹ- CƺƹơƺƽƢƞƿ ǂƞƾ ƽƣǁiƾƣƢ. Iƿ iƸƻlƣƸƣƹƿƣƢ ƤǀƽƿƩƣƽ- ƽƣƞơƩiƹƨ Ƹƣƞƾǀƽƣƾ 
ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ ƻƣƽƾƺƹƾ iƹǁƺlǁƣƢ iƹ ǁiƺlƣƹơƣ. Iƹƿƣƽ ƞliƞ, ƿƩƣ ƽƣǁiƾƣƢ ơƺƹơƺƽƢƞƿ ƾƿiƻǀ-
lƞƿƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ
ᅬ ƣǃơlǀƾiƺƹ ƺƽƢƣƽƾ ᄬRayonverbotᄭ Ƹǀƾƿ lƞƾƿ ƞƿ lƣƞƾƿ ƺƹƣ Ǆƣƞƽ ǀƹƢƣƽ ƞƹǄ 
ƨiǁƣƹ ơiƽơǀƸƾƿƞƹơƣƾ; ƞƹƢ
ᅬ ƿƩƣ Ƣǀƽƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƻƺƽƿiƹƨ ƺƟliƨƞƿiƺƹ ᄬMeldeauflageᄭ Ƹǀƾƿ Ƹƞƹ-
ƢƞƿƺƽilǄ Ɵƣ ƢƺǀƟlƣƢ iƤ ƾǀơƩ ƺƟliƨƞƿiƺƹ iƾ ƟƽƣƞơƩƣƢ ǂiƿƩƺǀƿ ƣǃơǀƾƞƟlƣ 
ƨƽƺǀƹƢƾ.
éƨƞiƹƾƿ ƿƩƣ ƞơơƣƾƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ƺƤ éƞƽƨƞǀ ƞƹƢ Lǀơƣƽƹƣ ƿǂƺ ơƺƸƻlƞiƹƿƾ 
ǂƣƽƣ ƤilƣƢ ƟƣƤƺƽƣ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ. eƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƣǃƞƸiƹƣƢ, iƹƿƣƽ ƞliƞ, 
ƿƩƣ ƽƣǁiƾƣƢ ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹƾ ƽƣƨƞƽƢiƹƨ ƿƩƣ Ƹƣƞƾǀƽƣƾ ƸƣƹƿiƺƹƣƢ ƞƟƺǁƣ ƟǄ ǂƞǄ ƺƤ 
ƞƟƾƿƽƞơƿ jǀƢiơiƞl ƽƣǁiƣǂ. 
ᇳᇲᇵ BGE ᇳᇶᇲ I ᇴ.
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eƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƽƣƞƾƺƹƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƣǃơlǀƾiƺƹ ƺƽƢƣƽƾ ƽƣƾƿƽiơƿ ƿƩƣ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ ƤƽƣƣƢƺƸ ƺƤ 
ƸƺǁƣƸƣƹƿ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇲ II Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. dǀơƩ Ƹƣƞƾǀƽƣƾ Ƹǀƾƿèᅬ ƞƻƞƽƿ ƤƽƺƸ Ɵƣiƹƨ 
ƟƞƾƣƢ ƺƹ ƞ lƣƨƞl Ɵƞƾiƾ ƞƹƢ ƻǀƽƾǀiƹƨ ƞ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƻǀƟliơ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿèᅬ Ɵƣ propor-
tionate. FǀƽƿƩƣƽ, ƿƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƽƣƞƾƺƹƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ, ƺƹ ƺƹƣ ƩƞƹƢ, ƿƩƣ ƽƣǁiƾƣƢ ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹ 
ơƺƸƻlƣƿƣlǄ Ɵƞƽƾ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ ƤƽƺƸ iƾƾǀiƹƨ any ƣǃơlǀƾiƺƹ ƺƽƢƣƽ iƹ lƣƾƾ ƾƣǁƣƽƣ 
ơƞƾƣƾ ǂƩƣƽƣ ƺƹlǄ ƺƽƢƣƽƾ ƺƤ lƣƾƾ ƿƩƞƹ ƺƹƣ Ǆƣƞƽ ǂƺǀlƢ Ɵƣ ƻƽƺƻƺƽƿiƺƹƞƿƣ. Oƹ 
ƿƩƣ ƺƿƩƣƽ ƩƞƹƢ, ƿƩƣ ƸiƹiƸǀƸ ƿiƸƣ liƸiƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƣǃơlǀƾiƺƹ ƺƽƢƣƽ ƻƽƣǁƣƹƿƾ ƿƩƣ 
ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ ƤƽƺƸ ƞƢjǀƾƿiƹƨ ƿƩƣ Ƹƣƞƾǀƽƣƾ ƺƹ ƞ ơƞƾƣ- ƟǄ- ơƞƾƣ Ɵƞƾiƾ ƞƾ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣƢ 
ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ ƻƽƺƻƺƽƿiƺƹƞliƿǄ. eƩǀƾ, ƿƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƩƣlƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƾƻƣơƿiǁƣ 
ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹƾ ǁiƺlƞƿƣ ƿƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ ƻƽƺƻƺƽƿiƺƹƞliƿǄ.
diƸilƞƽlǄ, ƿƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ Ƽǀƣƾƿiƺƹƾ ǂƩƣƿƩƣƽ ƞ Ƣǀƻliơƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƻƺƽƿiƹƨ ƺƟli-
ƨƞƿiƺƹ iƾ ƿƩƣ lƣƞƾƿ ƽƣƾƿƽiơƿiǁƣ Ƹƣƞƾǀƽƣ ǀƹƢƣƽ ƞƹǄ ơiƽơǀƸƾƿƞƹơƣƾ. cƞƿƩƣƽ, ƿƩƣ 
ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿƣƾ ƞ ƽiƨiƢ ƞǀƿƺƸƞƿiƾƸ ƿƩƞƿ Ƣƺƣƾ ƹƺƿ lƣƞǁƣ ƞƹǄ Ƹƞƽƨiƹ ƺƤ 
Ƣiƾơƽƣƿiƺƹ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ iƹ ƿƩƣ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl ơƞƾƣƾ. eƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ơƺƹƾƣƼǀƣƹƿlǄ 
ƩƣlƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƾǀơƩ ƞǀƿƺƸƞƿiƾƸ ǁiƺlƞƿƣƾ ƿƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ ƻƽƺƻƺƽƿiƺƹƞliƿǄ. Iƿ ƽƣƾơiƹ-
ƢƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƸƣƹƿiƺƹƣƢ ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹƾ ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Hƺƺliƨƞƹ- CƺƹơƺƽƢƞƿ.
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dƣlƣơƿƣƢ BiƟliƺƨƽƞƻƩǄ
aؔاإ؜ؖ؜ؔ Eؚ؟؜, IƹƿƽƺƢǀơƿiƺƹ ƿƺ dǂiƾƾ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl Lƞǂ, kǀƽiơƩ/dƿ. Gƞllƣƹ 
ᇴᇲᇳᇸ
e؛آؠؔئ F؟ؘ؜ءؘإ/é؟ؘثؔءؘؗإ M؜ئ؜ؖ/N؜ؖآ؟ؘ eöأأؘإت؜ؘء, Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl 
Lƞǂ iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, élƻƩƣƹ ƞƞƹ Ƣƣƹ cijƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇴ 
f؟إ؜ؖ؛ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Gؘآإؚ Mü؟؟ؘإ/Fؘ؟؜ث f؛؟ؠؔءء, éllƨƣƸƣiƹƣƾ gƣƽǂƞl-
ƿǀƹƨƾƽƣơƩƿ, ᇹƿƩèƣƢiƿiƺƹ, kǀƽiơƩ/dƿ.èGƞllƣƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇸ 
cؘؚ؜ءؔ K؜ؘءؘإ/Bؘإء؛ؔإؗ cüائؖ؛ؘ/Mؔا؛؜ؔئ Kب؛ء, yƤƤƣƹƿliơƩƣƾ gƣƽƤƞƩ-
ƽƣƹƾƽƣơƩƿ, ᇴnd ƣƢiƿiƺƹ, kǀƽiơƩ/dƿ. Gƞllƣƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇷ
a؜ؘإإؘ Mآآإ/é؟ؘثؔءؗإؘ F؟üؖ؞؜ؘؚإ/g؜ءؘؖءا Mؔإاؘءؘءا, Dƽƺiƿ ƞƢƸiƹiƾ-
ƿƽƞƿiǁƣ, gƺl. I, lƣƾ ƤƺƹƢƣƸƣƹƿƾ, ᇵrd ƣƢiƿiƺƹ, Bƣƽƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇴ
e؛؜ؘإإج eؔءؤبؘإؘ؟, Mƞƹǀƣl Ƣƣ Ƣƽƺiƿ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiƤ, Gƣƹƣǁƞ/kǀƽiơƩ/Bƞƾƣl 
ᇴᇲᇳᇳ
a؜ؘإإؘ eئؖ؛ؔءءؘء, dǄƾƿƣƸƣ Ƣƣƾ éllƨƣƸƣiƹƣƹ gƣƽǂƞlƿǀƹƨƾƽƣơƩƿƾ, Bƣƽƹ ᇴᇲᇲᇺ
a؜ؘإإؘ eئؖ؛ؔءءؘء/f؟إ؜ؖ؛ k؜ؠؠؘإ؟؜/Mؔإ؞بئ Mü؟؟ؘإ, éllƨƣƸƣiƹƣƾ 
gƣƽǂƞlƿǀƹƨƾƽƣơƩƿ, ᇶƿƩ ƣƢiƿiƺƹ, Bƣƽƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇶ
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I. Lƣƨƞl dƺǀƽơƣƾ
ᇳ. H؜ئاآإ؜ؖؔ؟ Dؘةؘ؟آأؠؘءائ
The Swiss Constitution of 1874 guaranteed only a limited range of procedu-
ral rights (for example, the right to be sued at one’s home court). It should 
be noted that it also guaranteed a narrow range of substantive fundamental 
rights. However, over the course of the 20th century, the Swiss Federal Supreme 
Court developed many procedural guarantees, such as the right to be heard 
and other principles of effective legal protection.2 The legal basis which the 
court relied on to develop these rights was the equal protection clause.3 
Shortcomings of legal procedure at that time typically involved a deficit 
in independent judicial control. Many Swiss cantonal and federal rules only 
granted limited access to courts in administrative matters. The typical legal 
recourse involved an appeal to the hierarchically higher administrative body, 
including the Federal Council or the executive of the cantons.4 Appeals to 
the Swiss Federal Supreme Court were possible in some cases and excluded 
or reduced to a review with very limited scrutiny in others. The Swiss sys-
tem which did not permit access to independent and full judicial review in 
administrative matters was incompatible with the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR) as far as its protection of “civil rights” was concerned. 
Such civil rights included matters that were considered “administrative” 
under Swiss law such as disputes concerning bar exams; the withdrawal of a 
professional licence; disputes on the use of public grounds by private parties 
for economic aims; or claims for damages and satisfaction based on state liabi-
lity. Switzerland therefore had to extend judicial control. Such developments, 
2 cؘؚ؜ءؔ K؜ؘءؘإ/Bؘإء؛ؔإؗ cüائؖ؛ؘ/Mؔا؛؜ؔئ Kب؛ء, Öffentliches Verfahrensrecht, 
2nd ƣƢiƿiƺƹ, kǀƽiơƩ/dƿ.èGƞllƣƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇷ, ƹ.èᇵᇷ.
3 f؟إ؜ؖ؛ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Gؘآإؚ Mü؟؟ؘإ/Fؘ؟؜ث f؛؟ؠؔءء, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, 
7thèƣƢiƿiƺƹ, kǀƽiơƩ/dƿ.èGƞllƣƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇸ, ƹ.èᇷᇹᇸ; BGEèᇳᇵᇶèIèᇴᇵ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇻ.ᇳ.
4 cؘءé c؛؜ءآت/Hؘ؜ءإ؜ؖ؛ Kآ؟؟ؘإ/C؛إ؜ئا؜ءؔ K؜ئئ/Dؔء؜ؘ؟ؔ e؛بإء؛ؘإإ/Dؘء؜ئؘ 
Bإü؛؟- Mآئؘإ, yƤƤƣƹƿliơƩƣƾ aƽƺǅƣƾƾƽƣơƩƿ, GƽǀƹƢlƞƨƣƹ ǀƹƢ BǀƹƢƣƾƽƣơƩƿƾƻƤlƣƨƣ, ᇵrd edi-
ƿiƺƹ, Bƞƾƣlèᇴᇲᇳᇶ, ƹ.èᇶᇳᇴ.
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among other factors, led to the framework of the current Swiss Constitution 
and to a reform of the Swiss judicial process.ᇷ
ᇴ. Cآءئا؜ابا؜آءؔ؟ Fإؔؠؘتآإ؞
The Swiss Constitutionᇸ dedicates three Articles to the codification of proce-
Ƣǀƽƞl ƽiƨƩƿƾ: éƽƿiơlƣƾèᇴᇻ, ᇴᇻƞ, ƞƹƢ ᇵᇲ. éƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇴᇻ ƞƹƢ ᇵᇲ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ơƺƹơƣƽƹ 
rights within ƞ ơƣƽƿƞiƹ ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ ƞƹƢ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇴᇻƞ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƿƩƞƿ ǂƞƾ iƹƿƽƺ-
duced later on and has been in force since 1 January 2007 stipulates a right to 
(judicial) proceedings. Together, these provisions are the cornerstone of legal 
protection of due process in Switzerland. They are part of the framework of 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Swiss Constitution. 
éƽƿiơlƣ ᇴᇻ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƾƣƿƾ ƺǀƿ ƿƩƣ ƨƣƹƣƽƞl ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƞl ƨǀƞƽƞƹƿƣƣƾ ǂƩiơƩ 
apply in Switzerland: 
“Every person has the right to equal and fair treatment in judicial and administra-
tive proceedings and to have their case decided within a reasonable time.”
These guarantees apply in any proceedings, whether they are administra-
tive or in court, concerning civil, criminal, constitutional, or administrative 
Ƹƞƿƿƣƽƾ. éƽƿiơlƣ ᇴᇻ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƞlƾƺ ƣǃƻliơiƿlǄ ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩƣƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣƾƣ ƻƽƺơƣ-
dural guarantees encompass fundamental rights such as the right be heard 
(II) or the right to legal aid (III). It also includes the term “fair treatment” that 
allows the courts to further develop procedural rights.
Article 30 Constitution requires that specific additional guarantees must 
be met in judicial proceedings. According to this provision, a court must be 
legally constituted, competent, independent, and impartial. Its hearings must 
be open to the public and judgements shall be made public7.
éƽƿiơlƣ ᇴᇻƞ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƾƣƿƾ ƺǀƿ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƢiƿiƺƹƾ Ƥƺƽ ƞơơƣƾƾ ƿƺ ơƺǀƽƿ: 
ᇷ c؛؜ءآت ƣƿ ƞl., ƹ.èᇶᇳᇻ; ƾƣƣ ƞlƾƺ e؛آؠؔئ F؟ؘ؜ءؘإ/é؟ؘثؔءؘؗإ M؜ئ؜ؖ/N؜ؖآ؟ؘ eöأأؘإت؜ؘء, 
Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl Lƞǂ iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, élƻƩƣƹ ƞƞƹ Ƣƣƹ cijƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇴ, ƻ.èᇳᇲᇹ.
ᇸ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ᇳᇺ éƻƽil ᇳᇻᇻᇻ, dc ᇳᇲᇳ; ƾƣƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ EƹƨliƾƩ 
ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/MᇺfJ- dᇵᇸᇻᄭ.
7 The law may restrict this guarantee and does particularly so in administrative matters. 
Hence, parties requesting hearings typically rely on Articleèᇸ ECHc.
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“In a legal dispute, every person has the right to have their case determined by a 
judicial authority. The Confederation and the Cantons may by law preclude the de-
termination by the courts of certain exceptional categories of case.” 
The term “legal dispute” must be defined by relevant procedural law and 
constitutional practice. Only the law itself may restrict access to court. The 
Constitution establishes that this may only be done in exceptional circum-
ƾƿƞƹơƣƾ. éƽƿiơlƣ ᇴᇻƞ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ǂƞƾ ơlƣƞƽlǄ iƹƾƻiƽƣƢ ƟǄ éƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇻèIg ƺƤ ƿƩƣ 
GƣƽƸƞƹ Grundgesetz (Rechtsweggarantie).8
The Constitution remains silent on the question of the scope of judicial 
ƽƣǁiƣǂ. éƽƿiơlƣèᇴᇻƞ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ iƾ ƨƣƹƣƽƞllǄ ǀƹƢƣƽƾƿƺƺƢ ƞƾ ƨǀƞƽƞƹƿƣƣiƹƨ ƺƹlǄ 
a single, first instance review of the facts and of the law by a court. The right 
to appeal, especially the right to appeal to the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, 
ơƞƹƹƺƿ Ɵƣ ƢƣƢǀơƣƢ ƤƽƺƸ éƽƿiơlƣè ᇴᇻƞ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƿƩiƾ ƽiƨƩƿ iƾ 
often guaranteed by more specific provisions of the Constitution such as the 
ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ ƞƻƻƣƞl iƹ ƻƣƹƞl Ƹƞƿƿƣƽƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇵᇴ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ ƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƨƣƹƣƽƞl ᄬƟǀƿ 
ƹƺƿ ǀƹiǁƣƽƾƞlᄭ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ ƞơơƣƾƾ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇳᇻᇳ 
Constitution). It is also unequivocal that an (administrative) court may not 
review questions of administrative discretion;ᇻ this is not a matter that comes 
ǀƹƢƣƽ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇴᇻƞ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ’ƾ ƨǀƞƽƞƹƿƣƣ ƺƤ ƞ ƽƣǁiƣǂ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Ƥƞơƿƾ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ.
ᇵ. Fؘؘؗإؔ؟ Aؖا آء Aؗؠ؜ء؜ئاإؔا؜ةؘ aإآؘؖؗبإؘ 
ؔءؗ Cؔءاآءؔ؟ Lؔتئ
Specific regulation on administrative procedure is laid down in federal and 
cantonal legislation. The Administrative Procedure Act10 is relevant for admi-
nistrative decisions of the federal authorities. It is also relevant in part for the 
Swiss Federal Administrative Court. There are also acts on the Swiss Federal 
Administrative Court11 and the Swiss Federal Supreme Court.12 
8 éƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇻèIg GƽǀƹƢƨƣƾƣƿǅ ƽƣƞƢƾ, iƹ iƿƾ EƹƨliƾƩ ƿƽƞƹƾlƞƿiƺƹ, ƞƾ Ƥƺllƺǂƾ: “Should any per-
son’s rights be violated by public authority, he may have recourse to the courts. If no other 
jurisdiction has been established, recourse shall be to the ordinary courts. […].”
ᇻ c؛؜ءآت ƣƿ ƞl., ƹ.èᇳᇳᇴᇲ.
10 FƣƢƣƽƞl éơƿ ƺƹ éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ ƺƤ ᇴᇲ DƣơƣƸƟƣƽ ᇳᇻᇸᇺ, dcèᇳᇹᇴ.ᇲᇴᇳ.
11 FƣƢƣƽƞl éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Cƺǀƽƿ éơƿ ƺƤ ᇳᇹ Jǀƹƣ ᇴᇲᇲᇷ, dcèᇳᇹᇵ.ᇵᇴ.
12 FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ éơƿ ƺƤ ᇳᇹ Jǀƹƣ ᇴᇲᇲᇷ, dcèᇳᇹᇵ.ᇳᇳᇲ.
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The Swiss cantons have their own codes of administrative procedure. These 
codes are applicable not only to cantonal acts based on cantonal law but also 
to cantonal acts which apply federal law (or which apply both cantonal and 
federal law). Many federal laws are implemented by the cantons (e.g. spa-
tial planning, traffic safety, migration). Although the cantons are not legally 
required to adhere to definitions in federal law such as the definition of an 
administrative act (or the consequences for legal protection that follow from 
the federal approach), there are no noticeable definitional differences of an 
administrative act in cantonal law. Hence, the definition of administrative 
acts is virtually the same in both federal and cantonal procedures. In many 
other aspects, federal and cantonal acts on administrative procedure are 
quite likewise.
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II.  aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƞl ciƨƩƿƾ ƞƹƢ 
Principles
ᇳ. Aؗؠ؜ء؜ئاإؔا؜ةؘ Aؖا؜آء
In Switzerland, legal protection from administrative action is traditionally lin-
ked to the nature of the administrative action. Administrative action carried 
out in the form of administrative decisions, also called rulings (Verfügungen, 
decisions, decisioni), typically trigger legal protection, either from the admi-
nistration or the courts, or sometimes from both.13 fƹƢƣƽ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl lƞǂ, ƞƹ 
administrative decision must be notified to the parties in writing. It “must 
state the grounds on which [it is] based and contain instructions on legal reme-
dies” ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇵᇷ I éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿᄭ.
This leads to the question of what kind of administrative action must be clo-
thed in the form of an administrative decision. The answer is that administ-
rative decisions must be issued where the administration’s actions determine 
the rights and obligations of private individuals. This was explained in the 
chapter on Administrative Law.14 
éƽƿiơlƣè ᇷ éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿ iƾ ƿƩƣ ƽƣlƣǁƞƹƿ ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ 
definition of administrative decisions. This Article also specifies that enforce-
ment measures, interim orders, decisions on objections, appeal decisions etc. 
fall under the scope of this clause. It may be that an administrative decision is 
simply declaratory, clarifying the extent, existence, or non- existence of pub-
lic law rights or obligations (e.g. confirming that a certain business practice 
is within the boundaries of the laws on environmental protection). Such a 
declaratory ruling must be issued if the applicant has an interest that is 
worthy of protection.ᇳᇷ
The link between administrative decisions and legal protection for indivi-
Ƣǀƞlƾ illǀƾƿƽƞƿƣƾ ǂƩǄ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ƻƞƽƿiƣƾ ƞƽƣ lƺƺkiƹƨ Ƥƺƽèᅬ ƺƽ iƹ ƿƩƣ ǂƺƽƢƾ ƺƤ ƺƹƣ 
13 K؜ؘءؘإ/cüائؖ؛ؘ/Kب؛ء, ƹ.èᇳᇴᇶᇷ; ƾƣƣ F؟ؘ؜ءؘإ/M؜ئ؜ؖ/eöأأؘإت؜ؘء, ƻ.èᇴᇺᇶ.
14 See pp. 204.
ᇳᇷ dƣƣ éƽƿiơlƣèᇴᇷèII éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿ.
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scholar, “hunting for”ᇳᇸè ᅬ ƿƩiƾ ƾƻƣơiƤiơ ƤƺƽƸ ƺƤ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞơƿiƺƹ. OƿƩƣƽ 
types of state action not clothed in the form administrative decisions are real 
acts (Realakte, actes matériels, atti materiali). They encompass acts such as 
teaching in schools, treatments in hospitals, police action, public informa-
tion etc. Legal protection against such acts was traditionally weak. People 
could rely on state liability claims but this presented disadvantages.17 Thus, 
ƿƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl lƣƨiƾlƞƿƺƽ iƹƿƽƺƢǀơƣƢ éƽƿiơlƣè ᇴᇷƞ éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿ 
in order to improve legal protection: this provision establishes that everyone 
with an “interest worthy of protection”18 may require that an administrative 
decision is taken on real acts.
eƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ƞƽƣ ƹƺƿ ƟƺǀƹƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƹƣǂ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇴᇷƞ éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ 
Procedure Act within their own domain. In practice, cantons have taken a 
variety of responses to the introduction of this Article. In some cases, they 
have copied the provision; in others they have either opted to enact their own 
independent solutions (such as allowing for a direct appeal against real acts) 
or made no change at all. It is disputed whether the latter is still permissible 
ǀƹƢƣƽ éƽƿiơlƣèᇴᇻƞ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ: ƿƩiƾ ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹ ƨǀƞƽƞƹƿƣƣƾ jǀƢiơiƞl ƻƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ 
in any legal dispute and arguably, in those cantons which have still intro-
duced no change, there is currently only limited legal protection available 
against real acts. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court has not yet made a ruling 
on this issue.
ᇴ. c؜ؚ؛ا اآ ؘؕ Hؘؔإؗ
As explained above, when administrative bodies act through an administra-
tive decision, a number of procedural rights are triggered.ᇳᇻ The most import-
ant guarantee is the right to be heard.20 It applies in administrative and court 
proceedings.
ᇳᇸ dؘإؚ؜آ G؜ؔؖآؠ؜ء؜, gƺƸ „JƞƨƢƸƞơƩƣƹ ƞǀƤ Ƣiƣ gƣƽƤüƨǀƹƨ“è ᅬ Eiƹ DiƾkǀƾƾiƺƹƾƟƣiƿƽƞƨ, 
dơƩǂƣiǅƣƽiƾơƩƣƾ kƣƹƿƽƞlƟlƞƿƿ Ƥüƽ dƿƞƞƿƾ- ǀƹƢ gƣƽǂƞlƿǀƹƨƾƽƣơƩƿ ᇳᇻᇻᇵ, ƻ.èᇴᇵᇹ, ƻ. ᇴᇵᇻ.
17 f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƻ.èᇵᇲᇹ.
18 dƣƣ BGEèᇳᇴᇳèIèᇺᇹ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇳƟ.
ᇳᇻ For simplicity, the following quotations only contain constitutional federal law. The 
legal situation in the cantons is very similar, partly because of the compulsory nature of 
constitutional law, partly because of the example set out by federal law.
20 F؟ؘ؜ءؘإ/M؜ئ؜ؖ/eöأأؘإت؜ؘء, ƻ.èᇴᇷᇷ. 
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The right to be heard encompasses the right to access relevant documents, 
the possibility to propose witnesses and other means of evidence, and the 
right to be informed of the possible administrative decision beforehand etc. As 
mentioned before, the right to be heard is granted by the Swiss Constitution. 
Procedural law and court practice further concretize the right in specific situ-
ations, as well as providing for restrictions on the right in cases which involve 
relevant third party interests (e.g. business secrets) or state interests (e.g. state 
security). The imposition of such restrictions often necessitates the striking of 
a fair balance between differing interests. If a restriction is necessary, courts 
will try to summarize the content of the document for the relevant party in 
order to allow a fair discussion on the relevant facts of the case. The court 
iƿƾƣlƤ ǀƾǀƞllǄ Ʃƞƾ ƞơơƣƾƾ ƿƺ ƞll ƢƺơǀƸƣƹƿƾèᅬ ơƞƾƣƾ ǂƩƣƽƣ ƢƺơǀƸƣƹƿƾ Ʃƞǁƣ ƹƺƿ 
been released to the courts are extremely rare.21
Although access to documents is probably the most important aspect of the 
right to be heard, it should be noted that the scope of this right goes much 
further. The right may also be violated if relevant evidence is rejected by the 
court, for example the refusal to hear witnesses (although note that witness 
hearings are relatively rare in administrative cases) or the refusal to admit 
expert evidence. The court must also effectively take the private parties’ 
arguments into account. If a decision has already been taken before conside-
ring the parties’ arguments, the right to be heard is clearly violated. Further, 
only when the authorities give oral or written reasons for their decisions can 
the person concerned determine whether his or her argument has been heard 
or taken into account. In the authority’s decision, it must also deal with the 
private parties’ arguments, although this may be done briefly. The reason for 
the decision must also be sufficiently clear in order to allow an appeal. 
The right to be heard also demands that the administrative process is suf-
ficiently transparent. The authority must make it very clear when it is acting 
through the form of an administrative act. This means that the private par-
ties know when the process has ended; and if no administrative act has been 
issued they will also know that the process is still ongoing. This obligation 
goes hand in hand with the duty of the authority to be transparent about the 
21 A notorious example involved constructions plans on nuclear weapons that the Federal 
Council, i.e. the federal government, ordered to be destroyed during ongoing criminal 
proceedings; see the investigation of the Swiss Parliament (Fall Tinner, Rechtmässigkeit 
Ƣƣƽ BƣƾơƩlüƾƾƣ Ƣƣƾ BǀƹƢƣƾƽƞƿƾ ǀƹƢ kǂƣơkƸäƾƾiƨkƣiƿ ƾƣiƹƣƽ FüƩƽǀƹƨ, BƣƽiơƩƿ Ƣƣƽ 
GƣƾơƩäƤƿƾƻƽüƤǀƹƨƾƢƣlƣƨƞƿiƺƹ Ƣƣƽ EiƢƨƣƹöƾƾiƾơƩƣƹ cäƿƣ ǁƺƸ ᇳᇻ.è Jƞƹǀƞƽ ᇴᇲᇲᇻ [FƣƢƣƽƞl 
Gƞǅƣƿƿƣ Nƺ ᇴᇹ ƺƤ ᇳᇻ JƞƹǀƞƽǄ ᇴᇲᇲᇻ, ƻ. ᇷᇲᇲᇹ]ᄭ.
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process and the possible measures it intends to use. The authority is not per-
mitted to be unduly vague about its actions nor may it “surprise” the private 
parties with the procedure it follows. The latter point is illustrated by a recent 
decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court: The local authorities had invited 
individuals who had applied to be naturalised to an informal “get- to- know” 
session. They had not made it clear that they planned to test the applicants 
on their knowledge of Swiss culture, history, and more at this meeting. The 
Federal Supreme Court considered that although it is acceptable to expect 
naturalization applicants to have a basic knowledge of Switzerland, it is not 
acceptable to test that knowledge without first giving them proper notice.22 
This case also shows that the right to be heard is a flexible instrument that the 
courts can utilise to intervene against any form of administrative process that 
does not appear fair.
ᇵ. c؜ؚ؛ا اآ ؔ Dؘؖ؜ئ؜آء h؜ا؛؜ء cؘؔئآءؔؕ؟ؘ e؜ؠؘ
A fair process also includes the right to have a decision taken within a reason-
ƞƟlƣ ƿiƸƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇴᇻ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. IƤ ƿƩƣ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿǄ Ƣƺƣƾ ƹƺƿ ƞơƿ ǂiƿƩiƹ ƞ ƽƣƞ-
sonable time, an appeal may be filed at any point. The reasonableness must 
be determined in light of all circumstances of the case. The authority may 
consider the complexity of the case, the urgency of the matter, and the beha-
viour of the parties. However, any internal issues of the relevant authority, i.e. 
shortage of personell, are certainly not valid grounds for delay.
ᇶ. c؜ؚ؛ا اآ Lؘؚؔ؟ A؜ؗ ؔءؗ اآ Cآبءئؘ؟
A last important aspect of the overall fairness of the procedure is the right 
to legal aid.23 The right to legal aid and to the assistance of a legal counsel if 
ƹƣơƣƾƾƞƽǄ iƾ ơlƣƞƽlǄ ƨǀƞƽƞƹƿƣƣƢ ƟǄ éƽƿiơlƣèᇴᇻ III Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ: 
“Any person who does not have sufficient means has the right to free legal advice 
and assistance unless their case appears to have no prospect of success. If it is 
22 BGE ᇳᇶᇲ I ᇻᇻ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹƾ ᇴ ƞƹƢ ᇵ.
23 F؟ؘ؜ءؘإ/M؜ئ؜ؖ/eöأأؘإت؜ؘء, ƻ.èᇴᇷᇸ.
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necessary in order to safeguard their rights, they also have the right to free legal 
representation.” 
The aid can only be granted if a reasonable person would consider the case 
to have a sufficient chance of success. The need for legal counsel depends 
on the complexity of the matter and the abilities of the private party: if that 
person may represent him or herself without great difficulties before the rele-
vant authority, the request for free legal representation will be denied. If the 
parties are covering the costs of legal representation themselves, it is possible 
to be represented. However, there is no obligation to employ a lawyer or ano-
ƿƩƣƽ ƾƻƣơiƞliƾƿ. GƣƹƣƽƞllǄ, ƿƩƣƽƣ ƞƽƣ ƹƺ ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣƾ iƹ dǂiƾƾ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ 
law in which legal representation is compulsory. There are very few excep-
tions, where the respective authority may order that the parties must appoint 
ƺƹƣ ƺƽ Ƹƺƽƣ ƽƣƻƽƣƾƣƹƿƞƿiǁƣƾ ᄬƣ.ƨ. éƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇳƞ éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿᄭ. 
In cases involving administrative and constitutional law, parties may (even 
before the Swiss Federal Supreme Court) be represented by anybody with 
ơƞƻƞơiƿǄ ƿƺèƞơƿ.
ᇷ. c؜ؚ؛ا اآ Aأأؘؔ؟
As previously discussed,24 the form of an administrative decision implies 
that there is a legal remedy available against that decision. The administ-
rative decision must contain instructions on the available legal remedies. 
DƣƻƣƹƢiƹƨ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƽƣlƣǁƞƹƿ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ, ƿƩƣ ƞƻƻƣƞl ƸƞǄ ƨƺ 
directly to a court or instead first to a higher administrative authority and 
then to a court. Exceptions from legal recourse must be clearly stated in the 
law and are restricted to exceptional cases. In practice, these exceptions con-
cern highly political matters, for example the issuing of a permit to build a 
ƹǀơlƣƞƽ ƻƺǂƣƽ ƾƿƞƿiƺƹ ƺƽ Ƹƞƿƿƣƽƾ ƺƤ ƹƞƿiƺƹƞl ƾƣơǀƽiƿǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇵᇴ I liƿ. ƞ ƞƹƢ ƣ 
Administrative Court Act). Some other exceptions concern technical matters 
or matters that seem little suited for court decisions such as financial bonuses 
Ƥƺƽ ơiǁil ƾƣƽǁƞƹƿƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇵᇴ I liƿ.è ơ éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ Cƺǀƽƿ éơƿᄭ. Oǁƣƽƞll, ƿƩƣ 
exceptions are narrowly circumscribed by the legislator, as demanded by the 
Swiss Constitution. 
24 See pp. ᇴᇴᇷ.
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Matters are more complicated if third parties intervene. Whether they 
are granted a right to appeal largely depends on the way the term “party” is 
defined. Any party to the procedure may launch an appeal (and has the right to 
participate in the proceedings from the very beginning). The Administrative 
Procedure Act defines parties, i.e. the holders of the procedural rights, in 
terms of their material interest in participating: “Parties are persons whose 
rights or obligations are intended to be affected by the ruling.”ᇴᇷ A similar wor-
ding is used for the definition of locus standi in an appeal. The right to appeal 
is granted to anyone that is “specifically affected by the contested ruling” and 
“has an interest that is worthy of protection in the revocation or amendment of 
the ruling” ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇶᇺ I éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿᄭ. aƞƽƿiơiƻƞƿiƺƹ iƹ ƿƩƣ 
first- instance proceedings is generally a requirement for a party to possess 
the legal standing to lodge an appeal. Typical third parties are neighbours 
ƞƹƢèᅬ Ƹƺƽƣ ƽƣƾƿƽiơƿƣƢèᅬ ơƺƸƻƣƿiƿƺƽƾ.
ᇸ. c؜ؚ؛ا اآ C؛ؔ؟؟ؘءؘؚ Lؘؚ؜ئ؟ؔا؜آء
Most legislation can be challenged in a concrete case before a court (or before 
an administrative body). A court will then proceed to conduct a two- tier 
review. First, it will examine whether the normative basis is legal (vorfra-
geweise, inzidente, konkrete Normenkontrolle). If this test is met, the court 
further examines whether the law was applied correctly.ᇴᇸ
éƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇻᇲ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƹƺƿiơƣƞƟlǄ ƻƽƣǁƣƹƿƾ jǀƢiơiƞl ƽƣǁiƣǂ ƺƤ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ, 
requiring that federal laws be applied even in the case that the court finds the 
law unconstitutional.
A direct challenge of legislation (abstrakte, direkte Normenkontrolle) is pos-
sible where cantonal laws and ordinances are at issue. The latter includes inter-
nal normative acts (Verwaltungsverordnungen) if these affect private parties 
and their review proves to be impossible or impractical in a concrete case.27 
The cases that challenge cantonal laws are typically decided directly by the 
Swiss Federal Supreme Court if there is no legal remedy at the cantonal level. 
The Swiss Federal Supreme Court may quash cantonal laws, thus rendering 
them fully or partially invalid. Even if the court does not invalidate cantonal 
ᇴᇷ Articleèᇸ Administrative Procedure Act also states that “other persons, organizations or 
authorities who have a legal remedy against the ruling” are parties.
ᇴᇸ c؛؜ءآت ƣƿ ƞl., ƹ.èᇹᇲᇹ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ.
27 BGE ᇳᇴᇺ I ᇳᇸᇹ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ᇶ.ᇵ; BGEèᇳᇴᇴèIèᇶᇶ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹèᇴƞ. 
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legislation, it may give important guidelines for the cantonal authorities how 
to apply the law in order to stay within the constitutional boundaries. This 
was e.g. the case for police legislation from Zurich. Cantonal constitutions 
are not subjet to judicial control as they must be approved in a procedure by 
ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ aƞƽliƞƸƣƹƿ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇷᇳ II ƞƹƢ ᇳᇹᇴ II Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ.28 There is no direct 
challenge against federal laws and ordinances.
The legal standing for challenging cantonal legislation exists in a far broa-
der manner than in cases concerning administrative decisions. A person may 
ơƩƞllƣƹƨƣ lƣƨiƾlƞƿiƺƹ iƤ ƾƩƣ ƺƽ Ʃƣ ơƞƹ ơlƞiƸ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ ƞ ƻƺƾƾiƟiliƿǄèᅬ ƣǁƣƹ iƤ ƞ 
ƽƣƸƺƿƣ ƺƹƣèᅬ ƿƩƞƿ ƾƩƣ ƺƽ Ʃƣ ǂill Ɵƣ ƞƤƤƣơƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƞơƿ ᄬvirtuelles Betroffensein).ᇴᇻ 
An appeal against legislation itself does not preclude an individual from later 
invoking a legal remedy against an individual administrative decision, which 
applies the law. In this respect, a cantonal law may be challenged twice: first 
in abstract terms regarding how the act could be applied and later regarding 
how the act was actually applied in a concrete case.
28 K؜ؘءؘإ/cüائؖ؛ؘ/Kب؛ء, ƹ.èᇳᇹᇺᇲ.
ᇴᇻ K؜ؘءؘإ/cüائؖ؛ؘ/Kب؛ء, ƹ.èᇳᇹᇶᇲ. 
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III. Iƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl FƽƞƸƣǂƺƽk
ᇳ. Aؗؠ؜ء؜ئاإؔا؜ةؘ Aبا؛آإ؜ا؜ؘئ
The administrative authorities themselves play a vital role in providing effec-
tive legal protection in administrative law. As was briefly explained above,30 
before the introduction of the current Swiss Constitution often only hierarchi-
cally higher administrative bodies were competent to grant legal protection 
against action taken by bodies lower in rank. This was problematic regarding 
the fact that these superior bodies were not institutionally independent. 
However, it is important not to underestimate the level of protection these 
bodies offered. First, these bodies, often affiliated with the office of Justice of 
the canton or at the very least staffed with qualified lawyers, developed high 
standards of judicial protection. Secondly, the superior administrative bodies 
are usually well aware of the daily work of the lower units, hence strengt-
hening administrative oversight. Finally, administrative control within the 
public administration has the practical advantage of allowing full scrutiny: 
whereas courts typically do not review questions of administrative discre-
tion, supervisory administrative bodies show less if any restraint.31 
The Swiss cantons also execute a substantial amount of federal law: the 
typical legal recourse against such action first involves going to the hierar-
chically higher administrative bodies. This can potentially encompass up to 
three instances, including a review by the cantonal executive.32 Following this, 
the applicant may turn to the cantonal administrative courts. These courts 
Ƹǀƾƿ ǀƻƩƺlƢ éƽƿiơlƣè ᇴᇻƞ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ Ƹƣƞƹiƹƨ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣǄ Ƹǀƾƿ ƞƿ lƣƞƾƿ ơƺƹ-
duct a full review of questions of law and facts. After a review by the cantonal 
administrative courts, most cases can be taken to the Swiss Federal Supreme 
Court (Bundesgericht, Tribunal fédéral, Tribunale federale). The Swiss Federal 
Supreme Court typically only reviews questions of law.33
30 See pp. 221.
31 K؜ؘءؘإ/cüائؖ؛ؘ/Kب؛ء, ƹ.èᇳᇵ.
32 K؜ؘءؘإ/cüائؖ؛ؘ/Kب؛ء, ƹ.èᇶᇴ.
33 See the grounds for appeal in Articlesèᇻᇷ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ. Federal Supreme Court Act. 
Felix Uhlmann: Administrative Procedure 233
Administrative acts of the federal administration can be taken to the 
Swiss Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht, Tribunal 
administratif fédéral, Tribunale administrativo federale). Judicial control by 
a higher administrative body is the exception rather than the rule for action 
taken in the federal system. However, it does have some practical signifi-
cance in areas that are excluded from judicial protection such as measures 
to safeguard internal security; in these cases, control may be partly exer-
cised by the Swiss Federal Council. According to existing legislation, the 
Federal Administrative Court reviews questions of law, facts, and adminis-
trative discretion. However, judicial practice over time has led to the courts 
typically exercising some restraint in the latter area; part of the rationale 
here is that cases involving administrative discretion often require specia-
lised technical understanding, or knowledge of the local circumstances or 
subjective factors (for example, this may be the case for administrative deci-
sions regarding exams).34 As a general rule, decisions of the Swiss Federal 
Administrative Court may be challenged before the Swiss Federal Supreme 
Court. However, some subject matter areas such as cases on immigration and 
asylum, exams, and subsidies are fully or partially excluded from Federal 
dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƽƣǁiƣǂ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇺᇵ liƿ.è ơ ƞƹƢ ƿ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ éơƿᄭ, 
hence rendering the Federal Administrative Court the court of last national 
instance.
ᇴ. Cآبإائ
As highlighted above, judicial control by the courts is a constitutional guaran-
ƿƣƣ ǀƹƢƣƽ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇴᇻƞ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ. Hƣƹơƣ, Ƹƺƾƿ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞơƿƾ ƸƞǄ Ɵƣ 
challenged before an administrative court directly (like the acts of the federal 
administration) or indirectly via recourse to higher administrative bodies (e.g. 
acts of the cantonal administration).ᇵᇷ The law may only “preclude the deter-
mination by the courts of certain exceptional categories of case” ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇴᇻƞ 
Constitution). 
The most important restriction on judicial control in Switzerland is not one 
ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƣǁiƺǀƾlǄ ƺǀƿliƹƣƢ ƣǃơƣƻƿiƺƹƾ; iƿ iƾ éƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇻᇲ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ. éơơƺƽƢiƹƨ 
to that provision, the “Federal Supreme Court and the other judicial authorities 
apply the federal acts and international law”. As a consequence of this provi-
sion, the constitutional review of federal laws is not permitted, or more 
34 Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇶᇶᇶ.
ᇵᇷ See, for an overview, F؟ؘ؜ءؘإ/M؜ئ؜ؖ/eöأأؘإت؜ؘء, ƻ.èᇳᇳᇲ.
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Figure 1: Appeal System before Cantonal (State) and Federal Authoritiesᇵᇸ
precisely, Swiss courts must apply federal laws even if they are considered 
to be unconstitutional.37 Judicial practice has carved out some exceptions to 
court abstinence, such as in the case of federal laws, which violate the ECHR. 
The Swiss Federal Supreme Court will not apply a federal law in conflict with 
the ECHR. Still, a substantial part of federal legislation is not subject to court 
nullification in the case of a violation of the Constitution. Swiss cantons, e.g., 
cannot sue the federal government for overstepping its competences if federal 
action is based on federal law.
eƩƣ ƽƞƿiƺƹƞlƣ ƟƣƩiƹƢ éƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇻᇲ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ iƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ lƞƾƿ ǂƺƽƢ ƺƹ Ƽǀƣƾ-
tions of constitutionality should not be given to a court but to the legislator 
itself, as this is the authority with the highest degree of democratic legitima-
tion. The federal legislator is not above the Constitution but above constituti-
onal control; it is officially bound by the Constitution and must respect it. This 
means that the federal Parliament itself must decide upon questions of the 
ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞliƿǄ ƺƤ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl lƞǂƾèᅬ ǂƩiơƩ iƿ ƽƣƨǀlƞƽlǄ Ƣƺƣƾ, ƾǀƻƻƺƽƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ 
ᇵᇸ f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƻ.èᇵᇳᇵ.
37 K؜ؘءؘإ/cüائؖ؛ؘ/Kب؛ء, ƹ.èᇳᇹᇸᇵ.
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ƣǃƻƣƽƿ ƺƻiƹiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl DƣƻƞƽƿƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ Jǀƾƿiơƣ. dƣǁƣƽƞl ƞƿƿƣƸƻƿƾ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ 
dǂiƾƾ ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿ ƿƺ ƞƟƺliƾƩ éƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇻᇲ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ Ʃƞǁƣ ƤƞilƣƢ; aƞƽliƞƸƣƹƿ 
has thus far refused to allow a shift in power to the courts, which in my view 
is regrettable.
NƺƿƞƟlǄ, dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ Ƣƺƣƾ ƹƺƿ Ʃƞǁƣ ƞ ƾƻƣơiƞl ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ơƺǀƽƿ. IƹƾƿƣƞƢ, 
constitutional questions may be decided by every Swiss court including 
cantonal courts and courts that decide upon civil or penal matters. In con-
crete cases, constitutional questions may even be decided by administrative 
bodies. Hence, Switzerland has opted for a so- called “diffuse” system of con-
stitutional review,38 ơlƺƾƣƽ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ fd ơƺǀƽƿ ƾǄƾƿƣƸ ƿƩƞƹ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ GƣƽƸƞƹ ƸƺƢƣl 
of concentrated constitutional review.
According to the Administrative Procedure Act, “[t]he appellate authority 
shall itself make the decision in the case or in exceptional cases shall refer the 
case back to the lower instance and issue binding instructions” ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇸᇳ I 
Administrative Procedure Act). A referral back to the lower instance admi-
nistrative authority is typically made if further fact- finding has to be done 
by the lower instance or if the lower instance may use its discretion to decide 
the case.ᇵᇻ 
BƺƿƩ ƞƻƻƣllƞƿƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ơƺǀƽƿƾ ƸƞǄ ƨƽƞƹƿ iƹƿƣ-
rim relief. Typically, an appeal automatically has suspensive effect.40 As the 
Administrative Procedure Act declares, a court may also take “other precau-
tionary measures […] to preserve the current situation or to temporarily safegu-
ard interests that are at risk” ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇷᇸ éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿᄭ. dǂiƾƾ 
courts typically approach the question of whether to grant suspensive effect 
or precautionary measures by conducting a balancing test between the inte-
rests of the state and those of private parties. If they believe that the even-
tual result of the case is clear, they also may take the probable outcome into 
account in considering the granting of such measures.41 Such decisions are 
often of great practical importance: cases on public procurement often do not 
continue once the public authority has legally concluded the contract with its 
chosen private partner; if the suspensive effect is denied, the claimants may 
only recover their costs from the procedure but not conclude the contract.
38 K؜ؘءؘإ/cüائؖ؛ؘ/Kب؛ء, ƹ.èᇳᇹᇳᇻ.
ᇵᇻ K؜ؘءؘإ/cüائؖ؛ؘ/Kب؛ء, ƹ.èᇳᇸᇶᇻ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ.
40 For details see c؛؜ءآت ƣƿ ƞl., ƹ.èᇸᇺᇲ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ.
41 K؜ؘءؘإ/cüائؖ؛ؘ/Kب؛ء, ƹ.èᇳᇵᇵᇲ.
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ᇵ. Oا؛ؘإ Bآؗ؜ؘئ ؔءؗ aإآؘؖؗبإؘئ
In the federal system, special committees which serve as courts have been 
abolished, with the exception of the Independent Complaints Authority for 
Radio and Television. The committees have been replaced by the Federal 
Administrative Court which is competent in all matters decided by the federal 
administration.42 In the cantons, special committees still exist, most notably 
in the areas of construction, taxes and culture.43
In some cantons, the institution of the Ombudsman has some practical sig-
nificance.44 On the federal level, an initiative to introduce the Ombudsman 
failed. There are however two independent, personalised functions of con-
trol of state- regulated prices (Eidgenössischer Preisüberwacher) and of data 
protection and transparency of the public administration (Eidgenössischer 
Datenschutz- und Öffentlichkeitsbeauftragter, EDÖBᄭ. BƺƿƩ ƸƞǄ ƽƣƾƺƽƿ ƿƺ 
the use of legal remedies but the most efficient tools available to them are 
negotiation with the administration and informing the public on its rights. 
eƩƣ “EDyB” ƸƞǄ ƞlƾƺ iƹiƿiƞƿƣ lƣƨƞl ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ƻƞƽƿiƣƾ; Ʃƣ Ʃƞƾ 
Ƣƺƹƣ ƾƺ iƹ ƞƹ iƸƻƺƽƿƞƹƿ ơƞƾƣ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ Gƺƺƨlƣ ᄬƨƺƺƨlƣ ƾƿƽƣƣƿ ǁiƣǂᄭᇶᇷ.
Another route through which parties can challenge administrative action 
iƾ élƿƣƽƹƞƿiǁƣ Diƾƻǀƿƣ cƣƾƺlǀƿiƺƹ ᄬéDcᄭ, ƽƣơƣƹƿlǄ iƹƿƽƺƢǀơƣƢ iƹƿƺ ƿƩƣ 
éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿ. éƽƿiơlƣè ᇵᇵƟ I éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿ 
establishes that the court “may suspend the proceedings with the consent of the 
parties in order that the parties may agree on the content of the ruling”. It may 
encourage the parties to reach an agreement by appointing a neutral media-
tor. The provision has not been in force long enough to make any useful com-
ment on its practical consequences.
ᇶ. Eبإآأؘؔء aؘإئأؘؖا؜ةؘ 
éƾ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ iƾ ƹƺƿ ƞ ƸƣƸƟƣƽ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Ef, Ef lƞǂ iƾ ƹƺƿ ƢiƽƣơƿlǄ ƞƻƻliơƞƟlƣ 
in Switzerland. However, it may be relevant due to the bilateral treaties or 
Ƣǀƣ ƿƺ ƞƹ ƞǀƿƺƹƺƸƺǀƾ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ ƿƺ iƸƻlƣƸƣƹƿ Ef lƞǂ 
42 c؛؜ءآت et al., ƹ.èᇹᇺᇹ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ. ƞƹƢ ᇳᇶᇳᇸ.
43 K؜ؘءؘإ/cüائؖ؛ؘ/Kب؛ء, ƹ.èᇳᇶᇲᇴ.
44 Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Mü؟؟ؘإ/f؛؟ؠؔءء, ƹ.èᇳᇹᇸᇺ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ.
ᇶᇷ BGE ᇳᇵᇺ II ᇵᇶᇸ. 
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(autonomer Nachvollzug).ᇶᇸ Ef lƞǂ iƾ lƞƽƨƣlǄ iƽƽƣlƣǁƞƹƿ iƹ ƿƣƽƸƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƾǀƟƾ-
tantive legal protection available in Switzerland; the procedure is predomi-
nantly dictated by domestic Swiss law.
Switzerland is currently in the process of negotiating an institutional agree-
ment to ensure the more consistent and efficient application of its present 
ƞƹƢ Ƥǀƿǀƽƣ ƞƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿƾ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ Ef. IƤ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ ơƞƹ ơƺƹơlǀƢƣ ƾǀơƩ ƞƹ iƹƾ-
ƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ƞƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ Ef, Ƽǀƣƾƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ jǀƽiƾƢiơƿiƺƹ ǂƺǀlƢ Ɵƣ ƞ ơƺƽƣ 
element. An agreement would clearly influence the administrative process in 
Ƹƞƿƿƣƽƾ iƹǁƺlǁiƹƨ Ef lƞǂ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƹƣƨƺƿiƞƿiƺƹƾ Ƣƺ ƹƺƿ ƞƻƻƣƞƽ likƣlǄ ƿƺ ơƺƸƣ 
to a successful end any time soon.
In contrast, the legal protection now available in administrative matters 
has certainly been influenced by the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights, namely to grant court review in administrative matters. As 
explained above, it was deemed insufficient for protection from the adminis-
tration to only encompass “civil matters”; it is necessary for such protection 
to also apply to areas technically falling under Swiss administrative law. The 
European Court of Human Rights is still influencing administrative proce-
dure in Switzerland, recently for example in cases, which concern the right 
to reply. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court has now shaped a practice that 
seems to be consistent with European Court of Human Rights requirements: 
all documents submitted in court procedures must be forwarded to the par-
ties.47 In administrative procedures this requirement extends to all relevant 
documents submitted to authorities and courts.
ᇶᇸ dƣƣ ƿƩƣ ơƩƞƻƿƣƽ ƺƹ Iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞl cƣlƞƿiƺƹƾ, ƻƻ. ᇳᇸᇷ.
47 dƣƣ BGE ᇳᇵᇹ I ᇳᇻᇷ.
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Ig. LƞƹƢƸƞƽk Cƞƾƣƾ
ᇳ. Nؘؘؖئئ؜اج آؙ Iئئب؜ءؚ ؔء Aؗؠ؜ء؜ئاإؔا؜ةؘ  
Dؘؖ؜ئ؜آء: IhB 48
i ǂƞƾ ƞ ƿƣƹƞƹƿ iƹ ƞ Bƞƾƣl ƻƽƺƻƣƽƿǄ. Fƺƽ ƿǂƺ Ǆƣƞƽƾ, iƿƾ ƺǂƹƣƽ Ʃƞƾ ƹƺƿ ƻƞiƢ ƿƩƣ 
bills for the general electricity supply of the building issued by the canton 
ƺƤ Bƞƾƣl- dƿƞƢƿ iƹƢǀƾƿƽiƞl ǂƺƽkƾ ᄬIndustrielle Werke des Kantons Basel- Stadt, 
IhBᄭ. Iƹ ƞ lƣƿƿƣƽ ƺƤ ƤƺƽƸƞl ƹƺƿiơƣ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƺǂƹƣƽ, IhB ƞƹƹƺǀƹơƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ iƿ ǂƺǀlƢ 
stop electricity supply should the outstanding amount not be paid in a cer-
tain period of notice. The owner allowed the period to expire without paying. 
eƩƣƹ, IhB iƹƤƺƽƸƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƿƣƹƞƹƿƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƻƣƽƿǄ ƞƟƺǀƿ ƿƩƣ ǀƻơƺƸiƹƨ ƾǀƻƻlǄ 
ƾƿƺƻ ǁiƞ ƺƽƢiƹƞƽǄ ᄬi.ƣ. ƹƺƹ- ƽƣƨiƾƿƣƽƣƢᄭ Ƹƞil ƢƞƿƣƢ ᇻ éƻƽil ᇴᇲᇲᇺ. EƹƣƽƨǄ ƾǀƻƻlǄ 
was then stopped between 23 April and 30 May 2008, for the elevator and hot 
ǂƞƿƣƽ Ɵƺilƣƽ. éƤƿƣƽ IhB ǂƞƾ iƹƤƺƽƸƣƢ ƞƟƺǀƿ ƞ ƻƽƣƨƹƞƹƿ ǂƺƸƞƹ liǁiƹƨ iƹ ƿƩƣ 
property, it resumed electricity supply. 
éơƿiƹƨ ƺƹ ƟƣƩƞlƤ ƺƤ i, ƿƩƣ Bƞƾƣl ƿƣƹƞƹƿƾ’ ƞƾƾƺơiƞƿiƺƹ ƞƻƻƣƞlƣƢ ƟƣƤƺƽƣ ƿƩƣ 
ƾǀƻƣƽiƺƽ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƟƺƢǄ ᄬƿƩƣ BǀilƢiƹƨ DƣƻƞƽƿƸƣƹƿᄭ ƺƹ ᇴᇻ MƞǄ ᇴᇲᇲᇺ. 
Oƹ ᇳᇶ JǀlǄ ᇴᇲᇲᇺ, ƿƩƣ DƣƻƞƽƿƸƣƹƿ ƢiƾƸiƾƾƣƢèᅬ i.ƣ. iƿ ƢiƢ ƹƺƿ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ 
Ƹƣƽiƿƾèᅬ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƼǀƣƾƿ ƿƺ ƽƣƾǀƸƣ ƾǀƻƻlǄ ƾiƹơƣ ƿƩƣ ƾƿƺƻ ǂƞƾ ƞlƽƣƞƢǄ ƽƣƾơiƹƢƣƢ 
and rejected the prayer for compensatory relief. X unsuccessfully challenged 
this decision before the cantonal government (the Regierungsrat of the can-
ƿƺƹ ƺƤ Bƞƾƣl- dƿƞƢƿᄭ ƞƹƢ, ƾǀƟƾƣƼǀƣƹƿlǄ, ƟƣƤƺƽƣ ƿƩƣ éƻƻƣllƞƿƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹ-
ƿƺƹ ƺƤ Bƞƾƣl- dƿƞƢƿ. 
X brought the case before the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, claiming that 
his constitutional right to be heard was violated because the supply stop was 
not issued in the form of an administrative act and he was not granted the 
right to take position on the planned measure beforehand although being 
tenant of the property. 
48 BGE ᇳᇵᇹ I ᇳᇴᇲ.
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eƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƣƸƻƩƞƾiǅƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ IhB iƾ lƣƨƞllǄ ƺƟliƨƣƢ ƿƺ ƾǀƻƻlǄ ƣlƣơƿƽiơiƿǄ. 
According to the statutory law, supply may only be refused contingent, inter 
alia, if it does not constitute unreasonable hardship for third parties such as 
the owner’s tenants. Hence, the Court reasoned that ordering such refusal 
interferes with the tenants’ rights. The order thus qualifies as administrative 
act and must be issued as such rather than as real act. Consequently, not only 
property owners but also tenants and other affected persons must be heard 
beforehand and be granted the right to express their objections against the 
admissibility of the planned supply stop (in particular with respect to the 
unreasonable hardship imposed on them). With respect to the information 
lƣƿƿƣƽ ƺƤ ᇻ éƻƽil ᇴᇲᇲᇺ, ƿƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƩƣlƢ ƿƩƞƿ iƿ ǂƞƾ ƹƺ ƾǀƤƤiơiƣƹƿ Ɵƞƾiƾ Ƥƺƽ lƞǄƻƣƽ-
sons to exercise their rights. Hence, the Court found that X’s right to be heard 
was violated.
ᇴ. aإآؘؖؗبإؔ؟ Fؔ؜إءؘئئ: Nؔابإؔ؟؜ئؔا؜آء49
dƻƺǀƾƣƾ é ƞƹƢ B ƞƾ ǂƣll ƞƾ ƿƩƣiƽ ơƩilƢƽƣƹ C ƞƹƢ D ƞƻƻliƣƢ Ƥƺƽ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾƩiƻ iƹ 
the municipality of Weiningen (canton of Zurich). With letter dated 8 October 
ᇴᇲᇳᇴ, ƿƩƣ Ƹǀƹiơiƻƞl Nƞƿǀƽƞliǅƞƿiƺƹ CƺƸƸiƾƾiƺƹ iƹǁiƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƤƞƸilǄ Ƥƺƽ ƞ ơƺƹ-
versation which, according to the invitation letter, should serve the purpose 
of getting to know the applicants and their motivation for the naturalization 
process. In reality, however, the Commission assessed the suitability of the 
applicants for citizenship. In the following, the municipality rejected their 
application on the grounds that they are not well integrated into Swiss lifes-
ƿǄlƣ; lƞơkƣƢ ơƺƸƸƞƹƢ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ GƣƽƸƞƹ lƞƹƨǀƞƨƣ; ƞƹƢ ơƺǀlƢ ƹƺƿ ƞƹƾǂƣƽ ƾiƸƻlƣ 
ƨƣƺƨƽƞƻƩiơƞl ƞƹƢ ơiǁiơ Ƽǀƣƾƿiƺƹƾ. é, B, C, ƞƹƢ D ǀƹƾǀơơƣƾƾƤǀllǄ ơƩƞllƣƹƨƣƢ 
ƿƩiƾ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ ƟƣƤƺƽƣ ƿƩƣ Diƾƿƽiơƿ Cƺǀƹơil ᄬBezirksrat), i.e. the hierarchically 
higher administrative body, and, subsequently, the Administrative Court of 
the canton of Zurich.
BƣƤƺƽƣ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ, é, B, C, ƞƹƢ D ƞƽƨǀƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣiƽ 
ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ Ƥƞiƽ ƿƽƣƞƿƸƣƹƿ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇴᇻèI Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ ǂƞƾ ǁiƺlƞƿƣƢ ƟǄ Ɵƣiƹƨ iƹǁiƿƣƢ 
to a personal interview and, instead, unexpectedly being examined.
The Court found that procedural guarantees of the Constitution apply in the 
ƹƞƿǀƽƞliǅƞƿiƺƹ ƻƽƺơƣƾƾ, ƹƞƸƣlǄ ƿƩƣ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƩƣƞƽƢ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇴᇻèI Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ 
as one aspect of procedural fairness, which also entails the right to receive 
ᇶᇻ BGE ᇳᇶᇲ I ᇻᇻ.
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information on the formal and substantive prerequisites of the naturalization 
process. The Court also stated that according to the principle of good faith 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇷèIII Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ, ƻƞƽƿiƣƾ ơƺǀlƢ ƣǃƻƣơƿ ƿƩƣ ƾƿƞƿƣ ƹƺƿ ƿƺ Ƣƣǁiƞƿƣ ƤƽƺƸ 
the announced course of proceedings without prior notice.
Further, the Court stated that it is within the municipal discretion to ask 
questions on general knowledge at some point during the naturalization pro-
cess; however, because of the early stage of the proceedings and the invita-
ƿiƺƹ lƣƿƿƣƽ, é, B, C, ƞƹƢ D ơƺǀlƢ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣlǄ ƣǃƻƣơƿ ƿƩƞƿ ƾǀơƩ ƣǃƞƸiƹƞƿiƺƹ 
would take place later on rather than during the (early) personal interview 
and that they could prepare beforehand. Consequently, the Court held that 
the municipality violated the right to fair proceedings and to be heard, res-
pectively, as well as the principle of good faith. 
Dǀƣ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƤƺƽƸƞl ƹƞƿǀƽƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƩƣƞƽƢ, ƿƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƽƣƻƣƞlƣƢ ƿƩƣ 
challenged decision and referred the case back to the municipality for further 
fact finding and in order to adopt the required procedural steps. 
As already stated above, this case also shows that the right to be heard is a 
flexible instrument that the courts can utilise to intervene against any form 
of unfair administrative process and that is not restricted to certain case 
ƨƽƺǀƻƾ. Iƿ iƾ iƸƻƺƽƿƞƹƿ ƿƺ ƹƺƿƣ ƿƩƞƿ éƽƿiơlƣèᇴᇻèCƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƞƻƻliƣƾ ƿƺ all state 
proceedings in civil, penal, and public law within which a decision on indivi-
dual rights and duties is rendered, be it before Courts or non- judicial bodies 
including the government and parliament.ᇷᇲ
ᇵ. D؜إؘؖا C؛ؔ؟؟ؘءؘؚ آؙ Lؘؚ؜ئ؟ؔا؜آء: aآ؟؜ؘؖ Aؖا 
آؙ kبإ؜ؖ؛51
Oƹ ᇷ JǀlǄ ᇴᇲᇲᇸ, ƿƩƣ aƞƽliƞƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ kǀƽiơƩ ƞƢƺƻƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ aƺliơƣ 
Act (Polizeigesetz), a cantonal law which was subsequently approved by the 
voters. The adoption of the Police Act should create statutory bases for the 
performance of the duties and measures of the police force in order to main-
tain public order and safety. Private persons, a lawyer’s association, and 
political parties challenged the Police Act directly before the Swiss Federal 
Supreme Court (abstrakte, direkte Normenkontrolle), claiming that various 
ᇷᇲ See also G؜آةؔءء؜ B؜ؚؚؔ؜ء؜, KƺƸƸƣƹƿƞƽ BǀƹƢƣƾǁƣƽƤƞƾƾǀƹƨ Ƣƣƽ dơƩǂƣiǅƣƽiƾơƩƣƹ 
Eidgenossenschaft, 2nd edition, Zurich 2017, éƽƿiơlƣèᇴᇻ ƹ.èᇵ.
ᇷᇳ BGE ᇳᇵᇸ I ᇺᇹ.
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provisions violate the Federal Constitution, the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
rights (ICCPR).
In general, the Court reasoned that it is crucial for the constitutionality of 
cantonal legislation whether it is possible to interpret the cantonal provision 
in a way that is consistent with the constitutional guarantees invoked. 
It is important to note that whereas the Court can only decide on 
whether to rescind or uphold the challenged legislation, its considerations 
predetermine the future (constitutional) application of the Police Act: The 
authorities must act according to the restrictions set out in the considera-
tions of the Court when applying the Police Act in the future, otherwise 
administrative acts or real acts based on the Police Act will be quashed if 
challenged. 
The Court then examined the procedural aspects of the police custody- 
regime in relation to the provisions concerning the requirements for taking 
a person into police custody. As the Police Act did not entail any provisions 
on the legal protection, the general rules of legal protection in the canton of 
Zurich applied, i.e. the affected person had to challenge the custody before 
the superior administrative body. Only after having exhausted these admi-
nistrative remedies an appeal to the Administrative Court of the canton of 
kǀƽiơƩ, i.ƣ. ƞ jǀƢiơiƞl ƟƺƢǄ, ǂƞƾ ƻƺƾƾiƟlƣ. eƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƽƣƞƾƺƹƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ éƽƿiơlƣèᇷèIg 
ECHRᇷᇴ does not bar the member states from implementing administrative 
control before granting access to judicial proceedings, contingent a judicial 
Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ iƾ ƽƣƹƢƣƽƣƢ “ƾƻƣƣƢilǄ”. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, éƽƿiơlƣè ᇵᇳè Ig Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƾƿƞƿƣƾ 
that any person who has been deprived of their liberty by a body other than 
a court has the right to have recourse to a court at any time which shall then 
decide as quickly as possible on the legality of their detention. The Court rea-
soned that the notion “at any time” means the Court can be invoked directly 
ǂiƿƩƺǀƿ ƻƽiƺƽ ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ ƟƣƤƺƽƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƟƺƢiƣƾ. eƩǀƾ, éƽƿiơlƣèᇵᇲèIg 
Constitution goes beyond the general right to judicial proceedings according 
ƿƺ éƽƿiơlƣè ᇴᇻƞ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ. éƾ ƞ ƽƣƾǀlƿ, ƿƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƩƣlƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ aƺliơƣ éơƿ 
ǁiƺlƞƿƣƾ éƽƿiơlƣè ᇵᇳè Ig Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ƽƣƼǀƣƾƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl lƣƨiƾlƞƿƺƽ ƿƺ 
ᇷᇴ Articleèᇷ IV ECHR states that everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or deten-
tion shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall 
be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.
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enact provisions on the legal protections that suffice under the constitutional 
guarantees.ᇷᇵ
ᇶ. “Lؘؚؔ؟ dؔبئؘؚؔ dؔ؟ؔؗ” آإ ا؛ؘ Iؠأآإاؔءؘؖ آؙ 
ا؛ؘ ECHc54
Oƹ ᇴᇶ FƣƟƽǀƞƽǄ ᇳᇻᇻᇺ, ƞƿƿƺƽƹƣǄ- ƞƿ- lƞǂ c ƞƻƻƣƞlƣƢ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ ƞ ơiǁil lƞǂ Ƣƣơi-
sion of a court of first instance to the High Court of the canton of Zurich. 
His appeal described the proceedings, the challenged decision, the oppo-
sing party, and its counsel by various improper expressions. Inter alia, he 
called the proceedings a “charade” (literally “monkey theatre”, Affentheater) 
and a “legal sausage salad”; described the statement of claim as “ludicrous” 
and “mad- brained”; designated the decision as “sheer nonsense”; called the 
court of first instance a “body of a rogue state”; and stated that the opposing 
counsel was “blathering of the law”. The High Court filed a complaint to 
the Supervisory Commission for Attorneys- at- Law (Aufsichtskommission 
über die Anwältinnen und Anwälte) which initiated a proceeding against 
R. Later, the (then existing) Court of Cassation of the canton of Zurich held 
that the High Court’s decision violated the right to be heard of the party 
represented by R. 
Oƹ ᇶ NƺǁƣƸƟƣƽ ᇳᇻᇻᇻ, ƿƩƣ CƺƸƸiƾƾiƺƹ iƸƻƺƾƣƢ ƞ Ƥiƹƣ ƺƹ c ƞƹƢ ƟƞƽƽƣƢ ƩiƸ 
from exercising his profession for three months because the expressions used 
in his first file were inadmissible under professional ethics and practice rules. 
R’s appeal to the High Court was not successful. He brought the case before 
the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, claiming that the High Court violated 
éƽƿiơlƣèᇸè I ECHc ƟǄ ƹƺƿ ơƞƽƽǄiƹƨ ƺǀƿ ƞ ƻǀƟliơ Ʃƣƞƽiƹƨ Ƣƣƾƻiƿƣ ƞ ơƺƽƽƣƾƻƺƹ-
ding request made by him. He argued that the Commission (which carried 
out such public hearing) did not constitute an independent court as required 
ƟǄ éƽƿiơlƣèᇸèI ECHc.
éƽƿiơlƣèᇸèI ECHc ƣƹƿiƿlƣƾ ƣǁƣƽǄƺƹƣ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƿƣƽƸiƹƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ Ʃiƾ ơiǁil ƽiƨƩƿƾ 
and obligations or of any criminal charge against him to a fair and public 
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
ᇷᇵ eƩƣ aƺliơƣ éơƿ ǂƞƾ ƿƩƣƹ ƞƸƣƹƢƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ aƞƽliƞƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ kǀƽiơƩ. NƺǂƞƢƞǄƾ, 
an appeal to the Compulsory Measures Court is available.
ᇷᇶ BGE ᇳᇴᇸ I ᇴᇴᇺ.
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established by law. The Court held that disciplinary proceedings leading to 
ƻƽƺƤƣƾƾiƺƹƞl Ɵƞƹƾ ơƺƹơƣƽƹ “ơiǁil ƽiƨƩƿƾ” ǂiƿƩiƹ ƿƩƣ Ƹƣƞƹiƹƨ ƺƤ éƽƿiơlƣèᇸèI ECHc.
The Court considered the Commission to be closer to an administrative 
body than to a court. Such finding is also supported by the case law of the 
ECHR that focuses on the appearance of the body. Consequently, the Court 
reasoned that the Commission acted as non- judicial body here and that a 
public hearing held only by such body does not meet the requirements impo-
ƾƣƢ ƟǄ éƽƿiơlƣèᇸèI ECHc ƞƹƢ éƽƿiơlƣèᇵᇲ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ, ƽƣƾƻƣơƿiǁƣlǄ. Iƿ ƽƣƤƣƽƽƣƢ 
the case back to the High Court to hold a public hearing in accordance with 
éƽƿiơlƣèᇸèIèECHc ƞƹƢ ƢƣơiƢƣ ƞƨƞiƹ.
244
Selected Bibliography
G؜آةؔءء؜ B؜ؚؚؔ؜ء؜, KƺƸƸƣƹƿƞƽ BǀƹƢƣƾǁƣƽƤƞƾƾǀƹƨ Ƣƣƽ dơƩǂƣiǅƣƽiƾơƩƣƹ 
Eidgenossenschaft, 2nd ƣƢiƿiƺƹ, kǀƽiơƩ ᇴᇲᇳᇹ, éƽƿiơlƣ ᇴᇻ
e؛آؠؔئ F؟ؘ؜ءؘإ/é؟ؘثؔءؘؗإ M؜ئ؜ؖ/N؜ؖآ؟ؘ eöأأؘإت؜ؘء, Constitutional 
Law in Switzerland, Alphen aan den Rijn 2012
dؘإؚ؜آ G؜ؔؖآؠ؜ء؜, gƺƸ „JƞƨƢƸƞơƩƣƹ ƞǀƤ Ƣiƣ gƣƽƤüƨǀƹƨ“ ᅬ Eiƹ Diƾkǀƾƾiƺƹƾ-
beitrag, Schweizerisches Zentralblatt für Staats-und Verwaltungsrecht 
ᇳᇻᇻᇵ
f؟إ؜ؖ؛ Häؘؙ؟؜ء/Gؘآإؚ Mü؟؟ؘإ/Fؘ؟؜ث f؛؟ؠؔءء, Allgemeines Verwal-
tungsrecht, 7th ƣƢiƿiƺƹ, kǀƽiơƩ/dƿ. Gƞllƣƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇸ 
cؘؚ؜ءؔ K؜ؘءؘإ/Bؘإء؛ؔإؗ cüائؖ؛ؘ/Mؔا؛؜ؔئ Kب؛ء, Öffentliches 
Verfahrensrecht, 2nd ƣƢiƿiƺƹ, kǀƽiơƩ/dƿ.èGƞllƣƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇷ 
a؜ؘإإؘ Mآإإ/Eا؜ؘءءؘ aآ؟ا؜ؘإ, Dƽƺiƿ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiƤ, gƺl. II, Lƣƾ ƞơƿƣƾ ƞƢƸi-
nistratifs et leur contrôle, 3rd ƣƢiƿiƺƹ, Bƣƽƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇳ
cؘءé c؛؜ءآت/Hؘ؜ءإ؜ؖ؛ Kآ؟؟ؘإ/C؛إ؜ئا؜ءؔ K؜ئئ/Dؔء؜ؘ؟ؔ e؛بإء؛ؘإإ/
Dؘء؜ئؘ Bإü؛؟- Mآئؘإ, yƤƤƣƹƿliơƩƣƾ aƽƺǅƣƾƾƽƣơƩƿ, GƽǀƹƢlƞƨƣƹ ǀƹƢ 
BǀƹƢƣƾƽƣơƩƿƾƻƤlƣƨƣ, ᇵrd ƣƢiƿiƺƹ, Bƞƾƣlèᇴᇲᇳᇶ ᄬơiƿƣƢ ƞƾ c؛؜ءآت ؘا ؔ؟.)
Fؘ؟؜ث f؛؟ؠؔءء, The principle of effective legal protection in Swiss admi-
nistrative law, in: Zoltán Szente/Konrad Lachmayer (Ed.), The Principle 
of Effective Legal Protection in Administrative Law, A European 
Comparison, London 2017, pp. 304.
I. Fiscal Sovereignty and Constitutional Principles  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
 1. Federalism and Fiscal Sovereignty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
 a) Distribution of Fiscal Sovereignty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
 b) Federal Tax Harmonisation Act  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
 2. Main (Constitutional) Principles. .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . 249
 a) Principle of Legality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
 b) Principle of Universality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
 c) Principle of Uniformity and Ability- To- Pay Principle . . . . . 250
 d) Prohibition of Inter- Cantonal Double Taxation . . . . . . . . . 250
 e) Principle of Good Faith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
II. Most Important Taxes and Tax Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
 1. Federal Taxes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
 a) Federal Direct Taxes .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 253
 b) Withholding (Anticipatory) Tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
 c) Federal Value Added Tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
 d) Other Taxes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
 2. Cantonal and Communal Taxes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
 a) Taxes on Income and Net Wealth  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
 b) Taxes on Net Profit and Capital of Legal Entities  . . . . . . . . 261
 c) Further Cantonal Taxes.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 262
 3. International Tax Agreements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
 a) Multilateral Conventions.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 263
 b) Double Taxation Treaties .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 264
 c) Bilateral Agreements with the European Union  . . . . . . . . 264
III. Landmark Cases .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . 265
 1. Principle of Equality: Taxation of Married and  
 Non- Married Couples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
Madeleine Simonek  
Martina Becker 
Tax Law
 2. Ability- To- Pay Principle: Degressive Income Tax Rates . . . . . . . 266
 3. Principle of Good Faith: Swiss Ruling Practice .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . 267
 4. Principle of Non- Discrimination: Salary Withholding Tax. .  . .  . 268
Selected Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
© 2018 Madeleine Simonek, Martina Becker, CC-BY 4.0, DOI: 10.24921/2018.94115924.10
247
I.  Fiscal Sovereignty and 
Constitutional Principles
ᇳ. Fؘؘؗإؔ؟؜ئؠ ؔءؗ F؜ئؖؔ؟ dآةؘإؘ؜ؚءاج
ƞᄭ DiƾƿƽiƟǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ Fiƾơƞl dƺǁƣƽƣiƨƹƿǄ
As a consequence of Swiss federalism,1 Switzerland’s tax system incorporates 
three levels of taxation: taxes are imposed by the federation, the cantons and 
the municipalities.2
éơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ éƽƿiơlƣèᇵ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ 
(Constitution),ᇵ the cantons retain law- making power except in areas where 
the Constitution expressly delegates this power to the federation. Therefore, 
the federation is only allowed to levy those taxes which the Constitution 
exclusively grants its competence over. These are the following:
ᅬ FƣƢƣƽƞl Ƣiƽƣơƿ ƿƞǃ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇴᇺ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ
ᅬ gƞlǀƣ ƞƢƢƣƢ ƿƞǃ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇵᇲ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ
– Stamp duty on securities, receipts for insurance premiums and certain 
ƺƿƩƣƽ ơƺƸƸƣƽơiƞl ƢƣƣƢƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇵᇴ I Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ
– Withholding tax on income from moveable capital assets, lottery win-
ƹiƹƨƾ ƞƹƢ iƹƾǀƽƞƹơƣ ƟƣƹƣƤiƿƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇵᇴ II Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ
1 dƣƣ Ƥƺƽ Ƹƺƽƣ ƣǃƻlƞƹƞƿiƺƹƾ ƺƹ dǂiƾƾ ƤƣƢƣƽƞliƾƸ ƿƩƣ CƩƞƻƿƣƽ ƺƹ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl Lƞǂ, ƻƻ. ᇳᇵᇷ.
2 See for the following and for more details on the whole chapter: Mؘؔؗ؟ؘ؜ءؘ d؜ؠآءؘ؞, 
Tax Coordination between Cantons in Switzerland - Role of the Courts, in Michael Lang/
Pasquale Pistone/Josef Schuch/Claus Staringer (eds.), Horizontal tax coordination, 
Amsterdam 2012 (cit. d؜ؠآءؘ؞, Tax Coordination), pp. 221.
ᇵ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ᇳᇺ éƻƽil ᇳᇻᇻᇻ, dc ᇳᇲᇳ; ƾƣƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ EƹƨliƾƩ 
ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/MᇺfJ- dᇵᇸᇻᄭ.
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– Taxes on commodities such as beer, tobacco and mineral oil etc. 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇵᇳ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ, ơǀƾƿƺƸƾ Ƣǀƿiƣƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇵᇵ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ, 
ƞƹƢ ƿƽƞƤƤiơ ƿƞǃƣƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇺᇷ ƞƹƢ ᇺᇸ II Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ
ᅬ eƞǃƣƾ ƺƹ ƨƞƸƟliƹƨ Ʃƺǀƾƣƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇲᇸ III Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ
Conversely, the cantons are essentially free to levy any taxes, except those 
which are exclusively reserved to the federation.4 The cantonal constitu-
tions further delegate and organise the division of tasks and powers bet-
ween each canton and its communes. Although the cantons have original 
taxing powers and are even permitted to create new taxes, they do not have 
unfettered discretion over the design of their tax system. They are limited 
by the Tax Harmonisation Act5 which obliges them to levy certain types of 
ƿƞǃƣƾ. FǀƽƿƩƣƽ, ƿƩƣǄ ƞƽƣ ƨƣƹƣƽƞllǄ ƽƣƾƿƽiơƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ Ƥƞơƿ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ 
and all federal laws take precedence over any conflicting cantonal and 
Ƹǀƹiơiƻƞlèlƞǂ.
Ɵᄭ FƣƢƣƽƞl eƞǃ HƞƽƸƺƹiƾƞƿiƺƹ Aơƿ
Fƺƽ ƞ lƺƹƨ ƿiƸƣ, Ƥiƾơƞl ƤƣƢƣƽƞliƾƸ ƽƣƾǀlƿƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƣǃiƾƿƣƹơƣ ƺƤ ᇴᇸ ᄬƺƤƿƣƹ ǁƣƽǄᄭ 
different cantonal tax laws. This situation hindered personal and economic 
mobility within Switzerland.ᇸ Taxpayers who were liable to be taxed in two or 
more cantons were subjected to different assessment principles and procedu-
res in each canton, for example, in the case that a taxpayer lived in one canton 
ƞƹƢ ƺǂƹƣƢ ƽƣƞl ƣƾƿƞƿƣ ƻƽƺƻƣƽƿǄ iƹ ƞƹƺƿƩƣƽ ơƞƹƿƺƹ. FǀƽƿƩƣƽƸƺƽƣ, ƞƹ ƣǃiƿ ƿƞǃ 
could be imposed if an individual or a legal entity relocated from one canton 
to another canton.
In order to remove these obstacles, on 12 June 1977, the Swiss people accep-
ted a new federal competence in a referendum to harmonise cantonal and 
federal direct tax law. Subsequently, the Tax Harmonisation Act entered into 
Ƥƺƽơƣ ƺƹ ᇳ JƞƹǀƞƽǄ ᇳᇻᇻᇵ, ƞƹƢ ƞƤƿƣƽ ƞ ƿƽƞƹƾiƿiƺƹ ƻƣƽiƺƢ ƺƤ ᇺ Ǆƣƞƽƾ Ʃƞƾ ƞơƿǀƞllǄ 
applied from 1 January 2001.
4 éơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇵᇶ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ, ǁƞlǀƣ ƞƢƢƣƢ ƿƞǃ, ƾƿƞƸƻ ƢǀƿǄ, ǂiƿƩƩƺlƢiƹƨ ƿƞǃ ƞƾ 
well as special consumption taxes are exclusively reserved to the federation. In contrast, 
income taxes are levied on the federal and cantonal levels and depending on the can-
tonal order on the communal level as well.
5 FƣƢƣƽƞl éơƿ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ HƞƽƸƺƹiƾƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ Diƽƣơƿ eƞǃƣƾ ƞƿ Cƞƹƿƺƹƞl ƞƹƢ CƺƸƸǀƹƞl Lƣǁƣlƾ ƺƤ 
ᇳᇶ DƣơƣƸƟƣƽ ᇳᇻᇻᇲ, dc ᇸᇶᇴ.ᇳᇶ.
ᇸ See for the following and for more details on the whole chapter: d؜ؠآءؘ؞, Tax 
CƺƺƽƢiƹƞƿiƺƹƾ, ƻƻ.èᇴᇵᇸ.
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The Tax Harmonisation Act significantly improved tax coordination in 
Switzerland, introducing tax harmonisation with regard to direct taxes bet-
ween the federation and the cantons (vertical tax harmonisation) as well as 
between the cantons themselves (horizontal tax harmonisation). It is a legal 
framework that contains rules on the tax subject, the tax object, the tax base, 
the tax period and the tax procedure. Some of these rules go into minute 
details, whilst others leave a certain scope of action and some room for inter-
pretation to the cantons. The Tax Harmonisation Act, however, does not har-
monise tax rates and tax allowances. In this regard the cantons remain fully 
sovereign. Hence, tax competition between the cantons and also between the 
communes is not hindered by the Tax Harmonisation Act.7
ᇴ. Mؔ؜ء ᄬCآءئا؜ابا؜آءؔ؟ᄭ aإ؜ءؖ؜أ؟ؘئ
ƞᄭ aƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ LƣƨƞliƿǄ
The principle of legality (Article 5 Constitution) is of fundamental import-
ance in Swiss tax law. Article 127 I Constitution ensures its application to tax 
matters and states that “the main structural features of any tax, in particular 
those liable to pay tax, the object of the tax and its assessment, are regulated by 
the law”. 
Swiss courts as well as academic literature demand strict adherence to 
the principle of legality. The principle requires that tax laws are be put to an 
ƺƻƿiƺƹƞl ƽƣƤƣƽƣƹƢǀƸ. FǀƽƿƩƣƽƸƺƽƣ, ƿƩƣ lƞǂ Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ ƞƻƻƽƺƻƽiƞƿƣlǄ ƢƣƿƞilƣƢ iƹ 
order to comply with the constitutional requirement of legality. 
Ɵᄭ aƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ fƹiǁƣƽƾƞliƿǄ
The principle of universality is enshrined in Article 127 II Constitution. It 
demands that each member of a community should contribute to the commu-
nity’s financial burdens and denotes that all taxpayers or groups of taxpayers 
should be subject to the same taxes and taxation rules. However, although the 
principle of universality aims to prevent the application of any privileges or 
discrimination, Swiss tax law does contain certain privileges which are con-
sidered justified due to their fulfilment of other constitutional principles and 
7 dƣƣ ƻ. ᇴᇸᇲ.
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goals. In particular, certain tax incentives granted to foreign wealthy taxpay-
ers, such as the lump- sum taxation, 8 or to foreign companies are considered 
justified by the goal to foster the Swiss economy. 
ơᄭ aƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ fƹiƤƺƽƸiƿǄ ƞƹƢ AƟiliƿǄ- eƺ- aƞǄ aƽiƹơiƻlƣ
The principle of uniformity and the ability- to- pay principle share similar con-
tent, requiring that each taxpayer must contribute to the fiscal burdens of 
the state according to his or her economic, financial and personal resources 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇴᇹ II Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. 
The Constitution demands both horizontal and vertical equality of tre-
atment of individuals. Horizontal equality requires that taxpayers living 
in the same economic and personal circumstances and deriving the same 
amount of taxable income should be subjected to equal taxation. Vertical 
equality, on the other hand, requires that taxpayers living in different 
economic and personal situations and/or deriving a different amount of 
taxable income should be subjected to different levels of taxation. Vertical 
equality particularly refers to the design of the tax scale and to the ques-
tion on whether progressive, proportional or degressive tax rates should be 
chosen.9 
Ƣᄭ aƽƺƩiƟiƿiƺƹ ƺƤ Iƹƿƣƽ- Cƞƹƿƺƹƞl DƺǀƟlƣ eƞǃƞƿiƺƹ
Since 1874, the Constitution explicitly prohibits inter- cantonal double taxa-
ƿiƺƹ. eƺƢƞǄ, ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƩiƟiƿiƺƹ iƾ ƣƹƾƩƽiƹƣƢ iƹ éƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇴᇹ IIIèCƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ. Iƹƿƣƽ- 
cantonal double taxation arises if a taxpayer is simultaneously subjected to 
the same or similar taxes on the same tax object by two cantons, for example, 
if the taxpayer is considered to be a tax resident of two cantons. No law on the 
prevention of inter- cantonal double taxation has ever been enacted. Instead, 
ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƢƣǁƣlƺƻƣƢ ƞ Ƣƣƹƾƣ ƹƣƿǂƺƽk ƺƤ ƽǀlƣƾ ơƺǁƣƽiƹƨ ƿƩƣ 
allocation of taxing rights between the cantons. Some of these rules have in 
the meantime been enacted by the Tax Harmonisation Act, but still most of 
the inter- cantonal allocation rules is based on case law.
The basic rules are the following: any income from real estate, permanent 
establishments and fixed places of businesses may only be taxed by the can-
ton wherein the property is situated. The same rules apply for the taxation of 
8 See pp. 254.
9 dƣƣ ƻ. ᇴᇸᇸ Ƥƺƽ ƞ lƣƞƢiƹƨ ơƺǀƽƿ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ ǂiƿƩ ƽƣƨƞƽƢ ƿƺ Ƣƣƨƽƣƾƾiǁƣ iƹơƺƸƣ ƿƞǃ ƽƞƿƣƾ. 
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net wealth. All other income or net wealth, including income from employ-
ment or income from moveable property, may only be taxed by the canton 
where the taxpayer has his or her main tax residence (usually the taxpayer’s 
centre of living).
The constitutional prohibition on inter- cantonal double taxation also 
embodies a kind of non- discrimination rule: A taxable person who is only 
liable to have part of his or her income taxed in a certain canton may not be 
treated less favourably than a taxpayer whose whole income is taxable in that 
canton.
ƣᄭ aƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ GƺƺƢ FƞiƿƩ
The Constitution expressly requires that “state institutions and private per-
sons shall act in good faith” ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇷ III Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. éƢƢiƿiƺƹƞllǄ, éƽƿiơlƣèᇻ 
Constitution states that “every person has the right to be treated by state 
authorities in good faith and in a non- arbitrary manner”. hƩƣƽƣƞƾ éƽƿiơlƣèᇷ III 
Constitution demands honest and trustworthy behaviour from every person, 
éƽƿiơlƣèᇻèCƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƣǃƻliơiƿlǄ Ƥƺơǀƾƣƾ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƽƣlƞƿiƺƹƾƩiƻ Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ ƿƩƣ iƹƢi-
ǁiƢǀƞl ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ƾƿƞƿƣ. EǁƣƽǄ ƻƣƽƾƺƹ Ʃƞƾ ƞ lƣƨƞllǄ ƣƹƤƺƽơƣƞƟlƣ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƿƽƣƞƿƣƢ 
in accordance with the principle of good faith by legislative bodies as well as 
by those who apply the law.10 
In tax law, the principle of good faith is of high relevance. In particular, 
it is considered to be the legal basis for the prohibition of an abuse of rights 
and the Swiss doctrine of preventing tax avoidance. According to the cons-
ƿƞƹƿ jǀƽiƾƻƽǀƢƣƹơƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ, ƿƩƣ ơƽiƿƣƽiƞ Ƥƺƽ ƢƣƤiƹiƹƨ ƿƞǃ 
avoidance are the following:
– the transaction structure or legal set- up chosen by the taxpayer is in-
appropriate or unusual, and completely inappropriate to the economic 
Ƥƞơƿƾ; ƞƹƢ
– the taxpayer’s primary goal for utilising the chosen legal form was to 
ƞơƩiƣǁƣ ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹƿiƞl ƿƞǃ ƾƞǁiƹƨƾ; ƞƹƢ
– the taxpayer will in fact achieve substantial tax savings if the legal 
form chosen is accepted by the tax administration.
10 See for the following and for more details Mؘؔؗ؟ؘ؜ءؘ d؜ؠآءؘ؞, The principle of good 
faith in Swiss domestic and international tax law, in Cécile Brokelind (ed.), Principles of 
Lƞǂ: Fǀƹơƿiƺƹ, ƾƿƞƿǀƾ ƞƹƢ iƸƻƞơƿ iƹ Ef ƿƞǃ lƞǂ, éƸƾƿƣƽƢƞƸ ᇴᇲᇳᇶ, pp. ᇵᇳᇻ.
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If the criteria for tax avoidance are met, the real facts are disregarded and 
replaced by those facts that would have been considered as the usual and 
ƞƻƻƽƺƻƽiƞƿƣ ƞƻƻƽƺƞơƩ. Fƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, iƤ ƿƩƣ ƿƞǃƻƞǄƣƽ ƿƽiƣƾ ƿƺ ơƺƹǁƣƽƿ ƿƞǃƞƟlƣ 
dividend income into tax- free capital gain by using a completely inapprop-
riate transaction structure, no tax free capital gain, but taxable dividend 
income will be recognised.
In practice, moreover, the principle of protecting a legitimate expectation 
that is also based on the principle of good faith is important in the context of 
the Swiss tax ruling practice.11
11 dƣƣ Ƥƺƽ Ƹƺƽƣ Ƣƣƿƞilƾ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ƿƞǃ ƽǀliƹƨ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣ ƻƻ. ᇴᇸᇹ.
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II.  Most Important Taxes and 
Tax Codes
ᇳ. Fؘؘؗإؔ؟ eؔثؘئ 
ƞᄭ FƣƢƣƽƞl Diƽƣơƿ eƞǃƣƾ
aa) Introduction
The first federal direct tax was introduced during World War I to meet the 
increasing financial needs of the federation. In the following, the federation’s 
right to levy a direct federal tax was prolonged ever since, today the compe-
ƿƣƹơƣ iƾ ƣƹƞơƿƣƢ iƹ éƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇴᇺ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ.12 The authorisation is still limi-
ted in time, relying on repeated extensions by popular vote (currently the 
ƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ Ʃƞƾ Ɵƣƣƹ ƨƽƞƹƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ ơƺƸƻƣƿƣƹơƣ ǀƹƿil ᇴᇲᇵᇷ; éƽƿiơlƣè ᇳᇻᇸ Nƺ.è ᇳᇵ 
Constitution).ᇳᇵ As a consequence, the federation is forced to reconsider its 
financial regime on a regular basis, particularly since the federal direct tax 
makes up approximately one third of the federal revenue. 
BƞƾƣƢ ƺƹ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇴᇺ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ, ƿƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ƣƹƞơƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl Diƽƣơƿ 
Tax Act14 which regulates the federal individual and corporate income tax 
and provides for the imposition of a source tax on the income of certain indi-
viduals and legal entities.
12 Mؘؔؗ؟ؘ؜ءؘ d؜ؠآءؘ؞, KƺƸƸƣƹƿiƣƽǀƹƨ ǅǀ éƽƿikƣl ᇳᇴᇺ Bg iƹ BƣƽƹƩƞƽƢ hƞlƢƸƞƹƹ/Eǁƞ 
Mƞƽiƞ Bƣlƾƣƽ/éƾƿƽiƢ EƻiƹƣǄ ᄬƣƢƾ.ᄭ, Bƞƾlƣƽ KƺƸƸƣƹƿƞƽ BǀƹƢƣƾǁƣƽƤƞƾƾǀƹƨ, Bƞƾƣl ᇴᇲᇳᇷ, N ᇳ 
et seq., also for additional information on the history of the federal income tax.
ᇳᇵ In a popular vote of 4 March 2018, the federation’s competence was prolonged for another 
ƿƣƽƸ ƺƤ ᇳᇸ Ǆƣƞƽƾ.
14 FƣƢƣƽƞl éơƿ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl Diƽƣơƿ eƞǃ ƺƤ ᇳᇶèDƣơƣƸƟƣƽèᇳᇻᇻᇲ, dc ᇸᇶᇴ.ᇳᇳ.
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bb) Federal Individual Income Tax
The federal individual income tax is levied from Swiss tax residents as well as 
from non- residents who have economic attachment to Switzerland. Income 
taxes are generally considered as the most appropriate indicator for the abi-
lity to pay taxes.
Tax residency is deemed to exist if an individual intends to live perma-
ƹƣƹƿlǄ iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, ƾƿƞǄƾ iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ Ƥƺƽ ƞƿ lƣƞƾƿ ᇵᇲ ƢƞǄƾ Ƣǀƽiƹƨ ǂƩiơƩ 
he is engaged in a gainful activity, or stays in Switzerland for at least 90 days 
ǂiƿƩƺǀƿ ƻƞƽƿƞkiƹƨ iƹ ƞƹǄ ƨƞiƹƤǀl ƞơƿiǁiƿǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇵ FƣƢƣƽƞl Diƽƣơƿ eƞǃ éơƿᄭ. 
Swiss tax residents are subject to unlimited tax liability on their world- wide 
income, with exceptions for enterprises, permanent establishments and 
immoveable properties which are situated abroad. Income derived from one 
of these sources is unilaterally exempt from taxation in Switzerland (Article 
ᇸ I FƣƢƣƽƞl Diƽƣơƿ eƞǃ éơƿᄭ. 
Non- residents with an economic relationship with Switzerland are subject 
to a limited tax liability. Limited tax liability means that taxation is restricted 
to income that is derived from Swiss sources such as income from real estate, 
permanent establishments situated in Switzerland, or from gainful activity 
ơƞƽƽiƣƢ ƺƹ iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇸèII FƣƢƣƽƞl Diƽƣơƿ eƞǃ éơƿᄭ. 
The individual income tax is levied on the taxpayer’s overall income. This 
includes income derived from employment and businesses as well as income 
from immoveable (e.g. rental income) and moveable property (e.g. interest, 
dividends, royalties, lottery winnings etc.), pension schemes and any other 
iƹơƺƸƣ ƿƩƞƿ iƾ ƽƣƞliƾƣƢ ƺƹ ƞ ƾiƹƨlƣ ƺƽ ƽƣƨǀlƞƽ ƺơơƞƾiƺƹ. EǃƣƸƻƿ ƤƽƺƸ iƹƢiǁi-
dual income tax are capital gains realised on privately held moveable and 
iƸƸƺǁƣƞƟlƣ ƞƾƾƣƿƾ ƾǀơƩ ƞƾ ƾƣơǀƽiƿiƣƾ, ǂƺƽkƾ ƺƤ ƞƽƿ, ƺƽ ƽƣƞl ƣƾƿƞƿƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇸ III 
FƣƢƣƽƞl Diƽƣơƿ eƞǃ éơƿᄭ. Iƹ ơƺƹƿƽƞƾƿ, ơƞƻiƿƞl ƨƞiƹƾ ƽƣƞliƾƣƢ ƺƹ Ɵǀƾiƹƣƾƾ ƞƾƾƣƿƾ, 
for example on assets belonging to an individual business, are fully taxable. 
The distinction between private assets and business assets is hence a rather 
weighty one, and in practice often a cause for dispute between the taxpayer 
and the tax authorities, particularly in cases in which a taxpayer incidentally 
acts as a professional trader, for example of securities or real estate, without 
having registered a business. 
FƞƸiliƣƾ ƞƽƣ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƣƢ ƿƺ ƤƺƽƸ ƞƹ ƣơƺƹƺƸiơ ǀƹiƿ Ƥƺƽ iƹơƺƸƣ ƿƞǃ ƻǀƽƻƺƾƣƾ. 
The income of spouses living in an intact marriage, meaning not legally or 
effectively separated, or of registered partnership are jointly assessed (Article 
ᇻ FƣƢƣƽƞl Diƽƣơƿ eƞǃ éơƿᄭ.
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There are various deductions which may be made from the taxable income 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾè ᇵᇵ, ᇵᇵƞ ƞƹƢ ᇵᇷ FƣƢƣƽƞl Diƽƣơƿ eƞǃ éơƿᄭ. Fƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, ƻƽƺƤƣƾƾiƺƹƞl 
expenses are deductible from the gross income if they were closely enough 
linked to or caused by the earning of the income, e.g. expenses for (public) 
transportation, even though capped at a certain amount15, expenses for any 
special clothing required for work, meals taken outside of the home, costs 
for professional development, etc. General deductions are also available for 
private debt interest, alimony or child support payments, donations to tax- 
exempt charities, contributions to social security institutions and pension 
plans, self- owned real estate maintenance costs, and medical expenses if not 
ƽƣiƸƟǀƽƾƣƢ. eƩiƾ liƾƿ iƾ ƹƺƹ- ƣǃƩƞǀƾƿiǁƣ. FǀƽƿƩƣƽ, lǀƸƻ- ƾǀƸ ƞllƺǂƞƹơƣƾ ƞƽƣ 
granted for each dependent child, for married couple and for individuals who 
are providing financial support to a person in need. 
The overall taxable income is taxed as a whole at the applicable tax rate. 
There are no baskets or schedules with different tax rates for certain kinds 
of income. Two different tariffs apply: on the one hand for single persons 
and on the other hand for married couples and/or families and single per-
sons living together with minor children or with persons requiring support 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇵᇸ FƣƢƣƽƞl Diƽƣơƿ eƞǃ éơƿᄭ. eƩƣ ƿƞǃ ƽƞƿƣ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl iƹơƺƸƣ ƿƞǃ 
ơǀƽƽƣƹƿlǄ ƾƿƞƽƿƾ ƞƿ ƞ ƿƞǃƞƟlƣ iƹơƺƸƣ ƺƤ CHFèᇳᇹ’ᇺᇲᇲ ƻƣƽ ƿƞǃ Ǆƣƞƽ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƺƾƣ ǂƩƺ 
ƞƽƣ ƾiƹƨlƣ ƞƹƢ CHFèᇵᇲ’ᇺᇲᇲ ƻƣƽ ƿƞǃ Ǆƣƞƽ Ƥƺƽ ƸƞƽƽiƣƢ ơƺǀƻlƣƾ. IƹơƺƸƣ ǂƩiơƩ 
Ƥƞllƾ Ɵƣlƺǂ ƿƩiƾ lƣǁƣl iƾ ƹƺƿ ƿƞǃƣƢ. eƩƣ ƿƞǃ ƾơƞlƣ iƾ ƻƽƺƨƽƣƾƾiǁƣ. Fƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ: 
ƿƩƣ ƿƞǃ ƽƞƿƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞ ƾiƹƨlƣ ƻƣƽƾƺƹ ǂiƿƩ ƞ ƿƞǃƞƟlƣ iƹơƺƸƣ ƺƤ CHF ᇳᇲᇲ’ᇲᇲᇲ ƞƸƺǀƹƿƾ 
ƿƺ ᇴ.ᇺᇹè% ƞƹƢ ǂiƿƩ ƞ ƿƞǃƞƟlƣ iƹơƺƸƣ ƺƤ CHF ᇴᇲᇲ’ᇲᇲᇲ ƿƺ ᇸ.ᇹᇺè%. é ƸƞƽƽiƣƢ 
couple with the same taxable income would pay federal income tax at a rate 
ƺƤ ᇳ.ᇻᇹè% ƺƽ ᇸ.ᇴᇺè% ƽƣƾƻƣơƿiǁƣlǄ. eƩƣ ƸƞǃiƸǀƸ ƿƞǃ ƽƞƿƣ iƾ ᇳᇳ.ᇷè%: iƿ ƞƻƻliƣƾ 
ƿƺ ƞ ƿƞǃƞƟlƣ iƹơƺƸƣ ƺƤ ƺǁƣƽ CHF ᇹᇷᇷ’ᇴᇲᇲ ᄬƤƺƽ ƾiƹƨlƣƾᄭ ƞƹƢ CHF ᇺᇻᇷ’ᇲᇲᇲ ᄬƤƺƽ 
married couples).ᇳᇸ
Swiss residents with foreign citizenship who are not engaged in any gainful 
activity in Switzerland may request that they are not taxed according to the 
ƺƽƢiƹƞƽǄ ƞƾƾƣƾƾƸƣƹƿ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣƾ, Ɵǀƿ iƹƾƿƣƞƢ ƺƹ ƞ lǀƸƻ- ƾǀƸ Ɵƞƾiƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇶ 
FƣƢƣƽƞl Diƽƣơƿ eƞǃ éơƿᄭ. eƩƣ iƹơƺƸƣ ƿƞǃ iƹ ƿƩƣƾƣ ơiƽơǀƸƾƿƞƹơƣƾ iƾ ƹƺƿ ƟƞƾƣƢ 
ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƣƤƤƣơƿiǁƣ ǂƺƽlƢ- ǂiƢƣ iƹơƺƸƣ, Ɵǀƿè ᅬ ǂiƿƩ ƾƺƸƣ ƣǃơƣƻƿiƺƹƾè ᅬ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ 
ƞƹƹǀƞl liǁiƹƨ ơƺƾƿƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƿƞǃƻƞǄƣƽ ƞƹƢ Ʃiƾ ƺƽ Ʃƣƽ ƤƞƸilǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇶ III FƣƢƣƽƞl 
15 Costs for private transportation are only deductible if no public transportation is 
available. 
ᇳᇸ Tax rates for the tax year 2017.
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Direct Tax Act). The justification of the very favourable lump- sum taxation 
is disputed, but is mainly seen in the goal to attract very wealthy people to 
Switzerland. On the cantonal level, in recent years, some cantons have remo-
ved lump- sum taxation in order to better ensure equality (e.g. Zurich and 
Basel Stadt).
Tax assessment is generally based on a personal tax return filed by each 
individual taxpayer. Switzerland’s system does not provide for a general 
salary tax (commonly referred to as a “pay as you earn” system). However, a 
source tax is levied in some circumstances (see below). The due date for filing 
ƿƩƣ ƿƞǃ ƽƣƿǀƽƹ iƾ ǀƾǀƞllǄ ᇵᇳ MƞƽơƩ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƞlƣƹƢƞƽ Ǆƣƞƽ Ƥƺllƺǂiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƿƞǃ Ǆƣƞƽ. 
The assessment procedure for assessing the federal income tax is delegated 
to the cantons: they assess the federal income tax together with the cantonal 
income and net wealth taxes. 
cc) Federal Corporate Income Tax 
Legal entities that have their statutory seat or their place of effective manage-
ment in Switzerland are subject to the federal corporate income tax , so called 
ƹƣƿ-ƻƽƺƤiƿ ƿƞǃ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇷᇲ FƣƢƣƽƞl Diƽƣơƿ eƞǃ éơƿᄭ. é ơƺƽƻƺƽƞƿiƺƹ iƾ ơƺƹƾiƢƣ-
red to have its statutory seat in Switzerland if it is registered with the Swiss 
cƣƨiƾƿƣƽ ƺƤ CƺƸƸƣƽơƣ. Fƺƽ ƢƣƿƣƽƸiƹiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƣƤƤƣơƿiǁƣ ƻlƞơƣ ƺƤ ƸƞƹƞƨƣƸƣƹƿ, 
the decisive criterion is where the activities which serve to achieve the com-
pany’s business purpose are taken in their entirety. Thereby, the day- to- day 
business decisions taken by the company as opposed to strategic or pure 
administrative decisions are the most important consideration in this regard.
Swiss income tax law generally follows the so- called separation principle: 
lƣƨƞl ƣƹƿiƿiƣƾ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣiƽ ƾƩƞƽƣƩƺlƢƣƽƾ ƞƽƣ ƿƞǃƣƢ ƾƣƻƞƽƞƿƣlǄ. Fƺƽ ƿƩƞƿ ƽƣƞƾƺƹ, dǂiƾƾ 
income tax law does not provide for group taxation. However, a so- called par-
ticipation exemption is available to avoid triple or multiple taxations within a 
ƨƽƺǀƻ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇸᇻ FƣƢƣƽƞl Diƽƣơƿ eƞǃ éơƿᄭ. aƞƽƿƹƣƽƾƩiƻƾ ƞƽƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻƞllǄ ƿƽƣƞƿƣƢ 
as transparent and the net profit of the partnership is attributed to each part-
ƹƣƽ ƞơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƻƞƽƿƹƣƽƾƩiƻ ƞƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇲ FƣƢƣƽƞl Diƽƣơƿ eƞǃ éơƿᄭ. 
Similar to the situation with the federal individual income tax, taxpayers 
with a personal attachment to Switzerland (i.e. statutory seat or effective place 
of management) are unlimitedly liable to pay tax on their world- wide income, 
except for income arising from permanent establishments, enterprises or 
ƽƣƞl ƣƾƿƞƿƣ lƺơƞƿƣƢ ƞƟƽƺƞƢ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇷᇴ I FƣƢƣƽƞl Diƽƣơƿ eƞǃ éơƿᄭ. Nƺƹ- ƽƣƾiƢƣƹƿ 
legal entities with an economic attachment to Switzerland are subject to a 
limited tax liability. This mainly includes income derived from permanent 
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establishments, business enterprises or real estate located in Switzerland 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇷᇴ II FƣƢƣƽƞl Diƽƣơƿ eƞǃ éơƿᄭ.
eƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ơƺƽƻƺƽƞƿƣ iƹơƺƸƣ ƿƞǃ iƾ lƣǁiƣƢ ƞƿ ƞ Ƥlƞƿ ƽƞƿƣ ƺƤ ᇺ.ᇷè%. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, 
because paid taxes are deductible, the effective tax rate is actually lower 
ƞƹƢ ƸƞǄ ƽƞƹƨƣ ƤƽƺƸ ƞƻƻƽƺǃiƸƞƿƣlǄ ᇹ ƿƺ ᇹ.ᇺè%, ƢƣƻƣƹƢiƹƨ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƢǀơƿiƟlƣ 
ƞƸƺǀƹƿ ƺƤ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl, ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ƞƹƢ ơƺƸƸǀƹƞl ƿƞǃƣƾ. é ƽƣƢǀơƣƢ ƿƞǃ ƽƞƿƣ ƺƤ ᇶ.ᇴᇷè% 
applies for associations, foundations and other legal entities.
The required filing date for the tax return depends on the balance sheet and 
ƽƣƻƺƽƿiƹƨ Ƣƞƿƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ lƣƨƞl ƣƹƿiƿǄ. eƩƣ ƿƞǃ ƽƣƿǀƽƹ ƨƣƹƣƽƞllǄ Ʃƞƾ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƤilƣƢ ᇸ ƿƺ 
8 months after the reporting date. 
dd) Source Tax Levied on Income of Certain Individuals and 
Lƣƨƞl Eƹƿiƿiƣƾ
Because the ordinary tax assessment procedure is considered too compli-
cated for taxpayers who are only living in Switzerland for a short period of 
time, Swiss tax residents with foreign citizenship and who do not have a Swiss 
residence permit are taxed at source for their employment income provided 
ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣiƽ ƿƞǃƞƟlƣ ƾƞlƞƽǄ Ƣƺƣƾ ƹƺƿ ƣǃơƣƣƢ ƞƹ ƞƸƺǀƹƿ ƺƤ CHF ᇳᇴᇲ’ᇲᇲᇲ ƻƣƽ Ǆƣƞƽ 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇺᇵᅬᇻᇲ FƣƢƣƽƞl Diƽƣơƿ eƞǃ éơƿᄭ. eƩiƾ Ƹƣƞƹƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƣƸƻlƺǄƣƽ ƺƤ ƾǀơƩ 
an individual is obliged to deduct the source tax directly from the salary and 
to forward it on to the tax administration. The source tax is principally a final 
tax replacing the ordinary income tax. 
Source taxation also applies to certain non- residents who have an econo-
mic attachment to Switzerland and derive income from Swiss sources, such 
as cross- border commuters, artists and sportspersons, or board members and 
ơƺƸƻƞƹǄ Ƣiƽƣơƿƺƽƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇻᇳᅬᇳᇲᇳ FƣƢƣƽƞl Diƽƣơƿ eƞǃ éơƿᄭ.
Ɵᄭ hiƿƩƩƺlƢiƹƨ ᄬAƹƿiơiƻƞƿƺƽǄᄭ eƞǃ
eƩƣ lƞǂ ơƺǁƣƽiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ǂiƿƩƩƺlƢiƹƨ ƿƞǃ iƾ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl éơƿ ƞƹƢ OƽƢiƹƞƹơƣ 
on Withholding Tax.17 Withholding tax is levied on the revenue from certain 
moveable capital assets (particularly dividends and interest on bonds and 
bank accounts), on Swiss lottery winnings (including commercial bets) and 
ƺƹ ơƣƽƿƞiƹ iƹƾǀƽƞƹơƣ ƟƣƹƣƤiƿƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇳ FƣƢƣƽƞl hiƿƩƩƺlƢiƹƨ eƞǃ éơƿᄭ. 
17 FƣƢƣƽƞl éơƿ ƺƹ hiƿƩƩƺlƢiƹƨ eƞǃ ƺƤ ᇳᇵèOơƿƺƟƣƽ ᇳᇻᇸᇷ, dcèᇸᇶᇴ.ᇴᇳ; OƽƢiƹƞƹơƣ ƺƹ hiƿƩƩƺlƢiƹƨ 
eƞǃ ƺƤ ᇳᇻèDƣơƣƸƟƣƽ ᇳᇻᇸᇸ, dc ᇸᇶᇴ.ᇴᇳᇳ.
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The tax is withheld at source by the Swiss debtor of the revenue (e.g. a Swiss 
bank paying out interest on bank accounts or a Swiss company distributing 
ƢiǁiƢƣƹƢƾᄭ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣƹ ƤƺƽǂƞƽƢƣƢ ƺƹ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl eƞǃ éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiƺƹ.
The tax rate for the withholding tax varies depending on the category of 
iƿƣƸ ƞƿ ƩƞƹƢ. Iƿ ƞƸƺǀƹƿƾ ƿƺ ᇵᇷè % Ƥƺƽ ƸƺǁƣƞƟlƣ ơƞƻiƿƞl ƽƣǁƣƹǀƣ ƞƹƢ lƺƿƿƣƽǄ 
ǂiƹƹiƹƨƾ, ᇳᇷè% Ƥƺƽ liƤƣ ƽƣƹƿƾ ƞƹƢ ᇺè% Ƥƺƽ ƺƿƩƣƽ iƹƾǀƽƞƹơƣ ƟƣƹƣƤiƿƾ. 
The purpose of the withholding (anticipatory) tax is to secure correct 
iƹơƺƸƣ ƿƞǃ Ƣƣơlƞƽƞƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ƿƺ ƞǁƺiƢ ƿƞǃ ƣǁƞƾiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ƿƞǃ ƤƽƞǀƢ. Fƺƽ ƿƩƞƿ ƽƣƞ-
son, Swiss resident beneficiaries can request a full reimbursement of the tax 
provided that they fully comply with their income tax reporting obligations 
in due time. 
In contrast, for non- resident beneficiaries the withholding tax is principally 
a final tax. Non- resident beneficiaries may only ask for a full or partial refund 
of the withholding tax if they are entitled to the benefits of the respective 
double taxation treaty concluded between Switzerland and their country of 
tax residence. 
ơᄭ FƣƢƣƽƞl gƞlǀƣ AƢƢƣƢ eƞǃ
eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl gƞlǀƣ éƢƢƣƢ eƞǃ ᄬgéeᄭ ǂƞƾ iƹƿƽƺƢǀơƣƢ iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ ƺƹ 
ᇳè JƞƹǀƞƽǄè ᇳᇻᇻᇷ. eƩƣ ơǀƽƽƣƹƿ gƞlǀƣ éƢƢƣƢ eƞǃ éơƿ ƣƹƿƣƽƣƢ iƹƿƺ Ƥƺƽơƣ ƺƹ 
ᇳèJƞƹǀƞƽǄ ᇴᇲᇳᇲ.18
The Swiss VAT is a general consumption tax aiming at the taxation of non- 
business related domestic consumption of goods and services. Therefore, 
VAT is levied on supplies of goods and services by a taxable person within 
Switzerland as well as on the import of goods and the acquisition of certain 
services from abroad. Because only consumption within Switzerland should 
be taxed, an exemption applies for the export of goods as well as the providing 
of certain services to recipients abroad. 
VAT is typically levied at all stages of the value chain. Since only final 
consumption should be taxed, registered businesses are allowed to deduct paid 
VAT as input VAT (net all- phase principle). This system avoids an accumulation 
of tax within the value chain. Because the tax must be shifted to the consumer, 
ƿƩƣ Ɵǀƾiƹƣƾƾ iƿƾƣlƤ ƾƩƺǀlƢèᅬ ƾǄƾƿƣƸƞƿiơƞllǄèᅬ ƹƺƿ Ɵƣƞƽ ƞƹǄ Ƥiƹƞl ƿƞǃ ơƺƾƿƾ.
18 FƣƢƣƽƞl éơƿ ƺƹ gƞlǀƣ éƢƢƣƢ eƞǃ ƺƤ ᇳᇴè Jǀƹƣè ᇴᇲᇲᇻ ᄬgƞlǀƣ éƢƢƣƢ eƞǃ éơƿ, gée éơƿᄭ, dc 
ᇸᇶᇳ.ᇴᇲ; ƾƣƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ EƹƨliƾƩ ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ gƞlǀƣ éƢƢƣƢ eƞǃ éơƿ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://
ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ᇸaᇵb- éiMhᄭ.
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With regard to VAT, a taxable person is anyone who carries on a business 
ƞơƿiǁiƿǄ iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ. EǃƣƸƻƿiƺƹƾ ƣǃiƾƿ Ƥƺƽ Ɵǀƾiƹƣƾƾƣƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƨƣƹƣƽƞƿƣ ƞ ƿǀƽ-
ƹƺǁƣƽ ƺƤ lƣƾƾ ƿƩƞƹ CHFèᇳᇲᇲ’ᇲᇲᇲ ƻƣƽ Ǆƣƞƽ ƺƽ ƽƣƾƻ. CHFèᇳᇷᇲ’ᇲᇲᇲ ƻƣƽ Ǆƣƞƽ iƹ ơƞƾƣ 
ƺƤ ƹƺƹ- ƻƽƺƤiƿ ƞƹƢ ơƩƞƽiƿƞƟlƣ iƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇳᇲ gƞlǀƣ éƢƢƣƢ eƞǃ éơƿᄭ. 
fƻƺƹ ƽƣƨiƾƿƽƞƿiƺƹ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl eƞǃ éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiƺƹ, ƿƩƣ ƿƞǃƞƟlƣ ƻƣƽƾƺƹ 
must self- declare and self- assess the VAT amount due generally on a quarterly 
or semi- annual basis. 
FƽƺƸ ᇳèJƞƹǀƞƽǄ ᇴᇲᇳᇺ, ƿƩƣ gée ƽƞƿƣƾ ƞƸƺǀƹƿ ƿƺ ᇹ.ᇹè% Ƥƺƽ ƞll ƾǀƻƻliƣƾ ƹƺƿ ƾǀƟ-
jƣơƿ ƿƺ ƞ ƾƻƣơiƞl gée ƽƞƿƣ, ᇵ.ᇹè % Ƥƺƽ ƞơơƺƸƸƺƢƞƿiƺƹ ƾƣƽǁiơƣƾ ƞƹƢ ᇴ.ᇷè % Ƥƺƽ 
certain goods and services typically used in daily life, for example, items like 
ƤƺƺƢ, ǂƞƿƣƽ, Ƣƽǀƨƾ ƞƹƢ ƹƣǂƾƻƞƻƣƽƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇴᇷ gƞlǀƣ éƢƢƣƢ eƞǃ éơƿᄭ. eƩƣ Ƹƞǃi-
ƸǀƸ gée ƽƞƿƣƾ ƞƽƣ ƾƣƿ ƺǀƿ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇵᇲ I Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. 
Any increase or decrease of the VAT rates thus requires the approval of the 
majority of the Swiss people and the cantons in a referendum. Past experience 
of referenda in this area demonstrates that the Swiss people tend to agree 
to a VAT increase if this is linked to special expenditures, for example the 
ƢƣǁƣlƺƻƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƽƞilǂƞǄ iƹƤƽƞƾƿƽǀơƿǀƽƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇵᇲ IIIbis Constitution) or the 
devoting of increased finance to the social security system. 
Ƣᄭ OƿƩƣƽ eƞǃƣƾ 
éơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl éơƿ ƺƹ dƿƞƸƻ Dǀƿiƣƾ,19 the federation levies three 
types of stamp duties purposing to tax the constitution or transfer of rights: 
an issuance stamp duty on the issuance of shares as well as participation and 
dividend certificates in companies and cooperatives, a transfer stamp duty on 
the transfer of securities and a stamp duty on insurance premiums. 
aǀƽƾǀƞƹƿ ƿƺ éƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇵᇳ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ, ƿƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ iƾ ƞlƾƺ ƻƣƽƸiƿƿƣƢ ƿƺ lƣǁǄ 
further consumption taxes, for example a tobacco tax, a beer and a spirits tax, 
a mineral oil tax on crude oil, other mineral oils, natural gas, the products 
obtained from the processing thereof and motor fuel, a mineral oil surtax on 
motor fuel, and an automobile tax on the value of imported or domestically 
manufactured automobiles. Moreover, the federation levies a CO2 tax and a 
federal casino tax.
19 FƣƢƣƽƞl éơƿ ƺƹ dƿƞƸƻ Dǀƿiƣƾ ƺƤ ᇴᇹèJǀƹƣèᇳᇻᇹᇵ, dc ᇸᇶᇳ.ᇳᇲ.
260 Madeleine Simonek / Martina Becker: Tax Law
ᇴ. Cؔءاآءؔ؟ ؔءؗ Cآؠؠبءؔ؟ eؔثؘئ
ƞᄭ eƞǃƣƾ ƺƹ IƹơƺƸƣ ƞƹƢ Nƣƿ hƣƞlƿƩ
aa) Individual Income Tax
The cantons are obliged to levy an individual income tax based on the princi-
ƻlƣƾ ƞƹƢ ƤƽƞƸƣǂƺƽk ƺǀƿliƹƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ eƞǃ HƞƽƸƺƹiƾƞƿiƺƹ éơƿ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾèᇵ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ. 
Tax Harmonisation Act). Because the Tax Harmonisation Act harmonises not 
ƺƹlǄ ƿƩƣ ƿƞǃ lƞǂƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ᇴᇸ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ᄬƩƺƽiǅƺƹƿƞl ƩƞƽƸƺƹiƾƞƿiƺƹᄭ, Ɵǀƿ ƞlƾƺ ƿƩƣ 
federal direct tax law and the cantonal tax laws (vertical harmonisation), the 
cantonal tax laws largely follow the system of the federal direct tax law and 
contain very similar, sometimes even identical provisions. 
There has been however no harmonisation in the area of tax allowances 
and tax rates. As such, the income tax rates vary considerably between the 
cantons and also between the communes of a canton. Traditionally, the 
municipalities with the lowest income tax rates are located in the Canton 
of Schwyz and Zug. The more expensive regions are traditionally found in 
ƿƩƣ FƽƣƹơƩ ƻƞƽƿ ƺƤ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ. Fƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, ƞ ƾiƹƨlƣ ƻƣƽƾƺƹ ǂiƿƩ ƞ ƿƞǃƞƟlƣ 
iƹơƺƸƣ ƺƤ CHF ᇳᇲᇲ’ᇲᇲᇲ ƻƣƽ Ǆƣƞƽ ƻƞǄƾ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ƞƹƢ ơƺƸƸǀƹƞl iƹơƺƸƣ ƿƞǃƣƾ 
ƞƿ ƞ ƿƺƿƞl ƽƞƿƣ ƺƤ ᇺ.ᇳè%20 if he or she lives in Wollerau (Canton Schwyz) and at 
ƞ ƿƺƿƞl ƽƞƿƣ ƺƤ ᇴᇵ.ᇷè%21 if he or she lives in Les Verrieres (Canton Neuchâtel). If 
such a person lived in the City of Zurich the income tax burden (cantonal and 
ơƺƸƸǀƹƞl lƣǁƣlƾᄭ ǂƺǀlƢ ƞƸƺǀƹƿ ƿƺ ᇳᇵ.ᇺè%.22 
Up to this day, political efforts to restrict the cantons’ sovereignty to auto-
nomously determine their income tax rates have been consistently unsuccess-
ful. The positive effects of tax competition have so far been weighted higher 
than equality concerns, in particular since tax competition is considered to 
foster the spending discipline of the cantons (and communes) and to uphold 
their right of fiscal self- determination. A fiscal equalisation system on both 
the cantonal and the federal level aims to balance out to a certain extent the 
ƢiƤƤƣƽƣƹƿ ƟǀƽƢƣƹƾ, Ƥiƹƞƹơiƞl ƾƿƽƣƹƨƿƩƾ ƞƹƢ Ƥiƹƞƹơiƞl ƹƣƣƢƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ᇴᇸ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ 
(and communes), but has not the purpose to prevent tax competition. 
20 IƹơlǀƢiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl iƹơƺƸƣ ƿƞǃ ƿƩƣ ƿƺƿƞl ƽƞƿƣ ƞƸƺǀƹƿƾ ƿƺ ᇳᇳ.ᇲè%.
21 IƹơlǀƢiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl iƹơƺƸƣ ƿƞǃ ƿƩƣ ƿƺƿƞl ƽƞƿƣ ƞƸƺǀƹƿƾ ƿƺ ᇴᇸ.ᇶè%.
22 These calculations include the usual deductions and tax allowances that may however 
vary from canton to canton, and represent the average tax rates for the tax year 2017.
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bb) Net Wealth Tax for Individuals
BƞƾƣƢ ƺƹ éƽƿiơlƣèᇴ eƞǃ HƞƽƸƺƹiƾƞƿiƺƹ éơƿ, ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ƞƽƣ ƺƟliƨƣƢ ƿƺ lƣǁǄ ƞ 
tax on the net wealth of individuals. In general, individuals’ worldwide net 
wealth is subject to the tax, including for example bank deposits, securities, 
ơƞƽƾ ƞƹƢ ƽƣƞl ƣƾƿƞƿƣ, Ɵǀƿ ƹƺƿ ƩƺǀƾƣƩƺlƢ ƨƺƺƢƾ ƞƹƢ ƻƣƽƾƺƹƞl ƣƤƤƣơƿƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇵ 
Tax Harmonisation Act). 
Assets are usually assessed at fair market value at the end of the tax year 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇳᇶ ƞƹƢ éƽƿiơlƣè ᇳᇹ eƞǃ HƞƽƸƺƹiƾƞƿiƺƹ éơƿᄭ. éll ƢƣƟƿƾ ƞƽƣ ƢƣƢǀơƿiƟlƣ. 
FǀƽƿƩƣƽ, ƢiƤƤƣƽƣƹƿ ƻƣƽƾƺƹƞl ƢƣƢǀơƿiƺƹƾ ƞƽƣ ƞǁƞilƞƟlƣ. dƺƸƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ƤǀƽƿƩƣƽ 
provide for tax- free minimums in terms of net wealth (e.g. Canton of Obwalden 
CHF ᇴᇷ’ᇲᇲᇲ, Cƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ kǀƨ CHF ᇳᇲᇲ’ᇲᇲᇲᄭ.ᇴᇵ 
Most of the cantons provide for a system of progressive tax rates. The maxi-
mum cantonal and communal net wealth tax rates range from between appro-
ǃiƸƞƿƣlǄ ᇲ.ᇳè% iƹ ƿƩƣ Cƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ NiƢǂƞlƢƣƹ ƿƺ ᇳè% iƹ ƿƩƣ Cƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ Gƣƹƣǁƞ.24
Ɵᄭ eƞǃƣƾ ƺƹ Nƣƿ aƽƺƤiƿ ƞƹƢ Cƞƻiƿƞl ƺƤ Lƣƨƞl Eƹƿiƿiƣƾ
aa) Net- Profit Tax of Legal Entities
The cantons are also obliged to levy a tax on the net- profit of legal entities. 
Due to horizontal harmonisation, the relevant provisions with regard to the 
tax subject, the tax object, the tax period, the tax procedure, and the tax 
penal law are again very similar or even identical to the federal net- profit tax. 
As already mentioned, the tax rates are however not harmonised and for 
that reason the cantonal and communal corporate income tax rates differ 
quite significantly. Today, for corporations, the effective cantonal and com-
munal tax rates including the federal direct tax rate range from approxima-
ƿƣlǄ ᇳᇴè% iƹ ƿƩƣ Cƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ Lǀơƣƽƹƣ ƿƺ ᇴᇶè% iƹ ƿƩƣ Cƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ Gƣƹƣǁƞ ᄬƤƺƽ ƿƩƣ 
tax year 2017).25 
As a consequence of the ongoing so- called tax proposal 17 that aims at 
abolishing several cantonal preferential tax regimes which the international 
community considers harmful, many cantons intend to considerably reduce 
their corporate income tax rate. In future, in order to remain internatio-
nally attractive, most of the cantons aim at reaching an income tax rate for 
ᇴᇵ Fƺƽ ƞ ƾiƹƨlƣ ƻƣƽƾƺƹ ǂiƿƩƺǀƿ ơƩilƢƽƣƹ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ Ǆƣƞƽ ᇴᇲᇳᇹ.
24 Maximum tax rate for a single person without children for the tax year 2017. 
25 “EƤƤƣơƿiǁƣ ƿƞǃ ƽƞƿƣ” Ƹƣƞƹƾ ƿƩƣ ƞƻƻliơƞƟlƣ ƿƞǃ ƽƞƿƣ ƟƣƤƺƽƣ ƢƣƢǀơƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƿƞǃƣƾ. 
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ơƺƽƻƺƽƞƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ ᇳᇵ ƿƺ ᇳᇷè% ᄬƿƺƿƞl ƺƤ ƣƤƤƣơƿiǁƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl, ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ƞƹƢ ơƺƸƸǀƹƞl 
tax rates). 
bb) Capital Tax
The cantons are also obliged to levy a capital tax on a legal entities’ equity. 
Fƺƽ ơƺƽƻƺƽƞƿiƺƹƾ, ƿƩƣ ƿƞǃƞƟlƣ ƣƼǀiƿǄ iƹơlǀƢƣƾ ƿƩƣ ƻƞiƢ- iƹ ƾƩƞƽƣ ơƞƻiƿƞl, ƞƹǄ 
capital contributions made by the shareholders, and both disclosed and taxed 
hidden reserves. In almost all cantons the tax rate is proportional and ranges 
ƤƽƺƸ ƞƻƻƽƺǃiƸƞƿƣlǄ ᇲ.ᇲᇲᇳè% iƹ ƿƩƣ Cƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ fƽi ƿƺ ᇲ.ᇷè% iƹ ƿƩƣ Cƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ 
Basel Stadt. 
ơᄭ FǀƽƿƩƣƽ Cƞƹƿƺƹƞl eƞǃƣƾ
aa) Inheritance and Gift Taxes 
Inheritance and gifts are not subject to the income tax, neither on the federal 
nor the cantonal level. However, almost all cantons levy a special inheri-
tance and/or gift tax.ᇴᇸ Inheritance and gift taxes are not subject to the Tax 
Harmonisation Act and are therefore not harmonised. 
The inheritance tax is levied on the transfer of assets to heirs and legatees 
(statutory and designated), and the gift tax comprises gifts inter vivos. The 
surviving spouse is exempted from inheritance and gift taxes in all cantons, 
and most cantons also fully exempt all children and grand- children. The tax 
is generally calculated on the market value of the assets at the time of the 
decedent’s death or the gift minus any transferred debts. Other relevant fac-
tors in calculating the tax rate are the total amount of the assets transferred 
and the relationship between the heir and the deceased (degree of relations-
hip) or the donor and the done respectively. 
bb) Real Estate Capital Gains Tax
As outlined above, capital gains realised on moveable and immoveable pri-
vate assets are tax- free on the federal level. Capital gains realised on moveable 
assets are also tax- free on the cantonal level. 
The cantons are however obliged to levy a real estate capital gains tax 
on privately held immoveable property. This tax qualifies as a special kind 
ᇴᇸ The Canton of Schwyz and the Canton of Obwalden levy neither an inheritance nor a gift 
ƿƞǃ; ƿƩƣ Cƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ Lǀǅƣƽƹ Ƣƺƣƾ ƹƺƿ lƣǁǄ ƞ ƨiƤƿ ƿƞǃ.
Madeleine Simonek / Martina Becker: Tax Law 263
ƺƤ iƹơƺƸƣ ƿƞǃ. Eǁƣƹ ƿƩƺǀƨƩ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƞl ƣƾƿƞƿƣ ơƞƻiƿƞl ƨƞiƹƾ ƿƞǃ Ɵƣlƺƹƨƾ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ 
ƩƞƽƸƺƹiƾƣƢ ƿƞǃƣƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇴ eƞǃ HƞƽƸƺƹiƾƞƿiƺƹ éơƿᄭ, ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ ƸǀơƩ lƣƾƾ Ʃƞƽ-
monisation here as compared to the individual and corporate income taxes. 
However, the Tax Harmonisation Act demands that short- term real estate 
capital gains are subject to a higher tax burden in order to combat property 
ƾƻƣơǀlƞƿiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇴèg eƞǃ HƞƽƸƺƹiƾƞƿiƺƹ éơƿᄭ. 
cc) Other Property and Expenditure Taxes
Due to the fiscal sovereignty of the cantons, the cantons or their commu-
nes provide for various further taxes. Most cantons levy a real estate transfer 
tax on the transfer of ownership of immoveable property (house and land) 
including any associated rights located in Switzerland. Some cantons levy a 
special real estate property tax that is assessed on an annual basis and calcu-
lated on the tax value of the property at the end of the tax period. 
All cantons levy a motor vehicle tax on all motor vehicles and trailers loca-
ted in Switzerland. Such motor vehicles must be duly registered in the res-
pective canton in order to receive the registration papers and a number plate.
FǀƽƿƩƣƽ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ƺƽ ơƺƸƸǀƹƞl ƿƞǃƣƾ iƹơlǀƢƣ Ƣƺƨ ƿƞǃƣƾ, ƣƹƿƣƽƿƞiƹƸƣƹƿ 
taxes levied on the ticket price of public events, lottery taxes, stamp duties 
and register duties as far as not covered by the federal stamp duties, city taxes 
or visitor’s taxes for overnight stays, tourism promotion taxes, fire brigade 
exemption taxes, water taxes, etc.
ᇵ. Iءاؘإءؔا؜آءؔ؟ eؔث Aؚإؘؘؠؘءائ 
ƞᄭ Mǀlƿilƞƿƣƽƞl Cƺƹǁƣƹƿiƺƹƾ
One key multilateral convention recently ratified by Switzerland is the 
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters entered 
iƹƿƺ Ƥƺƽơƣ ƺƹ ᇳ JƞƹǀƞƽǄ ᇴᇲᇳᇹ. DƽƞƤƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ OECD ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ Cƺǀƹơil ƺƤ Eǀƽƺƻƣ, 
the convention is today the most comprehensive multilateral instrument 
applicable to all forms of tax co- operation in order to tackle tax evasion and 
avoidance. 
Subsequently, Switzerland also ratified the Multilateral Competent 
éǀƿƩƺƽiƿǄ éƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƹ éǀƿƺƸƞƿiơ EǃơƩƞƹƨƣ ƺƤ Fiƹƞƹơiƞl éơơƺǀƹƿ 
Information. This agreement provides a standardised mechanism to facili-
tate the automatic exchange of financial account information between tax 
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authorities. It has been in force in Switzerland since 1 January 2017 with the 
consequence that the Swiss banking secrecy does no longer apply to holders 
of Swiss bank accounts living abroad. 
dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ ƞlƾƺ ƞơƿiǁƣlǄ ƻƞƽƿiơiƻƞƿƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ OECD’ƾ ǂƺƽkiƹƨ ƨƽƺǀƻƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ 
Bƞƾƣ Eƽƺƾiƺƹ ƞƹƢ aƽƺƤiƿ dƩiƤƿiƹƨ ᄬ“BEad”ᄭ ƻƽƺjƣơƿ. eƩƣ Mǀlƿilƞƿƣƽƞl Cƺƹǁƣƹƿiƺƹ 
ƿƺ IƸƻlƣƸƣƹƿ eƞǃ eƽƣƞƿǄ cƣlƞƿƣƢ Mƣƞƾǀƽƣƾ ƿƺ aƽƣǁƣƹƿ BEad ǂƞƾ ƾiƨƹƣƢ ƟǄ 
Switzerland on 7 June 2017 and shall be ratified in the course of 2018. This ins-
trument should allow countries to easily implement the minimum standard 
ƺǀƿliƹƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ BEad Ƥiƹƞl ƽƣƻƺƽƿƾ. 
Ɵᄭ DƺǀƟlƣ eƞǃƞƿiƺƹ eƽƣƞƿiƣƾ
Switzerland has signed a total of approximately 95 double taxation treaties 
covering individual and corporate income taxes as well as withholding taxes. 
Some of them also include net wealth and capital taxes. Swiss double taxation 
ƿƽƣƞƿiƣƾ ƻƽiƹơiƻƞllǄ Ƥƺllƺǂ ƿƩƣ OECD ƸƺƢƣl ơƺƹǁƣƹƿiƺƹ ǂiƿƩ jǀƾƿ ƞ Ƥƣǂ dǂiƾƾ- 
specific deviations. Unlike the situation regarding income taxes, currently, 
Switzerland has only concluded 8 double taxation agreements covering inhe-
ritance taxes.
ơᄭ Bilƞƿƣƽƞl AƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿƾ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ Eǀƽƺƻƣƞƹ fƹiƺƹ 
dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ iƾ ƹƺƿ ƞ ƸƣƸƟƣƽ ƾƿƞƿƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Eǀƽƺƻƣƞƹ fƹiƺƹ. NƣǁƣƽƿƩƣlƣƾƾ, ƞ 
close relationship exists between the two parties on political, economic and 
cultural levels. Over the years, countless bilateral agreements have been con-
ơlǀƢƣƢ ƿƺ ƨƺǁƣƽƹ ƿƩƣƾƣ ƽƣlƞƿiƺƹƾ. FƽƺƸ ƞ ƿƞǃ ƻƣƽƾƻƣơƿiǁƣ ƿƩƣ Ƹƺƾƿ iƸƻƺƽƿƞƹƿ 
ƞƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿƾ ƞƽƣ ƿƩƣ éƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƹ Fƽƣƣ MƺǁƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ aƣƽƾƺƹƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƻƽƺƩiƟiƿƾ 
ƞƸƺƹƨƾƿ ƺƿƩƣƽƾ ƢiƾơƽiƸiƹƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ Ef ƹƞƿiƺƹƞlƾ iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ ƞƹƢ ǁiơƣ ǁƣƽ-
sa,27 ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ éƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƹ éǀƿƺƸƞƿiơ EǃơƩƞƹƨƣ ƺƤ IƹƤƺƽƸƞƿiƺƹ iƹ eƞǃ Mƞƿƿƣƽƾ 
that replaced the former Agreement on the Taxation of Savings Income as of 
1 January 2017.
27 dƣƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞ lƞƹƢƸƞƽk ơƞƾƣ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƞƻƻliơƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ éƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƹ Fƽƣƣ MƺǁƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ 
aƣƽƾƺƹƾ ƻ. ᇴᇸᇺ.
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III. Landmark Cases
ᇳ. aإ؜ءؖ؜أ؟ؘ آؙ Eؤبؔ؟؜اج: eؔثؔا؜آء آؙ Mؔإإ؜ؘؗ 
ؔءؗ Nآء- Mؔإإ؜ؘؗ Cآبأ؟ؘئ
Iƹ ᇳᇻᇺᇴ, Mƽ.èƞƹƢ Mƽƾ.èHƣƨƣƿƾơƩǂƣilƣƽ ƤilƣƢ ƞ ơƺƸƻlƞiƹƿ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ FƣƢƣƽƞl 
Supreme Court, alleging that their canton of residence (Zurich) applied an 
income tax rate scheme that resulted in a non- justified higher or at least dif-
ferent tax burden for married couples as compared to unmarried taxpayers. 
eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ǀƻƩƣlƢ ƿƩƣ ơƺƸƻlƞiƹƿ, ƢƣơiƢiƹƨ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣƽƣ ƩƞƢ 
been an infringement of the Constitution.28 According to the court, the prin-
ciple of equality requires that a married couple must not be taxed at a higher 
rate than an unmarried couple living in the same circumstances and deriving 
the same taxable income. 
As already mentioned, Swiss income tax law applies family taxation. The 
joint assessment in connection with the progressive income tax rates may 
often lead to a so- called “progression effect”, meaning that the spouses pay 
higher taxes just because of their joint taxation. 
As a consequence of the decision in the Hegetschweiler case, all the can-
tons had to amend their laws. The cantons introduced different measures to 
ensure equal treatment such as splitting spouses’ income to define the appli-
cable tax rate, making special deductions for dual- income households, having 
various applicable tax rate schemes etc. Today, unequal treatment of married 
and unmarried couples is largely abolished on the cantonal and communal 
level. On the federal level, however, unequal taxation is not fully abolished. 
In particular, married couples with a high taxable income are still affected by 
the progression effect.
28 BGE ᇳᇳᇲ Iƞ ᇹ. 
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ᇴ. Aؕ؜؟؜اج- eآ- aؔج aإ؜ءؖ؜أ؟ؘ: Dؘؚإؘئئ؜ةؘ Iءؖآؠؘ 
eؔث cؔاؘئ
Iƹ ᇴᇲᇲᇹ, ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƩƞƢ ƿƺ ƢƣơiƢƣ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞliƿǄ ƺƤ 
degressive income tax rates.29
The people of the Canton of Obwalden approved, in a popular vote, a new 
income tax scale that included degressive tax rates. The tax scale combined 
ƻƽƺƨƽƣƾƾiǁƣ ƿƞǃ ƽƞƿƣƾ ƞƻƻliơƞƟlƣ ƿƺ ƞ ƿƞǃƞƟlƣ iƹơƺƸƣ ƺƤ ǀƻ ƿƺ CHF ᇴᇻᇻ’ᇻᇻᇻ ǂiƿƩ 
Ƣƣƨƽƣƾƾiǁƣ ƿƞǃ ƽƞƿƣƾ ƾƿƞƽƿiƹƨ ƞƿ ƞ ƿƞǃƞƟlƣ iƹơƺƸƣ ƺƤ CHF ᇵᇲᇲ’ᇲᇲᇲ. eƩƣ iƹơƺƸƣ 
tax scale was hence as follows: 
Taxable Income Tax (in CHF) Tax Rate
50’000 5’784 ᇳᇳ.ᇷᇹè%
100’000 ᇵ’ᇺᇵᇶ ᇳᇵ.ᇺᇵè%
ᇵᇲᇲ’ᇲᇲᇲ ᇶᇸ’ᇵᇳᇳ ᇳᇷ.ᇶᇵè%
500’000 ᇸᇷ’ᇺᇴᇶ ᇳᇵ.ᇳᇸè%
1’000’000 ᇳᇳᇹ’ᇸᇷᇲ ᇳᇳ.ᇹᇹè%
Fiƨǀƽƣ ᇳ: eƞǃ IƹơƺƸƣ dơƞlƣ
é ƸƞjƺƽiƿǄ ƺƤ ᇺᇸè% ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƣƺƻlƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ OƟǂƞlƢƣƹ ǁƺƿƣƢ iƹ Ƥƞǁƺǀƽ 
of this new income tax scale, most likely being convinced by the government’s 
argument that low income tax rates for higher taxable income could attract 
very wealthy new taxpayers to the canton. 
However, some taxpayers in the Canton of Obwalden argued before the 
FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƿƩƞƿ ƾǀơƩ ƞ ƻƞƽƿiƞllǄ Ƣƣƨƽƣƾƾiǁƣ ƿƞǃ ƾơƞlƣ iƹƤƽiƹ-
ges the ability- to- pay principle as well as the principle of uniformity. The 
FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ǀƻƩƣlƢ ƿƩiƾ ơƺƸƻlƞiƹƿ. eƩƣǄ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽlǄ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƣƢ 
that the conversion from a progressive to a degressive tax scale at a taxable 
iƹơƺƸƣ ƺƤ CHF ᇵᇲᇲ’ᇲᇲᇲ iƾ ƞƽƟiƿƽƞƽǄ ƞƹƢ ơƞƹƹƺƿ Ɵƣ ƽƣƞƾƺƹƞƟlǄ jǀƾƿiƤiƣƢ. éƾ 
a consequence, the new law did not enter into force. This judgement clari-
fied that, in Switzerland, income tax rates must be progressive or at least 
proportional. 
29 BGE ᇳᇵᇵ I ᇴᇲᇸ.
Madeleine Simonek / Martina Becker: Tax Law 267
ᇵ. aإ؜ءؖ؜أ؟ؘ آؙ Gآآؗ Fؔ؜ا؛: dت؜ئئ cب؟؜ءؚ aإؔؖا؜ؘؖ
A Swiss company belonging to a Swiss group set up a permanent establis-
hment in the Cayman Island. The permanent establishment’s purpose was 
carrying on financing functions for the whole group. In 1999, the cantonal 
tax administration approved the chosen structure in an advance tax ruling 
and confirmed that the income allocated to the Cayman permanent establis-
ƩƸƣƹƿ ǂill Ɵƣ ƣǃƣƸƻƿƣƢ ƤƽƺƸ dǂiƾƾ iƹơƺƸƣ ƿƞǃ. é Ƥƣǂ Ǆƣƞƽƾ lƞƿƣƽ, ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl 
Tax Administration took the view that the Cayman permanent establishment 
did not have enough substance and that therefore the income previously 
attributed to the Cayman permanent establishment will be attributed to the 
Swiss company. The cantonal tax administration informed the Swiss com-
ƻƞƹǄ ƞƟƺǀƿ ƿƩiƾ ƻƺƾiƿiƺƹ iƹ FƣƟƽǀƞƽǄ ᇴᇲᇲᇷ. eƩƣ Ƣiƾƻǀƿƣ ǂƞƾ ƟƽƺǀƨƩƿ ƟƣƤƺƽƣ 
ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ. 
Advance tax rulings are of high practical importance in Swiss tax practice. 
Taxpayers have the possibility of asking the competent tax authority to assess 
the tax implications of a proposed structure or transaction before implemen-
ting the structure or carrying on the transaction. Such assessments have a 
ƟiƹƢiƹƨ ƹƞƿǀƽƣ, ƟƞƾƣƢ ƺƹ éƽƿiơlƣè ᇻè Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣƾ ƺƤ ƨƺƺƢ 
faith and the prohibition of the abuse of rights. 
eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ơƺƹƤiƽƸƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƸƣƹƿiƺƹƣƢ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ ƿƩƣ Ɵƞƾiơ 
requirements for a tax ruling to have binding effect:
– the planned transaction and the accompanying facts must be described 
iƹ Ƣƣƿƞil ƞƹƢ Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ ơƺƽƽƣơƿ ᄬiƹơlǀƢiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƹƞƸƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƿƞǃƻƞǄƣƽᄭ;
ᅬ ƿƩƣ ƽǀliƹƨ Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ ƞƻƻƽƺǁƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ơƺƸƻƣƿƣƹƿ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿǄ;
– the information provided by the tax administration must not be obvi-
ƺǀƾlǄ iƹơƺƽƽƣơƿ;
– the taxpayer, based on the information provided in the ruling, has 
ƿƞkƣƹ ƾƿƣƻƾ ƿƩƞƿ ơƞƹƹƺƿ Ɵƣ ƣƞƾilǄ ǀƹƢƺƹƣ;
ᅬ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ Ʃƞƾ ƹƺƿ ơƩƞƹƨƣƢ; ƞƹƢ
– the public interest does not require a strict application of the law 
where this is contrary to the content of the tax ruling. 
Iƹ ƿƩƣ ơƞƾƣ ƞƿ ƩƞƹƢ, ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ 
company’s trust in the tax ruling should be protected for as long as its trust 
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in the tax ruling was not destroyed.ᇵᇲ However, from the moment the Swiss 
company received the letter from the cantonal authorities informing them of 
ƿƩƣ ƺƻiƹiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl eƞǃ éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiƺƹ, ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ơƺƸƻƞƹǄ ơƺǀlƢ ƹƺ 
longer rely on the ruling and the protection of his good faith. 
ᇶ. aإ؜ءؖ؜أ؟ؘ آؙ Nآء- D؜ئؖإ؜ؠ؜ءؔا؜آء: dؔ؟ؔإج 
h؜ا؛؛آ؟ؗ؜ءؚ eؔث
i, ƞ dǂiƾƾ ƹƞƿiƺƹƞl liǁiƹƨ iƹ Fƽƞƹơƣ, ơƺƸƸǀƿƣƢ ƣǁƣƽǄ ƢƞǄ ƿƺ Gƣƹƣǁƞ Ƥƺƽ ǂƺƽk. 
According to the double taxation treaty concluded between Switzerland and 
Fƽƞƹơƣ, dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ ǂƞƾ ƞllƺǂƣƢ ƿƺ ƿƞǃ i’ƾ iƹơƺƸƣ ƤƽƺƸ ƣƸƻlƺǄƸƣƹƿ. 
diƹơƣ i ǂƞƾ ƞ dǂiƾƾ ƹƺƹ- ƽƣƾiƢƣƹƿ, Ʃiƾ ƣƸƻlƺǄƸƣƹƿ iƹơƺƸƣ ǂƞƾ ƿƞǃƣƢ ƞƿ 
source. Under the Swiss source tax system, the source tax that was deducted 
ƤƽƺƸ i’ƾ ƾƞlƞƽǄ ƟǄ Ʃiƾ ƣƸƻlƺǄƣƽ ƢiƢ ƹƺƿ ƞllƺǂ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƢǀơƿiƺƹ ƺƤ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl 
expenses, such as commuting costs, contributions to pension funds, and per-
sonal tax allowances. Instead, only flat- rate deductions were included in the 
ƾƺǀƽơƣ ƿƞǃ ƾơƞlƣ. i ơƺƸƻlƞiƹƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƾǀơƩ ƿƞǃƞƿiƺƹ iƹƤƽiƹƨƣƾ ƿƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ 
ƣƼǀƞliƿǄ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ éƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ Fƽƣƣ MƺǁƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ aƣƽƾƺƹƾ ơƺƹơlǀƢƣƢ Ɵƣƿ-
ǂƣƣƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ Eǀƽƺƻƣƞƹ fƹiƺƹ.ᇵᇳ
eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ǀƻƩƣlƢ i’ƾ ơƺƸƻlƞiƹƿ. eƩƣ ơƺǀƽƿ ƽƣƤƣƽƽƣƢ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ 
dơƩǀƸƞơkƣƽ Ƣƺơƿƽiƹƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Eǀƽƺƻƣƞƹ Cƺǀƽƿ ƺƤ Jǀƾƿiơƣ ᄬC- ᇴᇹᇻ/ᇻᇵᄭ, ƢƣơiƢiƹƨ 
ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣƾ ƢƣǁƣlƺƻƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ Eǀƽƺƻƣƞƹ Cƺǀƽƿ ƺƤ Jǀƾƿiơƣ iƹ ƿƩƞƿ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ 
ƞƽƣ ƞlƾƺ ƞƻƻliơƞƟlƣ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ƾƺǀƽơƣ ƿƞǃ. Iƹ ƿƩƣ ơƞƾƣ ƞƿ ƩƞƹƢ, i ƣƞƽƹƣƢ Ƹƺƽƣ 
ƿƩƞƹ ᇻᇷè% ƺƤ Ʃiƾ ƿƞǃƞƟlƣ iƹơƺƸƣ iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ. éơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ dơƩǀƸƞơkƣƽ 
doctrine, Switzerland thus had to take into account his personal situation and 
ǂƞƾ ƹƺƿ ƞllƺǂƣƢ ƿƺ ƿƞǃ i lƣƾƾ ƤƞǁƺǀƽƞƟlǄ ƿƩƞƹ ƞ dǂiƾƾ ƿƞǃ ƽƣƾiƢƣƹƿ. 
Due to this decision, the law on the source taxation of employment income 
was amended. The new law does not fundamentally change source taxation 
as such, but gives taxpayers who are taxed at source the possibility to request, 
under certain conditions, an ordinary tax assessment. The new law will most 
likely enter into force on 1 January 2021.
ᇵᇲ BGE ᇳᇶᇳ I ᇳᇸᇳ.
ᇵᇳ BGE ᇳᇵᇸ II ᇴᇶᇳ.
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I. dǂiƾƾ Ciǁil CƺƢƣ 
ᇳ. H؜ئاآإج
The first attempt to codify civil law in Switzerland was undertaken during the 
Helvetic Republic. However, with the decline of the Helvetic Republic in 1803, 
the work on a comprehensive Private Law Code ceased.
In the 19th century, most cantons adopted civil law legislation with the aim 
of ending legal fragmentation and to achieving legal certainty on a canto-
nal level. Whereas the French Code Civil of 1804 was used as a model for the 
(French and Italian speaking) cantons in western and southern Switzerland 
(Fribourg, Ticino, Vaud, Valais, Neuchâtel, and Geneva), other cantons 
(amongst others, Bern, Lucerne, Solothurn, and Aargau) based their legis-
lation on the Austrian Civil Law Code. A third group of German- speaking 
cantons in central and eastern Switzerland managed to, by and large, remain 
uninfluenced by foreign legislators in their enactment of comprehensive civil 
law legislation (for instance Zurich). Finally, a last group of central cantons 
(inter alia, Uri, Schwyz, Glarus, and Appenzell) completely abstained from 
enacting any comprehensive civil law legislation.1
One influential cantonal codification during this period was that made 
on behalf of the canton of Zurich by Jآ؛ؔءء Cؔئأؔإ B؟بءائؖ؛؟؜, a legal 
scholar and professor of law in Zurich, Munich, and Heidelberg. He drafted 
Switzerland’s first independently codified cantonal civil code which entered 
into force in 1856. B؟بءائؖ؛؟؜’s work was well- recognised both nationally 
and internationally and it served as a model for the later codification and har-
monisation of Swiss civil law on the federal level.
1 aؘاؘإ eبآإ/Bؘإء؛ؔإؗ dؖ؛ءجؘؗإ/Jöإؚ dؖ؛ؠ؜ؗ/é؟ؘثؔءؗإؔ Jبءؚآ, Das Schweizerische 
Zivilgesetzbuch, 14th edition, Zurich 2015, § 1 n. 2 et seqq.
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Figure 1: Johann Caspar Bluntschli (1808–1881)2
However, the Swiss civil law landscape was to remain heterogeneous 
throughout the second half of the 19th century. Due to their extensive auto-
nomy, the 25 cantons3 (i.e. federal states) retained their legislative inde-
pendence leading to a variety of civil codes, while there was a total lack of 
legislation in some cantons. As such, significantly different legal principles 
in the field of civil law could be applied to different cases depending on the 
canton at issue. In the 1860s, in the context of this complex landscape, the 
Swiss Lawyers’ Association called for a unified civil code at the federal level. 
However, the first attempt to provide the federal legislator with the compe-
tence to enact such a code was rejected by both the people and the cantons 
in 1872, although shortly thereafter, a limited federal competence to pass the 
federal Code of Obligations of 14 June 1881 was accepted by the people and the 
cantons.4 Finally, in 1898 the people and the cantons transferred the (non- 
exclusive) competence regarding civil law matters to the federal legislator.
ᇴ dƺǀƽơƣ: hikiƻƣƢiƞ, ǂiƿƩ ƽƣƤƣƽƣƹơƣ ƿƺ: cƣƻƽƺƢǀơƿiƺƹ ƤƽƺƸ kǀƽiơƩè ᅬ GƣƾơƩiơƩƿƣ Kǀlƿǀƽ 
hiƽƿƾơƩƞƤƿ. GƣƟƽüƢƣƽ Fƽƣƿǅ, kǀƽiơƩ ᇳᇻᇵᇴ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ᇷKNN- iFGbᄭ.
3 Today, there are 26 cantons within the Swiss confederation. This has been the case since 
1979 when the canton of Jura seceded from the canton of Bern by popular vote.
4 éƾ ƞ Ƹƞƿƿƣƽ ƺƤ ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹƿiǁƣ lƞǂ, ƿƩƣ CƺƢƣ ƺƤ OƟliƨƞƿiƺƹƾèᅬ ƞlƿƩƺǀƨƩ ƞƢƺƻƿƣƢ ƣƞƽliƣƽèᅬ iƾ 
the fifth part of the Civil Code. However, the Code of Obligations formally and in terms 
of general use is considered a distinct codification with a separate Article numbering. 
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ᇴ. Lؘؚ؜ئ؟ؔا؜آء
The Federal Council mandated Eبؘؚء Hبؘؕإ, a professor of state law, private 
law and legal history at the Universities of Basel, Halle, and Bern, to draw up a 
comparative compendium of all existing cantonal civil codes. From 1886 until 
1893,5 Hبؘؕإ published his comparative analysis in four separate volumes.
Figure 2: Eugen Huber (1849–1923)6
Following the comparative analysis, Hبؘؕإ published the first draft of the 
Civil Code in 1900. Until 1904, a commission of experts deliberated on the 
draft. Finally, on 10 December 1907, the Code was adopted by the Federal 
Assembly: It officially came into force on 1 January 1912.
Therefore, this chapter does not address the Code of Obligations and its underlying prin-
ciples (for details on the Code of Obligations see the Chapter Law of Obligations, pp. 305).
5 Notably, Hبؘؕإ’s assistance was mandated several years before the referendum in 1898 
took place which granted the federal legislator the competence to codify civil law. This 
was also the situation with the Criminal Code: although the assistance of Cؔإ؟ dاآآئئ 
was mandated in 1892, the legislative competence was not granted to the federation until 
1898. The most probable explanation behind this is that the Federal Council was fairly 
confident that the referendum would pass and was merely a formality; thus they wanted 
to push the project immediately; see for details on the Criminal Code the Chapter on 
Criminal Law, pp. 369.
6 dƺǀƽơƣ: hikiƻƣƢiƞ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/Ebᇹe- Eᇴfgᄭ. 
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ᇵ. Cآءاؘءا7
The Civil Code is comprised of 977 Articles. It also contains, in a “final title”, 
251 commencement and implementing provisions which, inter alia, regu-
late the transitional relationship between this federal Code and its cantonal 
predecessors. 
After the ten introductory Articles which contain general principles of 
Swiss law (application of the law, good faith, relationship between federal and 
cantonal law, and rules of evidence), the Civil Code is divided into four parts.
Part 1 (Articles 11–89c) covers the Law of Persons and mainly regulates the 
legal personality of natural and legal persons, legal capacity as well as the 
protection of legal personality in case of infringements. It also addresses 
ƿƩƣèiƾƾǀƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƨiƾƿƽƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ơiǁil ƾƿƞƿǀƾ. éƹƺƿƩƣƽ Ƥƺơǀƾ ƺƤ aƞƽƿ ᇳ iƾ lƣƨƞl ƻƣƽ-
ƾƺƹƾ. eƩƣ ƨƣƹƣƽƞl ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹƾ ƺƤ éƽƿiơlƣƾèᇷᇴᅬᇷᇻ ơƺƹƿƞiƹ ƤǀƹƢƞƸƣƹƿƞl ƻƽiƹơiƻ-
les that are universally applicable to all legal persons under Swiss law (such 
as the separate legal personality of legal persons, their capacity to act and to 
acquire rights and obligations, their seat, and rules pertaining to their dis-
solution), while Articles 60–79 specifically address associations and Articles 
80–89a deal with foundations. The last two Articles (Articles 89b and 89c) are 
ƢƣƢiơƞƿƣƢ ƿƺ ƾƺ- ơƞllƣƢ ơƺllƣơƿiǁƣ ƞƾƾƣƿƾèᅬ i.ƣ. ƤǀƹƢƾ ƽƞiƾƣƢ ƟǄ ǂƞǄ ƺƤ ƞ ƻǀƟliơ 
ơƺllƣơƿiƺƹ Ƥƺƽ ơƩƞƽiƿƞƟlƣ ƻǀƽƻƺƾƣƾèᅬ ǂƩƣƽƣ ƹƺ ƞƽƽƞƹƨƣƸƣƹƿƾ Ʃƞǁƣ Ɵƣƣƹ ƸƞƢƣ 
with regards to the management or use of such funds.
Part 2 is dedicated to Family Law (Articles 90–456). It addresses the marital 
law and the marital property law. Although Swiss law does not (yet) allow 
for same-sex marriages, since 2007 the registered partnership between per-
sons of the same sex is regulated in a separate federal law. The family law 
also contains provisions on kinship and, inter alia, regulates the parent- child 
relationship. An entire section (Articles 360–456) sets out measures for the 
protection of adults (including measures for legally incompetent persons and 
the deputyship) and introduces the instruments of the health care proxy and 
the living will into Swiss civil law.8
Part 3 of the Civil Code (Articles 457–640) deals with the Law of Succession 
and is subdivided into provisions relating to heirs, testamentary freedom and 
7 In the following text, where Articles are mentioned without referencing their source 
of law, they are located in the Swiss Civil Code of 10 December 1907, SR 210; see for an 
EƹƨliƾƩ ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Ciǁil CƺƢƣ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/DgᇺN- FFeᇴᄭ.
8 The rules pertaining to the protection of minors and adults, which completely over-
hauled the former custodianship law, entered into force on 1 January 2013. 
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testamentary dispositions, executors, the commencement and legal effects of 
succession as well as the division of the estate.
Part 4 (Articles 641–977) focuses on Property Law. It contains rules regar-
Ƣiƹƨ ƺǂƹƣƽƾƩiƻ iƹ ƨƣƹƣƽƞl, lƞƹƢ ƺǂƹƣƽƾƩiƻ, ƞƹƢ ƺǂƹƣƽƾƩiƻ ƺƤ ơƩƞƿƿƣl. aƞƽƿèᇶ 
also regulates limited rights in rem (e.g. usufruct and other personal servitu-
des, right of residence and building rights), charges on immovable property 
(mortgages and mortgage certificates as personal obligations), and charges on 
chattel (such as pledges and liens). Swiss property law also contains rules on 
possession, including the legal definition of possession, rules pertaining to 
the transfer of possession, and legal remedies in case of interference. The final 
provisions of Part 4 cover formal and material aspects of the land register.
Swiss Civil Code (SCC)
IntroduĐion
General Principles 
(Art. 1-10)
Part I
Law of Persons
(Art. 11-89c)
1. Natural Persons
– Legal Personality
–	 Registraion	of	Ciǀil	
Status
Ϯ.	 Legal	Eniies
–	 General	Proǀisions	
–	 AssoĐiaions
–	 Foundaions
ϯ.	 Collecive	Assets
Part II
Family Law
(Art. 90-456)
1. Marital Law
– Marriage
–	 DiǀorĐe	and	 
Separaion
–	 General	EfeĐts	of	
Marriage
– Marital Property 
Law
2. Kinship
ϯ.	 Protecion	of	
Adults
– Own Arrangements 
for	Care
–	 OiĐial	Measures
–	 Organisaion
Part III
Law of Succession
(Art. 457-640)
1. Heirs
– Statutory Heirs
– Testamentary 
Disposiions
2. Succession
Part IV
Property Law
(Art. 641-977)
1. Ownership
–	 General	Proǀisions
– Land Ownership
–	 Chatel	Oǁnership
1. Ownership
–	 General	Proǀisions
– Land Ownership
–	 Chatel	Oǁnership
3. Possession and 
the Land Register
Part V
Code	of	Oďligaions
Figure 3: Structure of the Civil Code
ᇶ. Mؔإ؜اؔ؟ aإآأؘإاج Lؔت
Swiss family law establishes three marital property regimes to govern the 
ƺǂƹƣƽƾƩiƻ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƻƣƽƿǄ: ᄬiᄭè ƿƩƣ Ƹƞƽiƿƞl ƻƽƺƻƣƽƿǄ ƽƣƨiƸƣ ƺƤ ƻƞƽƿiơiƻƞ-
tion in acquired property (Errungenschaftsbeteiligungᄭ, ᄬiiᄭè ƿƩƣè ơƺƸƸǀ-
nity of property (Gütergemeinschaftᄭ, ƞƹƢ ᄬiiiᄭè ƿƩƣ ƾƣƻƞƽƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƻƽƺƻƣƽƿǄ 
(Gütertrennung). As participation in acquired property constitutes the default, 
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it applies if the spouses do not choose a different regime by marital agree-
Ƹƣƹƿ ᄬƣiƿƩƣƽ ƟǄ ǂƞǄ ƺƤ ƞ ƻƽƣƹǀƻƿiƞl ƞƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿ ƻƽiƺƽ ƿƺ Ƹƞƽƽiƞƨƣ/ơiǁil ǀƹiƺƹ 
or by a contract amending an existing matrimonial property regime follo-
ǂiƹƨ Ƹƞƽƽiƞƨƣ/ơiǁil ǀƹiƺƹᄭ. 
The marital property regime of participation in acquired property 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾèᇳᇻᇸᅬᇴᇴᇲᄭ ƢiƾƿiƹƨǀiƾƩƣƾ ƻƽƺƻƣƽƿǄ ƞơƼǀiƽƣƢ Ƣǀƽiƹƨ ƿƩƣ Ƹƞƽƽiƞƨƣ ƤƽƺƸ 
the individual property belonging to each individual spouse. Consequently, 
two different types of property can be distinguished, namely the individual 
ƞƾƾƣƿƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƾƻƺǀƾƣƾ/ƽƣƨiƾƿƣƽƣƢ ƻƞƽƿƹƣƽƾ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ƞƾƾƣƿƾ ƿƩƣǄ ƞơƼǀiƽƣƢ Ƣǀƽiƹƨ 
the marriage or registered partnership.9
The acquired property under this regime comprises the assets which a 
spouse acquired for valuable consideration during the marital property 
regime, in particular:
– proceeds from employment (e.g. salaries);
– benefits received from staff welfare schemes, social security, and so-
cial welfare institutions; 
– compensation for inability to work;
– income derived from individual property; and 
– property acquired to replace or substitute acquired assets.
BǄ ƺƻƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ lƞǂ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇻᇹᄭ, ƞ ƾƻƺǀƾƣ’ƾ individual property comprises: 
– personal belongings used exclusively by that spouse (e.g. jewellery, 
musical instruments, etc.); 
– assets belonging to one spouse as well as donated and inherited 
property; 
– claims for satisfaction; and 
– acquisitions substituting or replacing individual assets.
The marital property regime is dissolved (i) through divorce, (ii) on the 
death of a spouse, or (iii) on the implementation of a different regime. In the 
case of dissolution of the marital property regime of participation in acquired 
9 By default, registered partners live under the property regime of separation of property, 
see Article 18 of the Federal Act on Registered Partnership for Same Sex Couples of 18 
June 2004, SR. 211.231. However, registered partners can opt- in and declare applicable 
the principles of the regime of participation in acquired property, by way of a property 
agreement.
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ƻƽƺƻƣƽƿǄ, ƣƞơƩ ƾƻƺǀƾƣ ᄬƺƽ, iƹ ơƞƾƣ ƺƤ Ƣiƾƾƺlǀƿiƺƹ ǀƻƺƹ ƢƣƞƿƩ, Ʃiƾ/Ʃƣƽ Ʃƣiƽƾᄭ 
keeps his or her individual property and the spouses (or the surviving spouse 
with the deceased spouse’s heirs) settle their debts to one another. The distri-
bution of the property which was acquired during the marriage depends on 
the surplus or deficit of each spouse’s acquired property, whereby each spouse 
is entitled to one- half of the surplus of the other spouse.
The marital property regime of community of property comprises two types 
of property: the individual assets of each spouse and the common assets of 
the couple. If the community of property regime is dissolved by the death of 
a spouse or the implementation of a different marital property regime, each 
party is entitled to one- half of the common assets and may keep his or her 
own individual assets.
Finally, in the separation of property regime only one type of property 
exists, namely the individual property of each spouse. Each spouse, within 
the limits of the law, administers and enjoys the benefits of his or her indivi-
dual property. If the regime of separation of property is dissolved, each spouse 
is entitled to his or her individual property.
ᇷ. aإآ؛؜ؕ؜ا؜آء آؙ Mؔ؜ءاؘءؔءؘؖ Fآبءؗؔا؜آءئ ؔءؗ 
Fؘؘ eؔ؜؟ئ
éƽƿiơlƣè ᇵᇵᇷ I ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩƣƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƞƾƾƣƿƾ ƸƞǄ Ɵƣ ƿiƣƢ ƿƺ ƞ ƤƞƸilǄ ƟǄ Ƹƣƞƹƾ ƺƤ ƞ 
family foundation created under the Law of Persons or Inheritance Law (see 
Article 80 I) to meet the costs of raising, endowing or supporting family mem-
bers, or for other “similar purposes”. However, the establishment of (new) fee 
tails (Fideikommiss) is explicitly prohibited (Article 335 II, Article 488 II).10 
This prohibition of fee tails aims at preventing the preservation and accumu-
lation of wealth in dynastic family structures.
The Federal Supreme Court follows a strict interpretation of the phrase 
“similar purposes” contained in Article 335. In a key ruling it held that 
the establishment of family foundations for maintenance purposes 
10 Fee tails in civil law jurisdictions were a way of connecting assets to a certain family over 
generations by bequeathing them from father to, traditionally, eldest son thereby, pre-
venting desegregation of the family assets (e.g. lands, castles, etc.). Nowadays common- 
law trusts and, in some jurisdictions, family foundations can serve similar purposes.
280 Peter Georg Picht / Goran Studen: Civil Law
(Unterhaltsstiftungen) is not permissible.11 However, considering the historic 
will of the legislator at the time of the Civil Code’s enactment, this ruling 
was neither imperative nor convincing in the light of modern foundation 
law developments and the generally liberal approach of the Swiss civil law. 
Perhaps indicating a shift towards a less strict approach, the Federal Supreme 
Cƺǀƽƿ ƩƣlƢ iƹ ᇴᇲᇲᇻ ƿƩƞƿ éƽƿiơlƣèᇵᇵᇷ iƾ ƹƺƿ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƣƢ ƞ ƾƺ- ơƞllƣƢ loi d’ap-
plication immédiate preventing the legal recognition of maintenance founda-
tions established under foreign law.12
ᇸ. Iء؛ؘإ؜اؔءؘؖ Lؔت
As a consequence of the freedom to dispose of one’s property as one sees fit 
inter vivos ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇸᇶᇳᄭ, dǂiƾƾ iƹƩƣƽiƿƞƹơƣ lƞǂ ƾƿiƻǀlƞƿƣƾ ƿƩƣ ƤƽƣƣƢƺƸ ƿƺ ƻƞƾƾ 
ƺƹ ǂƣƞlƿƩ ƞƿ ƢƣƞƿƩ ƿƩƽƺǀƨƩ ƿƩƣ Ƹƣƞƹƾ ƺƤ ƞ ǂill ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇶᇹᇲ Iᄭ. hiƿƩiƹ ƿƩƣ 
numerus clausus of types of testamentary dispositions, the testator may, in 
ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ, ƤƽƣƣlǄ ƞllƺơƞƿƣ Ʃiƾ ƻƽƺƻƣƽƿǄ ƞƤƿƣƽ Ʃiƾ ƢƣƞƿƩ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇶᇺᇳ Iᄭ. eƩƣ Ciǁil 
Code stipulates testaments and contracts of succession as the two main types 
of wills. If the testator decides not to make a will, the Civil Code designates 
his offspring, spouse, and other family members as statutory heirs who are 
ƣliƨiƟlƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞ ơƣƽƿƞiƹ Ƽǀƺƿƞ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƣƾƿƞƿƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾèᇶᇷᇹᅬᇶᇸᇸᄭ.
Pursuant to Article 542, an heir must be alive and capable of inheriting 
at the time of succession. While natural persons can inherit both as statu-
tory and testamentary heirs, legal persons can only be appointed as heirs by 
way of a testamentary disposition. In certain constellations (for example if 
a person wilfully and unlawfully caused or attempted to cause the death of 
the decedent) a person will be regarded as unworthy (i.e. incapable) of inhe-
ƽiƿiƹƨ ƿƩǀƾ ƣǃơlǀƢiƹƨ ƾǀơƩ ƻƣƽƾƺƹ ƞƾ ƾƿƞƿǀƿƺƽǄ ƞƹƢ/ƺƽ ƿƣƾƿƞƸƣƹƿƞƽǄ Ʃƣiƽ 
(Articles 540 et seq.). By operation of law the excluded person’s issue inherit 
from the deceased as if the person unworthy to inherit had predeceased the 
deceased.
fƹlƣƾƾ ƿƩƣ ƿƣƾƿƞƿƺƽ Ʃƞƾèᅬ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣlǄèᅬ ƢƣƻƽiǁƣƢ ƞƹ Ʃƣiƽ ƺƤ Ʃiƾ ƺƽ Ʃƣƽ ƾƿƞ-
tutory heirship by way of disinheritance (Articles 477 et seqq., for example 
where the heir has committed a serious crime against the testator or a person 
close to the testator), the freedom to make a will is significantly limited by 
11 BGE 71 I 265.
12 BGE 135 III 614.
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Switzerland’s restrictive regime of forced shares. Under this regime, only the 
“disposable part” of a testator’s assets can be passed- on at his or her discretion 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇶᇹᇲ Iᄭ, ǂƩilƣ ƞ ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹƿiƞl Ƽǀƺƿƞ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƿƣƾƿƞƿƺƽ’ƾ ƞƾƾƣƿƾ iƾ ƞǁƞilƞƟlƣ 
to the testator’s offspring, spouse, and parents (again, unless the testator can 
disinherit one or more of the aforementioned persons).13 This is a statutory 
entitlement. Moreover, the statutory heirs do not simply receive the right to 
make a claim for payment against the testator’s estate; they become heirs ex 
lege. Finally, to protect against the possibility of the testator abusively eva-
ding the heir’s statutory rights inter vivos, the testator’s freedom to dispose of 
his or her assets inter vivos is limited by the possibility of an abatement of such 
ƿƽƞƹƾƞơƿiƺƹƾ ƞƤƿƣƽ Ʃiƾ ƺƽ Ʃƣƽ ƢƣƞƿƩ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇷᇴᇹᄭ. 
Example: At the time of his death the testator, whose spouse had died a 
couple of years earlier, leaves a daughter and assets of around CHF 1 million. 
The testator who had always lived with an attitude “to leave the world a bet-
ter place” had, over a period of three years prior to his death, made various 
donations of CHF 9 million in total to a charitable institution. In his testa-
ment the testator has appointed his daughter as sole heiress. Although the 
daughter had, from a formal point of view, been appointed as sole heiress, 
the inter- vivos- donations substantially undermine her compulsory share. 
Without the deceased’s donations the estate would have amounted to CHF 10 
million and the daughter would, from a legal point of view, have been entitled 
to a compulsory portion of ¾ of the estate (Article 471 I), i.e. CHF 7.5 million. 
However, in economic terms she only gets CHF 1 million under the testament. 
According to Article 527 III gifts made in the last five years before the decea-
sed’s death are subject to abatement. As a result, the daughter can demand 
CHF 6.5 million from the donee (i.e. the charitable institution) to fully restore 
her compulsory portion of the heritage. 
Another key characteristic of Swiss inheritance law is the principle of eo 
ipso ƞơƼǀiƾiƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞƹ ƣƾƿƞƿƣ ƿƩƽƺǀƨƩ ǀƹiǁƣƽƾƞl ƾǀơơƣƾƾiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇷᇸᇲᄭ. fƻƺƹ 
the death of the deceased, the estate in its entirety vests Ƣƿ ƳƢƧƢ)in the heirs. 
According to the eo ipso acquisition, the heirs acquire all of the deceased’s 
assets and debts automatically and without a requirement for any formal act 
ƤƽƺƸ ƿƩƣ Ʃƣiƽƾ ƞƹƢ/ƺƽ ƞƹǄ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƺƽ jǀƢiơiƞl ƟƺƢǄ. éƾ ƞ ƽƣƾǀlƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ 
principle of universal succession the deceased’s claims, rights of ownership, 
limited rights in rem, and rights of possession automatically pass to the heirs 
13 Currently, a draft legislation proposes abolishing the compulsory portion of the parents 
and reducing the offspring’s compulsory portion from ¾ to ½ of their statutory share.
282 Peter Georg Picht / Goran Studen: Civil Law
while the debts of the deceased become the personal debts of the heirs. The 
principle applies to both statutory and testamentary heirs. In order to pro-
ƿƣơƿ Ʃƣiƽƾ ƤƽƺƸ ƽƣơƣiǁiƹƨ ǀƹǂƞƹƿƣƢ ƺƽ ƺǁƣƽ- iƹƢƣƟƿƣƢ/iƹƾƺlǁƣƹƿ ƣƾƿƞƿƣƾ, ƣǁƣƽǄ 
Ʃƣiƽ Ʃƞƾ ƿƩƣ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ ƽƣƹƺǀƹơƣ ƿƩƣ iƹƩƣƽiƿƞƹơƣ ǂiƿƩiƹ ƿƩƽƣƣ ƸƺƹƿƩƾ ƞƤƿƣƽ Ʃƣ/
she learned of the death of the deceased (Article 567). In addition, there is 
a legal presumption in favour of renunciation in case of insolvent estates 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇷᇸᇸᄭ. 
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II. aƽiƹơiƻlƣƾ
ᇳ. Aأأ؟؜ؖؔا؜آء ؔءؗ Iءاؘإأإؘاؔا؜آء آؙ ا؛ؘ Lؔت
éơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ éƽƿiơlƣè ᇳ, ǂƩiơƩ ƞƢƢƽƣƾƾƣƾ ƿƩƣ ƽƣlƞƿiƺƹƾƩiƻ Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ ƾƿƞƿǀƿƺƽǄ 
law and judicial power, the law must be applied by the courts to all legal ques-
tions it provides an answer to, by directly applying its wording or by inter-
preting its terms. However, in the absence of an applicable provision, a court 
shall decide in accordance with customary law and, in the absence of custo-
mary law, in accordance with the rule that it would establish itself if it were 
the legislator. When applying and interpreting the law, the court shall follow 
established doctrine and tradition. 
Article 1 can be regarded as the civil law’s expression of the cons-
titutionally protected and fundamental principle of the rule of law 
(Rechtsstaatlichkeitsgrundsatz) in the following ways. Firstly, it provides for 
the separation of powers by requiring a court to apply the law in cases where 
it is applicable. The legislator passes laws as abstract and general rules; thus it 
is for the courts to concretely apply the law in each individual case. Secondly, 
Article 1 dictates that, when interpreting the law, the courts must follow esta-
blished methodology. Although the reference to doctrine and tradition in 
éƽƿiơlƣèᇳ iƾ ƹƺƿ ƣǃƩƞǀƾƿiǁƣ, ƿƩiƾ ƽƣƤƣƽƣƹơƣ Ƣƺƣƾ ƣǃƻliơiƿlǄ iƢƣƹƿiƤǄ ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩƣƢ 
Ƣƺơƿƽiƹƣ ƞƹƢ ơƞƾƣèlƞǂ ƞƾ ƿǂƺ ƽƣlƣǁƞƹƿ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ ƸƣƿƩƺƢƺlƺƨiơƞl iƹƿƣƽ-
pretation in the process of finding justice.14 eƩiƽƢlǄ, éƽƿiơlƣèᇳ ơƺƹƿƞiƹƾ ƿƩƣ pro-
hibition of arbitrary decisions. In cases where the legislator has not passed any 
legislation, the courts cannot simply decide the case as they see fit. Instead, 
this provision stipulates a process according to which a court must resort to 
customary (e.g. local or professional) laws, if available. If neither explicit nor 
customary laws exist, the court must put itself in the shoes of the legislature 
and establish a rule that could serve as a general statutory law- provision. Even 
14 “Tradition” within the meaning of Article 1 includes established case law as well as estab-
lished administrative practice, see eبآإ/dؖ؛ءجؘؗإ/dؖ؛ؠ؜ؗ, §èᇷ ƹ.èᇵᇹ ƣƿèƾƣƼƼ.
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in this scenario, the court is not permitted unfettered discretion. By dictating 
that the court must “act as legislator”, éƽƿiơlƣèᇳ ƢƣƸƞƹƢƾ ƞ ƾƿƽǀơƿǀƽƣƢ ƞƻƻƽƺ-
ach, and thereby subtly yet effectively reminds courts of the fundamental 
ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƽǀlƣ ƺƤ lƞǂèᅬ ƾǀơƩ ƞƾ ƻƽƺƻƺƽƿiƺƹƞliƿǄ ƞƹƢ lƣƨƞl ƣƼǀƞliƿǄ.
Whilst interpreting the law, the Federal Supreme Court utilises the follo-
wing common legal interpretation methods:
– grammatical interpretation relying on the wording, syntax, and lin-
guistic usage of the relevant text thereby giving words their literal, 
usual, and grammatical meaning;
– systematic interpretation by contextualising a provision within the 
overall legal and statutory framework;
– teleological interpretation which involves a consideration of the pur-
pose and rationale (telos) of a certain provision;
– realistic interpretation which demands that the result of an interpret-
ation must also consider questions of practicability; 
– historic interpretation considering either the legislator’s original will 
or relying on a more flexible historic intention, which may take into 
account later developments; and
– constitutional interpretation requiring courts to choose an interpret-
ation that is best in line with the fundamental values enshrined in the 
Swiss Constitution.15
It should be noted that there is no hierarchy between these methods of inter-
pretation; no method has greater importance or is accorded greater weight 
than the others. Instead, the Federal Supreme Court employs a “pragmatic” 
pluralism of methods. According to this approach, the law must primarily be 
interpreted integrally: its wording, meaning, and purpose as well as its under-
lying values and inherent rationale all must be part of the consideration. 
The interpretation must not be solely based on the wording of the provision. 
Instead, the relevant rule must be considered within the context of the law in 
a broader sense, and as something which can only be properly understood and 
ơƺƹơƽƣƿiƾƣƢèǂƩƣƹ ơƺƹƤƽƺƹƿƣƢ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ Ƥƞơƿƾ ƺƤ ƞƹ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl ơƞƾƣ. Iƹ ƿƩiƾ ǂƞǄ, 
the rule ultimately comes to life through interpretation.16 
15 BGE 106 Ia 33. 
16 BGE 136 III 23, consideration 6.6.2.1. 
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This pragmatic approach is being criticised in the legal doctrine. On clo-
ser examination, it can very well be argued that the Federal Supreme Court 
simply wants to keep the door open for any future interpretation of a certain 
law. Whether such blurring of boundaries between the different interpreta-
tion methods is strengthening legal certainty, is, however, highly doubtful. 
In addition, it becomes more difficult to draw the line between admissible 
further development of the law through judicial decisions (e.g. to close a legal 
loophole) and inadmissible judicial legislation.
ᇴ. Gآآؗ Fؔ؜ا؛
éƹƺƿƩƣƽ ƤǀƹƢƞƸƣƹƿƞl ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ dǂiƾƾ ơiǁil lƞǂ iƾ ƣƹƾƩƽiƹƣƢ iƹ éƽƿiơlƣèᇴ: ƣǁƣƽǄ 
person must act in good faith when exercising his or her rights or fulfilling his or 
her obligations. Further, this provision clarifies that the manifest abuse of a right 
is not protected by law. The general principle of good faith is not limited to civil 
law, but is universally applicable and has validity in all aspects of Swiss law.17
This general rule of good faith (bona fide) can be divided into two 
sub- principles: 
(i) the principle of mutual respect and consideration when exercising 
rights and fulfilling legal obligations; and 
(ii) the prohibition of abuse of rights. 
The principle of good faith requires that the parties to a legal relationship 
(regardless of whether the basis of the relationship is the law or a contract) 
act in an appropriate and honest manner, remaining loyal to their legal obli-
ƨƞƿiƺƹƾ. Iƹ ƿƩiƾ ƽƣƨƞƽƢ, éƽƿiơlƣèᇴ ơƺƢiƤiƣƾ ƞƹƢ ơƩƞƹƹƣlƾ ǀƹiǁƣƽƾƞl Ƹƺƽƞl ƞƹƢ 
philosophical ideas of integrity into the civil law.18
17 BGE 83 II 345: “Article 2 of the Civil Code contains a general rule which applies in addition to 
individual legal norms, and which claims validity also outside the scope of federal civil law, 
e.g. in cantonal procedural law […].”; see also the Chapter on Administrative Law, p. 200.
18 Hence, it is not surprising that the sub- principle of mutual respect has, in fact, a lot 
in common with Iؠؠؔءبؘ؟ Kؔءا’ئ categorical imperative: “Act only according to 
that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal 
law”, Iؠؠؔءبؘ؟ Kؔءا, GƽƺǀƹƢǂƺƽk ƺƤ ƿƩƣ MƣƿƞƻƩǄƾiơƾ ƺƤ Mƺƽƞlƾ, iƹ IƸƸƞƹǀƣl Kƞƹƿ, 
aƽƞơƿiơƞl aƩilƺƾƺƻƩǄ, eƩƣ CƞƸƟƽiƢƨƣ EƢiƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ hƺƽkƾ ƺƤ IƸƸƞƹǀƣl Kƞƹƿ, ƿƽƞƹƾlƞƿƣƢ 
and edited by Mary J. Gregor, Cambridge 2008, pp. 37.
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The principle of good faith reveals an important facet of Swiss civil law: 
éƽƿiơlƣè ᇴ iƾ ƿƩƣ ƨƞƿƣǂƞǄ ƞƹƢ Ƥƺơƞl ƻƺiƹƿ Ƥƺƽ lƣƨƞl iƹƿƣƽƻƽƣƿƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ, ƞƸƺƹƨ 
others, contracts, actions, etc., and, where necessary, the creation of amend-
ments or supplements to legal declarations of intention. Declarations of 
intention (such as declarations aiming at the conclusion of a contract), 
which are unclear, vague, or ambiguous and thus open to various interpre-
tations, will be interpreted in accordance with the so- called principle of trust 
(Vertrauensprinzip).19 This principle mandates that in cases where the true 
intention of the declaring party cannot be unequivocally established, the 
declaration will be interpreted as the receiving party, in good faith, could and 
should have understood it.
Other facets of the principle of good faith are the rule against unusual clau-
ses (Ungewöhnlichkeitsregel) and the ambiguity rule (Unklarheitenregel). In 
particular, in the context of general terms and conditions (GTCs), where an 
unusual or surprising wording was implemented without this being explicitly 
notified, it will not be considered binding on the weaker or less experienced 
party. Furthermore, ambiguous wording will be interpreted by the court to 
the detriment of the author of such a clause.
The prohibition of the abuse of rights allows Swiss courts to rectify or prevent 
a result which, although correct from a purely formalistic legal point of view, 
would be ethically and morally questionable. It leaves room for correcting or 
preventing unbearable consequences which might otherwise undermine the 
trust of the people in the legal system’s ability to provide fair and reasonable 
(and morally understandable) results.20 According to established case law of 
the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland a blatant abuse of the law will not 
Ɵƣ ƨƽƞƹƿƣƢ lƣƨƞl ƻƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇴ IIᄭ.21 Whether an exercise of rights is 
abusive must be determined in light of all the facts and circumstances of the 
individual case. Case- law has established certain types of conduct which will 
be considered abusive such as, amongst others, the exercise of a right which 
19 This applies to declarations of intention to be received by the other party (empfangs-
bedürftige Willenserklärungen). In case of a unilateral declaration of intention, which 
does not need to be received by another party to become legally binding (e.g. testament), 
the Federal Supreme Court applies the so- called principle of intent (Willenstheorie) 
according to which only the true and real intention of the declaring party is relevant 
(and not the interpretation of a hypothetical and [quasi- ] objective receiving third 
ƻƞƽƿǄᄭèᅬ ƞƾ lƺƹƨ ƞƾ ƿƩƣ iƹƿƣƽƻƽƣƿƞƿiƺƹ ƽƣƾǀlƿ ơƞƹ Ɵƣ ƽƣơƺƹơilƣƢ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ ǂƺƽƢiƹƨ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ 
declaration.
20 BGE 125 III 257, consideration 2 a.
21 éƸƺƹƨ ƺƿƩƣƽƾ, JǀƢƨƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ᇶé_ᇳᇶᇳ/ᇴᇲᇲᇺ ƺƤ ᇺ DƣơƣƸƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇲᇻ.
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is not justified by any legitimate interest, the misuse of a legal institution for 
inappropriate interests or the contradictory use of rights in a manner that 
ǁiƺlƞƿƣƾ ǁƞliƢ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ ƟƞƾƣƢ ƺƹ ƻƽiƺƽ ơƺƹƢǀơƿ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, éƽƿiơlƣèᇴ II iƾ ƿƺ 
be applied restrictively and only where the results of strictly applying the law 
would be severely unjust.
Example: With the aim of reducing taxes and duties, the seller and buyer 
of a building plot decide to formally reduce the official purchase price in the 
notarial deed of sale from CHF 6 million to CHF 5 million. However, they 
agree that the buyer shall pay the seller the difference in cash. If the buyer, 
upon signing of the notarial deed of sale, refuses to pay the additional CHF 
1 million, the seller cannot claim invalidity of the notarised purchase agree-
ment in order to get back ownership of the building plot in return for refund 
of the purchase price. Although, from a formal point of view, the notarised 
purchase agreement would be deemed invalid because it did not contain the 
correct purchase price and, therefore, does not fulfil the requirement that the 
entire agreement regarding the sale of land requires the notarial form, such 
approach could promote illicit behaviour of colluding parties and undermine 
the trust of the general public. Therefore, Article 2 II prohibits the seller from 
invoking the invalidity argument.22
One important group of cases revolves around the argument of venire con-
tra factum proprium whereby the contradictory conduct of one party is san-
ctioned if the other party, based on the previous conduct (either by action or 
omission) of the former, could reasonably expect a different behaviour and 
has made (financial) arrangements (e.g. investments) as a result of his or her 
expectations.
EǃƞƸƻlƣ: CƺƸƻƞƹǄ i ᄬƞ liƸiƿƣƢ liƞƟiliƿǄ ơƺƸƻƞƹǄ, GmbH) has rented busi-
ness premises from company Y (a company limited by shares, AG) for a fixed 
period of ten years. According to the rental agreement, the parties agreed to 
start negotiating the terms and conditions of a contract renewal three months 
prior to the end of the ten- year period. During the negotiations the CEO of 
company Y repeatedly stated both verbally and in various e- mails that the 
22 Interestingly, in similar cases (BGE 92 II 323 and BGE 104 II 99) the Federal Court de-
clined to set Article 2 II aside on the basis that the other party had willfully colluded in 
such illicit conduct. Instead, the court emphasised that the legal situation created by 
the parties as a result of the notarised deed of sale (i.e. the transfer of ownership and the 
changes registered in the land register) justified rejecting the formally correct argument 
of invalidity in order to uphold the public reliance and faith with regards to entries in the 
land register.
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lessor wanted to sign a new rental agreement (substantially in line with the 
previous one which allowed the tenant to modify the premises according to 
ƿƩƣ ƿƣƹƞƹƿ’ƾ ƹƣƣƢƾᄭ ǂiƿƩ ơƺƸƻƞƹǄ i “because of the great personal and busi-
ness relationship” between the two parties. 
Against this background and expecting to stay in the business premises for 
ƞƹƺƿƩƣƽ Ƥiǁƣ ƿƺ ƿƣƹ Ǆƣƞƽƾ, ơƺƸƻƞƹǄ i ƾƿƞƽƿƣƢ ƿƺ Ƹƞkƣ ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹƿiƞl ƽƣƹƺǁƞƿiƺƹƾ 
and modifications in the rented space. During this time the parties negotiated 
the terms of a new contract. Company Y CEO has frequently visited the rented 
ƻƽƣƸiƾƣƾ ǂƩƣƽƣ Ʃƣ ơƺƸƻliƸƣƹƿƣƢ CƺƸƻƞƹǄ i ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƾƿƽǀơƿiƺƹ ǂƺƽkƾ. 
However, on the day of the official expiry of the old rental agreement and with 
only minor issues left to negotiate, the CEO of company Y suddenly sent an e-mail 
ƿƺ ơƺƸƻƞƹǄ i ƾƿƞƿiƹƨ ƿƩƞƿ “as you are aware, the rental agreement is expiring today” 
ƞƹƢ ƢƣƸƞƹƢƣƢ ƤƽƺƸ ơƺƸƻƞƹǄ i ƿƺ “remove any installations and to make sure to 
hand over the premises in the original condition by 5.00 pm today at the latest”. 
Iƹ ƿƩiƾ ơƞƾƣ ơƺƸƻƞƹǄ i ơƺǀlƢ, ƟƞƾƣƢ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ CEO’ƾ ƟƣƩƞǁiƺǀƽ, ƽƣƞƾƺƹƞƟlǄ 
expect to sign a new rental agreement which would also allow the tenant to 
make renovations and modifications to the rented premises. By repeatedly 
ƾiƨƹƞlliƹƨ ƿƺ ơƺƸƻƞƹǄ i Ƣǀƽiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƹƣƨƺƿiƞƿiƺƹƾ, ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƺƹƣ ƩƞƹƢ, ƿƩƞƿ ƞ ơƺƹ-
tract renewal could be expected and, on the other hand, by abruptly abando-
ning the negotiations, CEO of company Y has acted in a contradictory manner. 
As a result and based on Article 2 II, Y can neither claim that the original 
ƽƣƹƿƞl ƞƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿ ƣǃƻiƽƣƢ ƹƺƽ ƢƣƸƞƹƢ ƿƩƞƿ ơƺƸƻƞƹǄ i ƩƞƹƢ ƺǁƣƽ ƿƩƣ Ɵǀƾiƹƣƾƾ 
premises in the original condition. 
ᇵ. aبؕ؟؜ؖ؜اج, aآئئؘئئ؜آء, ؔءؗ Lؔءؗ cؘؚ؜ئاؘإ
Property law allocates property by conferring rights in rem (or real rights) 
(dingliche Rechte)23, which have legal effect not only between the parties of a 
contract or other bilateral legal relationship (inter partes), but which can be 
enforced against everyone (erga omnes).24 To make it easy for any interested 
(third) party to ascertain the existence or non- existence of such real rights, 
Swiss property law upholds the principle of publicity (Publizitätsprinzip), 
23 A real right (or right in rem) is a right attached to a movable or immovable property in-
stead of a person.
24 E.g. such as ownership as a real right, conferring absolute freedom within the limits 
ƺƤ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇸᇶᇳ Iᄭ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ Ƹƞkƣ ƞ ơlƞiƸ ƺƤ ƺǂƹƣƽƾƩiƻ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ ƣǁƣƽǄƺƹƣ 
(Article 641 II).
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according to which rights in rem must be made public through suitable 
means.25
With regard to movable property, it is possession (Besitz), i.e. effective 
ơƺƹƿƽƺl ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇻᇳᇻ Iᄭ, ƿƩƞƿ ƨƽƞƹƿƾ ƻǀƟliơiƿǄ. éơơƺƽƢiƹƨlǄ, ƿƺ ǁƞliƢlǄ ƿƽƞƹƾƤƣƽ 
ownership the new owner must legitimately gain possession (traditio) of the 
chattel (Traditionsprinzip, éƽƿiơlƣèᇹᇳᇶ Iᄭ.26 
There are, however, different forms of possession under Swiss law which 
may result in different legal remedies being available for the different cate-
gories of possessors. First, more than one person is able to possess the same 
chattel at the same time (multiple possession). Thus, effective control can 
be exercised directly (immediate possession) or indirectly via another per-
son (indirect possession). Secondly, whoever exercises effective control as if 
he were the owner of the property has direct possession, while someone who 
exercises effective control based on an obligatory right or a limited right 
in rem has derivative possession ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇻᇴᇲᄭ. eƩiƽƢlǄ, ƻƺƾƾƣƾƾiƺƹ ᄬƞƹƢ ƞlƾƺ 
ownership) can be transferred without the need to physically exchange the 
object of possession (Article 924).
Example: A has borrowed a book from his friend B until the end of the semes-
ter (loan for use pursuant to Article 305 of the Swiss Code of Obligations).27 
Under Swiss law, B can sell his book to C while A may continue keeping and 
using the book. In this case B would need to inform A about the sale of the book 
and instruct him to hand it over to C at the end of the semester. Following the 
ƾƞlƣ, B Ʃƞƾ ƿƽƞƹƾƤƣƽƽƣƢ Ʃiƾ iƹƢiƽƣơƿ ƻƺƾƾƣƾƾiƺƹ ᄬƞƹƢ, ƾiƹơƣ ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ ƹƺ Ƣiƽƣơƿ/
indirect ownership, full ownership) to C by way of an instruction pursuant to 
Article 924 (Besitzanweisung). A remains the immediate or direct possessor of 
the book and is entitled to refuse delivery of the book to C based on the same 
ƞƽƨǀƸƣƹƿƾ Ʃƣ/ƾƩƣ ơƺǀlƢ Ʃƞǁƣ iƹǁƺkƣƢ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ B ǀƹƢƣƽ ƿƩƣ lƺƞƹ Ƥƺƽ ǀƾƣ ᄬC ƸƞǄ, 
therefore, not demand that A deliver the book to C during the semester). 
25 eبآإ/dؖ؛ءجؘؗإ/dؖ؛ؠ؜ؗ, § 88 n. 9. For a discussion of the principle of publicity under 
EƹƨliƾƩ lƞǂ, ƾƣƣ hƺlƤƨƞƹƨ FƞƟƣƽ/Bƽiƨiƿƿƞ Lǀƽƨƣƽ ᄬƣƢƾ.ᄭ, Nƞƿiƺƹƞl cƣƻƺƽƿƾ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ eƽƞƹƾƤƣƽ 
of Movables in Europe, Vol. 6, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Malta, Latvia, in European Legal Studies, Vol. 15, Munich 2011, p. 167.
26 Therefore, possession is a fact and not a right.
27 Federal Act on the Amendment of the Swiss Civil Code of 30 March 1911 (Part Five: The 
Code of Obligations), SR 220; see for the English version of the Code of Obligations www.
ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/éJᇴf- gᇵMBᄭ.
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Since possession usually reveals the existence of real rights on the chattel,28 
the possessor has an interest in excluding third parties from illegitimately 
exercising control over the chattel. Therefore, the Civil Code stipulates the 
action for restitution based on possession ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇻᇴᇹᄭ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƣǁƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƞ ǂƽƺƹƨ-
ful dispossession by any third party.29 Additionally, anyone who has a better 
right to possess the chattel (as opposed to possession as such) can utilise the 
action for restitution based on a right to possession ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾèᇻᇵᇶ ƞƹƢ ᇻᇵᇸᄭ. 
Example: After B had sold the book to C, fellow student D stole the book 
from A who was learning in the library. A (and, for that matter, also C as indi-
rect possessor) could demand restitution of possession based on Article 936 
since D was acting in bad faith when obtaining direct possession. 
However, if the current possessor took possession in good faith30 in the case 
of a chattel which was lost by the previous possessor, the latter must reclaim 
possession within a five year period from the moment the chattel was lost 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇻᇵᇶᄭ. Iƹ ƺƽƢƣƽ ƿƺ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿ ƿƩƣ ƻǀƟliơ ƤƞiƿƩ iƹ ơƣƽƿƞiƹ ƿƽƞƹƾƞơƿiƺƹƾ ƞƹƢ 
business practices, Article 934 II stipulates that whenever a chattel has been 
sold at a public auction, or on the market, or by a merchant dealing in goods 
of the same kind, it may be reclaimed from the first and any subsequent bona 
fide purchaser only against reimbursement of the price paid.
If D immediately after he had stolen the book sells it to E, who acted in good 
faith when purchasing the book, A and C have five years to reclaim their pos-
session from E. Assuming that D is neither a merchant nor sold the book to E on 
ƿƩƣ Ƹƞƽkƣƿ, E ơƞƹƹƺƿ ƢƣƸƞƹƢ ƞƹǄ ƽƣiƸƟǀƽƾƣƸƣƹƿ ƤƽƺƸ é ƺƽ C. dƩƺǀlƢ é ƞƹƢ/
or C fail to reclaim possession (and, in case of C, also ownership) within the 
five year- period, E acquires not only possession, but also ownership (!) based 
on Article 714 II in conjunction with Article 934 even though D as thief was 
neither authorised to transfer possession nor ownership. Consequently, after 
five years E becomes the sole possessor and sole owner of the book if he or she 
acted in good faith.
Further, the previous possessor is not permitted to reclaim possession at 
all if he or she had knowingly and willingly entrusted the chattel to another 
ƻƣƽƾƺƹ, ǂƩƺ ƿƩƣƹ ƿƽƞƹƾƤƣƽƽƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƻƣƽƿǄ ƿƺ ƞ ƿƩiƽƢ ƻƞƽƿǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇻᇵᇵᄭ. 
28 éƾ ƞ ơƺƹƾƣƼǀƣƹơƣ, éƽƿiơlƣèᇻᇵᇲ I ƾƿiƻǀlƞƿƣƾ ƞ ƻƽƣƾǀƸƻƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƺǂƹƣƽƾƩiƻ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ᄬƢiƽƣơƿᄭ 
possessor of the chattel.
29 Immediately after becoming aware of the dispossession and the identity of the offender, 
Ɵǀƿ ƹƺ lƞƿƣƽ ƿƩƞƹ ƺƹƣ Ǆƣƞƽ ƞƤƿƣƽ ƿƩƣ Ƣiƾƻƺƾƾƣƾƾiƺƹ ƺơơǀƽƽƣƢ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇻᇴᇻᄭ.
30 See pp. 285.
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Thus, in our example neither A nor C could reclaim (direct or indirect) pos-
session based on Article 936 if the book had not been stolen, but if A had ins-
tead given it to D as a gift. In this case D, if acting in good faith, is protected 
both with regards to possession and ownership since the chain of possession 
had not been broken by way of an unwanted loss or theft.
While a possessor may only invoke an action for restitution of possession 
based on Article 934 (against a possessor acting in good faith) or Article 936 
(against any possessor acting in bad faith), the owner can, additionally, rec-
laim his or her possession through an action for restitution based on ownership 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇸᇶᇳ IIᄭ. fƹlikƣ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹ iƹ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇻᇵᇶ, ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ ƹƺ ƾƻƣơiƤiơ ƿiƸƣ 
limitation period for an action based on Article 641 II, but property ownership 
needs to be proven.
In the case of immovable property, any disposition, change of ownership, 
or the creation or cancellation of as well as any amendments to real rights 
and obligations must be recorded in the land register to have legal effect. The 
expectation that the land register and its entries are accurate is guaranteed 
ƟǄ lƞǂ ǀƹƢƣƽ ƿƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ ƨƺƺƢ ƤƞiƿƩ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾèᇻᇹᇳᅬᇻᇹᇶᄭ.
Swiss contract law is characterised by the far- reaching autonomy of the con-
tracting parties. In this area, the law only defines certain boundaries (e.g. pro-
tection of the typically weak); otherwise it allows the parties to autonomously 
create and define the scope of rights and obligations which their legal arrange-
ment will encompass. In property law, on the other hand, contracting parties’ 
autonomy is much more limited. Since rights in rem take effect erga omnes, 
it must be easy for any third party to ascertain their scope. Therefore, Swiss 
property law follows a strict principle of numerus clausus ƺƤ ƽiƨƩƿƾ iƹèƽƣƸ.31 
The principle of numerus clausus regarding rights in rem means that par-
ties can select only from a given set of rights when they want to establish or 
modify a right in rem (in particular by way of contract). In this regard it is 
important to point out that possession in Swiss civil law does not constitute 
a right in rem. However, possession does indicate who has actual control over 
an asset and thereby ensures adherence to the principle of publicity and pro-
tects good faith.
In addition to ownership (Eigentum), Swiss property law only encompasses 
the following rights in rem:
31 The numerus clausus principle means that there is only a limited number of property rights 
available to the parties. As a consequence, parties are not entitled to create “new” property 
rights by deviating from the catalogue of real rights provided by Swiss property law.
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– easement (both on property and limited personal easement);
– usufruct; and
– lien (including charges on chattels, charges on immovable property 
such as mortgages, special liens, and liens on debts).
ᇶ. cب؟ؘئ آؙ Eة؜ؘؗءؘؖ
When the Civil Code came into effect in 1912, the federal legislator lacked 
the competence to legislate on matters of civil procedural law.32 However, it 
was deemed necessary that the Civil Code should address certain procedural 
issues relating to evidence which could not be separated from the substantive 
civil law. Thus, certain civil procedural matters are covered in this legislation.
One such rule is contained in Article 8: unless the law provides otherwise, 
the burden of proof for establishing an alleged fact shall rest on the person who 
would derive rights from that fact. Consequently, the party asserting a claim 
is obligated to prove the legally relevant facts giving rise to and substantiating 
the claim.33 Conversely, the party arguing that a claim is unsubstantiated or 
unenforceable bears the burden to prove the legally relevant facts that make 
the claim unenforceable (e.g. the argument that the applicable limitation 
period has lapsed or that the claimant had granted the defendant a deferral). 
Further, the legislator of the Civil Code foresaw potential evidence- related 
problems with regard to good faith if the party invoking or relying on bona 
fide ǂƺǀlƢ Ʃƞǁƣ ƿƺ ƻƽƺǁƣ iƿƾ ǁƣƽǄ ƣǃiƾƿƣƹơƣ. eƩƣƽƣƤƺƽƣ, éƽƿiơlƣèᇵ Ƹƞkƣƾ iƿ ơlƣƞƽ 
that where the law makes legal effect conditional on a person’s good faith, 
there shall be a presumption of good faith. However, according to Article 3 II, 
a person cannot invoke the presumption of good faith if he or she has failed 
to exercise the diligence required by the circumstances of the relevant case.
To illustrate this point: A, who is a car dealer, is offered a brand new “Race 
Car Deluxe Limited Edition” by B. B, who had stolen the car a couple of days 
ƣƞƽliƣƽ, iƾ ƞƾkiƹƨ Ƥƺƽ ƞ ƻǀƽơƩƞƾƣ ƻƽiơƣ ƺƤ CHFè ᇵᇲ’ᇲᇲᇲ. eƩƣ ơƞƽ iƹ iƿƾ ơǀƽƽƣƹƿ 
condition is being sold to customers at a market value of CHF 50’000, while 
32 As a matter of fact, only since a referendum in 2000 does the competence for procedural 
law lie with the federal legislator resulting in the Swiss Code of Civil Procedure of 19 
December 2008, SR 272. For details on Swiss Procedural Law, see the Chapter on Civil 
Procedure, pp. 333; see for an English version of the Civil Procedure Code www.admin.ch 
ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ᇹMgG- jabFᄭ. 
33 eبآإ/dؖ؛ءجؘؗإ/dؖ؛ؠ؜ؗ, §èᇹ ƹ.èᇹ.
Peter Georg Picht / Goran Studen: Civil Law 293
the dealer price paid by professional car dealers is approximately CHF 40’000. 
In such a case the low price asked by B should alarm A. Since the car is being 
offered to him 40 % below fair market value and still 25 % off the regular 
dealer price, A could not claim he acted in good faith. Instead, a court would 
argue that he failed to exercise proper diligence when acquiring the car and, 
as a consequence, A would be treated as mala fide (bad faith) possessor.34 
ᇷ. aإؘئبؠؘؗ Cؔأؔؖ؜اج آؙ Jبؘؚؗؠؘءا
Under Swiss law, in order for one’s actions to create legal effect, one must have 
ơƞƻƞơiƿǄ ƺƤ jǀƢƨƣƸƣƹƿ. éơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ éƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇸ, ƞ ƻƣƽƾƺƹ iƾ ơƞƻƞƟlƣ ƺƤ ƣǃƣƽơi-
sing judgement within the meaning of the law if he or she does not lack the 
capacity to act rationally by virtue of being below a certain age or because of 
mental disability, mental disorder, intoxication, or due to other similar cir-
cumstances. The capacity of judgment is not determined abstractly, but in 
light of each legal transaction or event taking place. For instance, Article 94 
requires prospective spouses to be at least 18 years old and to have capacity of 
judgement. In this case it is (only) relevant to ascertain that the prospective 
spouses are mentally capable to understand the general concept of marriage 
and to make such decision based on their own free will. In other words, for 
the question of capacity of judgement in relation to a prospective marriage 
it is irrelevant whether or not one of the prospective spouses would also be 
capable of concluding a complex legal contract.
éơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƨƣƹƣƽƞl ƽǀlƣ ƺƤ ƣǁiƢƣƹơƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇺᄭ, ƿƩƣ ƻƞƽƿǄ iƹǁƺkiƹƨ 
incapacity of judgement as an argument for or against a claim would, in prin-
ciple, have to prove this circumstance. However, capacity of judgement is pre-
sumed under Swiss civil law. Consequently, a party does not have to prove that 
he or she was capable of judgement. As a result, when entering into a contract, 
parties can assume that the other party is legally capable. This presumption 
cannot be rebutted easily or prematurely. Even in cases involving a person 
who constantly brings suits, the presumption cannot be easily rebutted. As 
ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƩƣlƢ, ƹƺƿ ƣǁƣƽǄƺƹƣ ǂƩƺ ƿƽiƣƾ ƿƺ ƣƹƤƺƽơƣ Ʃiƾ/Ʃƣƽ 
alleged rights in a stubborn manner with all possible means, and occasionally 
even disregards norms of common decency, can be automatically regarded 
34 For a similar case see BGE 107 II 41; see also BGE 113 II 397 where the court held that car 
dealers are subject to a higher standard of due care and diligence in the context of pur-
chases and sales of cars compared to other persons. 
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as a psychopathic grumbler (psychopathischer Querulant) who is incapable 
ƺƤ jǀƢƨƣƸƣƹƿè ᅬ ƣǁƣƹ iƤ Ʃƣ ƺƽ ƾƩƣ ƺǁƣƽƾƿƽƣƿơƩƣƾ ƿƩƣ ƻƞƿiƣƹơƣ ƺƤ ơƺǀƽƿƾ ƞƹƢ 
authorities.35 
It should be pointed out that doctrine and case law seem to be moving 
towards a less extreme approach to the presumption of capacity of judge-
ment. In a case from 2004, the Federal Supreme Court was confronted with 
the following facts: In 1985 and thus at the age of 85, E, who had no close rela-
tives at that time, had drawn up a notarised testament in favour of C and a 
local Swiss community (B). From 1988 onwards E needed intensive care and 
nursing in her home. At the instigation of the competent guardianship autho-
rity, A started taking care of E in July 1988 and both women developed a close 
personal relationship. In September 1988, E, accompanied by A, drew up a 
new notarised testament revoking all prior testamentary dispositions and 
appointing A as E’s sole heiress. Shortly afterwards E died. Upon E’s demise, 
B and C brought forward an action for annulment arguing that E had not 
acted with capacity of judgment when drawing up the second testament. The 
Federal Supreme Court upheld the lower courts’ decisions and, effectively, 
declared void the second testament. The Court held that the presumption of 
capacity of judgement cannot be invoked (i.e. the person concerned is regar-
ded as lacking capacity of judgement) if the person concerned, according to 
his or her general constitution, must normally and in all probability be regar-
ded as incapable of exercising judgment. Based on the facts of the case the 
court found that a reduction of the standard of evidence applies and that, as 
a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the person arguing in favour of 
capacity of judgement. Following such a shift of the burden of proof, the party 
confronted with a claim of incapability of judgement may, according to the 
ơƺǀƽƿ, Ɵƽiƹƨ ƤƺƽǂƞƽƢ ƞll Ƥƞơƿƾ ƞƹƢ ƞƽƨǀƸƣƹƿƾ iƹ ƾǀƻƻƺƽƿ ƺƤ Ʃiƾ/Ʃƣƽ ƻƺƾiƿiƺƹ ƟǄ 
providing full proof of capability of judgement.36 
However, this decision raises two questions: Firstly, how can someone 
provide full proof of capability of judgement, in particular in cases where 
the person concerned has already died? Secondly, in an ageing society one 
must be careful not to jump to the conclusion that older people from a cer-
ƿƞiƹ ƞƨƣ ƺƹǂƞƽƢƾ ƺƽ ǂiƿƩ ƞ ơƣƽƿƞiƹ ƩƣƞlƿƩ ơƺƹƢiƿiƺƹ ᄬhƩƞƿ ƞƨƣ/ƩƣƞlƿƩ ơƺƹ-
ditions exactly?) are, in essence, generally presumed to lack capacity of 
35 BGE 98 Ia 324, consideration 3. 
36 Judgment of the FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ᇷC.ᇵᇵ/ᇴᇲᇲᇶ ƺƤ ᇸ OơƿƺƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇲᇶ ᄬiƹ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽ, ơƺƹ-
siderations 3.1. and 3.2).
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jǀƢƨƣƸƣƹƿèᅬ ƿƩƣƽƣƟǄ ƾƩiƤƿiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƟǀƽƢƣƹ ƺƤ ƻƽƺƺƤ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƺlƢƣƽ ƞƹƢ Ƹƺƽƣ ǁǀlƹƣ-
rable members of society. Hence, it will be interesting to see how Swiss courts 
will decide in the future in potentially less obvious cases than the one descri-
bed above. 
ᇸ. dؘأؔإؔا؜آء aإ؜ءؖ؜أ؟ؘ
Part 1 of the Civil Code regulates the legal personality of legal persons in 
Switzerland. In Swiss law, so- called legal persons ( juristische Personen) pos-
sess all the same rights and duties as natural persons, except for those which 
presuppose intrinsically human attributes, such as gender, age, or kinship 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇷᇵᄭ.
The decision to grant legal persons legal capacity and hence the ability to 
possess rights and be subjected to obligations, raises questions regarding 
(i) the internal relationship between the legal person and its owners, foun-
ders, or members and (ii) the external relationship of the legal person vis- à- vis 
third parties. In this regard, Swiss civil law follows the so- called separation 
principle (Trennungsprinzip), a fundamental rule of Swiss civil law in general 
and the Law of Persons in particular.
Under the separation principle, a legal person is separated both in legal and 
economic terms from its members, owners, or founders. In other words, the 
legal person itself is not just the sum of its members, owners, or founders; 
instead, it carries out its own activities and participates independently in eco-
nomic and legal transactions. Hence, the legal person, and not the natural 
persons behind it, is the sole owner of its assets and the sole debtor of its obli-
gations. Consequently, the members, owners (i.e. shareholders), or founders 
are neither entitled to the legal person’s assets nor liable to third parties for 
its debts.37
37 Of course, shareholders are entitled to a company’s profits by way of dividends. However, 
shareholders cannot simply demand that a certain asset (e.g. real estate), belonging to 
the company be gifted to them (this would also be considered a breach of the fiduciary 
duties of the company’s board of directors).
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III. LƞƹƢƸƞƽk Cƞƾƣƾ
The Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgericht) in Lausanne is the highest court 
in Switzerland and also the highest instance court for civil cases. Parties may 
only appeal to the Federal Supreme Court if they have exhausted all other 
procedures before hierarchically lower courts. When considering civil law 
matters, the main task of the Federal Supreme Court is to secure the con-
sistent application of Swiss civil law throughout Switzerland. However, the 
Federal Supreme Court does not engage in reassessing the substance of a case 
or hearing new facts. Instead, it focuses only on whether the law has been 
correctly applied and interpreted.
ᇳ. Lؘؚؔؖج Hبءاؘإ38
In 2006 the Federal Supreme Court was given the (rare) opportunity (i) to 
shed light on the question whether a duty to inform can be derived from the 
general principle of good faith according to Article 2 I and (ii) to elaborate on 
grounds for unworthiness to inherit pursuant to Article 540.
E was born on 7 February 1907. She married an industrialist from Dresden. 
The marriage remained childless. A few years after the death of her husband, 
E relocated to and settled in Basel. She lived in her own flat, independently 
and without need for nursing care. On the 8 or 9 December 1993, E fell heavily 
in her apartment where she laid on the ground for a while without care or 
help. Following her accident, E (hereinafter: testator) was admitted to a nur-
sing home 1993 where she died on 9 July 1995. 
K ᄬƩƣƽƣiƹƞƤƿƣƽ: ƻlƞiƹƿiƤƤᄭ ơƺƸƣƾ ƤƽƺƸ ƞ ƤƞƸilǄ ƿƩƞƿ ƟƣlƺƹƨƣƢ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ơiƽơlƣ ƺƤ 
friends or acquaintances of the testator. According to a will dated 31 August 
ᇳᇻᇺᇹ, ƿƩƣ ƿƣƾƿƞƿƺƽ ƞƻƻƺiƹƿƣƢ K ƞƾ ƾƺlƣ Ʃƣiƽ. Iƹ ƞ ƾǀƻƻlƣƸƣƹƿ ƿƺ ƿƩƞƿ ǂill, ƿƩƣ 
ƿƣƾƿƞƿƺƽ ơƺƹƤiƽƸƣƢ K’ƾ ƻƺƾiƿiƺƹ ƞƾ ƾƺlƣ Ʃƣiƽ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ᇳᇲ MƞƽơƩ ᇳᇻᇻᇳ.
B (hereinafter: defendant) acted as the testator’s lawyer from 1991 until, pre-
sumably, her death. According to the facts the Federal Supreme Court was 
38 BGE 132 III 305.
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bound by, the defendant has been the lawyer of the testator since 1991 and has 
also discussed hereditary issues with her. When asked about her wishes regar-
ding her estate, the testator replied to the defendant with the words: “That’s 
you.” During a visit at the nursing home, the defendant was informed by the 
testator in April 1994 about her will and that she had appointed the defendant 
as her sole heir. The defendant took this testament dated 2 December 1993 
with him when he left the testator.
In addition to the relationship of trust as the testator’s nominated lawyer, 
the defendant exercised great personal influence over the testator. The tes-
tator has not only been in a relationship of trust with the defendant, but 
continued to be in an actual relationship of dependency. With constant gifts 
the testator wanted to gain and maintain the friendship and affection of the 
defendant. The defendant was almost the sole reference person of the testator. 
The testator assumed that the defendant’s consideration towards her was the 
result of genuine friendship and affection, and in this light she appointed the 
defendant as her sole heir. The defendant, on the other hand, did not act on 
the basis of friendship, but wanted to enrich himself. As the courts held, the 
defendant’s true intentions have remained hidden from the testator.
In a handwritten will dated 16 November 1992 or 1993 (the exact year 
could not be determined), the testator appointed the defendant as her sole 
heir and executor and instructed him to pay out a certain sum as a legacy 
(Vermächtnis) to the plaintiff. In a testament dated 2 December 1993, the tes-
tator confirmed the defendant as sole heir and executor, but this time she did 
not include in the new will the legacy in favour of the plaintiff. Finally, in a 
letter to the defendant dated 25 February 1995, the testator revoked all previ-
ous testamentary dispositions and instructions, with the exception of those 
in favour of the defendant.
The plaintiff challenged the defendant’s appointment as the sole heir and 
executor of the testator and, inter alia, brought an action seeking annulment 
ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƿƣƾƿƞƸƣƹƿ ƢƞƿƣƢ ᇴè DƣơƣƸƟƣƽ ᇳᇻᇻᇵ, ƾƿƞƿiƹƨ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƤƣƹƢƞƹƿ ǂƞƾ 
unworthy to inherit and thus incapable to act as executor. The civil court of 
Bƞƾƣl- dƿƞƢƿ ƢƣơlƞƽƣƢ ƿƩƣ lƞƾƿ ǂill ƺƤ ᇴ DƣơƣƸƟƣƽèᇳᇻᇻᇵ iƹǁƞliƢ. eƩƣ ƞƻƻƣllƞƿƣ 
court of the canton of Basel- Stadt came to the contrary conclusion that the 
last will of 2 December 1993 was valid. However, the appellate court ultima-
tely allowed the claim and found that the defendant was unworthy to inherit 
and incapable of exercising the office of executor.
With his appeal, the defendant requested to be, essentially, reinstated as 
executor and declared sole heir of the testator. The appeal was dismissed by 
the Federal Supreme Court.
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With regards to the unworthiness of the defendant to inherit, the Federal 
Supreme Court had to answer the question whether the defendant, as the lawyer 
of the testator, had been under the duty to inform her about his conflict of inte-
rest (as lawyer and presumed sole heir) and, as a result, had maliciously preven-
ƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƿƣƾƿƞƿƺƽ ƤƽƺƸ Ƹƞkiƹƨ ƞ ƹƣǂ ƞƹƢ/ƺƽ ƽƣǁƺkiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƣǃiƾƿiƹƨ ᄬlƞƾƿᄭ ǂill.
Firstly, the court held that the malicious act or omission pursuant to Article 
540 I No 3 does not require that a criminal act had been committed. Secondly, 
the court confirmed the view that there must be a causal relationship bet-
ween the malicious act or omission and the fact that the decedent did not 
make or revoke a will. In cases of a potential failure to provide advice and 
information, the hypothetical causality must be analysed. In other words, one 
Ƹǀƾƿ ƞƾk ǂƩƣƿƩƣƽèᅬ ƟƞƾƣƢ ƺƹ ƞƹ ƺƽƢiƹƞƽǄ ơƺǀƽƾƣ ƺƤ ƣǁƣƹƿƾ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ƨƣƹƣƽƞl 
ƣǃƻƣƽiƣƹơƣ ƺƤ liƤƣèᅬ ƞ ƿƣƾƿƞƿƺƽ ǂƺǀlƢ Ʃƞǁƣ ƸƞƢƣ, ƞƸƣƹƢƣƢ, ƺƽ ƽƣǁƺkƣƢ ƞ ƿƣƾƿƞ-
ment had he or she been informed in a proper manner.
The court then turned to the question whether the defendant was under a 
legal obligation to inform the testator about his true intentions which were 
not based on genuine friendship and about the conflict of interest arising from 
his simultaneous position as the testator’s appointed sole heir and lawyer. The 
court repeated that from 1991 until her death the defendant was the only refe-
rence person for the testator. From the testator’s perspective, this was much 
more than a working or purely professional relationship. Against this back-
ground, the court relied on the principle of good faith (Article 2) requiring 
parties to a legal relationship to act in an appropriate and honest manner. By 
ƹƺƿ iƹƤƺƽƸiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƿƣƾƿƞƿƺƽ ƞƟƺǀƿ Ʃiƾ ƿƽǀƣèᅬ i.ƣ. ƻǀƽƣlǄ ƣơƺƹƺƸiơèᅬ  iƹƿƣƹƿiƺƹƾ 
and the conflict of interest as the testator’s appointed heir and lawyer, the 
defendant had caused the testator to believe that they had a genuine friends-
hip. Against this background the testator kept the defendant as the sole heir 
and executor until her death. Interestingly, the court did see that the testator, 
ƤƽƺƸ ƞ lƣƨƞl ƻƺiƹƿ ƺƤ ǁiƣǂ, ơƺǀlƢ Ʃƞǁƣ ƞƸƣƹƢƣƢ ƺƽ ƽƣǁƺkƣƢ Ʃƣƽ lƞƾƿ ǂill ƞƹƢ/ƺƽ 
made a new testament at any time. However, it emphasised that the testator 
had relied on the (wrong) assumption that she and the defendant shared a 
friendship which made her believe there was no need to revoke her will or to 
make a new one. 
In the eyes of the court, the defendant’s failure to inform the testator about 
his true intentions as well as of his conflict of interest qualified as a grave 
misconduct on his part resulting in his unworthiness to inherit and to act as 
executor.
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ᇴ. Cؔأؔؖ؜اج اآ Mؔإإج39 
In this case the Federal Supreme Court was given the opportunity to exa-
mine the significance, meaning, and implications of the capacity of judgment 
(Article 16) in the context of a (prospective) marriage.
P, born in 1951 and E, born in 1934, had lived together since 1979 and in that 
year the couple initiated the formal preparatory procedure with the aim to 
ƸƞƽƽǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇻᇹ Iᄭ.40 
During the preparatory procedure, P’s mother, siblings, and in- laws spoke 
out against the marriage and, ultimately, brought forward an application to 
prohibit the prospective marriage. They claimed that P was mentally disa-
bled and thus lacked capacity of judgement with regards to the prospective 
marriage. 
Based on three court appointed experts’ opinions, the court of first instance 
came to the conclusion that P’s mental deficiency was in the border area bet-
ween debility and imbecility. However, the court of first instance held that 
neither the couple’s own interests nor those of other persons exclude the pro-
spective marriage. It stated that marrying E was evidently in P’s interest since 
she could remain in her familiar environment. P, who was pregnant at that 
time, was from a medical point of view also not in danger of passing on her 
mental condition onto her offspring, thereby rendering moot this (ethically 
very weak, to say the least) line of argument. As the court, dismissing the 
claim brought forward by P’s family, said: “Since P […] could expect some help 
from E […] in fulfilling her duties as a housewife and mother and since the sim-
ple, nature- loving life on the farm as well as the harmony between [the couple] 
could compensate for some educational shortcomings, it cannot be said that the 
child’s interests […] necessarily preclude the marriage.” P’s family appealed this 
decision to the Higher Court, but to no avail. With their appeal to the Federal 
Supreme Court the claimants essentially repeated their arguments presented 
to the lower courts. 
With regard to the capacity to marry (Article 97 I), the Federal Supreme 
Court had to decide whether P should be regarded as having capacity of 
39 BGE 109 II 273.
40 In a nutshell, the aim of the preparatory procedure is to give the civil register the oppor-
tunity to assure itself that the marriage requirements are met (inter alia, that no fake 
marriage takes place, that the prospective spouses are not already married to other per-
sons, and that the spouses are capable of marrying).
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judgement pursuant to Article 16. Agreeing with the lower courts, it held that 
the (in- )capacity of judgement cannot be determined, once and for all, in an 
abstract manner without regard to the specific circumstances of each indivi-
dual case. 
The Federal Supreme Court held that, as far as the capacity to marry is 
concerned, one must (only) determine whether the fiancées have the mental 
maturity to enter into marriage with the concrete partner and whether they 
are capable of understanding the concept and meaning of a marriage and the 
mutual obligations resulting from it. Interestingly, the court continues by sta-
ting that the requirements regarding the capacity of judgement in the context 
of marrying are higher compared to the capacity of judgement in business or 
commercial dealings. At the same time, however, the requirements must not 
be so high to effectively render meaningless marriage as a constitutionally 
guaranteed right for too large a part of the population. 
In its decision the Federal Supreme Court recalled that the reason for the 
requirement of Article 97 I was to prevent from the very beginning (dysfunc-
tional) marriages which can never result in a true communion between two 
people. In addition, this provision wishes to protect the mentally incapable 
weak(er) person from being at the mercy of his or her spouse. 
However, in a case like the present, capacity of judgement can be affirmed if 
the marriage is only beneficial for the mentally disabled person. By repeating 
the facts determined by the lower courts, the Federal Supreme Court found 
that a marriage with E was in the best interest of P and that she was to be con-
sidered as having capacity of judgement to enter into the marriage according 
to Article 97 I. 
ᇵ. Fآآاؠؔء ت؜ا؛ dؔؠآةؔإ41
In a landmark case involving a famous artwork, the Federal Supreme Court 
clarified its view with regard to claims for restitution based on possession 
(Articles 934 and 936) and the relevant question of good or bad faith of the 
ơǀƽƽƣƹƿ ƻƺƾƾƣƾƾƺƽ iƹ liƨƩƿ ƺƤ éƽƿiơlƣèᇵ.
Iƹ ᇳᇻᇺᇻ, Mƽ.è hƣƽƹƣƽ MƣƽǅƟƞơƩƣƽ, ƞƹ iƸƻƺƽƿƞƹƿ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ơƺllƣơƿƺƽ ƺƤ ơƺƹ-
temporary art, acquired for just over $ 1 million the painting “Footman 
41 BGE 139 III 305; the details, including the names of the parties involved, are publicly 
known.
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ǂiƿƩ dƞƸƺǁƞƽ” ǂƩiơƩ ǂƞƾ ƻƞiƹƿƣƢ iƹ ᇳᇻᇳᇶ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ cǀƾƾiƞƹ ƞƽƿiƾƿ KƞƾiƸiƽ 
Sewerinowitsch Malewitsch, one of the most prominent representatives of 
the so- called Cubo- Futurism school. The sale had been executed on a com-
mission basis by a gallery in Geneva, with the seller remaining anonymous.42
aƽiƺƽ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƞơƼǀiƾiƿiƺƹ, Mƽ.èMƣƽǅƟƞơƩƣƽ ƩƞƢ ơƺƹƾǀlƿƣƢ ǂiƿƩ ƞƹ ƣǃƻƣƽƿ ǂƩƺ 
had confirmed the authenticity of the artwork. However, the expert had also, 
ƞƿ ƿƩiƾ ƻƺiƹƿ, iƹƤƺƽƸƣƢ Mƽ.èMƣƽǅƟƞơƩƣƽ ƞƟƺǀƿ ƽǀƸƺǀƽƾ ǂƩiơƩ ǂƣƽƣ ơiƽơǀlƞ-
ting in the art world claiming that a stolen artwork from Malewitsch was 
ƞƻƻƞƽƣƹƿlǄ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ Ƹƞƽkƣƿ. CƺƹƾƣƼǀƣƹƿlǄ, Mƽ.èMƣƽǅƟƞơƩƣƽ iƹiƿiƞƿƣƢ ƣǃƿƣƹƾiǁƣ 
investigations regarding the “Footman with Samovar” and contacted organi-
sations including Interpol about the matter. These investigations yielded no 
results.
Iƹ ᇴᇲᇲᇶ, ƞ cǀƾƾiƞƹ ƞƽƿ ơƺllƣơƿƺƽ ƤilƣƢ ƞ lƞǂƾǀiƿ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ Mƽ.èMƣƽǅƟƞơƩƣƽ Ƥƺƽ 
restitution of possession based on Articles 934 and 936 (basically arguing 
ƿƩƞƿ Mƽ.èMƣƽǅƟƞơƩƣƽ ǂƞƾ ƹƺƿ ƞ Ɵƺƹƞ ƤiƢƣ ƻƺƾƾƣƾƾƺƽ, Ɵǀƿ ƩƞƢ ƞơƿƣƢ iƹ ƟƞƢ ƤƞiƿƩ 
when acquiring the artwork). He claimed that the “Footman with Samovar” 
had been stolen from the private collection of his parents in 1978, and argued 
ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩiƾ ǂƞƾ ƞ Ƥƞơƿ ƿƩƞƿ Mƽ.èMƣƽǅƟƞơƩƣƽ ƟƺƿƩ ơƺǀlƢ Ʃƞǁƣ ƞƹƢ ƺǀƨƩƿ ƿƺ Ʃƞǁƣ 
known.
Both the District Court of Meilen as the court of first instance and the High 
Court of the Canton of Zurich as the second instance dismissed the case. 
eƩƣǄ ƿƺƺk ƿƩƣ ǁiƣǂ ƿƩƞƿ Mƽ.èMƣƽǅƟƞơƩƣƽ ƹƣiƿƩƣƽ ƩƞƢ ƹƺƽ ƺǀƨƩƿ ƿƺ Ʃƞǁƣ ƩƞƢ 
knowledge of the theft of the painting and, therefore, bona fide could be assu-
ƸƣƢ ƟƞƾƣƢ ƺƹ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇵ I. eƩƣ lƺǂƣƽ ơƺǀƽƿƾ ƩƣlƢ ƿƩƞƿ Mƽ.èMƣƽǅƟƞơƩƣƽ ƩƞƢ ƣǃƣƽ-
cised proper and due diligence because he had initiated investigations prior 
to making the purchase.
The Federal Supreme Court, however, set aside the decision and remitted 
the case to the High Court of the Canton of Zurich. In particular, the Federal 
dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƩƣlƢ ƿƩƞƿ Mƽ.è MƣƽǅƟƞơƩƣƽ ƾƩƺǀlƢ Ʃƞǁƣ ơƺƹƢǀơƿƣƢ Ƹƺƽƣ 
detailed investigations and that, therefore, the presumption of bona fide does 
not apply in the current case. The court, having regard to Article 3 II, poin-
ƿƣƢ ƺǀƿ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƞƽƿ ƣǃƻƣƽƿ ƩƞƢ iƹƤƺƽƸƣƢ Mƽ.è MƣƽǅƟƞơƩƣƽ ƞƟƺǀƿ ƞ ơƺƹơƽƣƿƣ 
rumour indicating that “Footman with Samovar” might have been stolen. 
This was a clear warning sign considering that paintings from Malewitsch 
have only very rarely been put on the market for sale in the relevant period. In 
42 The details and facts of this complex case are contained in the decision CG040012 of the 
District Court of Meilen of 21 December 2010. 
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the court’s own words, “[i]t is sufficient that at the time, from an objective point 
of view, the consultation of one or more experts would have been a suitable (if 
not the most appropriate) and reasonable measure to find out more about this 
rumour and any defects or limitations of the right of disposal on the part of the 
seller.”
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The Swiss Law of Obligations is mainly contained within the Code of 
Obligations, which is Part Five of the Swiss Civil Code and is officially known 
as the Federal Act on the Amendment of the Swiss Civil Code.1 The Federal 
Assembly of the Swiss confederation decreed the creation of the Code of 
Obligations on March 30, 1911; together with the other parts of the Civil Code, 
it entered into force on January 1st, 1912. The Code of Obligations is filed in 
the classified compilation of federal legislation under the number 220 (the 
Civil Code is filed under the number 210).2 The Code of Obligations exists in 
three official language versions, namely in French, German, and Italian.3 For 
several years now, the confederation has also provided an English translation 
and since very recently a Romansh translation too. However, since English is 
not official language and Romansh only partial official language of the Swiss 
confederation, these translations are provided for information purposes only; 
they have no legal force.4 
The Code is regularly subjected to both minor and major retouches, but its 
basis is now over one hundred years old and remains to this day a model of 
simplicity. The legislator followed one basic rule: no more than three para-
graphs per Article and no more than one sentence per paragraph. This rule 
is largely still followed today. Thus, the basic aim of the Code is to codify the 
general rule rather than to enumerate each possible relevant scenario which 
may arise. The Code of Obligations draws key influence from the German 
Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB), but due to the Swiss legislator’s afo-
rementioned ambitions of simplicity, it is much easier to read. Exemplifying 
this, the Swiss Code of Obligations is often chosen by the parties as the law 
applicable to their contracts, particularly in commercial arbitration. 
The Code of Obligations consists of five divisions with the following titles:
– Division One: General Provisions (Articles 1–183)
– Division Two: Types of Contractual Relationship (Articles 184–551)
1 In the following text, where Articles are mentioned without referencing their source of 
law, they are located in the Federal Act on the Amendment of the Swiss Civil Code of 30 
March 1911 (Part Five: The Code of Obligations), SR 220.
2 For an explanation of the classified compilation of federal legislation see Chapter Swiss 
Legal System, pp. 31.
3 Article 70 I of the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 18 April 1999, SR 
101 (Constitution); see for an English version of the Constitution www.admin.ch (https://
perma.cc/M8UJ- S369).
4 See for the English version of the Code of Obligations www.admin.ch (https://perma.cc/
AJ2U- V3MB).
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– Division Three: Commercial Enterprises and the Cooperative (Articles 
552–926)
– Division Four: The Commercial Register, Business Names, and 
Commercial Accounting (Articles 927–964)
– Division Five: Negotiable Securities (Articles 965–1186)
eƩƣ ơƺƢƣ ƣƾƾƣƹƿiƞllǄ ơƺǁƣƽƾ ƿǂƺ Ƹƞjƺƽ ƾǀƟjƣơƿƾ: ơƺƹƿƽƞơƿ ƞƹƢ ƿƺƽƿ lƞǂ iƹèƿƩƣ 
first two divisions and company law (including the law on securities) in 
the subsequent three divisions. Since the two subjects cover different areas 
ƺƤ ƿƩƣè lƞǂ, ƿƩƣǄ ǂill Ɵƣ ƢiƾơǀƾƾƣƢ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞllǄ ƞƹƢ ơƩƽƺƹƺlƺƨiơƞllǄ iƹ ƿƩiƾ 
chapter.
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I. Cƺƹƿƽƞơƿ ƞƹƢ eƺƽƿ Lƞǂ
1. Cآؘؗئ
As mentioned above, the Articles about contract and tort law can be found in 
the first two divisions of the Code of Obligations. The first division with the 
general provisions contains the following subjects subdivided into five titles:
– Creation of Obligations (obligations arising by contract, obligations in 
tort, obligations deriving from unjust enrichment; Articles 1–67)
– Effect of Obligations (performance of obligations, consequences of 
non- performance of obligations, obligations involving third parties; 
Articles 68–113)
– Extinction of Obligations (Articles 114–142) 
– Special Relationships relating to Obligations (joint and several obliga-
tions, conditional obligations, earnest money,5 forfeit money,6 salary 
deductions, and contractual penalties; Articles 143–163)
– Assignment of Claims and Assumption of Debt (Articles 164–183)
It is important to mention that several of the general provisions of the Code 
of Obligations have a broader application than just within the context of the 
Code of Obligations. Article 7 Civil Code7 expressly states: 
“The general provisions of the Code of Obligations concerning the formation, per-
formance and termination of contracts also apply to other civil law matters.”8 
5 Earnest money is a payment already made upon conclusion of a contract with the mean-
ing that the contractual partner may retain the amount in the event of non- performance.
6 Forfeit money is a payment already made upon conclusion of a contract and which is a 
compensation for the right to withdraw from the contract.
7 Swiss Civil code of 10 December 1907, SR 210.
8 E.g. Article 18 about the interpretation of contracts and simulation is applicable to the 
interpretation of testamentary dispositions. The law of succession is contained in the 
Civil Code, starting at Article 457 Civil Code.
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The general provisions have probably undergone the least change as com-
pared to the rest of the Code of Obligations since its creation. Major reform 
projects traditionally face much resistance. For example, due to lacking con-
sensus in the relevant consultation procedure, the Federal Council decided in 
2009 to renounce plans to undertake a comprehensive revision and unifica-
tion of the Articles concerning tort law, opting instead for minor retouches9 
only. Since then, an initiative from the law faculties of all Swiss universities 
with a law department has been launched, demanding that the general part 
of the Code of Obligations be rewritten. The focus of the “CO 2020” initiative 
is threefold: Apply modern, unified language where needed, codify generally 
accepted principles, and modernise certain subjects, e.g. the consequences of 
defect performance of a contract; all this with the aim of continuing the tra-
dition of a simple, citizen- oriented code. The CO 2020 is available in French, 
German, Italian, and English.10 In 2013, the Swiss parliament made a request 
(formally known as a postulate) to the Federal Council with reference to CO 
2020 asking whether the Council would be willing to present entirely revised, 
more up- to- date general provisions of the Code of Obligations for Parliament 
to consider. In January 2018 the Federal Council answered Parliament that the 
consultation process has shown that there is not a societal consensus about 
the need of such a general revision. 
Articles 184–551 cover different types of contractual relationship (so called 
nominate contracts), namely the following:
– Sale and exchange (Articles 184–238), including amongst others spe-
cial provisions about the sale of chattel (Articles 187 et seqq.) and the 
sale of immovable property (Articles 216 et seqq.)
– Gift (Articles 239–252)
– Lease (Articles 253–274g) and usufructuary lease11 (Articles 275–304)
– Loan for use (Articles 305–311) and fixed- term loan (Articles 312–318)
– Employment contracts (Articles 319–362), including the individual 
employment contract and special employment contracts such as the 
9 The retouches implemented to date concern mainly the introduction of a liability in re-
spect of cryptographic keys used to generate electronic signatures or seals (Article 59a).
10 See www.or2020.ch (https://perma.cc/5N9L- FG6T). 
11 The usufructuary lease is a contract whereby the lessor undertakes to grant the lessee 
the use of a productive object or right and the benefit of its fruits or proceeds in exchange 
for rent (Article 275).
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apprenticeship contract, the commercial traveller contract,12 and the 
homeworker contract
– Contract for work and services (Articles 363–379)
– Publishing contract (Articles 380–393)
– Agency contracts (Articles 394–418), including the simple agency con-
tract and special agency contracts such as the brokerage contract and 
the commercial agency contract 
– Agency without authority (Articles 419–424)
– Commission contract (Articles 425–439)
– Contract of carriage (Articles 440–457)
– Payment instruction (Articles 466–471)
– Contract of bailment (Articles 472–491)
– Contract of surety (Articles 492–512)
– Gambling and betting (Articles 513–515)
– Life annuity contract and lifetime maintenance agreement (Articles 
516–529) 
– Simple partnership (Articles 530–551), although thematically these 
provisions belong to company law rather than contract law.13
Not all the regulated contracts have reached the same level of practical sig-
nificance. Chattel sale, sale of immovable property, lease, individual emplo-
yment contract, the contract for work and services, and the simple agency 
contract are probably the most widely used. The rest are, generally speaking, 
utilised on a significantly rarer basis.
Although contractual rules are generally located in the Code of Obligations, 
other federal acts (and not to forget treaties, on a higher level, and ordinances, 
on a lower level) aside from the Code of Obligations also contain contractual 
rules. Generally these other acts regulate a very specific contractual problem 
or relationship. Some notable examples include the Consumer Credit Act14 
(not [yet] available in English), the Product Liability Act15 (not [yet] available 
12 Under a commercial traveller’s contract, the commercial traveller undertakes to broker or 
conclude all manner of transactions on behalf of the owner of a trading, manufacturing, 
or other type of commercial company off the employer’s business premises in exchange 
for payment of a salary (Article 347).
13 See p. 325.
14 Federal Act on Consumer Credit of 23 March 2001, SR 221.214.1.
15 Federal Act on Product Liability of 18 June 2010, SR 221.112.944.
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in English), or the Package Travel Act16 (available in English). Also of import-
ance is the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods (CISG),17 which is also considered to be Swiss law due to Switzerland’s 
ratification of it.
How do the general and the specific provisions of the two first divisions of 
the Code of Obligations interact? Essentially, while the general provisions of 
the Code of Obligations regulate basic questions and contain rules relating to 
all types of contracts, the provisions on the types of contractual relationship 
only stipulate rules for specific certain types of contracts. Thus, in any given 
case, one must first determine whether that case relates to a specific regula-
ted contract. If so, the specific rules apply first and foremost, following the 
principle that the more specific law has priority over the more general one 
(“lex specialis derogat legi generali”). In all cases where the specific rules are 
not helpful, the general provisions apply. For example the provisions about 
the sale of chattle regulate the rights of the customer in the event of defects on 
the contractual object (Articles 197 et seqq.) and also the time limits applica-
ble on these claims (two years after delivery of the object to the buyer, Article 
210 I). But these provisions do not regulate the time limit for the payment of 
the purchase price. So we have to apply the general provisions which state 
that the time limit is ten years (Article 127).
ᇴ. aإ؜ءؖ؜أ؟ؘئ
dǂiƾƾ ơƺƹƿƽƞơƿ lƞǂ Ƥƺllƺǂƾè ᅬ ǂiƿƩiƹ ƿƩƣ liƸiƿƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ lƞǂè ᅬ ƿƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ 
freedom of contract. This means that no one is obligated to conclude a contract 
(unless there is a legal provision requiring this, e.g. the obligation of every car 
owner to secure insurance). It also means that everyone has the right to choose 
his or her contractual partner (as long as this partner has capacity to act18; a 
16 Federal Act on Package Travel of 18 June 1993, SR 944.3; see for an English version of the 
Package Travel Act www.admin.ch (https://perma.cc/BB2D- 84LN).
17 United Nations Convention for the International Sale of Goods of 11 April 1980 (CISG), 
dcèᇲ.ᇴᇴᇳ.ᇴᇳᇳ.ᇳ.
18 A person who is of age and is capable of judgement has the capacity to act (Article 13 Civil 
Code). A person is of age if he or she has reached the age of 18 (Article 14 Civil Code). A 
person is capable of judgement within the meaning of the law if he or she does not lack 
the capacity to act rationally by virtue of being under age or because of a mental dis-
ability, mental disorder, intoxication, or similar circumstances (Article 16 Civil Code).
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toddler, for example, would not have the required capacity). Further, the con-
tent of the contract may be freely chosen by the parties (as far as its content is 
legal: for example, a contract regulating the sale of illegal drugs is not an avai-
lable possibility). The scope of the word “content” here is wide. The parties not 
only have the freedom to define their mutual obligations but also to define 
the consequences for a breach of contract. Regarding the form of a contract, 
the Swiss Code of Obligations generally does not impose requirements: a con-
tract may therefore be concluded orally or even through implicitly consenting 
behaviour (Article 1). Such an implicitly consenting behaviour can e.g. be seen 
in putting a good on the cashiers desk in a self- service shop. There are, howe-
ver, a few exceptions where a special form is legally required, e.g. a sales cont-
ract about real estate must be concluded not only in written form but also as a 
public deed (Article 216 I). Finally, the freedom of contract also encompasses 
the right to alter or terminate a contract. 
Hereinafter, the functioning of the contract law part of the Code of 
Obligations will be discussed grouped by topics chronologically following the 
lifespan of a contract.
ƞᄭ Cƺƹơlǀƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞ Cƺƹƿƽƞơƿ
The conclusion of a contract requires a mutual expression of intent by the par-
ties, which can be expressed or implied (Article 1). That means that the parties 
must consent on every basic point (essentialia negotii); only secondary terms 
may be left open (Article 2). The basic points of a contract are determined by 
the characteristics of the contract under discussion.19 The usual process for 
concluding a contract is an offer and then the unqualified acceptance of this 
offer by the other contractual party, e.g. a shop offers a blouse for CHF 150 
and the customer agrees by bringing the item to the cash desk.20 But there 
can also be “loops” in the process, where an offer leads to a counter- offer (e.g. 
the customer asks the shop owner if she can have a discount of CHF 20 when 
she buys 2 blouses for CHF 280 altogether) which must then be accepted. Or 
Party A makes a request for an offer to Party B, which Party A can accept upon 
receipt (e.g. the customer asks for the total price of two blouses). It can be said 
19 Nominate vs. innominate contracts, see pp. 321.
20 Note that the essentialia negotii of a chattle sale are that the seller undertakes to deliver 
the item sold and to transfer ownership of it to the buyer in return for the sale price, 
which the buyer undertakes to pay to the seller. So the seller and buyer have to agree on 
the item sold and the sale price. 
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that a valid offer and a valid acceptance are always needed at some point to 
conclude a contract. 
It goes without saying that contractual parties must have capacity to act in 
order to create rights and obligations through their actions (Article 12 Civil 
Code). According to Article 13 Civil Code a person who is of age (Article 14 
Civil Code: 18 years) and is capable of judgement (Article 16 Civil Code) has the 
capacity to act. A contract can be concluded not only by a party themselves 
but also by their representatives. Non- commercial representation is regula-
ted in Articles 32–40, while commercial representation is covered by Articles 
458–465.21 Commercial representatives act on behalf of a trading, manufac-
turing, or other commercial business whereas the rules for non- commercial 
representation are applicable in all other cases of representation.
Ɵᄭ Iƹƿƣƽƻƽƣƿƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞ Cƺƹƿƽƞơƿ
The interpretation of a contract orients itself in the first place on the principle 
of will (subjective interpretation), or as stated in Article 18 I
“[…] the true and common intention of the parties must be ascertained without 
dwelling on any inexact expressions or designations they may have used either in 
error or by way of disguising the true nature of the agreement.” 
If e.g. two parties call the subject of their sales contract congruently “cat” 
although it is biologically a dog, that does not matter. They willingly agreed 
on that specific pet, the cat is covered by their so called natural consensus.
Only where there is doubt about the common intention of the parties does 
the principle of confidence (objective interpretation) become relevant. As 
such, the principle of confidence is not codified in Swiss law; the basis of the 
principle is thus largely seen as stemming from the duty to act in good faith, 
established by Article 2 Civil Code: 
“Every person must act in good faith in the exercise of his or her rights and in the 
performance of his or her obligations.” 
According to the principle of objective interpretation, a declaration of 
intention is to be understood the way the other party of the contract could 
21 It should also be noted that representation rules are also contained in company law, e.g. 
Article 718 et seqq. for companies limited by shares.
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and did in good faith understand it. If e.g. a customer orders “chips” in a Swiss 
restaurant, he has to expect potato crisps and not French fries (the latter are 
called “Pommes frites”). Therefore an English customer that orders chips con-
cludes a contract on potato crisps and not French fries according to the so 
called normative consensus of the parties. Although the English customer has 
concluded a valid contract, he may invoke a defect in consent in order to inva-
lidate the contract.22 
If the diverging interpretations of both parties are equally admissible, there 
is no consent but rather dissent and therefore no contract has ever come into 
legal existence.
ơᄭ DƣƤƣơƿƾ iƹ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹơlǀƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞ Cƺƹƿƽƞơƿ
The Code of Obligations establishes three cases where there will be a defect 
in the conclusion of a contract. These defects in the conclusion of a cont-
ract result in the contract being null/void ab initio. First, a contract is void 
if its terms are (from the outset) impossible (Article 20 I, e.g. a sales contract 
about a specific item that was incinerated before the conclusion of the cont-
ract). Second, a contract is also void, when its terms are unlawful or immoral 
(Article 20 I, the classic case would be a contract for the sale of prohibited 
drugs). Finally a contract is void if a prescribed formal requirement has not 
been fulfilled (Article 11, e.g. according to Article 216 I a contract for the sale 
of immovable property must be concluded as a public deed).
Ƣᄭ DƣƤƣơƿƾ iƹ Cƺƹƾƣƹƿ
Falling under defects in consent are error, fraud, and duress.
The error must be fundamental (Article 23). Article 24 enumerates the 
four cases where an error is fundamental. The cases in paragraph I No 1–3 
describe situations where a contract has been concluded due to the princi-
ple of confidence (normative consensus) but where one party has a different 
intention (e.g. „when an English customer orders chips in a restaurant and 
realizes only upon delivery that the food he wanted consists in french fries 
and not chips or) when a customer orders a bunch of roses from a f lorist 
and realizes only upon delivery that the f lowers he wanted are not roses but 
tulips). The case of fundamental error with the greatest impact (because 
often discovered only years after the conclusion of a contract) is paragraph 
22 See below, d) Defects in Consent.
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I No 4, where the error relates to specific facts which the party acting in 
error considered in good faith to be a necessary basis for the contract (e.g. 
the buyer thought it was a real Picasso he or she was purchasing for CHF 4 
million rather than a copy). 
In cases where a party is induced to enter into a contract by the fraud of 
the other party, the error does not have to be fundamental in order for the 
contract to be voidable (Article 28 I). An example of a fraud is when a jeweller 
intentionally sells a gold- plated bracelet as a pure gold bracelet. 
Further, if a party enters into a contract under duress, he or she is not bound 
by that contract. A party is considered as being under duress from the other 
party if, in the circumstances, he or she has good cause to believe that there 
is imminent and substantial risk to his own life, limb, reputation, property, or 
to those of a person close to him (Article 30 I). A person enters a sales cont-
ract for e.g. restaurant equipment under duress, when the seller threatens the 
buyer that he will harm his restaurant business by telling everybody about 
the hygiene issues the buyer had.
Defects in consent have a different effect on a contract than defects in the 
conclusion of a contract. While in the latter case, a contract is null/void from 
the outset for both parties, in the former cases the contract is “just” voidable. 
This means that the party whose consent was defective must notify the other 
party of his or her defect in order to invalidate the contract. Where this party 
does not notify the other party of the defect in consent within one year (for-
feiture limit), the contract is deemed to have been ratified (Article 31 I). The 
one- year limit starts at the time that the error or the fraud was discovered or 
from the time that the duress ended (Article 31 II).
ƣᄭ fƹƤƞiƽ AƢǁƞƹƿƞƨƣ
Somewhat of a “mixture” between defect in consent and defect in content is 
the case of unfair advantage. This is applicable when there is a clear discre-
pancy between performance and consideration under a contract concluded, 
as a result of one party’s exploitation of the other’s indigence, inexperience, 
or thoughtlessness. In such circumstances, the injured party is permitted 
to declare within one year that he or she will not honour the contract and 
demand restitution of any performance already made (Article 21 I). The 
one- year period commences from the point when the contract is concluded 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇴᇳèIIᄭ. éƹ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ ƺƤ ƞƹ ǀƹƤƞiƽ ƞƢǁƞƹƿƞƨƣ ǂƺǀlƢ Ɵƣ ƿƩƣ ƾƞlƣ ƺƤ ƞ ǂƣƢ-
ding gown for ten times the price the night before the wedding to a braid who 
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is already at the wedding location and who had realized that her wedding 
dress has been stolen.
Ƥᄭ ClƞiƸƾ AơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ Gƣƹƣƽƞl aƽƺǁiƾiƺƹƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ CƺƢƣ 
of Obligations
According to the general part of the Code of Obligations, contractual claims 
can stem from different bases. The most powerful contractual claims are 
those deriving from defect- free contracts. Other claims have their basis in 
unjust enrichment or tort obligations.
– Contractual claims and breach of contract: As a general rule and unless 
the terms or nature of the contract mandate otherwise, a contractual 
party can demand performance immediately after discharging or 
offering to discharge his own obligation (Article 82). Breach of con-
tract can not only result from non- performance but also from defective 
or delayed performance.
– According to the general rule, a party who does not correctly perform 
must compensate the other party for the damage sustained (Article 97 
I). The prerequisites (aside from the breach of the contract) are dam-
age, causality between the damage and the breach, and misconduct 
attributable to the obligor. All prerequisites must be satisfied in order 
for a claim to be valid. The last prerequisite is assumed in a contrac-
tual relationship, so that the burden of proof is shifted from the obligee 
(creditor) to the obligor (debtor). Due to this shift, it is rare that the 
non- performing debtor finds him or herself exonerated due to an evi-
dentiary absence of fault. For example a lawyer who misses a deadline 
for a claim has to compensate his client for the lost claim (damage), 
since missing a deadline is a fundamental breach of a lawyer’s duty of 
care (misconduct attributable to the obligor), missing the deadline was 
the cause for the lost claim (casualty between damage and the breach) 
and the lawyer cannot present any reason to exculpate himself (mis-
conduct is attributable to the obligor).
– Where an obligation is due, the obligor is in default as soon as he receives 
a formal reminder from the obligee. Where a deadline for performance 
of the obligation has been set by agreement, the obligor is automatically 
in default upon the expiry of the deadline (Article 102). These require-
ments are the basis for damages for delay in performance and, once in 
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default, the obligor is generally liable for further damages even if they 
are not attributable to him or her (Article 103 I). The creditor not re-
ceiving performance in due course is entitled to set a new, appropriate 
time limit for subsequent performance (Article 107 I). If performance 
has not been rendered by the end of that time limit, the obligee may 
either compel performance in addition to suing for damages in connec-
tion with the delay or instead forego subsequent performance (first right 
to choose) and either claim damages for non- performance or withdraw 
from the contract altogether (second right to choose) (Article 107 II).
– When claiming damages for non- performance, the obligee is entitled 
to receive the so called positive interest: this reflects the position the 
obligee would have been in had the defaulting party performed cor-
rectly. When withdrawing from the contract altogether, the obligee 
is entitled to receive the so called negative interest: this reflects the 
position the obligee would have been in had he never concluded the 
contract. Thus, in situations of delayed performance, an obligee must 
carefully assess which of the three options would best meet his needs. 
– As a general rule compelled performance is sought if the specific con-
tractual performance is essential, e.g. because no one else can provide 
it. If the performance can be provided by another supplier but is more 
expensive, damages for non- performance may be claimed in order to 
obtain the price difference. If one has lost the interest in the contrac-
tual object, it is best to withdraw from the contract. The same applies 
if the performance can be obtained cheaper from another supplier.
– Unjust enrichment: A person who has enriched oneself without just 
cause at the expense of another is obliged to make restitution (Article 
62 I). The concept of this condictio dates back to Roman law. The most 
commonly occurring case of unjust enrichment is the restitution of 
assets due to unjust enrichment (money is the most common asset 
demanded in such claims), where the obligee made a transfer of assets 
having mistakenly assumed the existence of an obligation, only later 
learning that this duty does not exist. Typically such a case occurs 
when a party to a contract that suffers from a defect in consent per-
forms his contractual duty (e.g. pays the sales price), subsequently 
discovers the defect in consent and successfully invokes it, thus invali-
dating the contract. 
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– Obligations in tort: The general provisions on civil liability (not to be 
confused with criminal responsibility which is dealt with by the Swiss 
Criminal Code) are stated in Articles 41 et seqq. While the general prin-
ciples can be found in the Articles 41–53, the subsequent provisions 
set general principles for special cases, e.g. the liability of employers 
(Article 55) or the liability of property owners (Article 58 et seq.). The 
prerequisites for a valid claim according to Article 41 are, aside from 
damage and illegality, causality between the damage and the illegality, 
and misconduct attributable to the defendant. All these prerequisites 
must be met in order for the claim to be valid. It should also be noted 
that the last prerequisite is not assumed to exist as it would be in a 
contractual claim, meaning that the damaged party must prove all 
four prerequisites. For example a man who by accident drives into the 
garage door of his neighbour has to compensate the latter for that door 
(damage). Damaging the neighbour’s property is prohibited (illegality). 
Driving into the garage door was the cause of the damage (causality) 
and the man’s driving must at least have been negligent (misconduct). 
In contrast, some of the claims for special cases are designed as strict liabi-
lity cases (meaning that the defendant is also liable where there is an absence 
of misconduct attributable to him or her), e.g. the liability of property owners. 
Finally, such provisions can often be found in special codes (the code concer-
ning road traffic23 is probably the most relevant of these).
ƨᄭ bǀƞƾi- Cƺƹƿƽƞơƿǀƞl ClƞiƸƾ
Quasi- contractual claims arise when parties interact in a contractual context 
but act without a (valid) contract and when the (at least partial) application of 
contractual provisions leads to a more appropriate result than the application 
of non- contractual ones. The Code of Obligations provides only a few quasi- 
contractual claims. For example, in the case of a negligent error, where accor-
ding to Article 26 I a party acting in error and invoking that error to repudiate 
a contract is liable for any loss or damage arising from the nullity of the agree-
ment where the error is attributable to his or her own negligence, unless the 
other party knew or should have known of the error. So if a customer orders 
23 Federal Act on Road Transport of 19 December 1958, SR 741.01.
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roses but means tulips24 she has to pay for the roses, if the florist cannot sell 
them to anyone else. The customer is not liable if she always orders tulips 
and the florist should have known this. Doctrine and court- practice, however, 
have widened the category of quasi- contractual claims. Prominent examples 
are the liability after inspired confidence based on trust25 or the liability for 
the fault in concluding a contract (culpa in contrahendo or short c.i.c.).
Ʃᄭ eiƸƣ LiƸiƿƾ
Under Swiss law, all claims (with some exceptions, particularly in the field of 
real estate, e.g. Article 807 Civil Code, which states that claims regarding a 
mortgage that has been recorded in the land register are not subject to time 
limits) become time- barred after a certain amount of time, meaning that the 
claims cannot be enforced, regardless of their validity. The concept of time 
limits must be strictly distinguished from the concept of forfeiture limits. 
Whereas time- barred claims may still be enforced if the counter- party does 
not object (Article 142), the passing of a forfeiture limit leads to the extin-
guishment of the right in question. A time- barred claim e.g. may be set off 
provided that it was not time- barred at the time it became eligible for set- off 
(Article 120 III).
In general, claims become time- barred after ten years (Article 127), unless 
federal civil law provides otherwise. A limit of five years applies to claims 
resulting from rent and other periodic payments, payments for food, board, 
lodging and hotel expenses and claims in connection with professional ser-
vices carried out by craftsmen, doctors, advocates, and notaries, and work 
performed by employees etc. (Article 128). The limitation period is counted 
from the moment the debt becomes due (Article 131 I). 
Obligations in tort and obligations stemming from unjust enrichment do 
not only have to meet an absolute time limit; a relative time limit also must be 
respected. In tort cases claims become time- barred one year after the injured 
party became aware of the loss/damage and of the identity of the person lia-
ble. In unjust enrichment cases the period is one year after the date on which 
the injured party learned of their claim. Claims are barred in any event ten 
years after the date on which the loss/damage was caused (tort) or the claim 
first arose (unjust enrichment).26
24 See pp. 315.
25 See the Swissair- Case, p. 323.
26 Articles 60 I and 67 I.
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iᄭ eǄƻƣƾ ƺƤ Cƺƹƿƽƞơƿǀƞl cƣlƞƿiƺƹƾƩiƻ
The contracts codified in the Code of Obligations are characterised by stan-
dard principal obligations that apply to the contractual parties (“standard” 
essentialia negotii). These standard obligations are in general stated in the 
first Code of Obligation- Article(s) of the respective contract. Every type of 
contract has its own particularities. The most relevant types of contract are 
the following:
– Sale (Articles 184–236): According to Article 184 I, the seller undertakes to 
deliver the item sold and to transfer ownership of it to the buyer in return 
for the sale price, which the buyer undertakes to pay to the seller. The 
validity of a chattel sale contract is not subject to compliance with any 
particular form (Article 11 I), however a contract for the sale of immov-
able property is only valid if concluded as a public deed (Article 216 I). 
– Lease (Articles 253–273c): Leases are contracts in which a landlord or 
lessor grants a tenant or lessee the use of an object in exchange for 
rent (Article 253). The compensation (rent) is compulsory in order for 
the contract to be characterised as a lease (while it is compulsory for a 
contract to make an object available free of charge in order for it to be 
characterised as a loan for use).
– Individual employment contract (Articles 319–355): Through an indi-
vidual employment contract, the employee undertakes to work for the 
employer for a limited or unlimited period and the employer under-
takes to pay him a salary based on the amount of time he works (time 
wage) or the number of tasks he completes (piece work) (Article 319 I). 
– Contract for work and services (Articles 363–379): A contract for work 
and services is a contract whereby the contractor undertakes to carry 
out work and the customer undertakes to pay him for that work 
(Article 363). The essential characteristic of this type of contract is the 
contractor’s duty to provide a certain result in the form of the agreed 
outcome. Usually, the agreed outcome will be something physical (e.g. 
a built- in wardrobe made by a carpenter), but it can also be something 
immaterial (e.g. static calculations by an engineer). The crucial criteria 
a contract must possess to qualify as a contract for work and services is 
agreement on a measurable result that can be guaranteed.27
27 See the Market Value Estimate- Case, p. 323.
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– Simple agency contract (Articles 394–406): A simple agency con-
tract is a contract whereby the agent undertakes to conduct a certain 
business or provide services in accordance with the terms of the con-
tract (Article 394 I). A simple agency contract can be gratuitous or pro-
vide for remuneration (Article 394 III). The main duty of agents is to 
perform the business entrusted to them diligently and faithfully. They 
are not liable for the contract to have a successful result.28 A simple 
agency contract is therefore the traditional type of contract governing 
activities of professionals like doctors and lawyers (who, for example, 
cannot guarantee the outcome of an operation or lawsuit but must act 
according to best practice in their respective fields). A simple agency 
contract may be mandatorily revoked or terminated at any time by 
either party (Article 404 I).29 Since a key feature of the simple agency 
contract is the existence of mutual trust between the contractual par-
ties, this option is considered to be in most cases acceptable. However, 
a party who revokes or terminates the contract at an inopportune 
point in time must compensate the other party for any resulting dam-
age (Article 404 II).
jᄭ IƹƹƺƸiƹƞƿƣ Cƺƹƿƽƞơƿƾ
Articles 184–551 cover so called “nominate” contracts (in the sense of “regula-
ted” types of contracts). Since the Code of Obligations follows the principle of 
freedom of contract, parties can also conclude contracts that do not follow the 
characteristics of a nominate contract. These contracts are called innominate 
contracts. Examples for common innominate contracts are leasing contracts, 
exclusive distribution contracts or licence contracts. As a basic rule, the gene-
ral provisions of the Code of Obligations apply to such contracts, although 
legal practice and doctrine regulates where provisions of the nominate cont-
racts are to be applied directly or analogously to innominate contracts.
28 In contrast to the contract for work and services, see the Market Value Estimate- Case, 
p. 323.
29 See the Revocability of Simple Agency Contracts- Case, p. 324.
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ᇵ. Lؔءؗؠؔإ؞ Cؔئؘئ
ƞᄭ dǂiƾƾƞiƽ- Cƞƾƣ30
Liability after inspired confidence based on trust
The claimant concluded a contract with a subsidiary company of the 
Swissair Group concerning membership rights to use luxurious residences 
near golf courses at home and in foreign countries. The claimant paid an ini-
tial fee of CHF 90’000. Subsequently, the project came to nothing, the subsi-
diary company went bankrupt. The claimant then asked for its money back 
from the Swissair Group. However, the group denied the existence of a claim 
as it had not entered into the contract with the claimant. The Federal Supreme 
Court agreed that the claimant had no contractual claim or obligation in tort 
against the defendant. Nonetheless, it recognised that there was liability after 
inspired confidence based on trust of the defendant, since the subsidiary 
company emphasized in its publicity for the membership heavily its affilia-
tion to the Swissair group and the latter’s approval of the project. The Federal 
Supreme Court held that there was a violation of confidence based on trust 
that merited protection, since the Swissair group had tolerated the behaviour 
of the subsidiary company. With this ruling, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court 
introduced the concept of liability after inspired confidence based on trust 
into Swiss Law, although there is no direct basis for such a claim in the Code 
of Obligations itself.
Ɵᄭ Mƞƽkƣƿ gƞlǀƣ EƾƿiƸƞƿƣ-Cƞƾƣ31 
Delineation between a contract for work and services and a simple agency 
contract
The matter in dispute in this case was a market value estimate of the defen-
dant of a piece of real estate. This estimate was the basis for the calculation 
of the claimant’s share in an inheritance case. Five years after the estimate 
was given, the claimant sold the real estate for a price almost 25 % below the 
estimate. The claimant sued the estimator for the damage, since his inheri-
tance share had been calculated on an inaccurately high estimate of the real 
estate’s value. To define the rules of liability which the defendant’s conduct 
30 BGE 120 II 331.
31 BGE 127 III 328.
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was to be measured against, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court started by 
considering what type of contract had been concluded regarding the market 
value estimation. It came to the conclusion that the estimate of a real estate 
is based on discretion and that the result of such an expert opinion cannot be 
measured objectively. Therefore, the Supreme Court qualified the contract as 
a simple agency contract and not as a contract for work and services: conse-
quently, they denied a damage claim. This case is a key example of the practi-
cal importance of delineating between a contract for work and services and a 
simple agency contract.
ơᄭ cƣǁƺơƞƟiliƿǄ ƺƤ diƸƻlƣ AƨƣƹơǄ Cƺƹƿƽƞơƿƾ-Cƞƾƣ32 
Revocability at any time of simple agency contract is compulsory
The claimant and the defendant agreed on an advisory contract concerning 
accounting services. It was undisputed between the parties that the consul-
tancy agreement qualifies as a simple agency contract. After a few months, 
the defendant terminated the contract based on Article 404 I without giving 
notice. The claimant sued the defendant for damages, arguing that the con-
tract conferred a right to resign only at the end of a quarter and after a three 
month notice period had been given. According to the Swiss Federal Supreme 
Court, Article 404 I is compulsory and cannot be altered by contractual pro-
visions. The court also negated the argument that the revocability at any time 
of simple agency contracts should be restricted to contracts governed by per-
sonal trust. According to the court the clear wording of the law text does not 
allow for such a differentiation.
32 BGE 115 II 464.
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II. CƺƸƻƞƹǄ Lƞǂ
ᇳ. Cآؘؗئ
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the Articles about company 
law (including the law on securities) can be found in divisions three to five 
of the Code of Obligations (further, the last part of division two regarding 
the simple partnership belongs to company law rather than to contract law). 
Division three covers commercial enterprises and the cooperative (Articles 
552–926) and is followed by division four which concerns the commercial 
register (Articles 927–943), business names (Articles 944–956), and com-
mercial accounting (Articles 957–964). Division five is entirely dedicated to 
negotiable securities, covering registered securities, bearer securities, and 
instruments to order (Articles 965–1155) as well as bonds (Articles 1156–1186).
ᇴ. aإ؜ءؖ؜أ؟ؘئ
ƞᄭ CƺƸƻƞƹǄ FƺƽƸƾ
Unlike Swiss contract law, the provisions of Swiss company law do not pro-
vide for the freedom to create any kind of company. On the contrary, one’s 
choice is limited to the types of company the law provides for. Most types of 
business associations are regulated in the Code of Obligations, while more 
variations can be found in the Civil Code and in the Federal Act on Collective 
Investment Schemes.33 Which type is chosen in the circumstances depends 
on the intentions and interests of the people creating the company. The com-
pany forms can be grouped as follows:
33 Federal Act on Collective Investment Schemes of 23 June 2006 (Collective Investment 
Schemes Act, CISA), SR 951.31.
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Type Sole proprietorships Partnerships Corporations Legal entities  
outside of the Code 
of Obligations
Character-
istic
“One- man- business” 
without separate 
legal personality
Association of per-
sons without  
separate legal  
personality
Legal entity with 
separate legal  
personality
Legal entity with 
separate legal  
personality
Forms  ᅫ Non- registered
 ᅫ Registered 
(Article 934, 
Article 36 ordin-
ance on the com-
mercial register)
 ᅫ Simple partnership 
(Articles 530–551)
 ᅫ General partner-
ship (Articles 
552–593)
 ᅫ Limited partner-
ship (Articles 
594–619)
 ᅫ Company limited 
by shares (Articles 
620–763)
 ᅫ Partnership lim-
ited by shares 
(Articles 764–771)
 ᅫ Limited liability 
company 
(Articles 772–827)
 ᅫ Cooperative 
(Articles 828–926)
 ᅫ Association 
(Articles 60–79 
Civil Code)
 ᅫ Foundation 
(Articles 80–89a 
Civil Code)
 ᅫ Collective 
Investment 
Schemes Act 
(CISA) with inter 
alia the investment 
company with 
variable capital
Figure 1: Types of Business Associations
By far the far most common business form in Switzerland is the sole prop-
rietorship (b.), followed by the company limited by shares (c.), and the limited 
liability company (d.), respectively. Thus, these three forms will now be stu-
died in greater detail.
Ɵᄭ dƺlƣ aƽƺƻƽiƣƿƺƽƾƩiƻ
The easiest to create is the sole proprietorship. It has no separate legal perso-
nality from the person running the business.
Creation  ᅫ automatically created when a natural person starts his or her own 
commercial activity under his or her own name and own responsi-
bility 
 ᅫ If the turnover p.a. amounts up to at least CHF 100’000, a sole propri-
etorship must be registered in the commercial register; below that level, 
it is optional (Article 934, Article 36 ordinance on the commercial 
register). The entry is in any case not constitutive but only declaratory.
Liability  ᅫ As a sole proprietor, the founder is fully, personally liable for the liabil-
ities of the business.
Company name  ᅫ Must contain the family name of the sole proprietor (Article 945)
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Employment  ᅫ Founder is self- employed by working under his or her own name and 
at his or her own expense, autonomously, at own risk
Legal basis  ᅫ Article 934 (provision concerning registration in the commercial 
register)
 ᅫ Article 936a (business identification number)
 ᅫ Articles 945 et seq. (business name)
 ᅫ Articles 36–39 ordinance on the commercial register
 ᅫ tax law
→ Regulation is very basic
Applicability  ᅫ To embark upon first commercial activities
 ᅫ Where commercial activities are small
 ᅫ Generally for “one- man- show” with max. a few employees
 ᅫ Where budget is insufficient to set up a corporation
Figure 2: Sole Proprietorship
ơᄭ CƺƸƻƞƹǄ LiƸiƿƣƢ ƟǄ dƩƞƽƣƾ
The flagship of commercial enterprises is the company limited by shares. 
Creation  ᅫ Is established when the founding members declare by public deed that they are 
forming a company limited by shares, lay down the Articles of association 
therein, and appoint the governing bodies (Article 629 I)
 ᅫ Acquires legal personality upon being entered into the commercial register 
(Article 643 I)
 ᅫ Share capital must amount to at least CHF 100’000 (Article 621)
Liability  ᅫ Shareholders are not personally liable for the debts of the company  
(Article 620 II)
 ᅫ The company’s liability is limited to its assets
Company name  ᅫ Can be freely chosen by respecting the general principles on the composition of 
business names, which means that the content of a company name has to be 
truthful, cannot be misleading, and does not run counter to any public interest 
(Article 944 I)
 ᅫ Must indicate the legal form (Ltd) in a national language (French, German, 
Italian, or Romansh) (Article 950)
Governing bodies  ᅫ General meeting (Articles 698–706b)  
as the supreme governing body
 ᅫ Board of directors (Articles 707–726)  
which leads the company. This role can be delegated to individual members of the 
board or third parties (directors) if provided for in the Articles of association.
 ᅫ External auditors (Articles 727–731b),  
by law, required intensity of the audit depends on the size of the company
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Duties of a share-
holder
 ᅫ Shareholders may not be required to contribute more than the amount fixed for 
subscription of a share on issue (Article 680)
→ If more duties are intended, shareholders must regulate them among themselves 
by a separate contract (shareholders’ agreement)
Where regulated  ᅫ Articles 620–763 
 ᅫ Article 936a (business identification number)
 ᅫ Articles 950 et seq. (business name)
 ᅫ Articles 43–70 ordinance on the commercial register
 ᅫ Tax law
→ Most intensively regulated business association
Applicability  ᅫ For commercial activities with a broader impact
 ᅫ Where is intention to employ people
 ᅫ Where existence and operation of the company should not depend on the people 
owning it
 ᅫ Where looking for limitation of the liability for the owners of the company
 ᅫ Where budget is sufficient to set up a company limited by shares
Figure 3: Company Limited by Shares (Ltd.)
Ƣᄭ LiƸiƿƣƢ LiƞƟiliƿǄ CƺƸƻƞƹǄ
Also very popular is the limited liability company. After an initial niche exis-
tence it somehow experienced a boom in popularity. This change was due to 
the increase of the default minimum share capital needed for establishing a 
company limited by shares from CHF 50’000 up to CHF 100’000 in 1992 and a 
law reform of the limited liability company in 2008, consequently shaping the 
limited liability company as a personalized corporation.
Creation  ᅫ Is established when the founding members declare by public deed that they are 
founding a limited liability company, lay down the Articles of association 
therein, and appoint the management bodies (Article 777 I)
 ᅫ Acquires legal personality upon being entered into the commercial register 
(Article 779 I)
 ᅫ Nominal capital must amount to at least CHF 20’000 (Article 773)
Liability  ᅫ Members are not personally liable for the liabilities of the company (Articleè794)
 ᅫ The company’s liability is limited to its assets 
Company name  ᅫ Can be freely chosen by respecting the general principles on the composition of 
business names, which means that the content of a company name has to be 
truthful, cannot be misleading, and does not run counter to any public interest 
(Article 944 I)
 ᅫ Must indicate the legal form (Ltd liab. Co) in a national language (French, 
German, Italian, or Romansch) (Article 950)
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Governing bodies  ᅫ Members’ general meeting (Articles 804–808c) 
as the supreme governing body of the company
 ᅫ Management (Articles 809–817)  
leads the company; company members are jointly responsible for the manage-
ment unless Articles of association adopt alternative provisions
 ᅫ Auditor (Article 818 with reference to Articles 727 et seqq.),  
by law, required intensity of the audit depends on the size of the company
Duties of a member  ᅫ Company members are obliged to pay the issue price of their capital contribu-
tions and, if required by the Articles of association, must make additional ma-
terial contributions (Articles 793, 795, 796)
 ᅫ Company members have a duty of loyalty and are subject to prohibition of com-
petition (Article 803)
Where regulated  ᅫ Articles 772–827 
 ᅫ Article 936a (business identification number)
 ᅫ Articles 950 et seq. (business name)
 ᅫ Articles 71–83 ordinance on the commercial register
 ᅫ Tax law
→ Well- regulated business association
Applicability – For commercial activities with a more local/regional impact
– Where there is an intention to employ people
– Where existence and operation of the company should depend on the people 
owning it
– Where looking for limitation of the liability for the owners of the company
– Where budget is insufficient to set up a company limited by shares
Figure 4: Limited Liability Company (Ltd liab. Co)
ᇵ. Lؔءؗؠؔإ؞ Cؔئؘئ
Generally, shareholders and corporations (as separate legal entities, e.g. a 
company limited by shares) are each liable “for their own business”, and 
neither one is liable for the obligations of the other. But the Swiss Federal 
Supreme Court has recognised exceptions to that principle. This can be seen 
in its established practice of breakthrough (also known as “piercing the cor-
porate veil”) where the company is totally dominated by one shareholder 
and this shareholder has somehow used the company for his or her own 
purposes. 
It can therefore be assumed that in accordance with the economic reality, 
there is an identity of the natural and the legal person and that the legal rela-
tions which bind one also bind the other; this is always the case where the 
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assertion of difference constitutes an abuse of rights or results in an obvious 
violation of legitimate interests of third parties.34
ƞᄭ BƽƣƞkƿƩƽƺǀƨƩ- Cƞƾƣ I35 
Liability of dominating shareholder for company limited by shares
The claimant, an engineer, sold a patent to a natural person. Under this 
licence contract, the buyer incurred some obligations, e.g. the obligation to 
refrain from exporting goods produced with the patent and to share experi-
ences with the seller. The buyer then did not perform these obligations. The 
user of the patent was a company limited by shares that was dominated by 
ƿƩƣè ƟǀǄƣƽ ƞƾ ƻƽiƹơiƻƞl ƾƩƞƽƣƩƺlƢƣƽ. eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƾƿƞƿƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ 
in the present case the natural person (buyer) and the legal person (the com-
pany limited by shares) were identical, although the buyer was formally not 
the sole shareholder. The court declared the other shareholders only as dum-
mies and stated that it would be a violation of good faith if the company limi-
ted by shares did not have to execute the duties its dominating shareholder 
had incurred.
Ɵᄭ BƽƣƞkƿƩƽƺǀƨƩ- Cƞƾƣ II36 
Liability of company limited by shares for dominating shareholder
To enforce a claim against an obligor, the claimant sequestrated a property. 
Formally the property had not belonged to the obligor but to a company limi-
ted by shares that he dominated. The Federal Supreme Court stated that in 
the present case the natural and legal person were identical and thus that it 
would be a violation of good faith if the obligor could escape his obligations by 
determining that the assets belonged to a separate legal entity.
34 BGE 121 III 319 Consideration 5.a)aa), confirmed e.g. in BGE 132 III 489 Consideration 3.2 
or Judgment of the Federal Supreme Court 5A_330/2012 of 17 July 2012, Consideration 3.1.
35 BGE 71 II 272.
36 BGE 102 III 165.
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I. dǂiƾƾ Ciǁil aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ CƺƢƣ
The first section of this chapter examines the long path that ultimately led to 
a unified civil procedure in Switzerland. First, the constitutional framework 
within which Swiss civil procedure laws1 operate (1.) and the legislative process 
that resulted in the Civil Procedure Code of 2008 (2.) are described. Finally, the 
third part of this section discusses the main content of the Code (3.).
ᇳ. Cآءئا؜ابا؜آءؔ؟ Fإؔؠؘتآإ؞
When the Swiss confederation was founded in 1848, one of its key features was 
(and still is) the autonomy of its 25 cantons.2 Legislative power was at their 
full disposal,3 including matters of civil and civil procedure law. Members of 
1 The most important enactment on civil procedure in Switzerland is the Swiss Civil 
Procedure Code of 19 December 2008 (Civil Procedure Code, CPC), SR 727, which con-
tains the procedural framework for conducting and deciding civil law disputes; see 
for an English version of the Civil Procedure Code www.admin.ch (https://perma.cc/
PE8T- RMBT). Besides, there are other laws of significance for civil procedure: The Debt 
Enforcement and Insolvency Act of 11 April 1889, SR 281.1, contains provisions on the 
enforcement of monetary claims and on insolvency proceedings. The Federal Act on 
the Federal Patent Court of 20 March 2009 (Patent Court Act, PatCA), SR 173.41, governs 
proceedings before the Federal Patent Court; see for an English version of the Patent 
Court Act www.admin.ch (https://perma.cc/NXD3- NSXP). The Federal Act on Federal 
Civil Procedure of 4 December 1947 (Federal Civil Procedure Act), SR 273, determines 
rules for disputes that are tried before the Federal Supreme Court as the first instance. 
The Federal Act on the Federal Supreme Court of 17 June 2005 (Federal Supreme Court 
Act), SR 173.110, governs the position and organisation of the Federal Supreme Court and 
proceedings before the Federal Supreme Court as an appellate court. The Federal Act 
on International Private Law of 18 December 1987, SR 291, determines the jurisdiction 
of Swiss civil courts and the applicable law in international matters. Finally, there is a 
variety of cantonal legislation on court organisation and subject- matter jurisdiction.
2 There were 25 cantons at this point in history. As the canton of Jura acceded to the feder-
ation in 1979, there are 26 cantons in Switzerland today.
3 Article 3 of the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 12 September 1848 
stated that the cantons are sovereign except to the extent that their sovereignty is lim-
ited by the Federal Constitution and that they exercise all rights that are not vested in 
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the Swiss Lawyers Association had begun to consider the benefits of unifying 
Switzerland’s civil and civil procedure law as early as in 1860. The first attempt 
to do so was narrowly rejected by both the people and the cantons in 1872.4 
Although the enforcement of monetary claims and the insolvency law were 
unified by the Debt Enforcement and Insolvency Act in 1889 and the compe-
tence regarding substantive civil law was transferred to the federal legislator 
in 1898,5 the cantons largely retained their power to enact legislation on civil 
procedure during this period. But competence in civil procedure matters was 
granted to the federation where it was considered indispensable in ensuring 
the uniform application of the civil law. This meant that the original Civil 
Code contained some procedural provisions, such as rules on evidence. Even 
after the codification of Swiss civil procedure law on a federal level, these pro-
visions were left to remain in the Civil Code and can therefore still be found 
in this legislation. An example for such a rule is contained in Article 8 Civil 
Code: unless the law provides otherwise, the burden of proof for establishing 
an alleged fact shall rest on the person who would derive rights from that fact.
While neighbouring countries had successfully codified their civil proce-
dure law by the end of the 19th century, discussions about expediency and 
potential versions of a unified procedure law would continue for nearly ano-
ther century in Switzerland. The 1999 version of the Constitution still did 
not provide for centralised legislative powers, although the federal legislator 
was enabled to regulate the territorial jurisdiction of courts for the whole of 
Switzerland.6 Subsequently, the Swiss Jurisdiction Act was issued.7 It con-
tained unified rules on the territorial jurisdiction of Swiss courts in civil 
the confederation. The provision still exists in its original form today (Article 3 of the 
FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ᇳᇺ éƻƽil ᇳᇻᇻᇻ, dcèᇳᇲᇳ; ƾƣƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ EƹƨliƾƩ 
version of the Constitution www.admin.ch [https://perma.cc/M8UJ- S369]).
4 253’606 people declared themselves in favour of adopting the draft that would have 
transferred substantial legislative competences towards the federal legislator, while 
260’859 people rejected it.
5 For details on the enactment of the Swiss Civil Code of 10 December 1907 (Civil Code), SR 
210, see the Chapter on Civil Law, pp. 271, and for details on the enactment of the Federal 
Act on the Amendment of the Swiss Civil Code (Part Five: The Code of Obligations) of 
30 March 1911 (Code of Obligations), SR 220, see the Chapter on the Law of Obligations, 
pp. 305. See for an English version of the Civil Code www.admin.ch (https://perma.
cc/DV8N- FFT2) and for an English version of the Code of Obligations www.admin.ch 
(https://perma.cc/AJ2U- V3MB). 
6 Articles 30 and 122 of the Constitution in the version dated 18 April 1999. 
7 Federal Act on the Jurisdiction in Civil Matters of 24 March 2000 (Jurisdiction Act), 
SR 272.
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domestic matters and entered into force on 1 January 2001.8 Despite being 
limited in its scope, it can be regarded as the first codification of Swiss civil 
procedure law on the federal level.
Since the 19th century, a total of almost 100 civil procedure codes have been 
issued by the cantons. These codes took influence from one another as well 
as from foreign civil procedure legislation. For example, the legislation in the 
French- speaking part of Switzerland was strongly shaped by the French Code 
de Procédure Civile. Varying developments in each canton meant there were 
substantial differences in the content and layout of the codes. For example 
some cantonal legislators decided to concentrate the proceeding in a main 
hearing where also evidence was taken (Bern, Lucerne, Vaud). In other can-
tons the taking of evidence preceded (Valais) or followed up on the main 
hearing (Zurich). In some cantons conciliation proceedings were mandatory 
before a claim could be filed (Lucerne, Valais, Zurich), in other cantons the 
conduct of such proceedings remained at the parties’ disposal (Bern, Vaud). 
Significant differences appeared also in the weighting of procedural prin-
ciples. For example, the cantonal code of Bern allowed the modification or 
correction of facts up until the party submissions during the main hearing 
while the canton of Vaud committed the parties to present all relevant facts 
ƢǀƽiƹƨèƿƩƣ iƹiƿiƞƿiƺƹ ƻƩƞƾƣ ƺƤ ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ. eƩƣ ƞƨƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ơƺƢƣƾ ƞƿ 
the time that the Civil Procedure Code entered into force in 2011 was also ext-
remely varied: for example, the code from the canton of Basel Stadt dated from 
1875, while the canton of Glarus’ code had been more recently issued in 2001. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that a tradition of Swiss civil procedure 
did exist on the federal level to some extent prior to the federal Code’s entry 
into force, in two respects. First, certain federal laws which had substantial 
influence on civil procedure were already in existence (such as the Debt 
Enforcement and Insolvency Act, the Jurisdiction Act, and the Civil Code 
mentioned above). Second, a number of questions of civil procedure were 
addressed at the federal level by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court in various 
landmark cases. For example, the Federal Supreme Court decided in 1988 that 
once an action is filed, the subject matter of the dispute may not be made 
pending elsewhere between the same parties.9 Later this principle was codi-
fied in the Jurisdiction Act (Article 35) and can now be found Article 64 Civil 
Procedure Code. 
8 The Jurisdiction Act was replaced by the Civil Procedure Code on 1 January 2011.
9 BGE 114 II 186.
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Still the variety of procedural codes proved to be a source of complication 
and legal insecurity, as the Federal Council indicated in its Message10 suppor-
ting the unification of Swiss civil procedure.11 At the turn of the millennium, 
the necessity of unifying civil procedure law on a national level was clear. The 
reform of the Swiss justice system was put to popular vote and approved in a 
landslide victory on 12 March 2000.12 This cleared the way for the drafting of 
the Civil Procedure Code. 
To this day, there are some domains in the area of civil procedure where the 
cantons retain responsibility. These areas are the organisation of the courts 
and conciliation authorities (Article 122 II Constitution and Article 3 Civil 
Procedure Code), the administration of justice in civil cases, and the tariff 
authority. 
First, the cantons are responsible for creating their own court systems. 
Cantonal legislation on court organisation regulates the composition of the 
courts and establishes the matters that fall under these courts’ competence, 
i.e. their subject- matter jurisdiction. Federal law does impose some limits on 
cantonal autonomy and discretion in this area, however: namely, it obliges 
the cantons to provide two cantonal instances of civil jurisdiction. This is 
referred to as the double- instance principle, meaning that the cantons must 
provide the possibility to appeal a first instance judgement to a cantonal 
appellate court. 
Neither the denominations for the institutions nor the substantive requi-
rements for the jurisdiction of the courts are uniform amongst the cantons. 
For example, individual cantons can decide whether they want district 
courts to be responsible for settling criminal and civil cases for a specific 
territorial area (as in the canton of Zurich) or a cantonal civil court with an 
exclusive jurisdiction in civil matters (as is the case in Basel Stadt). In some 
cantons, single judges are only used in proceedings with a value in dispute13 
below a certain amount. For example Basel Stadt, Lucerne, and Zurich in 
10 In Swiss legislation proceedings a message is a report by a federal authority that accom-
panies a draft for a legislative act submitted to parliament by that authority. Its purpose 
is to inform parliament about the suggested draft, its goals, and underlying problems. 
Messages are published and often used for interpretation of the law.
11 Message on the Swiss Civil Procedure Code (CPC), Federal Gazette No 37 of 19 September 
2006, pp. 7221, p. 7228.
12 86.4 % of the voters and all cantons approved the reform. The turnout was at 42 %. 
13 The value in dispute is the (estimated) economic interest that the plaintiff has in pur-
suing the case.
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principle use single judge proceedings for cases with a value of up to CHF 
30’000. For proceedings with a value in dispute higher than CHF 30’000, 
multi- judge courts are provided in these cantons. Other cantons use single 
judges for cases of higher value or use single judges regardless of the value in 
dispute (as in Bern where a judgement is delivered by a single judge in first 
instance proceedings, no matter how high the value in dispute is). Cantons 
can also use particular courts for specific types of disputes. For example, the 
canton of Zurich provides special courts for commercial (at second instance), 
employment, and tenancy matters. The cantons can also set up rules on the 
eligibility of judges. For example, cantons may allow laymen on the bench. 
This remains particularly common in rural areas, where judges often hold 
other jobs alongside their judgeship. They are usually supported by a legally 
trained clerk.
Secondly, the administration of civil justice lies in the hands of the cantons: 
although the Civil Code and the Code of Obligations are acts of the federal 
parliament, they are administered by cantonal courts. Only civil disputes 
between the confederation and a canton or disputes between cantons are 
tried directly by the Federal Supreme Court in Lausanne (known as direct 
proceedings, Article 120 Federal Supreme Court Act). However, such cases 
only occur rarely.
Figure 1: Court Organisation
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Finally, the cantons retain the exclusive competence to set tariffs for proce-
dural costs (Article 96 Civil Procedure Code).
ᇴ. Lؘؚ؜ئ؟ؔا؜آء
As mentioned, by the end of the 20th century it was becoming increasingly 
clear that there was a need to unify civil procedure in Switzerland. Thus, in 
1999, the then acting head of the Federal Department of Justice and Police 
éإءآ؟ؗ Kآ؟؟ؘإ established a commission of experts with the set pur-
pose of considering the unification of civil procedure in Switzerland and 
producing a preliminary draft for a federal code. In 2002, the commission 
delivered the preliminary draft to the Federal Department of Justice and 
Police together with an accompanying report. They proposed to unify the 
procedure before cantonal courts by uniting established institutions from 
different cantonal codes, without using any specific code as an archetype. 
Proceedings before the Federal Supreme Court and court organisation 
would not be affected.
From June to December 2003, the preliminary draft was submitted to a 
national consultation procedure.14 Almost everyone welcomed the idea of 
unification. The participants in the consultation procedure supported the 
concept of continuing the tradition of the cantonal civil procedure laws 
as far as possible and introducing innovations where this was considered 
useful. In particular, the fact that the proposals avoided the introduction of 
a US- style class action (meaning proceedings where one of the parties is a 
group of people who are represented collectively by a member of that group) 
was widely approved of. The inclusion of the Jurisdiction Act into the new 
federal Code without changing its content also met approval. However, there 
was some minor criticism on the details of the Code: the strong emphasis 
on written form for civil proceedings was criticised for being likely to lead 
to unnecessarily long proceedings. Further, the provisions on the admissi-
bility of new facts and evidence were considered too strict. Finally, it was 
demanded that mediation as an alternative to conciliation proceedings be 
introduced.
14 Article 3 of the Federal Act on the Consultation Procedure of 18 March 2005 (Consultation 
aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿ, Caéᄭ, dcèᇳᇹᇴ.ᇲᇸᇳ; ƾƣƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ EƹƨliƾƩ ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾǀlƿƞƿiƺƹ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ 
Act www.admin.ch (https://perma.cc/HS8B- 2PVT).
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Figure 2: Civil Procedure Laws
Following the national consultation procedure, the Federal Council assi-
gned the task of drawing up a Draft of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code15 and 
an explanatory message16 on to the Federal Department of Justice and Police. 
During the creation of this Draft, the criticisms from the national consulta-
tion procedure were taken into account. The Draft was adopted in June 2006 
and submitted to the members of parliament together with the Message. 
Subsequently, after just over a year of debates, parliament passed the federal 
Civil Procedure Code on 19 December 2008. It entered into force on 1 January 
2011, replacing the 26 cantonal civil procedure codes and the Jurisdiction Act. 
The nationwide standardisation of civil procedure by the Civil Procedure 
Code was not exclusively met with approval. It was sometimes criticised by 
academics for being poorly drafted and for the fact that it was not motivated 
by any legal policy issues apart from that of unification itself. Nonetheless, 
there was a broad consensus that the introduction of the Civil Procedure 
Code was an important step in the right direction in many ways. For instance, 
it became a lot easier for lawyers to represent clients in other cantons. The 
unification also enhanced the academic debate about civil procedure in 
15 Draft of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code, Federal Gazette No 37 of 19 September 2006, pp. 
7413.
16 See footnote 11. See also footnote 10 for an explanation of the message in the Swiss legis-
lation process.
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Switzerland: before the introduction of the Civil Procedure Code, there was 
only limited publishing on cantonal codes, meaning that there was often a 
lack of literature for legal professionals to rely on. Also, since the introduction 
of the Code, there has been an increase in federal judicial activity concerning 
civil procedure in Switzerland which has led to enhanced predictability of 
court decisions, thus improving legal certainty.
Of course, there remains room for progress. There are still 26 different 
cantonal acts on the organisation of civil courts: this results in a lack of cla-
rity for legal subjects as well as for practitioners and means that there is still 
difficulty for lawyers who want to practice in different cantons. Also, some 
authors point out that cantonal customs have not been eliminated by the 
introduction of a federal code; instead, there seems to be a tendency to imple-
ment the new Code in a manner that respects old cantonal traditions. This is 
ơƺƹƹƣơƿƣƢ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ Ƥƞơƿ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ Ciǁil aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ CƺƢƣ iƾèᅬ ƟǄ iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺ-
ƹƞl ơƺƸƻƞƽiƾƺƹèᅬ ǁƣƽǄ ơƺƸƻƞơƿ iƹ ƿƣƽƸƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƹǀƸƟƣƽ ƺƤ ƞƽƿiơlƣƾ iƿ ơƺƹƿƞiƹƾ 
(408) as well as regarding the length of those articles. In the Message on the 
Draft of the Civil Procedure Code, the legislator even expressed its pride in 
having the “courage to leave gaps”17 in the spirit of simplicity and comprehen-
sibility. Some argue that this is beneficial in that it helps lay judges to better 
understand the law and provides the courts with a certain flexibility to tailor 
proceedings to the circumstances of a certain case. But this terseness also 
opens the door for cantonal idiosyncrasies and thus legal uncertainty. 
Another aspect of the Code which has proven controversial is its lack of pro-
per collective redress mechanisms. The legislator decided not to introduce the 
Anglo- American concept of class action lawsuits when it passed the new Code 
in 2011. This was because it was considered that this procedural tool would 
not fit with the Swiss legal system, which rests on the fundamental principle 
that only the holder of a legal right can assert that right. Thus, instead, courts 
in Switzerland deal with proceedings involving multiple parties by relying on 
existing procedural instruments: in particular, the group action for clubs and 
organisations (Article 89 Civil Procedure Code)18 and the general joinder of 
claims which were filed separately but which are closely related in substance 
(Article 90 Civil Procedure Code). However, it is now widely recognised that 
17 Message Civil Procedure Code, p. 7236.
18 Article 89 Civil Procedure Code allows associations and other organisations of national 
or regional importance that are authorised by their articles of association to protect the 
interests of a certain group of individuals to bring an action in their own name for a vio-
lation of the personality of the members of the group.
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the existing instruments for aggregating claims are no substitute for proper 
collective redress mechanisms. For example, just recently in late December 
2017, a Swiss consumer protection organisation filed for damages against 
Volkswagen on behalf of 6’000 people in light of the emissions scandal. In 
order to do so, they had to develop a complicated concept of combining dif-
ferent legal remedies, thereby breaking completely new ground. Consumer 
protection organisations are among the sharpest critics of the lacking possi-
bilities for collective redress in Swiss civil procedure. 
The demand for collective redress mechanisms is to be seen in connection 
with the more fundamental problem of ensuring access to justice.19 Court fees 
and reimbursement of lawyers’ fees differ greatly within Switzerland as these 
are still areas where the cantons retain exclusive competence. Additionally, 
in Switzerland the plaintiff is usually obliged to pay court fees and the costs of 
his or her lawyer in advance (Article 98 Civil Procedure Code). So proceedings 
might not only be economically pointless in cases with a low value in dispute; 
also, claimants may be prevented from filing an action due to a lack of readily 
available finances.
On 2 March 2018 a preliminary draft for a partial revision of the Civil 
Procedure Code was submitted to a national consultation procedure. It aims 
in particular to improve collective redress in Switzerland. To this end the pre-
liminary draft stipulates a readjustment of the group action. Under current 
legislation associations and other organisations can file non- monetary claims 
(prohibiting an imminent violation, putting an end to an ongoing violation 
or establishing the unlawful character of a violation) to safeguard collective 
interests (group action, Art. 89 Civil Procedure Code). In the future, collective 
enforcement of monetary claims, especially mass damages, shall be possible. 
Examples could be the selling of faulty products, but also unfair business 
practices that concern a large number of people. Also, the preliminary draft 
provides for the establishment of a new group comparison proceeding orien-
ted towards a similar instrument that exists in the Netherlands since 2005. 
Essentially it shall be possible for a person accused of a rights violation to 
reach a settlement on the consequences of that rights violation with an orga-
nisation legitimated to file a group action. A court could then declare this 
settlement binding for all affected persons if they do not claim their refusal 
within three months (“opt out”).
19 eؔء؝ؔ Dآؠؘ؝, The Swiss Federal Code of Civil Procedure: Achievements and missed op-
portunities, Tijdschrift voor Civiele Rechtspleging, 24 (2), pp. 36, pp. 40.
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Other proposed adjustments concern costs of civil proceedings: advance 
payments that the court can demand from the plaintiff shall be limited to 
half of the amount of the expected court costs (as opposed to the whole of 
the expected costs under current law, Article 98 Civil Procedure Code). Also, 
court costs shall be set off against the advances paid by the parties only to 
the extent that the parties are charged. So the collection risk shall lie with 
the state instead of the parties in the future. These adjustments stem from 
the criticism mentioned above, deeming current cost law as an access barrier 
and so- called paywall for those seeking legal protection. The deadline for the 
national consultation procedure is 11 June 2018.
ᇵ. Cآءاؘءا20
The Swiss Code of Civil Procedure contains 408 Articles. They are divided up 
into four parts which are themselves subdivided into several titles.
Part 1 contains general provisions and consists of eleven titles. Title 1 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᅬᇵᄭ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣƾ ƿƩƣ ƾǀƟjƣơƿ Ƹƞƿƿƣƽ ƞƹƢ ƾơƺƻƣ ƺƤ ƞƻƻliơƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Ciǁil 
Procedure Code. It is applicable to contentious civil matters (Article 1 lit. a), 
i.e. disputes between two adverse parties (known as contradictory procedure) 
that do not concern public law. To a limited extent, the Code is also applica-
ble to court orders made in non- contentious matters (Article 1 lit. b). These 
are procedures with only one party: for example, a woman who applies for 
a declaration that her husband is presumed deceased because he has been 
missing for a long period of time without any indication that he is still alive. 
The procedure for the enforcement of monetary claims as well as ban-
kruptcy matters are regulated by the Debt Enforcement and Insolvency Act. 
The collection of debts is called Betreibung in Switzerland and is special in 
that it is possible to enforce money claims by legal compulsion without prece-
ding substantive judicial assessment.21 Therefore, competent authorities in 
20 In the following text, where articles are mentioned without referencing their source 
of law, they are located in the Swiss Civil Procedure Code of 19 December 2008 (Civil 
Procedure Code), SR 727.
21 The creditor can address a demand for enforcement to the competent enforcement au-
thority, specifying legal ground and amount of his claim (Article 67 Debt Enforcement 
and Insolvency Act). Upon receipt of the demand for enforcement, the enforcement au-
thority issues an order for payment (Article 69 Debt Enforcement and Insolvency Act) 
and serves it to the creditor and debtor. The order contains the request to the debtor 
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these matters are to a large extent so- called debt enforcement offices and 
bankruptcy offices and not courts. For example, a debt collection procedure 
is initiated by the creditor addressing his demand for enforcement to the debt 
enforcing office. Still, the Debt Enforcement and Insolvency Act stipulates 
some procedural steps in debt collection and bankruptcy proceedings to be 
carried out by court orders. An example would be the opening of bankruptcy. 
For such court orders in cases involving debt enforcement and bankruptcy 
law, the Civil Procedure Code is also applicable (Article 1 lit. c).
Furthermore, the Code is also applicable to arbitration in domestic cases 
(Article 1 lit. d), i.e. if both parties have their domicile and habitual residence 
in Switzerland at the time of signing the arbitration agreement. 
The Code governs the procedure to be followed before cantonal courts. 
Provisions for complaint proceedings before the Federal Supreme Court are 
contained in the Federal Supreme Court Act. So- called direct civil procee-
dings that are tried before the Federal Supreme Court at first instance are sub-
ject to the Federal Civil Procedure Act. These cases are very rare and concern 
for example conflicts between the federation and the cantons or between the 
cantons among each other.
eƩƣ ƾƣơƺƹƢ eiƿlƣ ƺƤ aƞƽƿ ᇳ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇶᅬᇷᇳᄭ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣƾ ƿƩƣ jǀƽiƾƢiơƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ 
courts. As explained above, subject- matter jurisdiction is mostly governed by 
cantonal legislation. In contrast, territorial jurisdiction, determining the geo-
graphical area in which a court will have competence (place of jurisdiction), 
is regulated by federal law. The Civil Procedure Code establishes general pla-
ces of jurisdiction. For natural persons, this will be the court at the location of 
the defendant’s domicile (Article 10 I lit. a). For defendant legal entities, this 
will be the court at the location of the company’s registered office (Article 10 
I lit. b). The general place of jurisdiction applies if no other (specific) place of 
jurisdiction is provided for. Specific places of jurisdiction are for instance pro-
vided for disputes which concern immovable property (Article 29: the court 
at the place where a property is or should be recorded in the land register), 
employment law (Article 34: the court at the domicile or registered office of 
the defendant or where the employee normally carries out his or her work), 
or consumer contracts (Article 32: for actions brought by the consumer: the 
to pay his debts plus the costs of the enforcement within 20 days to the creditor. If the 
debtor wants to contest the claim, he can do so by raising an objection within ten days 
from being served the order for payment (Article 74 Debt Enforcement and Insolvency 
Act). If an objection is raised, the progress of the enforcement procedure is interrupted 
until a court makes a decision on the claim.
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court at the domicile or registered office of one of the parties and for actions 
brought by the supplier: the court at the domicile of the defendant). Most pla-
ces of jurisdiction are of an optional nature, meaning that the parties may 
choose the court they want to have jurisdiction over an existing or future dis-
pute arising from a particular legal relationship (Article 17). For optional pla-
ces of jurisdiction it is also possible for the defendant to consent tacitly to the 
jurisdiction of an incompetent court by entering an appearance on the merits 
without objecting to the court’s jurisdiction (acceptance by appearance, 
Article 18). Few places of jurisdiction are of mandatory nature, in these cases 
it is not possible for the parties to agree on the jurisdiction of a court at ano-
ther place and acceptance by appearance is excluded. For example, an action 
based on marital law can exclusively be brought before the court at the domi-
cile of either of the parties (Article 21). Finally, some places of jurisdiction are 
designed as partly mandatory, meaning the parties may agree on a different 
place of jurisdiction only after a dispute has arisen. This is for instance the 
case for consumer or tenancy contracts (Article 35).
eƩƣ ƿƩiƽƢ eiƿlƣ ƺƤ aƞƽƿ ᇳ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇷᇴᅬᇸᇳᄭ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣƾ ƿƩƣ Ɵƞƾiơ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣƾ ƺƤ 
civil procedure such as acting in good faith (Article 52), the right to be heard 
(Article 53), the court’s duty to enquire (Article 56), ex- officio application of 
the law (Article 57), and the principles of the production of evidence (Article 
55). Title 3 also lists procedural requirements (Article 59). Those are the formal 
requirements for proceedings, like for example the proper filing of the state-
ment of claim, a legitimate interest of the plaintiff, the case not being the sub-
ject of pending proceedings elsewhere, and the subject- matter and territorial 
jǀƽiƾƢiơƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƺǀƽƿ ƾƣiǅƣƢ. eiƿlƣ ᇶ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇸᇴᅬᇸᇷᄭ ƨƺǁƣƽƹƾ ƻƣƹƢƣƹơǄ ƞƹƢ 
withdrawal of the action. As soon as an action is filed, a case becomes pending 
(Article 62 I). If the claimant withdraws the action, he cannot bring procee-
dings against the same party on the same subject matter again (Article 65). 
eiƿlƣ ᇷ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇸᇸᅬᇺᇵᄭ ơƺƹƿƞiƹƾ ƽǀlƣƾ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƻƞƽƿiƣƾ. éƹǄƺƹƣ ǂƩƺ iƾ lƣƨƞllǄ 
capable has the capacity to be a party (Article 66). Natural persons are always 
legally capable,22 while legal entities have to be pronounced legally capable by 
the law. Any person with capacity to act23 has the capacity to take legal action 
(Article 67 I). A person without capacity to act (for example, a child) may act 
through a legal representative (Article 67 I). A party may choose whether or 
22 Article 11 Civil Code: “Every person has legal capacity”.
23 Article 13 Civil Code: “A person who is of age and is capable of judgement has the capacity 
to act”.
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not to be represented in proceedings (Article 68 I). Professional representa-
tion is essentially reserved to lawyers (lawyers’ monopoly), although the can-
tons may provide exceptions in some areas such as for representation before 
conciliation authorities or before the special courts for tenancy and employ-
ment matters (Article 68 II). For example, the canton of Zurich allows emplo-
yees of a tenants or employee organisation to represent clients that belong to 
these organisations before tenancy and employment courts in cases with a 
value in dispute of CHF 20’000 or less. Title 5 also regulates the joinder of par-
ƿiƣƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇹᇲᅬᇹᇴᄭ, ƿƩiƽƢ ƻƞƽƿǄ iƹƿƣƽǁƣƹƿiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇹᇵᅬᇹᇹᄭ, ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ƾǀƟƾƿi-
tution of a party (Article 83).
eiƿlƣ ᇸ ƺƤ aƞƽƿ ᇳ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇺᇶᅬᇻᇲᄭ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣƾ ƢiƤƤƣƽƣƹƿ ƿǄƻƣƾ ƺƤ ƞơƿiƺƹƾ. eƩƣƽƣ ƞƽƣ 
three main types of actions in Switzerland. One is the action for performance, 
which is where the claimant demands that the court order the defendant to do 
something, refrain from doing something, or tolerate something (Article 84). 
For instance, the court may demand that the defendant hand over a certain 
item. Second, there is the action to modify a legal relationship, by which the 
claimant demands the creation, modification, or dissolution of such a relati-
onship or a specific right (Article 87). Typical examples are filing for divorce or 
challenging a resolution of an association’s general assembly. Third, an action 
for a declaratory judgement is used to demand that the court establish whether 
or not a right or legal relationship exists (Article 88). It is subsidiary to the 
action for performance and the action to modify a legal relationship.
The other titles of Part 1 contain rules on the calculation of the value in 
dispute (Title 7) and on costs and legal aid (Title 8). At this point it should 
be noted that the federal Code regulates the determination and allocation of 
procedural costs while the competence to set the tariffs for procedural costs 
(deciding how high costs are) lies with the cantons (Article 96). Further rules 
in this Part include provisions on procedural acts and deadlines as well as 
on the direction of proceedings by the court (Title 9) and mutual assistance 
between Swiss courts (Title 11).
aƞƽƿ ᇳ eiƿlƣ ᇳᇲ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇷᇲᅬᇳᇻᇵᄭ ơƺƹƿƞiƹƾ ƿƩƣ ƽǀlƣƾ ƺƹ ƣǁiƢƣƹơƣ. EǁiƢƣƹơƣ 
is required to prove facts that are both legally relevant and disputed (Article 
150). The court forms its opinion on the case based on its free assessment 
of the evidence taken (Article 157). Evidence that relates to publicly known 
facts, facts known to the court, and commonly accepted rules of experience 
shall not be taken into account (Article 151). Article 29 II Constitution defi-
nes the right to be heard, which is mirrored in the Code’s so- called right 
to evidence (Article 152 I). A party is entitled to have the court accept the 
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evidence that he or she offers in the required form and time. However, there 
is a key exception to the right to evidence: the court’s so- called anticipated 
evaluation of evidence. This allows a judge to refuse to accept evidence if he 
or she is already convinced that a certain fact is true or false before taking 
the evidence, or if already convinced that the evidence offered is unsuita-
ble. Some authors see this practice as inherent to the free assessment of 
evidence and necessary with a view to the constitutionally granted24 need 
for speed (the Civil Procedure Code obliges the courts to issue the required 
procedural rulings to enable the proceedings to be prepared and conduc-
ted efficiently, Article 124 I). Indeed, the principle of the free assessment of 
evidence means that the court forms its opinion on whether a controver-
sial fact is true or false through free assessment of the available evidence. 
It is certainly true that in some constellations there will be a point when a 
judge is convinced that his opinion is established and cannot be affected by 
taking (more) counterevidence. As an example one could assume a case in 
which the fact to be proven is that A bought a car from B and the available 
evidence includes a notarized signed purchase agreement, written commu-
nication between A and B about the purchase, an expert opinion that con-
firms the authenticity of A’s signature, and the statement of the notary who 
was present during the conclusion of contract. If A now offers the testimony 
of his wife claiming that she was abroad with A on the day of the contract 
conclusion and he therefore could not have signed the contract, it would be 
comprehensible that such a statement would not change the court’s opinion 
about A having bought the car from B. As a matter of fact, it would be unfa-
vourable if the judge was obliged to take any evidence being offered despite 
of his opinion making being concluded, as this could open doors to parties 
considerably prolonging cases. Of course, for the anticipated evaluation of 
evidence to be acceptable, the court may only refuse to accept evidence if 
it is sure that it will not change its opinion, not in cases of doubt. This is 
especially given when evidence is generally unfit to prove a certain fact, for 
instance an expert opinion can generally not prove the agreement of will 
between two parties. Some authors regard the rejection of generally suita-
ble evidence that is seen as unfit in a particular case by subjective assess-
ment of the court as permissible, for instance when only the testimony of a 
strongly biased witness is offered as sole evidence. Still, it must be noted that 
24 Article 29 I Constitution: “Every person has the right to […] have their case decided within 
a reasonable time”.
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the questioning of witnesses and parties and also their confrontation can 
provide valuable indications for their credibility and therefore, anticipated 
evaluation of evidence can be problematic.
Article 168 I lists the admissible types of evidence (numerus clausus of evi-
dence): testimony, physical records, inspection, expert opinion, written state-
ments and questioning, and statements of the parties. A witness must disclose 
if parts of his statement are based on information that was not obtained by 
his or her direct sensory perception but given to him or her by another person 
(hearsay evidence). Such statements do not possess direct evidential value, 
but can be included as circumstantial evidence when assessing the probative 
force of other evidence. Expert opinions commissioned by the parties have 
no evidentiary force and are essentially treated in the same way as a party 
statement. However the preliminary draft for a partial revision of the Civil 
Procedure Code from 2018 proposes to consider them as physical records.
The distribution of the burden of proof is determined by Article 8 Civil Code, 
rather than the Civil Procedure Code: this provision states that unless the law 
provides otherwise, the burden of proof for establishing an alleged fact shall 
rest on the person who would derive rights from that fact. Consequently, the 
party asserting a claim is obligated to prove the legally relevant facts giving 
rise to and substantiating the claim. For example, if the claimant demands 
that the defendant hand over an object in fulfilment of a purchase contract, 
the claimant has to prove the existence of said contract as he is deriving his 
claim from it. Contrarily, the defendant has to prove possible objections, like 
the contract being invalid or the object having been handed over and the con-
tract therefore already being fulfilled. There are also legal provisions which 
establish a presumption of certain facts as long as there is no proof to the 
contrary (presumption of facts). An example of such a provision is Article 3 I 
Civil Code, which states that where the law makes legal effect conditional on 
a person’s good faith, there shall be a presumption of good faith. This means 
that in such cases, the party invoking good faith is released from the obli-
gation to prove it; it is presumed to exist by law. The reason rules about the 
burden of proof can be found in the Civil Code is a historical one: at the time 
of the enactment of the Civil Code it was considered vital to regulate such 
matters on the federal level to ensure the uniform application of civil law, 
even though at this point civil procedure was still the cantons’ domain. Even 
after the codification of Swiss civil procedure law on a federal level, these pro-
visions were not transferred but left to remain in the Civil Code which is why 
they can still be found there.
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Parties to the proceedings as well as third parties have a duty to cooperate 
in the taking of evidence (Article 160 I). They must give truthful testimony, 
produce the required physical records, and allow an examination of their per-
son and/or property. In the case of a party’s unjustified refusal to cooperate 
in this area, the law does not allow for the imposing of any fines or sanctions 
whatsoever. Instead, the refusal is taken into account during the appraisal of 
evidence; this can in fact have all the more serious consequences. For example, 
if a party refuses to produce a certain document although it is known to be 
in possession of it, the court might use the refusal as an indication for the 
assumption that the document features the content claimed by the opposing 
party. For situations where third parties refuse to cooperate without a valid 
reason, the courts have a number of measures at their disposal, including 
imposing a disciplinary fine or ordering compulsory measures (Article 167 I), 
like the enforcement of witness appearances or the seizure of documents.
Part 1 Title 10 also sets out the rules for dealing with illegally obtained evi-
dence. The taking of evidence can be formally unlawful, for example when 
a witness gives testimony without being advised of their right to refuse to 
cooperate (although third parties have a general duty to cooperate, they are 
under certain circumstances given the right to refuse, for instance if they are 
or were married to, cohabit with or have a child with a party [Article 165 I]). 
Such a testimony is usually not admissible as evidence. Evidence can also be 
obtained in infringement of the substantive law, for example when a letter is 
opened in breach of the privacy of a sealed document (Article 179 Criminal 
Code)25 or a conversation is recorded in breach of Article 179bis Criminal Code. 
Such illegally obtained evidence is generally not admissible, unless there is an 
overriding interest in finding the truth (Article 152 II). The public interest in 
finding the truth is assumed to be higher the more prevalent the principle of 
ex- officio investigation (meaning the courts must inquire into the “material” 
truth ex officio instead of relying on the facts presented by the parties) is in a 
proceeding. This principle is strongest pronounced in cases concerning child-
ren in family matters, which is why in these cases also the public interest in fin-
ding the truth appears highest. Least weight is attached to the public interest 
in finding the truth in proceedings without any ex- officio investigation and 
in matters of voluntary jurisdiction. The private interest in finding the truth 
25 Swiss Criminal Code of 21 December 1937 (Criminal Code), SR 311.0; see for an English 
version of the Swiss Criminal Code www.admin.ch (https://perma.cc/4QS4- CWQ5).
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rises and falls with the sum of the value in dispute. The interest in finding the 
truth must be weighed against the interest in protecting the legal right that 
was violated by the unlawful taking of evidence. Generally, physical and psy-
chological integrity stands above material goods, which means that evidence 
obtained by violence or threat is not admissible in claims proceedings.
Part 2 of the Civil Procedure Code contains special provisions. In its first 
eiƿlƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾèᇳᇻᇹᅬᇴᇳᇴᄭ ƿƩƣ ƽǀlƣƾ Ƥƺƽ ơƺƹơiliƞƿiƺƹ ƞƿƿƣƸƻƿƾ ƞƽƣ ƾƣƿ ƺǀƿ, ǂƩilƣ iƿƾ 
ƾƣơƺƹƢ eiƿlƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇴᇳᇵᅬᇴᇳᇺᄭ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣƾ ƸƣƢiƞƿiƺƹ. é ơƺƹơiliƞƿiƺƹ ƞƿƿƣƸƻƿ iƾ 
an informal proceeding in which a conciliation authority tries to reconcile the 
parties in an informal manner and that serves to avoid a court proceedings. 
The conciliation authority assesses the conflict and can propose a solution. 
Mediation is an even less formal voluntary and confidential dispute resolution 
procedure guided by an independent third party that is only responsible for 
the procedure while the subject of the negotiations and the development of 
solutions largely lie in the hands of the parties. In line with Swiss tradition the 
law values consensus- based solutions between the parties and therefore man-
dates an attempt at conciliation before a case can be brought before a court 
(Article 197). There are a number of exceptions, for example for summary pro-
ceedings and family matters (Article 198). Also, the parties can agree to wave 
any attempt at conciliation in financial disputes which have a value of at least 
CHF 100’000 (Article 199). The organisation of conciliation authorities is regu-
lated by the cantons and therefore can take several forms. Many cantons use 
so- called justices of the peace, who are often non- lawyers, being elected by the 
public into the role. Some cantons provide specific conciliation centres and a 
few cantons hold conciliation proceedings in courts. About half of such conci-
liation attempts are successfully settled, although the numbers differ substan-
tially between the cantons. Parties can agree to use mediation rather than the 
conciliation proceedings (Article 213) but this option is only rarely used.
The remaining Titles of Part 2 of the Civil Procedure Code contain rules 
ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƢiƤƤƣƽƣƹƿ ƿǄƻƣƾ ƺƤ ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ. eiƿlƣ ᇵ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇴᇳᇻᅬᇴᇶᇴᄭ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣƾ ƿƩƣ 
ordinary proceedings at first instance that apply in general civil cases where 
the value of dispute exceeds CHF 30’000. The established rules concern the 
exchange of written submissions, hearings, the taking of evidence, and deci-
ƾiƺƹƾ. eiƿlƣ ᇶ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇴᇶᇵᅬᇴᇶᇹᄭ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣƾ ƾiƸƻliƤiƣƢ ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ. eƩƣƾƣ ƻƽƺ-
ceedings apply in financial disputes with a value in dispute not exceeding 
CHF ᇵᇲ’ᇲᇲᇲ. eiƿlƣ ᇷ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇴᇶᇺᅬᇴᇹᇲᄭ ơƺƹơƣƽƹƾ ƾǀƸƸƞƽǄ ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ: ƿƩƣƾƣ 
are applied in cases where the facts or the law are clear, where matters are 
non- contentious, and in various other specific circumstances as provided by 
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law (for example in proceedings fixing a time limit for legal transactions by 
minors or persons subject to a general deputyship; proceedings of acceptance 
of an oral will or proceedings appointing, dismissing, and replacing a com-
pany’s liquidator). Titles 6, 7, and 8 set out special provisions which apply in 
cases of marital disputes, proceedings concerning children in family matters, 
ƞƹƢ ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ ơƺƹơƣƽƹiƹƨ ƾƞƸƣ- ƾƣǃ ƻƞƽƿƹƣƽƾƩiƻƾ. eiƿlƣ ᇻ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇲᇺᅬᇵᇵᇶᄭ 
establishes the legal remedies available to the parties (appeal, objection, 
review) and Title 10 regulates the enforcement of decisions concerning non- 
money- claims (for instance the delivery of a moveable property or the resto-
ration of earlier conditions on a property), while the enforcement of money 
claims is regulated by the Debt Enforcement and Insolvency Act.
aƞƽƿ ᇵ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇵᇷᇵᅬᇵᇻᇻᄭ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ CƺƢƣ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣƾ ƞƽƟiƿƽƞƿiƺƹ iƹ ƢƺƸƣƾƿiơ 
cases, i.e. where both parties have their domicile and habitual residence in 
Switzerland at the time of signing the arbitration agreement. Arbitration in 
cross- border cases is subject to the Private International Law Act. Finally, 
aƞƽƿ ᇶ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇶᇲᇲᅬᇶᇲᇺᄭ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣƾ ƿƩƣ iƸƻlƣƸƣƹƿƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ CƺƢƣ.
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II. aƽiƹơiƻlƣƾ
Civil procedure in Switzerland is constrained by a set of principles outlined 
by the Civil Procedure Code. For example, all those who participate in pro-
ceedings must act in good faith (Article 52). Further, the parties’ right to be 
heard must be respected (Article 53). Court hearings are public and judge-
ments must both be pronounced publicly and made accessible to the public 
(Article 54 I). The court applies the law ex- officio (Article 57). In the following 
paragraphs, four other fundamental principles will be examined. 
ᇳ. e؛ؘ aإ؜ءؖ؜أ؟ؘ آؙ aؔإاج D؜ئأآئ؜ا؜آء ؔئ ؔ cب؟ؘ
In Swiss civil procedure, the parties largely have the power to decide the 
time, subject matter, and duration of proceedings: this is what is known as 
the principle of party disposition. In this regard, the only principle that the 
Civil Procedure Code explicitly mentions is that of non ultra petitia. It states 
that the court may not award a party anything more than or different from 
that requested (Article 58 I). Nonetheless, the principle of party disposition is 
recognised as being generally applicable to Swiss civil procedure, including 
matters like the initiation and closing of proceedings. The courts do not open 
proceedings on their own initiative; instead, the claimant decides whether or 
not to file an action. The claimant also determines the subject of the procee-
dings through his or her claim, i.e. what he or she is demanding from whom. 
If a claim is divisible, an action for only part of the claim can be filed (Article 
86). Because of the principle of non ultra petitia, the court is restricted to the 
claimant’s request. The principle of party disposition also means that the pro-
ceedings can be brought to an end by the parties at any point. Procedural 
institutions to end a proceeding are settlement or acceptance of the claim 
and withdrawal (Article 241). They have the same effect as a binding decision.
The principle of party disposition is complemented by the court’s duty to 
enquire (Article 56). If a party’s submissions are unclear, contradictory, ambi-
guous, or manifestly incomplete, the court provides an opportunity for either 
party to clarify or complete the submission by asking appropriate questions. 
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Shortly after the entry into force of the Civil Procedure Code, it was heavily 
disputed whether the court merely had a right to enquire or an actual obli-
gation to do so. It is now recognised that the court is indeed obligated to ask 
questions.
ᇴ. e؛ؘ aإ؜ءؖ؜أ؟ؘ آؙ Eث- Oؙؙ؜ؖ؜آ Aئئؘئئؠؘءا ؔئ ؔء 
Eثؘؖأا؜آء
Another exception to the principle of party disposition in Swiss civil proce-
dure is the principle of ex- officio assessment (Article 58 II). It means that the 
court has a duty to independently assess the case before it; it deprives the par-
ties of their free disposal over the matter in dispute and means that the court 
is not bound by the parties’ requests. In Swiss civil procedure, the principle 
of ex- officio assessment is applied where the public interest requires that the 
parties are deprived of their free disposal. Such a reason may be, for instance, 
the protection of weaker parties (like minors). For example, the court can 
award more child maintenance than the amount requested by the claimant 
or than the amount the parties had agreed on in a divorce settlement. 
The claimant still has to file an action if ex- officio assessment is applicable. 
State authorities may only initiate civil proceedings if this is explicitly stated 
by federal law: for example, this is the case for the action for annulment of 
marriage (Article 106 Civil Code).26 Appellate proceedings can never be initi-
ated ex- officio.
ᇵ. e؛ؘ aإ؜ءؖ؜أ؟ؘ آؙ aؔإاج cؘأإؘئؘءاؔا؜آء ؔئ 
ؔ cب؟ؘ
While the principle of party disposition stipulates how the subject matter of 
proceedings is defined, the principle of party representation concerns the 
question of how the court comes to know the facts and evidence it needs for 
26 Grounds for marriage annulment are for instance that one of the spouses was already 
married at the time of the wedding; that one of the spouses lacked capacity of judgement 
at the time of the wedding and has not regained such capacity since; that the marriage 
was prohibited due to kinship; that a spouse has not married of his or her own free will 
or that one of the spouses is a minor.
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deciding the case. In Swiss civil procedure, this principle is the rule, mea-
ning that only the facts and evidence produced by the parties form the subject 
matter of the proceedings. This means that the parties must present the court 
with the facts in support of their case and submit the related evidence (Article 
55 I). This can contradict the search for the material truth. For example, if a 
party does not dispute or concedes allegations of its opponent, the judge has 
to base his or her decision on these facts, regardless of his conviction of the 
truth. However, this is justified by the principle of individual autonomy in 
civil procedure. Like according to the principle of party disposition explained 
above, the parties can decide whether they want to bring proceedings before a 
court; they also can decide which facts they present in their statements.
The principle of party representation is limited in several ways: evidence is 
not required to be provided in support of publicly known facts, facts known 
to the court, and commonly accepted rules of experience. The latter can be 
based on general life experience (common sense) or on experiences from 
specific areas of life (trade and commerce, technology, art, etc.). An example 
would be the determination of the time spent on housekeeping based on 
statistical data. Facts can also be undisputed and therefore be considered 
proven. As with the principle of party disposition, the principle of party repre-
sentation is also complemented by the court’s duty to enquire. Again, this 
means that the court asks questions for either party to clarify or complete 
their submissions if they are unclear or incomplete. If this duty to enquire 
is exercised extensively, the proceedings acquire a more inquisitorial touch, 
something which runs counter to the idea of the principle of party represen-
ƿƞƿiƺƹ ǀƻƺƹèǂƩiơƩ iƿ iƾ ƿƩƣ ƻƞƽƿiƣƾ’ ƽƣƾƻƺƹƾiƟiliƿǄ ƿƺ ƻƽƣƾƣƹƿ ƿƩƣ ƽƣlƣǁƞƹƿ Ƥƞơƿƾ 
ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ơƺǀƽƿ ǂƩiơƩèƢƺƣƾ ƹƺƿ ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩ Ƥƞơƿƾ ƺƤ iƿƾ ƺǂƹ. eƩƣƽƣƤƺƽƣ, iƿ iƾ ǂiƢƣlǄ 
recognised that the duty to enquire shall be exercised with great restraint 
towards parties who are legally represented, at least in ordinary proceedings. 
For simplified proceedings, a comparably stronger duty to enquire is imposed 
by the Civil Procedure Code (Article 247).
ᇶ. e؛ؘ aإ؜ءؖ؜أ؟ؘ آؙ Eث- Oؙؙ؜ؖ؜آ Iءةؘئا؜ؚؔا؜آء ؔئ 
ؔء Eثؘؖأا؜آء
While the principle of ex- officio assessment means that courts are bound 
by the parties’ requests, the principle of ex- officio investigation concerns 
the establishment of the facts in a case. Within the scope of the principle of 
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ex- officio investigation the courts cannot rely on the facts presented to them 
by the parties: they must inquire into the “material” truth ex officio, thus pro-
viding an exception to the principle of party representation. The principle 
of ex- officio investigation is highly relevant in criminal proceedings. It does 
not have the same significance in civil proceedings because civil courts can-
not rely on the relevant investigation authorities. Distinction is to be made 
between the principle of limited ex- officio investigation (establish the facts) 
and the principle of unlimited ex- officio investigation (investigate the facts). 
Unlimited ex- officio investigation applies in proceedings concerning children 
in family matters. Limited ex- officio investigation applies in disputes concer-
ning matters of discrimination under employment law and certain tenancy 
matters, as well as in tenancy, lease, and employment law disputes where the 
value in dispute does not exceed CHF 30’000. As with ex- officio assessment, 
the main reason behind ex- officio investigation is to protect the weaker party. 
Where ex- officio investigation is required, the court questions the parties 
extensively and demands that they produce relevant materials, for example 
by calling witnesses. Still, due to the court’s limited possibilities of investiga-
tion, it is up to the parties to describe the main facts, being prompted by the 
judge’s questions where necessary. Only where unlimited ex- officio investi-
gation applies does the court have the responsibility for establishing the rele-
vant facts. 
This means the involvement of the court in the establishment of the facts of 
a case can have the following manifestations in different proceedings: 
Figure 3: Levels of Court Involvement in Establishing the Facts
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III. Iƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƾ ƞƹƢ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ
The institutions and procedure of Swiss civil justice can be best understood 
by chronologically following the course of a standard case. First, the attempt 
at conciliation, which is essentially mandatory before a case can be brought 
before a court, will be explained (1.). Subsequently, the rules for ordinary pro-
ceedings will be examined in detail (2.) following which a short overview of 
simplified and summary proceedings will be given (3.). Finally, the appellate 
remedies in Swiss civil procedure will be outlined (4.).
ᇳ. Aااؘؠأا ؔا Cآءؖ؜؟؜ؔا؜آء
As explained above, an attempt at conciliation is basically mandatory in 
Switzerland before a case can be brought to court (Article 197), although the 
law does provide for some exceptions (such as in summary proceedings). For 
financial disputes with a value in dispute of more than CHF 100’000, parties 
can agree to waive the conciliation attempt (Article 199 I). Like with cantonal 
courts, the federal law regulates the procedure before conciliation authori-
ties but leaves their organisation to the cantons. The conciliation proceedings 
are initiated by the claimant filing an application for conciliation in the form 
of paper documents, either electronically (Article 130 I) or orally before the 
conciliation authority (Article 202 I). In their application, they must identify 
the opposing party, describe the prayers for relief and the matter in dispute. 
This is the minimum content required for a conciliation application (Article 
202 II). With the filing of the application, a case becomes pending (Article 
62): from this point, the same subject matter can no longer be filed elsewhere 
between the same parties (Article 64). 
Conciliation authorities try to help the parties reach an agreement. The pro-
cedure is thus less formal than that followed in court proceedings. Conciliation 
hearings are also generally27 not open to the public. After the application is 
27 In disputes relating to the tenancy and lease of residential and business property the 
conciliation authority may allow full or partial public access to the hearings if there is a 
358 Sophie- Katharina Matjaz: Civil Procedure
filed, the conciliation authority serves the defendant and summons the par-
ties to a hearing. The parties must appear in person. The statements made 
during the hearing are confidential and cannot be used subsequently in any 
court proceedings (Article 205). In financial disputes where the value in dis-
pute is below CHF 2’000, the conciliation authority can decide on the merits 
on the plaintiffs’ request (Article 212). If the value in dispute is below CHF 
5’000, the conciliation authority can submit a proposed judgement to the par-
ties, which has binding effect as long as it is not rejected by any of the parties 
within 20 days (Article 211). If the parties do not reach an agreement during 
the hearing and the conciliation authority can neither decide the case nor 
render a proposed judgement, it grants authorisation to proceed (Article 209 
I). From this point, the claimant has three months to file the action in court 
if he or she wishes.
ᇴ. Oإؗ؜ءؔإج aإآؘؘؖؗ؜ءؚئ
Court proceedings are initiated by the claimant filing a detailed statem-
ent of claim (Article 221). If the value in dispute exceeds CHF 30’000, the 
ordinary proceeding applies. Provisions regulating ordinary proceedings 
apply to other proceedings unless there are specialised rules stipulated by 
law. After the statement of claim is received by the court, the preparation 
of the main hearing begins. The court examines whether the procedural 
requirements (such as the proper filing of the statement of claim, a legi-
timate interest of the plaintiff, the case not being the subject of pending 
proceedings elsewhere, and the subject- matter and territorial jurisdiction 
of the court seized) are met (Article 60), serves the statement of claim 
on the defendant, and sets a deadline for the submission of a written sta-
tement of defence (Article 222). If the defendant does not submit within 
the deadline (including a short period of grace)28, the court can if feasible 
make a decision solely from the statement of claim (Article 223 II). 
After the statement of defence is received, the court has several choices 
regarding the next procedural steps to be taken. It can proceed directly to the 
main hearing, order that an instruction hearing be held before proceeding to 
the main hearing, or order that a second written exchange be conducted before 
public interest.
28 If the statement of defence is not filed within the deadline, the law orders the court to 
allow the defendant a short period of grace.
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the main hearing. An instruction hearing can be held at any time during the 
proceedings to discuss the dispute informally, complete the facts,29 reach an 
agreement, or simply prepare for the main hearing (Article 226). Courts can 
also take evidence during such hearings. Prior to the main hearing, the court 
delivers the so- called ruling on evidence (Article 154): here the court rules on 
the admissibility of each piece of evidence and determines which party has 
the burden of proof for each fact.
Figure 4: Possible Options for the Conduct of Ordinary Proceedings
29 In ordinary proceedings, the courts usually exercise their duty to enquire during the 
instruction hearing, giving the parties the opportunity to clarify, or complete their sub-
missions by asking appropriate questions.
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In Swiss civil procedure, the main hearing is structured in a fairly formal 
way. First, there are two rounds of oral statements taken from each party 
(Article 228). After the second round of written or oral statements, new facts 
and evidence are admissible only if they are introduced immediately and 
came into existence after the statements or, where they existed prior to this 
point, if the party was unable to introduce them earlier despite exercising 
reasonable diligence (Article 229). If the court decides to proceed directly 
to the main hearing after the statements of action and defence, parties can 
introduce new facts and evidence in their first oral statement. If the court 
decided to hold an instruction hearing for reasons other than simply reaching 
agreement, parties are generally not permitted to introduce any new facts 
or evidence in the main hearing (except if they arose after the instruction 
hearing or if they existed before but the party was unable to introduce them 
earlier despite exercising reasonable diligence). Instead, the parties can only 
comment on the statements that the other party made during the instruction 
hearing. The same goes for cases in which the court ordered a second round of 
written exchanges between the parties: here, the parties can only comment 
on the statements made by the other party in the last written exchange. So in 
conclusion, in Swiss civil procedure parties have two opportunities to bring 
new facts or evidence into the proceedings without limitation: First the sta-
tements of action and defence and second depending on the further course of 
the procedure either the second round of written exchanges, the statements 
during the instruction hearing, or the first oral statements during the main 
hearing.
The second oral statement in the main hearing provides the parties with 
an opportunity to comment on the other party’s first statement. This is espe-
cially important in cases where new facts or evidence have been introduced. 
Thereupon, the court examines the evidence produced by the parties and 
indicated in the ruling on evidence (questioning witnesses, performing an 
inspection, etc.). Afterwards, the parties may comment on the result of the 
evidence and on the merits of the case (Article 232). Each party has the right 
to make a second round of submissions. Parties can jointly agree to dispense 
with the main hearing (Article 233). In such cases, no evidence is taken as this 
is exclusively done as part of the main hearing. 
If the court is able to make a decision, it closes the proceedings either by 
deciding not to consider the merits or by making a decision on the merits 
(Article 236). If the proceedings are not presided over by a single judge, the 
court decides by majority. The court may give notice of the decision to the 
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parties without providing a written statement of the grounds, although 
the parties can request that such a statement be produced within ten days 
(Article 239).
ᇵ. Oا؛ؘإ eجأؘئ آؙ aإآؘؘؖؗ؜ءؚئ
diƸƻliƤiƣƢ ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ ƞƽƣ ƨƺǁƣƽƹƣƢ ƟǄ éƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇴᇶᇵᅬᇴᇶᇹ. eƩƣǄ ƞƻƻlǄ iƹ ơƞƾƣƾ 
where the value in dispute is below CHF 30’000, as well as to disputes in social 
matters, such as tenancy disputes, employment disputes, and consumer dis-
putes. Simplified proceedings are less formal, largely allow oral submissions, 
and attribute a more active role to the court. Contrary to ordinary procee-
dings, in simplified proceedings a claimant may submit his claim orally 
before the court. 
The Civil Procedure Code provides for summary proceedings in Articles 
ᇴᇶᇺᅬᇴᇹᇲ. eƩƣƾƣ ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣƾ ƞƽƣ ƣǁƣƹ ƾiƸƻlƣƽ ƞƹƢ Ƹƺƽƣ ƣǃƻƣƢiƣƹƿ ƿƩƞƹ ƾiƸƻli-
fied proceedings. They apply, in particular, to urgent requests and requests for 
provisional measures. They also apply to non- contentious matters, matters 
where the facts can be immediately proven, or matters where the legal situa-
tion is straightforward and indisputable. Summary proceedings also apply to 
specific proceedings under the Debt Enforcement and Insolvency Act, such 
as a declaration of bankruptcy. As in simplified proceedings, a claimant may 
present his or her claim orally. In the context of summary proceedings, the 
only permitted form of evidence is documents. Other types of evidence are 
only admissible if the taking of such evidence does not delay the proceedings 
or if the court has to establish facts ex officio.
ᇶ. Aأأؘ؟؟ؔاؘ aإآؘؘؖؗ؜ءؚئ
As mentioned above each canton has a second- instance, appellate court. The 
Civil Procedure Code knows three appellate remedies: appeal, complaint, and 
revision. Subsequent complaints against final cantonal decisions can, in limi-
ted circumstances, be filed with the Swiss Federal Supreme Court. Such com-
plaints are governed by the Federal Supreme Court Act (Articles 72 et seqq. 
Federal Supreme Court Act). 
éƹ ƞƻƻƣƞl ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇵᇲᇺᅬᇵᇳᇺᄭ iƾ ƿƩƣ ƺƽƢiƹƞƽǄ ƽƣƸƣƢǄ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ Ƥiƹƞl ƞƹƢ 
interim decisions of first instance if the value in dispute amounts to at least 
CHFè ᇳᇲ’ᇲᇲᇲ. Dƣơiƾiƺƹƾ iƹ ƹƺƹ- Ƥiƹƞƹơiƞl Ƹƞƿƿƣƽƾ ơƞƹ ƻƽƞơƿiơƞllǄ ƞlǂƞǄƾ Ɵƣ 
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challenged by appeal (for example, divorce cases). An appeal must be filed 
in writing within 30 days of service of a decision (Article 311 I). If the decision 
was rendered in summary proceedings, the deadline for filing the appeal is 10 
days (Article 314 I). An appeal may be filed on grounds of the incorrect appli-
cation of law (such as incorrect application of the Civil Procedure Code itself 
or incorrect application of substantial civil law) or the incorrect establish-
ment of facts (such as incorrect assessment of evidence, incorrect assumption 
about whether facts have been claimed or not claimed). 
Where an appeal is excluded, i.e. in financial cases with a value in dispute 
Ɵƣlƺǂ CHFèᇳᇲ’ᇲᇲᇲ, ƞ ƻƞƽƿǄ ƸƞǄ Ƥilƣ ƞƹ ƺƟjƣơƿiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇵᇳᇻᅬᇵᇴᇹƞᄭ. OƟjƣơƿiƺƹƾ 
are admissible on the grounds of the incorrect application of the law, but 
incorrect establishment of facts may be raised as a ground only if the establis-
hment of facts has been obviously incorrect (Article 320). This is for instance 
presumed if the court determines facts based on an arbitrary assessment of 
evidence or if it assumes a fact that needs to be proven as proved without any 
records giving information on this fact. The deadline for filing an objection is 
30 days from service of a court’s decision (Article 321 I). In the case of sum-
mary proceedings, it is 10 days (Article 321 II). Contrary to an appeal, the filing 
of an objection does not, as a rule, suspend the legal effect and enforceability 
of the contested decision (Article 325 I). However, exceptionally, the appellate 
court may grant a suspension of the enforceability (Article 325 II). As opposed 
to appeals, new evidence, or new allegations of facts are, in principle, inad-
missible (Article 326).
Finally, a party can apply to the court that has decided as final instance in 
iƿƾ ơƞƾƣ ƿƺ ƽƣƺƻƣƹ ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ ƿƩƽƺǀƨƩ ƞ ƽƣǁiƣǂ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇵᇴᇺᅬᇵᇵᇵᄭ lƣƞƢiƹƨ ƿƺ 
a final judgment if significant facts or decisive evidence are discovered which 
were not available in the earlier proceedings (Article 328 I lit. a). Review of a 
decision may also be requested when the decision was unlawfully influenced 
to the detriment of a party (Article 328 I lit. b). Offences in this context are for 
instance perjury by a party to civil proceedings (Article 308 Criminal Code), 
perjury by an expert witness or false translation (Article 307 Criminal Code), 
issuing a false medical certificate (Article 318 Criminal Code), or bribery of 
Swiss public officials (Article 322ter Criminal Code). A review must be filed 
within 90 days of the discovery of the grounds for review (Article 329 I) and 
within 10 years of the date the decision came into force (Article 329 II). Like 
with objections, the filing of a review does not suspend the legal effect and 
enforceability of the decision (Article 332).
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Ig. LƞƹƢƸƞƽk Cƞƾƣƾ
ᇳ. Iءاؘإءؔا؜آءؔ؟ Cؔئؘ30
In this case, a firm that owned a Swiss patent and had its registered office in 
Denmark accused a firm with its registered office in Switzerland of infrin-
ging the aforementioned patent. The question was whether this qualified as 
an international matter in which case territorial jurisdiction would be deter-
mined by international treaties or if it should instead be subject to Swiss juris-
diction regulations. The Federal Supreme Court stated that the question of 
whether a matter was of international nature or not must be examined in 
each case individually and under the given circumstances. Therefore, it can-
not be assumed that every case in which one party is of foreign nationality 
will automatically qualify as international. However, the Federal Supreme 
Court decided that a case will always qualify as international if one of the 
parties has its domicile or registered office in a foreign country. This applies 
regardless of the party’s role in the proceedings (claimant or defendant).
The Federal Supreme Court rendered this decision with regards to the Swiss 
Jurisdiction Act, a piece of legislation that has since been replaced by the 
Federal Code of Procedure. However, the rules of the Jurisdiction Act were 
simply transferred in their full content to the Federal Code: thus, this land-
mark case on the international nature of a dispute is still relevant today.
ᇴ. Düإإؘءؠؔاا’ئ Hؘ؜إئ31
The famous Swiss author Fإ؜ؘؗإ؜ؖ؛ Düإإؘءؠؔاا (one of his most well- 
known works being the highly recommended play “The Physicists”) died on 
14 December 1990, leaving his wife C؛ؔإ؟آااؘ Düإإؘءؠؔاا and his three 
children as sole heirs. However, the publishing house he had worked with erro-
neously transferred the rights of theatrical performances of Düإإؘءؠؔاا’s 
30 BGE 131 III 76.
31 BGE 121 III 118.
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work “Midas” to a Bavarian theatre. Thereupon, C؛ؔإ؟آااؘ Düإإؘءؠؔاا 
filed an action for a declaratory judgement, demanding that the court declare 
the transfer of rights invalid. The Federal Supreme Court ruled that the rights 
on Düإإؘءؠؔاا’s work were common property of his heirs; hence, they 
could only jointly appear as plaintiffs. This is largely to ensure that none of the 
heirs suffer any damage due to the sole efforts of another heir. Consequently, 
C؛ؔإ؟آااؘ DüإؘءؠؔااᅬǂƩƺ ƩƞƢ Ɵƣƣƹ liƾƿƣƢ ƞlƺƹƣ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƾƿƞƿƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ 
ơlƞiƸèᅬ ǂƞƾ ƹƺƿ ƞ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣ ƻlƞiƹƿiƤƤ: ƞll ƺƤ Düإإؘءؠؔاا’s heirs would have 
to have been listed in order for the claim to proceed. 
This decision occurred before the Federal Code of Civil Procedure was 
enacted. Today, the mandatory joinder of parties is regulated by Article 70. 
Nevertheless, the decision is still important today, as the substantive civil law 
that determines which cases two or more persons must appear jointly in has 
not changed since the entry into force of the Code of Civil Procedure.
ᇵ. Aؚإؘؘؠؘءا آء Jبإ؜ئؗ؜ؖا؜آء32
Iƹ ƿƩiƾ ơƞƾƣ, ƿƩƣ ơlƞiƸƞƹƿèᅬ ƞ lƞǂǄƣƽèᅬ ƤilƣƢ ƞƹ ƞơƿiƺƹ Ƥƺƽ ƻƣƽƤƺƽƸƞƹơƣ ƿƺ ơlƞiƸ 
the fees for his legal services against the defendant in Winterthur, though the 
defendant’s domicile was in Schaffhausen. The claimant justified his petitio-
ning of the court in Winterthur on an agreement on jurisdiction in his Terms 
and Conditions (T&Gs) that the defendant had signed. The Federal Supreme 
Court stated that parties can only waive jurisdiction at the defendant’s domi-
cile if there is a consensus between them regarding this matter. If an actual 
consensus in the sense of an agreement cannot be proven, it is the normative 
consensus33 that counts. Such a consensus is only found if the contracting 
party can assume in good faith that the other party accepted the agreement 
on jurisdiction by signing the contract. Relevant factors in this context are, 
for example, the business experience of the waiving party, the arrangement 
of and emphasis on the jurisdiction clause within the T&Gs, etc. The Federal 
Supreme Court established that a jurisdiction clause must be on prominent 
display and be clearly marked out in the T&Gs if the contracting party does 
not have a lot of business experience. This is because otherwise it cannot be 
32 BGE 124 III 72.
33 According to the principle of objective interpretation, a declaration of intention is to be 
understood the way the other party of the contract could and did in good faith under-
stand it.
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assumed that the party wanted to waive jurisdiction at his or her domicile 
(this requirement is known as the typographic practice).
As the typographic practice was developed before the Federal Code of Civil 
Procedure entered into force, doctrine largely assumes that it was abolished 
by the new Code and that nowadays, it is sufficient for an agreement on juris-
diction to be written, as opposed to clearly demarcated. Nonetheless, the 
Swiss Federal Supreme Court has confirmed its previous practice in several 
more recent decisions.34
ᇶ. F؜؟؜ءؚ ؔء Aأأؘؔ؟ ت؜ا؛ ؔء Iءؖآؠأؘاؘءا Cآبإا35
A woman filed an action against her employer before the employment court 
in Zurich which dismissed her case. She filed an appeal against this judge-
ment on the last day of the time limit via the Swiss Postal Services, addressing 
it to the employment court that had dismissed her claim. In reality, it was the 
High Court of Zurich that had jurisdiction over the appeal. Thus, the High 
Court rejected the appeal on the basis that it had not been appropriately filed 
within the time limit. Upon a further appeal to the Federal Supreme Court, it 
was held that the lack of a legal provision covering situations where the dead-
line to appeal was missed due to the application being filed with an incompe-
tent court was not intended by the legislator; thus there was a gap in the law.
Before the Federal Code entered into force in 2011, the Federal Supreme 
Court had already defined it as a “principle of civil procedure” that filing 
an appeal with an incompetent court and therefore missing the deadline to 
appeal does not preclude compliance with said deadline. This principle was 
also applied to situations where there was a gap in the regulation of this issue 
in the former cantonal codes. According to the Federal Supreme Court, this 
principle has continued to apply since the entry into force of the Federal 
Code, albeit in a slightly modified form. Specifically, because court organisa-
tion is still within the cantons’ domain; it might not be possible for a federal 
authority or one from another canton that mistakenly receives an appeal to 
accurately determine the authority that actually has jurisdiction in order to 
forward the appeal on towards it. Hence the principle now only applies where 
34 Judgment of the Federal Supreme Court 4A_4/2015 of 9 March 2015, consideration 2; 
Judgment of the Federal Supreme Court 4A_247/2013 of 14 October 2013, consideration 
2.1.2.
35 BGE 140 III 636.
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the party mistakenly addresses the appeal to the court that delivered the dis-
puted judgement: as soon as the appeal is filed with this court, the deadline is 
considered to be met. By contrast, if an appeal remedy is filed with any other 
incompetent authority, compliance with the deadline can only be assumed if 
the incompetent authority forwards the documents towards the competent 
authority within the deadline: notably, such authorities have no legal obli-
gation to do so. Of course this argumentation is not without cynicism as the 
Federal Supreme Court obviously does not have the confidence in the canto-
nal courts to determine the competent authority but requests the exact same 
thing from the claimant.
As the claimant in this case had filed the appeal against the judgement of the 
ƣƸƻlƺǄƸƣƹƿ ơƺǀƽƿ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ ƣƸƻlƺǄƸƣƹƿ ơƺǀƽƿ iƿƾƣlƤ, ƿƩƣ ƢƣƞƢliƹƣ ǂƞƾèƸƣƿ.
ᇷ. Iءؖآإإؘؖا Iءئاإبؖا؜آءئ آء Oؕ؝ؘؖا؜آء 
cؘؠؘؗ؜ؘئ36
In this case, a party raised an objection to the decision of a supervisory autho-
rity in debt enforcement matters to the Federal Supreme Court, under the 
assumption the deadline for raising such an objection was 30 days from noti-
fication of the original decision. In this case, because the claimant objected to 
the decision of a cantonal supervisory authority in debt enforcement matters, 
the deadline was only 10 days. The party had been given incorrect instructions 
on the deadline by the supervisory authority. The Federal Supreme Court sta-
ted that, according to federal law, such incorrect instructions must not result in 
disadvantages for the party in question (Article 49 Federal Supreme Court Act). 
But the Federal Supreme Court decided that this provision is only applicable 
if the party did not know and also could not have known despite exercising 
reasonable diligence that the instruction was incorrect. Further, it established 
that a person who is not legally trained and who is not represented by a legal 
agent cannot be blamed for not realising that an instruction was incorrect, 
except where they have relevant knowledge from prior proceedings. As this 
exception was not applicable in this case, the Federal Supreme Court declared 
the objection admissible despite the fact that the party had failed to comply 
with the 10 day deadline.
36 BGE 135 III 374.
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I. CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣ
This first section is intended to introduce and explain the development of the 
Swiss Criminal Code, starting with a brief history of the codification of crimi-
nal law across Switzerland (1.). Next, the gradual development of the criminal 
code we have today, designed by Carl Stooss, is examined (2.). The content and 
form of this current criminal code will be outlined (3.), before some particu-
larities of the code are analysed in more detail: namely, the dualism of sanc-
tions (4.), the death penalty in Swiss law (5.), and the regulations on assisted 
suicide and euthanasia (6.). 
ᇳ. H؜ئاآإج
eƩƣ Ƥiƽƾƿ ơƺƸƻƽƣƩƣƹƾiǁƣ ơƺƢiƤiơƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ơƽiƸiƹƞl lƞǂ iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢè ᅬ ƿƩƣ 
Code pénal de la République helvétique 1799è ᅬ ǂƞƾ iƹƾƻiƽƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ iƢƣƞlƾ ƺƤ 
the French Revolution, such as equality in sentencing and the abolishment 
of general confiscations.1 However, this codification was not to last for long: 
after the decline of the Helvetic Republic in 1803, the cantons regained their 
right to create and apply their own criminal codes. The canton of Fribourg, for 
example, reintroduced the Constitutio Criminalis of Emperor Carl V of 1532 
(“Carolina”);2 this Code provided on one hand for some brutal forms of pun-
ishment such as drawing and quartering, on the other hand it had once been 
quite modern for it also “advanced” individual rights and protected suspects 
from excessive legal arbitrariness (e.g. no torture without probable cause, no 
leading questions, compensation if tortured illegally, etc.). Of course, in the 
19th century the Carolina was hopelessly outdated.
1 dاؘؙؔء eإؘؖ؛ئؘ؟/Mؔإا؜ء K؜؟؟؜ؔئ, CƽiƸiƹƞl Lƞǂ, iƹ Fƽƞƹơƺiƾ DƣƾƾƣƸƺƹƿƣƿ/eǀƨƽǀl 
Ansay, (eds.), Introduction to Swiss Law, 3rd edition, The Hague 2004, pp. 245, p. 246.
2 Nؔؗ؜ءؘ kبإ؞؜ءؘؗء, National characteristics, fundamental principles, and history of 
ơƽiƸiƹƞl lƞǂ iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, iƹ flƽiơƩ diƣƟƣƽ/Kƺƹƾƿƞƹǅƣ Jƞƽǁƣƽƾ/EƸilǄ dilǁƣƽƸƞƹ ᄬƣƢƾ.ᄭ, 
National Criminal Law in a Comparative Legal Context, Vol 1.1, Berlin 2013, pp. 205, p. 295.
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The Switzerland we know today was founded in 1848 in the aftermath of 
the Sonderbund war, which was a civil war between Catholic and Protestant 
cantons. The seven Catholic cantons who formed the Sonderbund opposed 
the impending centralisation of Switzerland as they feared that their inte-
rests would be marginalized by the majority of Protestant cantons. It was the 
Protestants that prevailed in the Sonderbund war, but it is the lasting legacy of 
ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ƤƺǀƹƢiƹƨ ƤƞƿƩƣƽƾèᅬ ƞƹƢ ƣƾƻƣơiƞllǄ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƣƾiƢƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺ-
nal convention f؟إ؜ؖ؛ Oؖ؛ئؘءؘؕ؜ءèᅬ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƤƣƞƿƣƢ ǂƣƽƣ 
also taken into account, when drafting the Constitution which followed this 
conflict. Hence, it was not a central Swiss Republic but the Swiss Confederation 
that emerged at this point. 
Fiƨǀƽƣ ᇳ: flƽiơƩ OơƩƾƣƹƟƣiƹ, ᇳᇺᇳᇳᅬᇳᇺᇻᇲ3
One of the main features of this federal system founded in 1848 is the auto-
nomy of the 25 cantons:4 the cantons kept their legislative independence. So 
even after Switzerland was founded as a modern federal state, the cantons 
retained their own criminal codes. Considering the size of the cantons (for 
example, even today the canton of Glarus has a population of only 40’000 
inhabitants) this variety of criminal codes proved to be very inefficient. 
Therefore, the Swiss Lawyers Association held, at its general assembly of 1887, 
3 dƺǀƽơƣ: Bƽiƿƞƹƹiơƞ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ECᇹg- CeEᇶᄭ.
4 There were 25 cantons at this point in history. The canton which was added later is that 
ƺƤ Jǀƽƞ, ǂƩiơƩ ƞơơƣƢƣƢ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ iƹ ᇳᇻᇹᇻ, ƟƣơƺƸiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ᇴᇸth Swiss canton.
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that an “efficient and successful fight against crime is not possible as long as the 
fragmentation of cantonal criminal codes persists.”5
ᇴ. Lؘؚ؜ئ؟ؔا؜آء
Following this declaration by the Swiss Lawyers Association, the Swiss Federal 
Council asked Cؔإ؟ dاآآئئ, a professor of criminal law at the University of 
Bern, to draw up a comparative compendium of all the cantonal criminal 
codes. In 1892, Cؔإ؟ dاآآئئ published his comparative analysis. He pointed 
out that the foundations of Swiss criminal law were “quite cosmopolitan”, 
drawing from Romanic and German sources. While the French influence of 
the Code pénal of 1799 persisted in the cantons of the Romandie (western, 
French- speaking part of Switzerland), the codes of the central and eastern 
(German- speaking) cantons were more inspired by the Austro- Hungarian 
codification.
Interestingly, three cantons were missing in Cؔإ؟ dاآآئئ’ compilation: Uri, 
Unterwalden and Appenzell Innerrhoden. The reason for this was that these 
small cantons had no formal criminal codes, only a few written sources of 
law at that time. Fribourg, as mentioned, still relied on the “Carolina”. Cؔإ؟ 
dاآآئئ’ compilation of the cantonal codes focused on what was viewed as the 
core of the criminal law (murder, assault, theft, fraud, rape, etc.). The minor 
“police offences” (vagrancy, begging, alcoholism, gambling, and lottery) were 
not covered. The cantonal rules on the death penalty became a part of the 
compilation even though capital punishment was already highly controver-
sial by this time.
In 1893, Cؔإ؟ dاآآئئ published his first draft of the Criminal Code. At 
that time, nobody anticipated that the legislative procedure would take a 
record- breaking 50 years to achieve completion. Up until 1916, three com-
missions of experts deliberated on various drafts of the code. In 1918, the 
Swiss Federal Council handed its dispatch6 to Parliament. It was another 
ten years before the Federal Assembly entered the debate in 1928; following 
5 This is an own translation of a quote from Carl Stooss’ 1890 comparative compendium on 
ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ơƽiƸiƹƞl ơƺƢƣƾ, ƻ. Ii ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/dᇴEE-LeᇸMᄭ.
6 The term “dispatch” (German: Botschaft; French: message) is the official term used by the 
Swiss government for explanatory reports to draft legislation; resembling a White Paper 
iƹ ƿƩƣ fK; ƾƣƣ CƩƞƻƿƣƽ dǂiƾƾ Lƣƨƞl dǄƾƿƣƸ, ƻ. ᇴᇺ. 
374 Marc Thommen: Criminal Law
this, they actually spent a further ten years deliberating the Code. Finally, 
on 21 December 1937, the still highly controversial Swiss Criminal Code was 
adopted. The opponents claimed that a unified codification for Switzerland 
undermined cantonal autonomy in the crucial field of criminal law. Catholic 
groups also opposed the Code because it legalised (medically warranted) 
abortions.7
The Code’s abolition of the death penalty was also still a controversial 
issue.8 eƩƣ CƺƢƣ ƿƩǀƾ ƩƞƢ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƾǀƟƸiƿƿƣƢ ƿƺ ƞ ƽƣƤƣƽƣƹƢǀƸ. Oƹ ᇵ JǀlǄ ᇳᇻᇵᇺ, ƞ 
slim majority of 53.5 % of the electorate approved the new criminal code. The 
CƺƢƣ ƺƤƤiơiƞllǄ ơƞƸƣ iƹƿƺ Ƥƺƽơƣ ƺƹ ᇳ JƞƹǀƞƽǄ ᇳᇻᇶᇴ.
ᇵ. Cآءاؘءا9
In the Swiss criminal law of today, there are three types of offences: felo-
nies, misdemeanours, and contraventions. Felonies are offences that carry 
a custodial sentence of more than three years, the maximum custodial sen-
tence usually being 20 years. Some felonies (e.g. murder, aggravated hostage- 
taking) carry a life sentence (Article 40). Misdemeanours are offences that 
carry a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or a monetary penalty 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇲᄭ. MƺƹƣƿƞƽǄ ƻƣƹƞlƿiƣƾ ƞƽƣ ơƺƸƻƺƾƣƢ ƺƤ ƻƣƹƞlƿǄ ǀƹiƿƾ. eƩƣ ƼǀƞƹƿiƿǄ 
of the units (a maximum of 180; Article 34 I) reflects the culpability of the 
offender, while the amount charged per unit reflects the offender’s finan-
ơiƞl ƾiƿǀƞƿiƺƹ ᄬơǀƽƽƣƹƿlǄ CHF ᇵᇲèᅬ ᇵ’ᇲᇲᇲ, ǂƩilƣ ƞllƺǂiƹƨ ơƺǀƽƿƾ ƿƩƣ ƻƺƾƾiƟiliƿǄ 
of lowering this minimum to CHF 10 where special financial circumstances 
exist; Article 34 II). Finally, contraventions are criminal acts that are punis-
hable only with a fine (Article 103). The maximum fine is usually CHF 10’000 
(Article 106).
7 kبإ؞؜ءؘؗء, p. 296 with further references.
8 kبإ؞؜ءؘؗء, p. 296 with further references.
9 In the following text, where Articles are mentioned without referencing their source 
of law, they are located in the Swiss Criminal Code of 21 December 1997, SR 311.0; see 
Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ EƹƨliƾƩ ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.
ơơ/ᇶbdᇶ- Chbᇷᄭ. 
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Figure 2: Structure of the Swiss Criminal Code
The Swiss Criminal Code contains 392 Articles. It is divided up into three 
books. 
Part I ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾèᇳᅬᇳᇳᇲᄭ ƸƞiƹlǄ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣƾ ƿƩƣ general provisions on criminal 
liability (omissions, intention and negligence, justifications, guilt, respon-
sibility, attempt, and participation) and sanctions (e.g. custodial sentences, 
monetary penalties, suspension of sentences, parole, therapeutic measures, 
and indefinite incarceration). For example, there are two types of intention in 
Swiss criminal law: these are contained in Article 12. Article 12 encompasses 
both direct intent and conditional intent. Direct intent is possessed when the 
offender both knows that a particular consequence is possible and wants this 
consequence to occur.10 Conditional intent, or dolus eventualis, is possessed 
when the offender realises that the consequence is possible and accepts this 
ƽiƾkèᅬ ƞlƟƣiƿ ƹƺƿ ƹƣơƣƾƾƞƽilǄ ǂƞƹƿiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƩƞƽƸ ƿƺ ƺơơǀƽ. Iƹ ƿƩiƾ ƾƺƽƿ ƺƤ ơƞƾƣ, ƿƩƣ 
offender is indifferent about whether or not the harm will occur.11
The Swiss legislator’s decision to introduce a general part that sets up the 
common elements of crime and sentencing followed a long tradition. The 
Italian Renaissance jurist e؜ؘؕإ؜آ Dؘؖ؜ؔء؜ ᄬᇳᇷᇲᇻᅬᇳᇷᇺᇴᄭ iƾ ơƽƣƢiƿƣƢ ǂiƿƩ Ɵƣiƹƨ 
the first to coin the idea of splitting up criminal codes into general and speci-
fic parts in his Tractatus Criminalis of 1590. Criminal codes which were crea-
ted before this, such as the Carolina (1532), only contained specific, casuistic 
10 éءءؔ aؘاإ؜ؚ/Nؔؗ؜ءؘ kبإ؞؜ءؘؗء, dǂiƾƾ CƽiƸiƹƞl Lƞǂ, kǀƽiơƩ/dƿ. Gƞllƣƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇷ, ƻ. ᇸᇻ.
11 aؘاإ؜ؚ/kبإ؞؜ءؘؗء, p. 70.
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provisions. The move towards including both general and specific parts allo-
wed criminal codes to be kept much shorter. By creating general rules for all 
crimes, the legislator also better fulfilled the nulla poena sine lege principle;12 
having general rules removes any gaps in criminal liability that would other-
wise have to be filled by analogy. Further, by predetermining liability in a 
general manner, the legislator hoped to minimize the influence of courts and 
academics on the interpretation of criminal codes. 
Part II ơƺǁƣƽƾ ƿƩƣ ƾƻƣơiƤiơ ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇳᇳᅬᇵᇵᇴᄭ: iƿ ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩƣƾ ơƽiƸi-
nal offences which protect individual interests such as life and limb (mur-
der, assault), property (theft, fraud), honour (defamation), liberty (coercion, 
hostage taking, unlawful entry) or sexual integrity (rape, exploitation, por-
nography, sexual harassment). In addition, criminal offences which protect 
collective interests such as families (incest, bigamy), public safety (arson), 
public health (transmission of diseases), public order (rioting, criminal orga-
nisations, racial discrimination), genocide and war crimes, trading interests 
(counterfeiting, forgery), national security (high treason, espionage), judicial 
interests (false accusation, money laundering, perjury), and state interests 
(abuse of public office, bribery) were also included. 
Part III ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇵᇵᇵᅬᇵᇻᇴᄭ Ƣƣƞlƾ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ iƹƿƽƺƢǀơƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ƞƻƻliơƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ 
the Swiss Criminal Code. 
MƞƹǄ ơƽiƸiƹƞl ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹƾ ƣǃiƾƿ ƺǀƿǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣ: Ƥƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, 
road traffic offences, drug crimes, and illegal use of weapons all form part of 
specific federal codes.13 In practice, these laws are highly relevant, in particu-
lar road traffic offences.14 
12 A key principle in Swiss law, meaning “no penalty without law” (see pp. 385.).
13 Federal Act on Road Traffic of 19 December 1958, SR 741.01; Federal Act on Narcotics and 
Psychotropic Substances of 3 October 1951 (Narcotics Act, NarcA), SR 812.121, see for an 
EƹƨliƾƩ ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/BfᇴC- ᇶᇻᇷFᄭ; FƣƢƣƽƞl éơƿ ƺƹ hƣƞƻƺƹƾ, 
hƣƞƻƺƹ EƼǀiƻƸƣƹƿ ƞƹƢ éƸƸǀƹiƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ᇴᇲ Jǀƹƣ ᇳᇻᇻᇹ, dc ᇷᇳᇶ.ᇷᇶ.
14 In 2016, there were 57’518 convictions of adults for road traffic offences, which is 52 % 
ƺƤ ƞll ᇳᇲᇻ’ᇳᇳᇸ ơƺƹǁiơƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ ƞƢǀlƿƾ ᄬƾƺǀƽơƣ: FƣƢƣƽƞl dƿƞƿiƾƿiơƞl OƤƤiơƣ: Ʃƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/
baᇴᇵ- Eᇺᇵiᄭ.
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ᇶ. Dبؔ؟؜ئؠ آؙ dؔءؖا؜آءئ
Sanctions are the consequences imposed for criminal acts. In Switzerland 
there are two main categories of sanctions: sentences and measures. 
Sentences (monetary penalties, custodial sentences, fines) are retributive 
in nature. They are mainly backward- looking: their aim is to reprimand and 
ƻǀƹiƾƩ ƺƤƤƣƹƢƣƽƾ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣiƽ ǂƽƺƹƨƢƺiƹƨ. Mƣƞƾǀƽƣƾ, ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƺƿƩƣƽ ƩƞƹƢ, ƞƽƣ ƻƽƣ-
ventive in nature. Thus, they are predominantly forward- looking: they are 
designed to protect society from dangerous offenders by either curing them 
of any mental deficiencies or addictions (therapeutic measures) or by perma-
nently incapacitating them (indefinite incarceration).
Measures
Protective Measures
Therapy
In-Patient Measures for
Young Adults
Article 61
Retrospective In-Patient 
Measure
Article 65 I
Isolation
Indefinite Incarceration
Article 64
Retrospective Indefinite 
Incarceration
Article 65 II
Other measures
Personal
Prohibition From Carrying
on an Activity, Contact
Prohibition, and
Exclusion Order 
Articles 67 et seqq.
Disqualification From
Driving
Article 67e
Publication of the
Judgment
Article 68
Material
Forfeiture of Assets
Articles 70 et seqq.
Sentences
Monetary Penalty
Article 34
Fines
Article 106
Death Penalty / Corporal
Punishment
Sanctions
Use for the Benefit of the
Person Harmed
Article 73
Expulsion 
Articles 66a et seqq.
In-Patient Treatment of
Addiction
Article 60
In-Patient Treatment of
Mental Disorders
Article 59
Good Behaviour Bond
Article 66
Forfeiture of Dangerous
Objects 
Article 69
Custodial Sentence
Articles 40 et seq.
Out-patient Treatment
Article 63
Community Service
Article 37
*
* Community service is no longer a separate type of sentence. However all sentences up to 6 months can be converted 
into community service (Art. 79a).
* * The death penalty was abolished when the Swiss Criminal Code came into force on 1 January 1942, see I.5.
**
Figure 3: Dual System of Sanctions
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This dual system of sanctions was Cؔإ؟ dاآآئئ’ invention. The idea recei-
ved universal acclaim, and other jurisdictions soon followed the approach.15 
Cؔإ؟ dاآآئئ’ ƹƣǂ ơƺƹơƣƻƿ ǂƞƾ ƾǀơơƣƾƾƤǀlèƟƣơƞǀƾƣ iƿ ƞƻƻƣƞƾƣƢ ƺƹƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ 
fiercest debates to occur in criminal law: the debate over the legitimacy of 
criminal punishment. Scholars fought over this idea throughout the 18th and 
19th century. What gives the state the right to inflict harm upon offenders? 
There were three possible answers: (1) They deserve it, i.e. just desert.16 ᄬᇴᄭèIƿ 
will teach them a lesson about their behaviour and thus deter future offen-
ding, i.e. special prevention.17 (3) The threat and enforcement of criminal 
punishment will deter wider society from offending as well, i.e. general 
prevention.18 
Jǀƾƿ Ƣƣƾƣƽƿ ƿƩƣƺƽiƣƾ ƺƤ ƻǀƹiƾƩƸƣƹƿ ƞƽƣ ƺƹlǄ ƞƟƺǀƿ ƽƣƿƽiƟǀƿiƺƹ Ƥƺƽ ƻƞƾƿ ƞơƿƾ. 
They are also called absolute theories because they assert that punishment 
does not have to serve any future societal goals. In contrast, special and gene-
ral prevention are known as relative theories because punishment always has 
to relate to a future societal goal (deterrence, safety etc.). 
These fundamentally different views on punishment led to two opposing 
schools of thought. The classical school around Kؔإ؟ B؜ءؗ؜ءؚ ᄬᇳᇺᇶᇳᅬᇳᇻᇴᇲᄭ 
advocated that punishment can and must only be concerned with retribu-
tion. Sentences are imposed because offenders need to get their just deserts 
15 kبإ؞؜ءؘؗء, p. 304
16 Jǀƾƿ Ƣƣƾƣƽƿ/ƽƣƿƽiƟǀƿiƺƹ ǂƞƾ ƿƩƣ ƾƿƞƽƿiƹƨ ƻƺiƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƞƟƾƺlǀƿƣ ƿƩƣƺƽiƣƾ ƺƤ ƻǀƹiƾƩƸƣƹƿ 
purported by Iؠؠؔءبؘ؟ Kؔءا and Gؘآإؚ Fإ؜ؘؗإ؜ؖ؛ h؜؟؛ؘ؟ؠ Hؘؘؚ؟. These the-
ories were known as “absolute” because punishment was absolved from serving any 
future societal goals. Such theorists strictly viewed punishment as a retributive act 
against the offender. Punishment was thus viewed as a necessary act of communication 
to demonstrate the condemnation of an autonomous agent who had chosen to break 
the law. 
17 Special prevention was advocated by C؛إ؜ئاآأ؛ Cؔإ؟ dاüؘؕ؟ and Kؔإ؟ ةآء Gإآ؟ؠؔء. 
They argued for a criminal law system that should effectively prevent the offender from 
reoffending. 
18 General prevention was championed by aؔب؟ Jآ؛ؔءء éءئؘ؟ؠ c؜ااؘإ ةآء Fؘبؘإؕؔؖ؛. 
He opposed special prevention because tying punishment to the offender’s future likeli-
hood of reoffending (rather than connecting punishment to the past criminal act) would 
leave the offender’s punishment entirely at the discretion of the judge. This could lead 
to perverse outcomes: for example, someone who had repeatedly committed petty theft 
could, under this principle, be imprisoned for life due to the statistical likelihood that 
they would steal again. In Fؘبؘإؕؔؖ؛’ئ opinion, however, it was permissible to try to 
educate and deter the general public through punishment. 
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for their crimes. Contrastingly, the modernists championed (special) pre-
vention as the main goal of criminal punishment. One of their strongest 
advocates, Fإؔءح ةآء L؜ئحا ᄬᇳᇺᇷᇳᅬᇳᇻᇳᇻᄭ, opposed the idea of having retri-
bution as a sole focus in his main oeuvre, ‘Purpose in Criminal Law’ (1882). 
There, he asserted that punishment must achieve at least one of the follo-
wing goals: to heal offenders, to scare them straight, or to permanently inca-
pacitate them. 
Both schools had legitimate points: the classical school rightly pointed out 
that theories of prevention turned offenders from autonomous human beings 
into mere objects, by shaping them as people into a form that better meets 
societal needs (special prevention) or by making an example out of them 
to deter criminality in the wider public (general prevention). The offender 
is used as a means to an end and is not respected as an autonomous moral 
agent. Simultaneously, the modernists were also right to assert that punish-
ment cannot be entirely detached from its effects: it must also serve societal 
ends like the reintegration of offenders. Therefore, the modernists advocated 
for the use of new instruments in the criminal law, like the employment of 
fines, parole, educational prison schemes, pedagogical rather than punitive 
sanctions for young offenders, and the protection of society from dangerous 
offenders.
Cؔإ؟ dاآآئئ’ landmark achievement was to accommodate both schools’ 
beliefs in his dual system of sanctions, formalised in the Criminal Code.19 
Sentences should serve the purpose of retribution, while measures must serve 
societal ends like reintegration or maintaining safety. 
ᇷ. Dؘؔا؛ aؘءؔ؟اج
The most controversial sanction is capital punishment. Today, the death pen-
alty is prohibited (Article 10 I Constitution).20 In 2002, Switzerland ratified 
Protocol No 13 to the ECHR, concerning the abolition of the death penalty in 
all circumstances.
19 kبإ؞؜ءؘؗء, p. 304.
20 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 18 April 1999, SR 101; see for an English 
ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/MᇺfJ- dᇵᇸᇻᄭ.
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eƩƽƺǀƨƩƺǀƿ ƿƩƣ MiƢƢlƣ éƨƣƾ ƞƹƢ iƹƿƺ ƸƺƢƣƽƹ ƿiƸƣƾ, ƿƩƣ ƢƣƞƿƩ ƻƣƹƞlƿǄ ǂƞƾ 
commonly employed in Switzerland. It also holds the unfortunate record of 
being the last country in Europe to have executed a person for witchcraft: 
Oƹ ᇳᇵ Jǀƹƣ ᇳᇹᇺᇴ éءءؔ Gö؟ؗ؜21 was beheaded immediately after the council 
of Glarus had convicted her of witchery. Of course, she had only confessed 
under torture. 
Later, both the Code pénal of 1799 and the cantonal criminal codes of the 
early 19th century provided for the death penalty in the case of crimes like 
murder, aggravated robbery, or arson. Beheading by sword or guillotine was 
the most common means of execution. Under the influence of enlighten-
ment thinkers like Bؘؖؖؔإ؜ؔ and gآ؟اؔ؜إؘ, the Federal Constitution of 1848 
banned the death penalty for political crimes. In the following decades, seve-
ral cantons22 entirely abolished it. Further, in 1874, Article 65 of the Federal 
Constitution issued a total ban. Yet, unfortunately, this prohibition only las-
ted for a couple of years. After a series of murder cases in the late 1870s, the 
ban on the death penalty was revoked by popular vote. Henceforth, the death 
penalty, again, was only forbidden for political crimes. This led to several can-
tons reintroducing capital punishment.23
In the making of the Swiss Criminal Code, the death penalty was subject 
to fierce debate, but the ultimate decision was to ban it in all cases, for 
all crimes. This decision was made in 1937 by the federal legislator, even 
though up until 1999,24 the Constitution would have allowed the death 
21 éءءؔ Gö؟ؗ؜ was employed as a maid by Jآ؛ؔءء Jؔ؞آؕ eئؖ؛بؗ؜, a rich physician and 
politician in Glarus. She was accused of having put needles in the milk of eئؖ؛بؗ؜’s 
daughter, although later examinations of the case suggest that eئؖ؛بؗ؜ may have been 
conducting an extra- marital affair with Gö؟ؗ؜ and that this may have been the actual 
cause of the accusation of witchcraft. Differing recollections of this case are unclear on 
whether éءء ’ؔs last name was Gö؟ؗ؜ or Gö؟ؗ؜ء. 
22 IƹơlǀƢiƹƨ FƽiƟƺǀƽƨ, NƣǀơƩǈƿƣl, kǀƽiơƩ, eiơiƹƺ, Gƣƹƣǁƞ, Bƞƾƣl dƿƞƢƿ, Bƞƾƣl LƞƹƢƾơƩƞƤƿ, 
and Solothurn. 
23 éƻƻƣƹǅƣll IƹƹƣƽƽƩƺƢƣƹ, OƟǂƞlƢƣƹ, dơƩǂǄǅ, kǀƨ, dƿ.è Gƞllƣƹ, Lǀơƣƽƹƣ, gƞlƞiƾ, 
Schaffhausen, and Fribourg.
24 Switzerland ratified the “Second Option Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
ƞƹƢ aƺliƿiơƞl ciƨƩƿƾ, ƞiƸiƹƨ ƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƞƟƺliƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƞƿƩ ƻƣƹƞlƿǄ” ƺƹ ᇳᇸ Jǀƹƣ ᇳᇻᇻᇶ. eƩiƾ 
protocol obliges state parties to take all necessary measures to abolish the death penalty 
within their jurisdiction, during both war and peace time. Switzerland implemented the 
protocol into the revision of the Swiss Federal Constitution of 20th November 1996, but 
ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƢiƢ ƹƺƿ ƤƺƽƸƞllǄ ƣƹƿƣƽ iƹƿƺ Ƥƺƽơƣ ǀƹƿil ᇳ JƞƹǀƞƽǄ ᇴᇲᇲᇲ. 
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penalty to be used as the means of punishment for all crimes except poli-
tical ones. 
For the cantons, the enactment of the Swiss Criminal Code meant that 
their provisions on the death penalty would become invalid (Article 336 lit. b 
Criminal Code of 1937). However, in the time between Parliament’s decision 
to abolish the death penalty (21 December 1937) and the official enactment 
ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣ ᄬᇳ JƞƹǀƞƽǄ ᇳᇻᇶᇴᄭ, ƿǂƺ Ƹƺƽƣ ơƺƹǁiơƿƣƢ ƸǀƽƢƣƽƣƽƾ 
were executed. The last execution mandated under civic jurisdiction was that 
of Hؔءئ gآ؟؟ؘءتؘ؜ؘؗإ, an offender who had killed a young policeman. In 
the early morning of 18 October 1940, at the prison of Sarnen in Obwalden, he 
ascended the scaffold. This execution was highly contested: even the widow 
of the policeman had asked for a pardon. Furthermore, the Federal Criminal 
CƺƢƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ MiliƿƞƽǄ ƞllƺǂƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƞƿƩ ƻƣƹƞlƿǄ ǀƹƿil ᇳᇻᇻᇴ. Dǀƽiƹƨ ƞƹƢ ƞƤƿƣƽ 
World War II, 35 persons were sentenced to death for military crimes such as 
high treason, and 17 of them were executed. 
éƾ ƸƣƹƿiƺƹƣƢ ƞƟƺǁƣ, dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ Ʃƞƾ ƹƺǂ, ƞƾ ƺƤ ᇵ MƞǄ ᇴᇲᇲᇴ, ƽƞƿiƤiƣƢ 
Protocol 13 of the ECHR, thereby committing to banning the death penalty 
in all circumstances without the possibility of derogation. There is not, 
however, total clarity regarding the extent to which this Protocol would 
prevent Switzerland from re- introducing the death penalty. Some argue 
that the Swiss Constitution could be modified by a popular initiative 
(Article 139 Constitution) in a way that explicitly and intentionally viola-
tes Protocol 13, which would allow Switzerland to reintroduce the death 
penalty.25 
Aside from this legal issue, public debate over the use of the death penalty 
continues. In 1985, a popular initiative26 “to Save our Youth” was launched to 
reinstate the death penalty for selling hard drugs. The committee, however, 
25 This sort of argument makes use of the so called Schubert exception, which is discussed 
in the chapter on International Relations on pp. 179.). The case establishes that where the 
Federal Assembly has intentionally enacted legislation which violates the treaty obliga-
tion, the authorities shall apply the federal act. The Schubert exception does not apply 
in the case of treaties which guarantee fundamental rights, such as the ECHR; the rights 
conferred by such instruments must be respected in all cases. However, there has been 
no explicit decision as of yet regarding whether the Schubert exception would apply to 
a conflict between a treaty, even one which guarantees fundamental rights, and the 
Constitution. 
26 Then Article 121 II Constitution of 1874; today: Article 139 Constitution.
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failed to collect the necessary 100’000 signatures. In 2010, the family mem-
bers of a murder victim started a popular initiative entitled “Death Penalty 
Ƥƺƽ MǀƽƢƣƽ ǂiƿƩ dƣǃǀƞl éƟǀƾƣ”. Iƿ ƿǀƽƹƣƢ ƺǀƿ ƿƺ ƞơƿǀƞllǄ Ɵƣ ƞ ac- ƾƿǀƹƿ ƿƺ ƽƞiƾƣ 
awareness for victims of such a crime, and their families. Nevertheless, it once 
again sparked huge controversy. 
ᇸ. Eبا؛ؔءؔئ؜ؔ / Aئئ؜ئاؘؗ dب؜ؖ؜ؘؗ
A further particularity worth discussing is the Swiss regulation on euthanasia 
and assisted suicide. Regarding suicidal persons themselves, as Cؔإ؟ dاآآئئ 
had stated already in 1894: they “deserve pity, not punishment.” Thus, attemp-
ted suicide is not a crime under Swiss Law. It was, however, at the time of draf-
ting the Criminal Code, a matter of some controversy whether this removal of 
criminal liability should also be stretched to cover persons who aid and abet 
suicide.
The legislator decided that helping someone to die out of compassion and 
empathy should not constitute criminal wrongdoing. The legality of assis-
ted suicide results from Article 115 e contrario: any person who, for selfish 
motives, incites or assists another person to commit suicide is liable to a 
custodial sentence of up to five years or to a monetary penalty. Criminal 
liability is only warranted if the incitement or assistance to suicide is driven 
by selfish motives: for example, the possibility of financial gain. Due to this 
regulation, a physician who provides a person who wishes to die with a let-
hal dose of Natrium- Pentobarbital (NaP) is not liable. Nor are organisations 
such as Exit or Dignitas that provide comfort and assistance in suicide, as 
long as they operate on a non- profit basis. However, family members who 
help their loved- ones commit suicide, even by simply accompanying them 
to an organisation like Dignitas, are put at risk by this provision: due to 
their likely position as heirs to the suicidal individual, they might be viewed 
as having acted for selfish motives even if, in reality, they were spurred by 
compassion. 
PƞƺƺƩƽƢ  ƢƼƻƨƞƵƞƺƩƞ) is also allowed by Swiss criminal law. This term 
refers to situations in which death ensues from a deliberate decision not 
to intervene or not to pursue life- saving measures, where the failure to 
act corresponds with the will of the person concerned. For example, when 
a person with a heart attack has refused CPR, or an elderly person with 
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pneumonia refuses to be treated with antibiotics, or the parenteral nutri-
tion of a person in coma is discontinued, where this is what the coma pati-
ent himself would have wished. Generally under Swiss law, a deliberate 
failure to save someone’s life can lead to criminal responsibility for homi-
cide by omission (Articles 111 et seqq.).27 This applies only when the person 
failing to act is under a legal or contractual obligation to safeguard the 
victim’s life (Article 11). Physicians or spouses would generally have such 
an obligation. However, in the circumstances outlined above, criminal 
responsibility is not incurred. Their general obligation to act to safeguard 
life is outweighed by the fact that intervening against the patient’s will 
in such a case would in itself constitute a crime (for example, assault or 
coercion). 
AƠƻƩƽƢ ƢƼƻƨƞƵƞƺƩƞ)is not permitted by Swiss criminal law. This term refers 
to situations where a person’s death is caused by a wilful act, where this 
act was requested by the person. An example would be the administra-
tion of a lethal injection to a person who wishes to die.28 Actively killing 
someone is a crime under Swiss law, even if the “victim” explicitly asks to 
be killed. According to Article 114 (“Homicide at the request of the victim”), 
any person who for commendable motives, and in particular out of compas-
sion, causes the death of a person at that person’s own genuine and insis-
tent request is liable to a custodial sentence of up to three years or to a 
monetary penalty. When this rule was drafted in the early 20th century, the 
legislators decided that “the principle that all life is untouchable” prevented 
them from legalising consensual killings. There is, however, a substantially 
reduced sentence; killing someone who has given their consent is only a 
misdemeanour. 
There are two key problems with the law’s absolute prohibition on 
active euthanasia in Switzerland. Firstly, contrary to what the legislators 
of the early 20th century claimed to be the case, it is clear that life is not 
“untouchable” under Swiss law. This is illustrated by, for example, the law 
on passive euthanasia or the legality of killing in self- defence (Article 15). 
Secondly, it is highly controversial whether turning off a life- sustaining 
27 Liability can also ensue from Article 128 (“AƵǀ)ƷƢƹƺƶƵ)ƾƨƶ)ƣƞƩƳƺ)ƻƶ)ƶƣƣƢƹ)ƞƩơ)ƻƶ)ƞƵƶƻƨƢƹ … ƾƨƶ)
is in immediate life- threatening danger, in circumstances where the person either could 
reasonably have been expected to offer aid.”).
28 JǀƢƨƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ BƣǅiƽkƾƨƣƽiơƩƿ DiƣlƾƢƺƽƤ/kH, ᇳᇷ DƣơƣƸƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇲᇵ ᄬNƽ. GGᇲᇵᇲᇲᇹᇸᄭ.
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machine is to be viewed as an active behaviour punishable by Article 114. 
It has been argued that such an action simply allows the person’s health 
condition to kill them, rather than the removal of the machine being the 
cause of death.29 Further, arguably removing any life- sustaining measures 
iƾ ƸƺƽƞllǄ ƣƼǀiǁƞlƣƹƿ ƿƺ ƹƣǁƣƽ Ɵƣƨiƹƹiƹƨ ƿƩƣƸ iƹ ƿƩƣ Ƥiƽƾƿ ƻlƞơƣè ᅬ ǂƩiơƩ 
Swiss law permits. Today, the debate on whether the active killing of per-
sons who are unable to kill themselves can be justified rages on.
29 As was argued in the famous British case of Airedale National Health Service Trust v 
Bland (1993) 1 All ER 821 by the House of Lords, concerning the removal of life- sustaining 
treatment from a 17 year old boy in a persistent vegetative state: e.g. see Lord Goff at 867. 
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II. aƽiƹơiƻlƣƾ
This section discusses key principles followed in the Swiss legal system. Two 
of the main principles in Swiss criminal law are the principle of legality (1.) 
and the principle of no punishment without culpability (2.). The principle of 
legality contains many sub- principles which will be further analysed; subse-
quently, the notion of culpability itself in Swiss law is examined.
ᇳ. Nب؟؟ؔ aآؘءؔ d؜ءؘ Lؘؘؚ
Swiss criminal law is first of all dominated by the principle of legality. éƽƿiơlƣ èᇳ 
states that sanctions (i.e. sentences and measures) may only be imposed for a 
behaviour that the law explicitly threatens with punishment.30 Article 1 thus 
encompasses two principles. Firstly, there is the principle of nullum crimen 
sine lege: no act or omission shall be considered a crime unless the law expli-
citly says so. For example, today there is no rule in the Swiss criminal code 
prohibiting homosexual acts.31 Thus, they are not a crime and courts cannot 
declare them illegal. Secondly, Article 1 contains the principle nulla poena 
sine lege: no penalty without law. This principle stipulates that all sanctions 
imposed for criminal acts must be provided for in the law. For example, the 
death penalty has been abolished in Switzerland. This means that no one in 
Switzerland can be sentenced to death, even for the most heinous crime. 
30 The “official” translation of Article 1 by the Swiss Government is incorrect in many ways: 
“No penalty (recte: sanction) without a law. No one may be punished (recte: no sanctions 
may be imposed) for an act (recte: or omission) unless it has been expressly declared to 
be an offence (recte: by the law).” 
31 The Swiss Criminal Code of 21 December 1937 abolished the criminal liability of homo-
sexuality between adults and introduced an age of consent of 20 years, as opposed to 16 
years in the case of sexual acts between opposite- sex partners. With the criminal law 
reform of 1990, the age of consent was lowered to 16 years. 
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Figure 4: Principle of Legality
The nulla poena sine lege principle is commonly used as a pars pro toto term 
which encompasses the nullum crimen principle as well. The nulla poena sine 
lege principle has been refined into a set of sub- principles that have a strong 
impact on the practical application of the criminal law.
The first sub- principle of nulla poena sine lege is the nulla poena sine 
lege scripta principle: no penalty without written law. This principle preclu-
des the creation or existence of customary criminal law; all crimes must 
be laid down by a formal Act of Parliament. For example, several canto-
nal criminal codes used to prohibit extra- marital sexual relations: such a 
prohibition could not be reintroduced today by declaring it a customary 
criminal rule. 
The second sub- principle is the nulla poena sine lege praevia principle: no 
penalty without pre- existing law. In general, criminal law may not be applied 
retroactively (Article 2 I) unless the new provision is more lenient (Article 2 
II). For example, since 1 October 2002, abortions have been completely lega-
liƾƣƢ Ƣǀƽiƹƨ ƿƩƣ Ƥiƽƾƿ ᇳᇴ ǂƣƣkƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƣƨƹƞƹơǄèᄬƟƣƤƺƽƣ ƿƩiƾ, ƞƟƺƽƿiƺƹƾ ǂƣƽƣ 
only permitted for medical reasons). Because the new 12- weeks- rule is milder, 
it could be applied retroactively. 
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The third sub- principle is the the nulla poena sine lege certa/stricta prin-
ciple, which demands that the elements of a crime and the sanctions which 
apply to it be clearly defined. Addressees of rules must get a fair warning: they 
must know exactly what the consequences of their actions will be. An example 
of a provision which infringes this principle is Article 303, which imposes an 
unspecified monetary or custodial sentence for false accusations. An offen-
der can face any sentence from 3 units of monetary penalty to 20 years of 
imprisonment. The nulla poena sine lege certa/stricta principle also prohi-
bits criminal law operating on the basis of analogies. For example, Article 215 
prohibits bigamy: this prohibition could not be extended to cohabitation by 
ƞƹƞlƺƨǄ, ƿƺ Ƹƣƣƿ ƞ ơƞƾƣ ǂƩƣƽƣ ƞ ǂƺƸƞƹ Ʃƞƾ ƿǂƺ ƟƺǄƤƽiƣƹƢƾ ƞƿ ƞèƿiƸƣ. 
ᇴ. Nب؟؟ؔ aآؘءؔ d؜ءؘ Cب؟أؔ 
“Punishment without guilt is nonsense, barbarism”, wrote Eإءئا Hؙؔاؘإ, one 
of the early and influential criminal law scholars in Switzerland, in 1946. The 
principle nulla poena sine culpa (keine Strafe ohne Schuld; no punishment 
without culpability) is crucial to Swiss criminal law. In fact, to understand 
the notion of Schuld is to understand the concept of Swiss criminal law itself. 
Schuld has many different meanings; it can be used interchangeably to con-
vey notions like culpability, guilt, blame, fault, and responsibility.
Figure 5: Criminal Liabilty
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Criminal liability in Swiss law is a three- stage concept: all three stages of 
the test must be met in order for criminal liability to apply. First, the objec-
tive and subjective elements of the crime (Tatbestandsmässigkeit) have to be 
ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩƣƢ: Ʃƞƾ ƿƩƣ ǁiơƿiƸ Ɵƣƣƹ killƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƤƣƹƢƞƹƿèᄬƺƟjƣơƿiǁƣ ƣlƣƸƣƹƿ; 
“actus reus”)? Did the defendant kill the victim intentionally (subjective ele-
ment; “mens rea”)? Second, the unlawfulness (Rechtswidrigkeit) of the act has 
to be determined. Did the defendant kill in legitimate self- defence? Was a 
theft of food warranted by the necessity to survive? Did the masochist con-
sent to violent sexual practices? Third, the culpability (Schuld) of the offender 
has to be assessed. Can the defendant be blamed for the act? Perpetrators can 
only be held responsible for their unlawful acts if they were able to both grasp 
the demands imposed on them by legal rules and act accordingly (Article 19). 
Culpability can be excluded on three different grounds. The first ground 
is the defendant’s lack of criminal responsibility. If wrongdoers are unable to 
understand the wrongfulness of their act they cannot be held to account. An 
ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ ƺƤ ƿƩiƾ iƾ ǂƩƣƹ ƿƩƣ ƺƤƤƣƹƢƣƽ Ʃƞƾ ƞ ƾƣǁƣƽƣlǄ lƺǂ Ib. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, iƿ ƾƩƺǀlƢ 
be noted that this ground is not often accepted by courts. Children under the 
ƞƨƣ ƺƤ ƿƣƹ ƞƽƣ lƣƨƞllǄ ƣǃơlǀƢƣƢ ƤƽƺƸ ơƽiƸiƹƞl ƽƣƾƻƺƹƾiƟiliƿǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵ Jǀǁƣƹilƣ 
Criminal Law Act)32. Their inability to fully assess wrongfulness is presumed 
by law. Criminal responsibility is also excluded if a person is able to assess 
wrongfulness but is unable to act accordingly. In most cases where culpability 
is excluded, it is under this ground of inability to control one’s actions des-
pite knowing they are wrong. This ability to restrain oneself may be absent 
in some manifestations of paranoid schizophrenia. Further, it can be absent 
where the defendant is under the influence of extreme emotions and acts in 
the heat of the moment. The typical example of this latter sort of case is where 
the defendant, just previously to committing an offence of assault, has found 
ƺǀƿ ƿƩƞƿ Ʃiƾ/Ʃƣƽ ƻƞƽƿƹƣƽ iƾ ơƺƹƢǀơƿiƹƨ ƞƹ ƞƤƤƞiƽ. 
The second ground for the exclusion of culpability is an error of law. Again, 
in this situation the person is not aware of the wrongfulness of their act. Yet 
the reason for this failure is not a mental deficiency: instead, it is missing or 
incorrect information about the law. However, the standard is high. Error of 
law is only accepted as grounds for excluding culpability if the perpetrator 
both did not and, crucially, could not have known that he or she was acting 
unlawfully. In a famous case from 1978, a 19- year- old Sicilian immigrant had 
sex with a 15- year- old Swiss girl. He successfully claimed that he did not know 
32 Jǀǁƣƹilƣ CƽiƸiƹƞl Lƞǂ éơƿ ƺƤ ᇴᇲ Jǀƹƣ ᇴᇲᇲᇵ, dc ᇵᇳᇳ.ᇳ.
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the concept of the legal age of consent. He had thought that sexual intercourse 
with a minor was only punishable if he did not intend to marry his sexual 
partner.33 It is highly questionable whether the Federal Supreme Court would 
still rule today that this man could not have known that his act was illegal. 
Thirdly, culpability is excluded if the wrongdoer could not have been rea-
sonably expected to act lawfully. An example of when this unreasonableness 
standard can be met is where a perpetrator kills a person in order to save 
his or her own life. Had the famous English R v. Dudley and Stephens case 
of 188434èᅬ ǂƩƣƽƣ ƿƩƽƣƣ ƾƩiƻǂƽƣơkƣƢ ƾƞilƺƽƾ killƣƢ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣƹ ƞƿƣ ƞ ơƞƟiƹ ƟƺǄ 
ƿƺ ƞǁƺiƢ ƾƿƞƽǁƞƿiƺƹèᅬ Ɵƣƣƹ jǀƢƨƣƢ iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, ƿƩƣ ƢƣƤƣƹƢƞƹƿƾ ǂƺǀlƢ Ʃƞǁƣ 
had to be acquitted. Though the killing was unlawful, it would have been 
excusable under Swiss law to end the boy’s life in such extreme circumstan-
ces, meaning the defendants would not have met the culpability test. They 
could not reasonably have been expected to sacrifice their own lives, by not 
killing and eating the cabin boy. 
There is one hugely intriguing problem regarding culpability which remains 
unsolved. If culpability is about blaming someone for having acted unlaw-
fully, then it must be established that this person could have acted differently. 
In other words, culpability hinges on free will; there can be no culpability 
without freedom of will. If, as some believe, our actions are predetermined, 
then we cannot be blamed for having “chosen” to do something illegal. The 
current state of knowledge allows us neither to prove nor disprove freedom of 
will. Currently, the notion that any perpetrator could have chosen to behave 
otherwise is therefore merely presumed as an “inevitable fiction” in (Swiss) 
criminal law.
33 BGE 104 IV 217.
34 c ǁ. DǀƢlƣǄ ƞƹƢ dƿƣƻƩƣƹƾ ᄬᇳᇺᇺᇶᄭ ᇳᇶ bBD ᄬbǀƣƣƹ’ƾ BƣƹơƩ Diǁiƾƺƹᄭ ᇴᇹᇵ DC.
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III. LƞƹƢƸƞƽk Cƞƾƣƾ
The Federal Supreme Court in Lausanne is Switzerland’s highest court. Its cri-
minal law division was formerly known as the Court of Cassation. In dealing 
with criminal law, its main task is to secure the consistent application of the 
Swiss Criminal Code throughout Switzerland. In the following paragraphs, 
some landmark rulings of the Federal Supreme Court will be discussed. 
ᇳ. cآ؟؟؜ءؚ dاآءؘئ35
In the evening of 21 April 1983, two men (A and B) were on their way home 
ƤƽƺƸ ƿƩƣiƽ ơƞƟiƹ iƹ ƿƩƣ eöƾƾ ƽiǁƣƽ ǁƞllƣǄ ƹƣƞƽ kǀƽiơƩ. eƩƣǄ ƾƻƺƿƿƣƢ ƿǂƺ Ɵiƨ 
stones (individually weighing 52 kg and 100 kg) at the top of slope so steep 
that the bottom was not visible. They decided to roll these stones down the 
slope. A pushed the 52 kg stone down the hill, whilst B pushed the heavier, 100 
kg stone. One of these stones struck and killed a fisherman at the foot of the 
slope. However, it could not be established which of the two stones had killed 
ƩiƸ, ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣƽƣƤƺƽƣ ǂƩƺèᅬ é ƺƽ Bèᅬ ƩƞƢ Ɵƣƣƹ ƽƣƾƻƺƹƾiƟlƣ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƞƿƩ.
When the case came before the Supreme Court, the judges held that A and 
B were criminally liable as co- offenders for negligent homicide. Up until that 
ruling, the notion of co- offending was strictly limited to intentional crimes. 
This seemed logical because the conventional view of co- offending generally 
requires the existence of a conspiracy: at least two persons who embark on a 
common criminal pursuit. However, in the “rolling stones” case there was no 
joint decision (conspiracy) to kill the fisherman. By deciding to roll the stones 
down the slope, A and B jointly engaged in a grossly negligent behaviour that 
caused the death of the fisherman. The Supreme Court ruling was an attempt 
to overcome problems of evidence, by employing the tools of the substantive 
criminal law.36 
35 BGE 113 IV 58.
36 Concurring that the Supreme Court’s reasoning was f lawed, aؘاإ؜ؚ/kبإ؞؜ءؘؗء argue 
that it would have been better to hold A and B liable for negligent, parallel perpetration 
Marc Thommen: Criminal Law 391
ᇴ. Dآؠؘئا؜ؖ eجإؔءا37
i ǂƞƾ ƞ ǁƣƽǄ ƻƺƺƽlǄ iƹƿƣƨƽƞƿƣƢ iƸƸiƨƽƞƹƿ ƤƽƺƸ Kƺƾƺǁƺ. dƩƣ ǂƞƾ ƸƞƽƽiƣƢ ƿƺ 
Y, whom she had five children with. Y constantly abused X: he beat her with 
the cable of a vacuum cleaner, he threw a butcher’s knife at her, he banned her 
ƤƽƺƸ lƣƞǁiƹƨ ƿƩƣ Ʃƺǀƾƣ ƞƹƢ ƿƺƽƣ ǀƻ Ʃƣƽ ƻƞƾƾƻƺƽƿ. Iƹ JƞƹǀƞƽǄ ᇳᇻᇻᇵ, Ʃƣ ƿƺlƢ ƿƩƣiƽ 
eldest daughter that her mother was going to die during the course of that 
Ǆƣƞƽ. Oƹ ᇳᇷ MƞƽơƩ ᇳᇻᇻᇵ, j ƾƩƺǂƣƢ Ʃiƾ ǂiƤƣ ƞ ƽƣǁƺlǁƣƽ Ʃƣ ƩƞƢ ƟƺǀƨƩƿ iƹ ƺƽƢƣƽ ƿƺ 
kill her. He then put it under his pillow and went to sleep. At one o’clock in the 
morning, X took the revolver and shot Y dead while he was sleeping. 
The Supreme Court ruled that X had acted in a state of excusable necessity 
ƿƺ ƣƹƢ Ʃƣƽ ƾǀƤƤƣƽiƹƨ. eƩƣ killiƹƨ ƺƤ Ʃƣƽ ƩǀƾƟƞƹƢ ǂƞƾ ǀƹlƞǂƤǀl ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇳᇵèᅬ 
manslaughter): there was no legal justification for her actions. She had not 
acted in legitimate self- defence (Article 15) for Y was not imminently about 
ƿƺ ƞƿƿƞơk Ʃƣƽ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƾƩƣ ƢiƢ ƹƺƿ ƞơƿ ơǀlƻƞƟlǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇻèᅬ ƣǃơǀƾƞƟlƣ ƞơƿ iƹ 
a situation of necessity). She was excused because her life was in danger and 
she saw no other way out.38 
This 1995 case seems to send out a very strong message against domestic 
violence. However, its applicability should not be over- interpreted. X’s situa-
tion was extreme: the law would normally still expect victims of abuse to call 
for help before resorting to such an act. 
ᇵ. Dؘؔؗ؟ج Cؔإ cؘؔؖ39
In the late evening on 3 September 1999, two motorists who had never met 
before and who were both driving a Volkswagen Corrado started a car race on 
a cross- country road near Lucerne. As the two drivers were approaching the 
ǁillƞƨƣ ƺƤ GƣlƤiƹƨƣƹ ƞƿ ƞ ƾƻƣƣƢ ƺƤ ƞƻƻƽƺǃiƸƞƿƣlǄ ᇳᇵᇲkƸ/Ʃ, ƺƹƣ Ƣƽiǁƣƽ ƾƺǀƨƩƿ ƿƺ 
overtake the other. He subsequently lost control of his car, which veered onto 
the sidewalk and hit two teenagers who were killed instantly. 
ƟǄ ƺƸiƾƾiƺƹèᅬ ƿƩiƾ ƻƽƣƾǀƻƻƺƾƣƾ é ƞƹƢ B ƞƽƣ iƹ “ƨǀƞƽƞƹƿƺƽ” ƻƺƾiƿiƺƹ Ƣǀƣ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ Ƥƞơƿ ƿƩƣǄ 
both created a risk (i.e. they would incur criminal liability for failing to prevent each 
other from rolling the stones down the hill), p. 124.
37 BGE 122 IV 1
38 See unreasonableness standard, p. 389.
39 BGE 130 IV 58.
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Both of the drivers were convicted of homicide (Article 111) and sentenced 
to 6.5 years of imprisonment. The Federal Supreme Court upheld this convic-
tion. For the first time in a binding precedent, persons responsible for a fatal 
car accident were convicted of homicide with conditional intent (dolus even-
tualis). Up until that case, even accidents caused by gross carelessness were 
always classified as criminal negligence. The Supreme Court argued that not 
only did the drivers know that their behaviour was extremely dangerous, but 
that by putting achieving victory in the race above everything else, they had 
willingly accepted a deadly outcome. 
From a retributive point of view the decision can be understood. The maxi-
mum penalty of 3 years for a negligent double homicide just did not fit the 
crime. From a dogmatic point of view, however, the ruling is highly proble-
matic. The drivers knowingly incurred an extremely high risk by engaging in 
a car race. But the Court made a large leap from here: the fact that the dri-
vers knew of the risk led the Court to the conclusion that they had accepted 
the fatal outcome. To draw a straight inference from what someone knew to 
what someone wanted has far- reaching consequences for criminal liability in 
general. It is highly unlikely that the drivers wanted to kill the teenagers, or 
even that they were indifferent to such an outcome.40 It is much more likely 
that they (wrongly) trusted their driving skills and hoped for a lucky outco-
me.41 In other words, they willingly accepted the risk of death, but they did not 
accept the actual outcome of death. Thus, they should have been convicted 
for life endangerment (Article 129) which allows a maximum prison sentence 
ƺƤ ᇹ.ᇷèǄƣƞƽƾ.42 
ᇶ. H؜؞؜ءؚ ؜ء ا؛ؘ Nبؘؗ43
On a warm and sunny Sunday afternoon in autumn 2009, 45- year- old X was 
hiking in the nude through the mountains of Appenzell Innerrhoden. He wal-
ked by a fire- pit where a family with young children was resting and past a 
40 As is required for the offender to possess conditional intent, see p. 375. 
41 See BGE 133 IV 9
42 According to Article 129, this crime can mandate a custodial sentence not exceeding five 
years or a monetary penalty. In cases of multiple endangerment or when committed in 
combination with other offences, this maximum sentence can be elevated by 150 %, i.e. 
it can be up to 7.5 years (see Article 49).
43 BGE 138 IV 13.
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Christian rehabilitation centre for people with drug- addictions. A woman 
who observed him filed a report with the local police. 
Article 19 of the relevant cantonal code which regulated “indecent behavi-
our” provided that “any person publicly displaying indecent behaviour is liable 
to a fine.” The Federal Supreme Court first considered whether the Canton 
of Appenzell Innerrhoden had exceeded its legislative powers by legislating 
on indecent behaviour, considering the fact that the Federal Parliament has 
exclusive legislative competence in the field of sexual offences. The court 
found that because walking in the nude did not qualify as exhibitionism, 
sexual harassment, or pornography, the cantonal legislator possessed the 
power to legislate on indecency. Secondly, the Court considered whether the 
notion of “indecent behaviour” in Article 19 was sufficiently clear to satisfy 
the nulla poena sine lege principle. They held that the provision was suffi-
ciently clear, deeming walking in the nude as obviously indecent behaviour. 
Both of the Court’s assessments are questionable. When considering the 
issue of the canton’s competence to legislate on indecent behaviour, it should 
be noted that the Federal Parliament generally restricted sexual offences to 
harmful behaviour (rape, sexual harassment, etc.). Parliament made some 
specific exceptions (e.g. exhibitionism, pornography) to this general rule: this 
can be interpreted as the federal legislator setting the outer limit for the cri-
minalisation of immoral conduct. Hence, following this view, there was no 
room for a cantonal rule on indecent behaviour: Appenzell Innerrhoden had 
acted out- with their legislative competence. Regarding the Court’s ruling that 
Article 19 was sufficiently clear to satisfy the principle of nulla poena sine lege, 
here they missed the key point. The question was not whether hiking in the 
nude can be classified as indecent behaviour, but whether such a classifica-
tion was foreseeable given the broad and changeable notion of “indecency”. If 
the legislator wants to ban walking in the nude, they must and should issue 
an unambiguous rule, for example: “Any person who displays nudity in public 
is liable to a fine.” 
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I. Criminal Procedure Code
The first section of this chapter examines the constitutional framework wit-
hin which the laws on criminal procedure in Switzerland operate (1.) and gives 
a brief history of criminal procedural laws in Switzerland, before embarking 
on an examination of the key developments en route to the eventual codifi-
cation of the unified Swiss Criminal Procedure Code in 2011 (2.). Finally, the 
CƺƢƣ’ƾ lƞǄƺǀƿ ƞƹƢ ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹƾ ƞƽƣ ƞƹƞlǄƾƣƢèᄬᇵ.ᄭ. 
ᇳ. Cآءئا؜ابا؜آءؔ؟ Fإؔؠؘتآإ؞
Switzerland is a federal republic. All competencies that are not vested in the 
ơƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ƞƽƣ ƣǃƣƽơiƾƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ.1 Criminal 
law and criminal procedure were traditionally a key legislative area for the 
cantons: neither the Constitution of 1848 nor the one of 1874 provided for 
centralised legislative powers. However, towards the end of the 19th century 
pressure mounted on parliament to draw up a criminal code to deal with the 
ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹƿiǁƣ ơƽiƸiƹƞl ƺƤƤƣƹơƣƾ Ƥƺƽ ƞll ƺƤ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ. Oƹ ᇳᇵ NƺǁƣƸƟƣƽ ᇳᇺᇻᇺ, 
the confederation became entitled to legislate in the field of substantive cri-
minal law.2 
From this point, it would be a further 102 years before the confederation 
finally obtained the power to legislate in the field of criminal procedure. 
Throughout the 20th century, there were more than 50 different codes of crimi-
nal procedure applicable in Switzerland: 26 cantonal codes of criminal proce-
Ƣǀƽƣ, ᇴᇸ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ƽƣƨǀlƞƿiƺƹƾ ƺƹ Jǀǁƣƹilƣ Jǀƾƿiơƣ, ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƞl ơƺƢƣ ƺƤ ᇳᇻᇵᇶ 
on Federal Criminal Justice, the administrative criminal procedure code of 
1974, and the criminal procedure code of the Swiss Military in 1979. This vari-
ety of procedural rules proved to be extremely inefficient in practical terms: 
1 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 18 April 1999, SR 101; see for an English 
ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/MᇺfJ-dᇵᇸᇻᄭ.
2 Fƺƽ Ƣƣƿƞilƾ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƣƹƞơƿƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣ ƺƤ ᇴᇳ DƣơƣƸƟƣƽ ᇳᇻᇵᇹ, dc ᇵᇳᇳ.ᇲ, 
ƾƣƣ ƿƩƣ ơƩƞƻƿƣƽ ƺƹ CƽiƸiƹƞl Lƞǂ, ƻƻ. ᇵᇸᇻ; ƾƣƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ EƹƨliƾƩ ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƽiƸiƹƞl 
Code www.admin.ch (https://perma.cc/4QS4-CWQ5). 
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for example, it made the prosecution of interstate and transnational (organi-
sed) crime very difficult. Further, many of the existing procedural codes stood 
increasingly at odds with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights and the Swiss Federal Supreme Court. At the turn of the millennium, it 
was clear to everyone that criminal procedural law needed to be standardised 
on a national level. The reform of the Swiss Justice System was put to popular 
vote and approved in a landslide victory on 12 March 2000.ᇵ This cleared the 
way for the drafting of Swiss criminal and civil procedure codes.
Before embarking on a discussion of the legislative process leading to the 
adoption of a unified code of criminal procedure, it should be noted that 
despite such a development, there are three domains the cantons retain full 
responsibility. These areas are the organisation of the courts, the administra-
tion of justice in criminal cases and the execution of sentences and measures 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇴᇵ II Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. FiƽƾƿlǄ, ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ƽƣƸƞiƹ ƽƣƾƻƺƹƾiƟlƣ Ƥƺƽ ƣƾƿƞ-
blishing their own court system. For example, they can decide whether they 
want district courts to be responsible for settling criminal and civil cases for 
a specific area (as is the case in the canton of Zurich) or a cantonal crimi-
nal court with an exclusive jurisdiction in criminal matters (as is the case 
in Lucerne and Basel Stadt). They can also set up rules on the eligibility of 
judges. For example, federal law does not preclude the existence of lay jud-
ges.4 This means that cantons retain the power to allow laymen on the bench: 
many cantons do so, although Zurich has recently banned them. Regarding 
the regulation of juries, the federal rules on the main hearings at court do 
not contain provisions on jury selection and/or instruction. Thus, trial by 
jury, which used to be quite widespread, is almost entirely excluded today.5 
NƣǁƣƽƿƩƣlƣƾƾ, ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ eiơiƹƺ ƾƿill ơƺƹƿiƹǀƣƾ ƿƺ ƩƺlƢ jǀƽǄ ƿƽiƞlƾ. FǀƽƿƩƣƽ, 
the cantons can decide whether they want to allow the publication of dissen-
ting opinions. 
Secondly, the administration of criminal justice lies in the hands of the 
ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ: ƞlƿƩƺǀƨƩ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣ ƺƤ ᇴᇳ DƣơƣƸƟƣƽ ᇳᇻᇵᇹ iƾ ƞƹ ƞơƿ ƺƤ 
the federal parliament, it is administered by cantonal courts. There are only 
ᇵ 86.4 % of the voters and all cantons approved the reform. The turnout was at 42 %.
4 Nؔؗ؜ءؘ kبإ؞؜ءؘؗء, Nƞƿiƺƹƞl ơƩƞƽƞơƿƣƽiƾƿiơƾ, ƤǀƹƢƞƸƣƹƿƞl ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣƾ, ƞƹƢ ƩiƾƿƺƽǄ ƺƤ 
criminal law in Switzerland, in Ulrich Sieber/Konstanze Jarvers/Emily Silverman (eds.), 
Nƞƿiƺƹƞl CƽiƸiƹƞl Lƞǂ iƹ ƞ CƺƸƻƞƽƞƿiǁƣ Lƣƨƞl Cƺƹƿƣǃƿ, gƺl ᇳ.ᇳ, Bƣƽliƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇵ, ƻƻ. ᇴᇲᇷ, ƻ. ᇴᇴᇳ.
5 “A jury is not explicitly prohibited but is probably inadmissible due to a lack of provisions 
governing the division of tasks within the court and a lack of special procedural provisions”, 
kبإ؞؜ءؘؗء, p. 221.
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a handful of very serious crimes6 against national interests prosecuted by the 
Attorney General of Switzerland and tried by the Federal Criminal Court in 
Bellinzona. 
Finally, the cantons are mainly responsible for the execution of the (dual) 
system of sanctions:7 in the executing of sentences, the cantons have to provide 
penitentiary institutions, a system for the collection of monetary penalties 
and fines, and probation offices. For the execution of measures, the cantons 
must install suitable institutions to treat those with addictions and mental 
ƢƣƤiơiƣƹơiƣƾ. IƹƢƣƤiƹiƿƣ iƹơƞƽơƣƽƞƿiƺƹ iƾ ǀƾǀƞllǄ ƣǃƣơǀƿƣƢ iƹ ƩiƨƩ-ƾƣơǀƽiƿǄ ƾƣơ-
tions of regular prisons. Such a penitentiary system is too expensive for every 
canton to be expected to individually create one. The cantons have therefore 
united their efforts in several inter-cantonal agreements (“concordats”8).
ᇴ. Lؘؚ؜ئ؟ؔا؜آء
As mentioned, by the end of the 20th century it was becoming increasingly 
clear that there was a need to standardise criminal procedure in Switzerland. 
Thus, in 1994, a commission of experts was established with the set purpose 
ƺƤ ƣǃƻlƺƽiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƻƺƾƾiƟiliƿǄ ƺƤ ơƽƣƞƿiƹƨ ƞ ǀƹiƤiƣƢ ơƽiƸiƹƞl ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ. Iƹ ᇳᇻᇻᇹ 
they produced their completed report, entitled “From 29 to 1”. They proposed 
to unify 29 of the existing criminal justice codes for adults (26 cantonal crimi-
nal codes of procedure, the procedural code on Federal Criminal Justice and 
the administrative and military criminal codes of procedure) in one federal 
code of criminal Procedure. The commission decided to postpone the unifica-
tion of procedural legislation on Juvenile Justice for the time-being. 
Iƹ ᇳᇻᇻᇻ, ƺƹƣ Ǆƣƞƽ ƟƣƤƺƽƣ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ƺƟƿƞiƹƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƻƺǂƣƽ ƿƺ ƽƣƨǀ-
late criminal procedure on a national level, the Federal Council mandated 
N؜؞؟ؔبئ dؖ؛ؠ؜ؗ, professor of criminal law at the University of Zurich, to 
draw up a Federal Code of Criminal Procedure.9 The commission’s idea of 
6 Fƺƽ ƿƩƣ ơƽiƸƣƾ ǀƹƢƣƽ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl jǀƽiƾƢiơƿiƺƹ ƾƣƣ éƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇴᇵ ƞƹƢ ᇴᇶ CƽiƸiƹƞl aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ CƺƢƣ
7 dƣƣ ƿƩƣ ơƩƞƻƿƣƽ ƺƹ CƽiƸiƹƞl Lƞǂ, ƻƻ. ᇵᇹᇹ.
8 See the chapter on Constitutional Law, p. ᇵᇻᇻ.
9 Iƹ ƢƣƤiƞƹơƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƺƸƸiƾƾiƺƹ’ƾ ƻƽƺƻƺƾƣƢ ƻƺƾƿƻƺƹƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩiƾ iƾƾǀƣ, ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl 
Council also decided to proceed with unifying the codes on Juvenile Justice. Thus, the 
aƽƣƾiƢƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Jǀǁƣƹilƣ Jǀƾƿiơƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƺƤ gƞlƞiƾ, Jؘؔء kؘإؠؔااؘء, was commissioned to 
draft a Swiss Juvenile Justice code. 
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integrating the administrative and military criminal procedure codes was 
overruled. 
FƽƺƸ ᇴᇲᇲᇳᅬᇴᇲᇲᇵ, ƿƩƣ ƿǂƺ ƻƽƣliƸiƹƞƽǄ ƢƽƞƤƿƾ ǂƣƽƣ ƾǀƟƸiƿƿƣƢ ƿƺ ƞ ƹƞƿiƺƹƞl 
ơƺƹƾǀlƿƞƿiƺƹ ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵ Cƺƹƾǀlƿƞƿiƺƹ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿᄭ.10 Almost ever-
yone welcomed the idea of unification. The most controversial issue was that 
of who should be in charge of the preliminary proceedings: should it be the 
sole responsibility of the prosecutor or should it also involve investigative jud-
ƨƣƾ ƺƽ Ƹƞƨiƾƿƽƞƿƣƾ? Iƹ ƽƣlƞƿiƺƹ ƿƺ ƿƩiƾ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽ iƾƾǀƣ, ƿƩƣ GƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿ ƻƽƺ-
posed in its dispatch11 of 21 December 2005 that the Federal Assembly should 
introduce a purely prosecutorial system, meaning that the preliminary pro-
ceedings would indeed be the sole responsibility of the prosecutor’s office. 
This proposal was followed by Parliament. Subsequently, after less than one 
year of debates Parliament passed the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code on 5 
OơƿƺƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇲᇹ. Iƿ ƣƹƿƣƽƣƢ iƹƿƺ Ƥƺƽơƣ ƺƹ ᇳ JƞƹǀƞƽǄ ᇴᇲᇳᇳ.12
The nationwide standardisation of criminal procedure under the Swiss 
Criminal Procedure Code of 2011 was an important step in the right direction 
in many ways. For defence counsels, it has become a lot easier to represent 
defendants in other cantons. They now only have to be familiar with one, 
unified law of criminal procedure. This means a better standard of represen-
tation for accused persons; their interests will be better protected. The unifi-
cation has also sparked a national academic debate about different aspects of 
Swiss criminal procedure. Before the unification, hardly anything was publis-
hed on cantonal procedure codes, meaning that lawyers and judges looking 
for an answer to a particular legal problem would not have much literature to 
rely on. This seriously hindered discussion of the topic, which to some extent 
hindered progress or change, although the Supreme Court was making great 
efforts to introduce progressive measures into the cantonal procedure codes. 
Still, today there remains much room for progress. The organisation of 
the criminal justice authorities and the execution of sanctions, which are 
10 Federal Act on the Consultation Procedure of 18 March 2005 (Consultation Procedure 
Act, CPA), SR 172.061; see for an English version of the Consultation Procedure Act www.
admin.ch (https://perma.cc/6MCM-KXYG); see for legislative procedure the Chapter 
Swiss Legal System, pp. 27.
11 The term “dispatch” (German: Botschaft; French: message) is the term used by the Swiss 
government for explanatory reports to draft legislation; resembling a White Paper in the 
UK; see Chapter Swiss Legal System p. 28.
12 The Swiss Juvenile Criminal Procedure Code was adopted on 20 March 2009 and entered 
iƹƿƺ Ƥƺƽơƣ ƺƹ ᇳ JƞƹǀƞƽǄ ᇴᇲᇳᇳ ᄬdc ᇵᇳᇴ.ᇳᄭ.
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currently still areas in which the cantons have exclusive competence, need to 
be harmonised on a national level. The administrative and military criminal 
codes are out-dated, too; it is unfortunate that the Federal Council dropped 
the idea of standardising these back at the turn of the millennium. 
The two biggest contemporary challenges in terms of legislation on crimi-
nal procedure, however, lie outside the subject’s traditional realm. Firstly, 
with the threat of terrorism constantly evolving and increasing, one key 
challenge is the need to bring police and secret service legislation (both on 
a cantonal and federal level) in line with criminal procedure legislation. For 
example, can information from police-intercepted phone calls be handed 
over to the criminal justice authorities, considering the fact that such infor-
mation may have been intercepted before there was any adequate level of 
suspicion against a person? Secondly, administrative laws provide for many 
sanctions that have traditionally not been regarded as criminal penalties: 
for example, federal agencies can ban bank managers from their profession 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇵ Fiƹƞƹơiƞl Mƞƽkƣƿ dǀƻƣƽǁiƾiƺƹ éơƿᄭᇳᇵ or close down pharmaceutical 
firms (Article 66 Therapeutic Products Act).14 These sanctions clearly meet 
the standard of ‘criminal charges’ as assessed in case law dealing with Article 
ᇸ I ECHc.15 Hence, the procedures which lead to these sanctions being impo-
sed must also meet criminal procedure standards (e.g. nemo tenetur).16 
ᇳᇵ Federal Act on the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority of 22 June 2007 
ᄬFiƹƞƹơiƞl Mƞƽkƣƿ dǀƻƣƽǁiƾiƺƹ éơƿ, FINMédéᄭ, dc ᇻᇷᇸ.ᇳ ᄬ“[1.] If the Swiss Financial Market 
Supervisory Authority (FINMA) detects a serious violation of supervisory provisions, it may 
prohibit the person responsible from acting in a management capacity at any person or 
entity subject to its supervision. [2.] The prohibition from practising a profession may be 
imposed for a period of up to five years.”). 
14 Federal Act on Medicinal Products and Medical Devices of 15 December 2000 (Thera-
peutic Products Act, TPA), SR 812.21 („[1.] The Agency may take all administrative meas-
ures necessary to enforce this Act. 2 In particular it may: c. close down establishments.“).
15 Iƹ ƞƾƾƣƾƾiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƞƻƻliơƞƟiliƿǄ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƽiƸiƹƞl ƞƾƻƣơƿ ƺƤ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇸ ECHc, ƿƩƣ ơƞƾƣ ƺƤ Eƹƨƣl 
ƞƹƢ OƿƩƣƽƾ ǁ. ƿƩƣ NƣƿƩƣƽlƞƹƢƾ, éƻƻ ƹƺ ᇷᇳᇲᇲ/ᇹᇳ, ᇷᇳᇲᇳ/ᇹᇳ, ᇷᇳᇲᇴ/ᇹᇳ, ᇷᇵᇷᇶ/ᇹᇴ ƞƹƢ ᇷᇵᇹᇲ/ᇹᇴ, 
ECƿHc ᇺ Jǀƹƣ ᇳᇻᇹᇸ, ƻƽƺǁiƢƣƾ ƿƩƽƣƣ ƽƣlƣǁƞƹƿ ơƽiƿƣƽiƞ ƞƿ ƻƞƽƞƨƽƞƻƩƾ ᇺᇴᅬᇺᇵ: ƿƩƣ ơlƞƾƾiƤiơƞ-
tion of the act in domestic law; the nature of the offence; and the severity of the penalty 
that the person concerned risks incurring. The first criteria is only a starting-point for 
ƿƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ’ƾ ƣǃƞƸiƹƞƿiƺƹè ᅬ ƣǁƣƹ iƤ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƢǀơƿ iƾ ƹƺƿ ơlƞƾƾiƤiƣƢ ƞƾ ơƽiƸiƹƞl iƹ ƿƩƣ Ƣƺ-
mestic law, the Court will still delve behind this classification to examine the actual 
substance of the offence and make its own independent assessment. 
16 For „nemo tenetur“ see pp. 412.
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ᇵ. Cآءاؘءا17
The Swiss Criminal Procedure Code contains 457 Articles. They are divided 
up into 12 parts. The Swiss Juvenile Criminal Procedure Code has roughly 
ƿƩƣ ƾƞƸƣ ƾƿƽǀơƿǀƽƣ Ɵǀƿ iƾ ƸǀơƩ ƾƩƺƽƿƣƽ ᄬᇷᇶ éƽƿiơlƣƾᄭ. Iƿ iƾ ơƺƹơƣƻƿǀƞliƾƣƢ ƞƾ 
a lex specialis: if a specific problem is not regulated in the Juvenile Criminal 
Procedure Code, the Swiss Code of Criminal Procedure applies. 
Part 1 (Articles 1–11) regulates basic principles of criminal procedure such as 
fairness, independence, speediness, ex officio investigation, mandatory pro-
secution and prosecutorial discretion, presumption of innocence, in dubio 
pro reo, or double jeopardy. 
Part 2 ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇴᅬᇳᇲᇵᄭ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣƾ ƿƩƣ criminal justice authorities (police, 
prosecution, and courts). As mentioned, the legislator decided to establish 
a prosecutorial system. The preliminary proceedings are there fore led solely 
by the prosecutor (Article 61 lit. a). There is no (independent) investigative
 
Figure 1: Criminal Procedure Laws
17 Iƹ ƿƩƣ Ƥƺllƺǂiƹƨ ƿƣǃƿ, ǂƩƣƽƣ éƽƿiơlƣƾ ƞƽƣ ƸƣƹƿiƺƹƣƢ ǂiƿƩƺǀƿ ƽƣƤƣƽƣƹơiƹƨ ƿƩƣiƽ ƾƺǀƽơƣ ƺƤ 
law, they are located in the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code of 5 October 2007 (Criminal 
aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ CƺƢƣ, CƽiƸaCᄭ, dc ᇵᇳᇴ.ᇲ; ƾƣƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ EƹƨliƾƩ ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ CƽiƸiƹƞl aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ 
Code www.admin.ch (https://perma.cc/6S55–6MBC).
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judge or magistrate in charge of the proceedings. Some intrusive investigative 
measures, such as detention on remand or wire-tapping of phones, have to be 
ordered or approved by a judge at the “compulsory measures court” (Article 
ᇳᇺè Iᄭ Ɵǀƿ ƿƩƣ ƞơƿǀƞl iƹǁƣƾƿiƨƞƿiƺƹ iƾ ƾƿill ơƺƹƢǀơƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿƺƽ. eƽiƞl 
cases are handled by the courts of first instance (Article 19). Their decisions 
can be taken to the court of appeal (Article 21). The appeal to and the pro-
ceedings of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court are regulated in the (separate) 
Federal Act of 17 June 2005 on the Federal Supreme Court. Part 2 also contains 
provisions on the cantonal/federal jurisdiction (Articles 22 et seqq.), recusal 
(Articles 56 et seqq.), or disciplinary measures (Article 64) as well as general 
procedural rules (oral and public proceedings, language, written records, ser-
vice of decisions, time limits, and file management). 
Part 3 ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇲᇶᅬᇳᇵᇺᄭ ƢƣƤiƹƣƾ ƿƩƣ parties and the other persons invol-
ved in the proceedings (witnesses, experts, defence counsels, etc.). The par-
ties are the accused, the private claimant and the prosecutor (Article 104). 
The accused is a person suspected, accused of or charged with an offence 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇳᇳᄭ. eƩƣ accused is the technical term used for the defendant. The 
private claimant is a harmed person who voluntarily participates in the cri-
minal proceedings (Article 118). There are three categories of harmed per-
sons: (1) the aggrieved: a person whose rights have been directly violated by 
the criminal offence (Article 115), e.g. a defrauded person; (2) the victim: an 
aggrieved person whose bodily, sexual or psychological integrity was direc-
tly affected by the criminal offence (Article 116), for example a person raped 
ƞƹƢ/ƺƽ ƾƣƽiƺǀƾlǄ iƹjǀƽƣƢ; ᄬᇵᄭ ƿƩƣ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ơlƞiƸƞƹƿ: ƟƺƿƩ ƿƩƣ ƞƨƨƽiƣǁƣƢ ƻƣƽƾƺƹ 
and the victim can declare that they want to participate as a private claimant 
iƹ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇳᇻᄭ. eƩƣ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ơlƞiƸƞƹƿ iƾ ƹƺƿ ƸƣƽƣlǄ ƞƹ ƞơơƣƾ-
sory participant to the proceedings but a party on equal standing with the 
accused. Private claimants have access to the files, can participate in hea-
rings with the accused, appoint their own legal adviser, or request that evi-
Ƣƣƹơƣ Ɵƣ ƿƞkƣƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇲᇹᄭ. eƩƣǄ ơƞƹ Ƥilƣ ƿƩƣiƽ ơiǁil ơlƞiƸƾ iƹ ƿƩƣ ơƽiƸiƹƞl 
proceedings (Article 122). They even have a say in the prosecution and  con-
ǁiơƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞ ƢƣƤƣƹƢƞƹƿ ᄬ“ơƽiƸiƹƞl ơlƞiƸ”, éƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇳᇻ II liƿ. ƞᄭ. Fƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, ƿƩƣǄ 
could request that specific charges be pursued: the parents in the case of the 
teenagers killed in the deadly car race discussed in the chapter on criminal 
law could have requested that the defendants be charged with intentional 
killing (Article 111 Criminal Code) rather than negligent killing (Article 117 
Criminal Code). 
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Figure 2: Categories of Harmed Persons
The prosecution only becomes a party to proceedings at the eventual court 
hearing. During the preliminary phase, the prosecution is the head of procee-
dings (Article 61 lit. a). This shifting of roles from the head of the proceedings 
into a party to the proceedings is a particularity of the prosecutorial system. 
Iƹ ƾƺƸƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƣǁiƺǀƾ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ƾǄƾƿƣƸƾ, ƞƹ iƹƢƣƻƣƹƢƣƹƿ Ƹƞƨiƾƿƽƞƿƣ ǂƞƾ 
in charge of the preliminary proceedings and the prosecution was a party 
throughout the preliminary and principal proceedings. 
Part 4 ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇵᇻᅬᇳᇻᇷᄭ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl CƺƢƣ ƺƤ CƽiƸiƹƞl aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ ơƺƹƿ-
ains the rules on evidence. Criminal justice authorities can rely on any lawful 
ƣǁiƢƣƹơƣ ƢƣƣƸƣƢ ƾǀiƿƞƟlƣ ƿƺ ƢƣƿƣƽƸiƹƣ ƿƩƣ ƿƽǀƿƩ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇵᇻᄭ. EǁiƢƣƹơƣ ƾƩƞll 
not be taken in relation to facts which are insignificant, obvious, well known 
to the criminal justice authorities, or which have already been sufficiently 
ƻƽƺǁƣƹ iƹ lƞǂ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇵᇻ IIᄭ. eƩƣ ‘ƾǀƤƤiơiƣƹƿlǄ ƻƽƺǁƣƹ’ ơlƞǀƾƣ iƾ ƻƽƺƟlƣƸƞƿiơ. Iƿ 
allows criminal justice authorities to engage in a so-called anticipated assess-
ment of evidence. For example, prosecutors or judges can refuse a request to 
hear a witness for the defence at any time if they have already decided on the 
Ƥƞơƿƾ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ Ɵƞƾiƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Ƥilƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇳᇺ IIᄭ. eƩiƾ Ƹƞkƣƾ iƿ ƸǀơƩ ƩƞƽƢƣƽ Ƥƺƽ 
the defence to tell their side of the story and could potentially conflict with 
éƽƿiơlƣ ᇸ III liƿ. Ƣ ECHc ǂƩiơƩ ƨǀƞƽƞƹƿƣƣƾ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƤƣƹƢƞƹƿ’ƾ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ “ƣǃƞƸiƹƣ 
or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and 
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Fiƨǀƽƣ ᇵ: cƺlƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ aƽƺƾƣơǀƿiƺƹ iƹ ƿƩƣ aƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnes-
ses against him.” However, in this regard it should be noted that generally the 
European Court of Human Rights leaves it to the national courts to assess the 
relevance of the evidence which defendants request to bring forth.18
Parties have certain rights regarding the taking of evidence under Part 4. Most 
importantly, they have the right to be present when evidence is taken (Article 
ᇳᇶᇹ Iᄭ. aƽiǁƞƿƣ ơlƞiƸƞƹƿƾ ƞƹƢ ơƺ-ƢƣƤƣƹƢƞƹƿƾ ơƞƹ ƻƞƽƿiơiƻƞƿƣ iƹ ƣǁƣƽǄ Ʃƣƞƽiƹƨ ƺƤ 
the accused,19 and vice versa. This rule was meant to enforce the participatory 
rights of the parties. There are however practical problems to be solved: what 
if 250 persons have been defrauded in a Ponzi scheme and all of them want to 
participate in the interrogation of the accused? Or what if co-defendants attend 
the hearing of the accused, then adjust their own statements to avoid criminal 
liability? Thus, the Supreme Court has allowed for some narrow exceptions to 
the right to participation.20 These restrictions do not apply to the defence coun-
18 eƩƣ ƤǀƹƢƞƸƣƹƿƞl ƞiƸ ƺƤ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇸ III liƿ. Ƣ ECHc iƾ ƿƺ ƣƹƾǀƽƣ Ƥǀll “ƣƼǀƞliƿǄ ƺƤ ƞƽƸƾ” ƽƞƿƩƣƽ 
than mandating the examination of every witness on the defendant’s behalf (Perna v. 
IƿƞlǄ, éƻƻ ƹƺ ᇶᇺᇺᇻᇺ/ᇻᇻ, ECƿHc, ᇸ MƞǄ ᇴᇲᇲᇵ, ƻƞƽƞƨƽƞƻƩ ᇴᇻᄭ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ǂƩƣƹ ƞ ƽƣƼǀƣƾƿ ƟǄ 
a defendant to examine witnesses is sufficiently reasoned, not vexatious, relevant to the 
subject matter of the accusation, and could potentially have strengthened the accused’s 
position, relevant reasons for dismissing such a request must be given by the authorities 
ᄬaƺlǄƞkƺǁ ǁ. cǀƾƾiƞ, éƻƻ ƹƺ ᇹᇹᇲᇳᇺ/ᇲᇳ, ECƿHc, ᇴᇻ JƞƹǀƞƽǄ ᇴᇲᇲᇻ, ƻƞƽƞƨƽƞƻƩƾ ᇵᇶᅬᇵᇷᄭ.
19 éƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇶᇹ I ƨǀƞƽƞƹƿƣƣƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƻƞƽƿiƣƾ Ʃƞǁƣ ƿƩƣ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƻƽƣƾƣƹƿ ǂƩƣƹ ƿƩƣ ƻǀƟliơ ƻƽƺƾ-
ecutor and the courts take evidence and to put questions to the persons being questioned. 
20 dƣƣ BGE ᇳᇵᇻ Ig ᇴᇷ: ƿƩiƾ ơƞƾƣ ƩƣlƢ ƿƩƞƿ iƹ ơƞƾƣƾ ǂiƿƩ Ƹƺƽƣ ƿƩƞƹ ƺƹƣ ƞơơǀƾƣƢ ƻƣƽƾƺƹ, ƿƩƣ 
accused person may be excluded from participating in the questioning of the co-accused 
where there is a concrete risk of collusion. However, a mere abstract danger of collusion 
Ƣƺƣƾ ƹƺƿ jǀƾƿiƤǄ ƿƩƣ ƣǃơlǀƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƞơơǀƾƣƢ ƤƽƺƸ ƻƞƽƿiơiƻƞƿiƹƨ. dƣƣ ƞlƾƺ BGE ᇳᇶᇲ Ig 
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sel’s presence in police examination hearings: he or she may always be present 
ƤƽƺƸ ƿƩƣ ǁƣƽǄ Ɵƣƨiƹƹiƹƨ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƺliơƣ iƹǁƣƾƿiƨƞƿiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇷᇻ IIᄭ.
aƞƽƿ ᇶ ƞlƾƺ ƾƣƿƾ ƺǀƿ ƿƩƣ ƽǀlƣƾ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƻƣƽ ƿƞkiƹƨ ƺƤ ƣǁiƢƣƹơƣ. Iƿ iƾ ƻƽƺƩiƟi-
ted to obtain evidence through coercion, violence, threats, promises, decep-
tion or through any measures that interfere with a person’s freedom of will 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇶᇲ Iᄭ. Hƣƹơƣ, ƹƣiƿƩƣƽ Ƣƽǀƨƾ ƹƺƽ ƻƺlǄƨƽƞƻƩƾ ƸƞǄ Ɵƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƣƽƣƢ, ƹƺƿ 
ƣǁƣƹ ǂƩƣƹ ƿƩƣ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl ơƺƹƾƣƹƿƾ ƿƺ ƿƩƣiƽ ǀƾƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇶᇲ IIᄭ. 
Regarding the exclusion of evidence, Article 141 sets out three pivotal rules 
in this area. Firstly, evidence obtained through coercion (torture etc.) is stric-
tly iƹƞƢƸiƾƾiƟlƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇶᇲ Iᄭ, ƞƾ iƾ ƣǁiƢƣƹơƣ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƺƢƣ ƺƤ CƽiƸiƹƞl 
Procedure explicitly declares to be inadmissible. For example, statements 
given by the accused without a prior caution of his or her right to remain silent 
ƞƽƣ ƢƣơlƞƽƣƢ iƹƞƢƸiƾƾiƟlƣ ƟǄ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇷᇺ II. dƣơƺƹƢlǄ, ƣǁiƢƣƹơƣ ƺƟƿƞiƹƣƢ iƹ ƞ 
criminal manner or in violation of rules protecting the validity of the evidence 
shall not be used, unless its use is essential to prosecuting serious criminal 
ƺƤƤƣƹơƣƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇶᇳ IIᄭ. IƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƺliơƣ Ƥƺƽƨƣ ƞ ƾƣƞƽơƩ ǂƞƽƽƞƹƿ, Ƥƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, ƿƩƣƹ 
any evidence obtained during the search would have been obtained in a crimi-
nal manner, as forgery of a document by a public official is a criminal offence 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇳᇹ CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣᄭ. ‘gƞliƢiƿǄ ƽǀlƣƾ’ ƞƽƣ ƢƣƾiƨƹƣƢ ƿƺ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿ ƤǀƹƢƞ-
mental rights of the accused: if a witness is not cautioned to tell the truth, 
for example, then “the examination hearing is invalid” ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇹᇹ Iᄭ. dǀơƩ ƣǁi-
dence is generally inadmissible, unless, as stated above, it is needed to secure 
the conviction of a serious crime. Courts having to review such evidence must 
conduct a balancing exercise:21 the private interests of the accused have to be 
172: this case established that the right of accused persons to participate in evidence-
gathering does not apply to separate proceedings against other accused persons (where 
the other accused persons were involved in the same criminal incident but are being 
tried wholly separately as opposed to as a co-accused).
21 Strangely, the fact that the evidence could have been obtained legally is viewed to be an 
ƞƽƨǀƸƣƹƿ iƹ Ƥƞǁƺǀƽ ƺƤ iƿƾ ƞƢƸiƾƾiƟiliƿǄ. IƹƞƢƸiƾƾiƟiliƿǄ ǂƺǀlƢ, Ʃƺǂƣǁƣƽ, Ɵƣ ƞ Ƥƞƽ Ƹƺƽƣ lƺ-
gical sanction: if evidence can be obtained lawfully then it should be obtained lawfully. 
See the same argument in the context of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine by Jآ؛ء 
D. Jؔؖ؞ئآء/dؔإؔ؛ J. dبؠؠؘإئ, eƩƣ Iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞliƾƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ CƽiƸiƹƞl EǁiƢƣƹơƣ, BƣǄƺƹƢ ƿƩƣ 
Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, Cambridge 2012, pp. 191 (“Clearly, it could equally 
be argued that the fruit of the poisonous tree ought not be relied upon as evidence in such 
circumstances precisely because the authorities could have obtained the evidence lawfully.”). 
The test formally required by the Supreme Court jurisprudence of whether evidence could 
have been legally obtained did not make it into the new Code and can henceforth be 
disregarded. 
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weighed against the public interest in finding the truth and securing a convic-
tion for the relevant crime. The graver the alleged crime, the more the public 
interest will prevail.22 Finally, evidence “obtained in violation of administrative 
rules shall be usable” ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇶᇳ IIIᄭ. ‘éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƽǀlƣƾ’ ƞƽƣ ƢƣƾiƨƹƣƢ ƿƺ 
guarantee the smooth administration of criminal proceedings. Their viola-
tion has no consequence. The provision on the search of mobile phones has 
- not very convincingly - been qualified as an administrative rule.ᇴᇵ
The Swiss Code of Criminal Procedure contains no statutory exclusion of 
hearsay evidence.24 Whilst Article 169 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code25 for-
bids such evidence, indirect evidence is admissible in criminal procedure and 
ơƞƹ Ɵƣ ƞƾƾƣƾƾƣƢ ƤƽƣƣlǄ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ơƽiƸiƹƞl jǀƾƿiơƣ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇲ IIᄭ.
Figure 4: Evidence Exclusion
22 BGE ᇳᇵᇲ I ᇳᇴᇸ.
ᇴᇵ BGE ᇳᇵᇻ Ig ᇳᇴᇺ.
24 dاؘؙؔء eإؘؖ؛ئؘ؟/dؔإؔ؛ J. dبؠؠؘإئ, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings, Oxford 
ᇴᇲᇲᇸ, ƻ. ᇵᇴᇴ. 
25 Swiss Civil Procedure code of 19 December 2008 (Civil Procedure Code, CPC), SR 272; 
see for an English version of the Civil Procedure Code www.admin.ch (https://perma.
cc/99QZ-BZ8T). 
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The rules on evidence exclusion set out in Part 4 are unconvincing. One 
key concern is the fact that illegally obtained evidence can be used if a seri-
ƺǀƾ ơƽiƸƣ iƾ ƞƿ iƾƾǀƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇶᇳ IIᄭ. Fƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƞơơǀƾƣƢ, ƿƩiƾ Ƹƣƞƹƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ Ɵiƨ-
ger the crime he is accused of, the smaller his chances of a fair trial.26 This 
is problematic considering the possibility that severe sentences and thus a 
more severe deprivation of liberty will be imposed for more serious crimes; 
one would hope that in such cases, the trial and investigative process should 
be as fair and reliable as possible. Moreover, it is very hard in practice to draw 
a clear line between validity and administrative rules. This means that the 
defining of these terms is overly open to judicial discretion, leading to little 
protection for the accused. For example, the duty to obtain a search warrant 
has been viewed as an administrative rule in the past,27 even though house 
searches clearly involve a strong interference with the accused’s privacy inte-
rests. This demonstrates the ease of interpreting the category of rule (validity 
or administrative) to the detriment of the accused’s interests, and means the 
administrative rules lose their deterrent effect to an extent.28 
Part 5 (Articles 196–298d) determines the permissible coercive measures 
criminal justice authorities can resort to. Coercive measures are procedural 
actions of the criminal justice authorities which interfere with fundamen-
tal rights. They have multiple purposes, including: (a) to secure evidence 
ᄬƾƣƞƽơƩƣƾ ƺƤ ƻƽƣƸiƾƣƾ/ƽƣ ơƺƽƢƾ/ƻƣƽ ƾƺƹƾ, ƻƺƾƿ-ƸƺƽƿƣƸƾ, DNé ƞƹƞlǄƾiƾ, ƾƣi-
zure, covert surveillance of communication, of whereabouts and of banking 
connections, and undercover operations); (b) to ensure the presence of per-
sons in the proceedings (summons, arrest, detention on remand, bail) and 
(c) to ensure that the final decision can be enforced (seizure of assets, secu-
rity detention). Most of the coercive measures available under Part 5 can be 
ordered by the prosecution. Some measures that strongly interfere with fun-
damental rights have to be ordered by a judge at the “compulsory measures 
ơƺǀƽƿ”, Ƥƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, Ƣƣƿƣƹƿiƺƹ ƺƹ ƽƣƸƞƹƢ ƺƽ DNé Ƹƞƾƾ ƾơƽƣƣƹiƹƨ. dƺƸƣ Ƹƣƞ-
sures like surveillance of telecommunications or undercover operations must 
26 Mؔإؖ e؛آؠؠؘء/Mآ؝ؔء dؔؠؔؗ؜, The Bigger the Crime, the Smaller the Chance of a 
Fair Trial?, in European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 24 (2016), 
pp. 65, p. 65.
27 eƩƣ ơƺƹƾƣƼǀƣƹơƣƾ ƺƤ ǀƹlƞǂƤǀl ƾƣƞƽơƩƣƾ ƞƽƣ ơƺƹƿƽƺǁƣƽƾiƞlèᅬ ƿƩƣ ƣǁiƢƣƹơƣ ƿƩǀƾ ƺƟƿƞiƹƣƢ 
has also been viewed as fully usable, see Judgement of the Federal Supreme Court BGE 
ᇻᇸ I ᇶᇵᇹ ᄬǁƺƹ Däƹikƣƹ ǁƣƽƾǀƾ ƿƩƣ Cƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ GƽƞǀƟüƹƢƣƹᄭ.
28 For a comprehensive overview of the debate over the admissibility of evidence, see 
e؛آؠؠؘء/dؔؠؔؗ؜.
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ƞƿ lƣƞƾƿ Ɵƣ ƞƻƻƽƺǁƣƢ ƽƣƿƽƺƞơƿiǁƣlǄ ƟǄ ƾǀơƩ ƞ ơƺǀƽƿ. IƹƿƣƽƣƾƿiƹƨlǄ, ƿƩƣ ƾƣƞƽơƩ ƺƤ 
premises, a very intrusive measure, can be ordered by the prosecution alone 
without any need for court approval. The only explanation for this is that the 
power to order searches has traditionally belonged to the prosecution. The 
prosecutor can also order the freezing of assets without judicial approval. 
However, the accused and other persons affected by the freezing can take the 
order to court. 
The remaining parts of the Swiss Code of Criminal Procedure are less per-
tinent in the context of this chapter and as such will not be discussed in any 
depth. Part 6 ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇴᇻᇻᅬᇵᇴᇹᄭ ƾƣƿƾ ƺǀƿ ƿƩƣ ƽǀlƣƾ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƣliƸiƹƞƽǄ ƻƽƺ-
ceedings (police inquiries, opening and dropping prosecutorial investiga-
tion, charges). Part 7 ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇵᇴᇺᅬᇵᇷᇳᄭ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣƾ ƿƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻƞl ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ 
at first instance (examination of the charge, hearing, taking of the evidence, 
pleadings, judgement) and Part 8 ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇵᇷᇴᅬᇵᇹᇺᄭ ƾƻƣơiƤiƣƾ ƿƩƣ ƾƻƣơiƞl ƻƽƺ-
ceedings available (summary penalty order, abridged and in absentia procee-
dings, proceedings in cases of insanity, non-conviction-based confiscation 
proceedings). Part 9 ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇵᇹᇻᅬᇶᇳᇷᄭ ƾƣƿƾ ƺǀƿ ƿƩƣ lƣƨƞl ƽƣƸƣƢiƣƾ ƞǁƞilƞƟlƣ ƿƺ 
various parties (complaints, appeals, retrials). Part 10 ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇶᇳᇸᅬᇶᇵᇸᄭ ƽƣƨǀ-
lates the costs of the proceedings and compensation, while Part 11 (Articles 
ᇶᇵᇹᅬᇶᇶᇶᄭ ƾƣƿƾ ƺǀƿ ƿƩƣ ƽǀlƣƾ ƺƤ ƣƹƤƺƽơƣƸƣƹƿ. FiƹƞllǄ, Part 12 (Articles 445–457) 
is the provision on the implementation of the Code.
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II. aƽiƹơiƻlƣƾ
Criminal procedures in Switzerland are constrained by a set of principles laid 
out by the Swiss Code of Criminal Procedure. Firstly, the state has a monopoly 
on criminal justice (Article 2). Further, human dignity and fairness must be 
ƽƣƾƻƣơƿƣƢ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᄭ. CƽiƸiƹƞl jǀƾƿiơƣ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ ƞƽƣ iƹƢƣƻƣƹƢƣƹƿ ƞƹƢ ƺƹlǄ 
bound by the law (Article 4), and must investigate and proceed without undue 
delay (Article 5). According to the accusation principle, courts cannot start 
criminal proceedings themselves; charges have to be brought to them by the 
ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇻᄭ. Cƺǀƽƿƾ ƞƾƾƣƾƾ ƣǁiƢƣƹơƣ ƤƽƣƣlǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇲ IIᄭ, ƹƺƿ Ƥƺllƺ-
wing specific rules but their ‘conviction intime’.29 Court hearings are public 
ƞƹƢ ǁƣƽƢiơƿƾ Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ ƻƽƺƹƺǀƹơƣƢ ƻǀƟliơlǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇸᇻᄭ. Iƹ ƿƩƣ Ƥƺllƺǂiƹƨ ƻƞƽƞ-
graphs, three other fundamental principles will be examined. 
ᇳ. Eث Oؙؙ؜ؖ؜آ Iءةؘئا؜ؚؔا؜آء
The Swiss criminal justice system is traditionally viewed as possessing an 
inquisitorial structure.ᇵᇲ The criminal justice authorities, i.e. the prosecu-
tion and the courts, cannot rely on the facts presented to them by the parties 
but have to inquire into the “material” truth ex officio. They have to investi-
gate exculpatory and incriminatory circumstances with equal care (Article 
ᇸ IIᄭ. hƩƣƿƩƣƽ iƿ iƾ ƾǀiƿƞƟlƣ ƿƺ Ƣƣlƣƨƞƿƣ ƿƩƣ ƿƞƾk ƺƤ iƹǁƣƾƿiƨƞƿiƹƨ ƣǃơǀlƻƞƿƺƽǄ 
evidence to the prosecution, whose institutional duty is to obtain as many 
29 Defined as the judge’s “inner or personal conviction” in Kؔإ؜ؠ é.é. K؛ؔء/Cؔإآ؟؜ءؘ 
Bب؜ئؠؔء/C؛إ؜ئ Gآئءؘ؟؟, aƽiƹơiƻlƣƾ ƺƤ EǁiƢƣƹơƣ iƹ Iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞl CƽiƸiƹƞl Jǀƾƿiơƣ, 
OǃƤƺƽƢ ᇴᇲᇳᇲ, ƻ. ᇵᇸ.
ᇵᇲ Critical on the inquisitorial- accusatorial divide: dؔإؔ؛ J. dبؠؠؘإئ, Fair Trials: the 
European Criminal Procedural Tradition and the European Court of Human Rights, 
OǃƤƺƽƢ ᇴᇲᇲᇹ, ƻƻ. ᇳᇹᇻ, ƾ.ƞ. ƻƻ. ᇵ ᄬ“The Enduring legacy of the Inquisitorial/Accusatorial 
Divide”); detailed criticism by Jؔؖؤبؘ؟؜ءؘ Hآؚؗئآء, French Criminal Justice: a 
CƺƸƻƞƽƞƿiǁƣ éơơƺǀƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Iƹǁƣƾƿiƨƞƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ aƽƺƾƣơǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ CƽiƸƣ iƹ Fƽƞƹơƣ OǃƤƺƽƢ 
2005, p. 241 (“GƩƽƢƵ)ƻƨƢƺƢ)ơƩƣƣƢƹƢƵƻ)ƻƨƢƶƹƢƻƩƠƞƳ)ƷƹƶƠƢơƼƹƞƳ)ƠƶƵƺƻƹƼƠƻƩƶƵƺ … Ʃƻ)ƟƢƠƶƴƢƺ)ƴƶƹƢ)
difficult to speak of ‘the trial’ in a way that makes sense across jurisdictions.”).
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convictions as possible, is a highly debated issue. The courts, on the other 
hand, preside over the parties. They are in a much better position to weigh 
arguments for and against the accused’s guilt. The problem with this is that 
this role is not properly exercised until the case comes to court; by this point, 
the accused may already be at a disadvantage because of the “cherry- picking” 
of evidence by the prosecutor. Due to the inquisitorial structure of the pro-
ceedings, witnesses in the Swiss system are questioned by the President of 
the court: they are not subjected to cross examination by the parties. Another 
much debated issue is, of course, whether criminal proceedings can ever actu-
ally be expected to reveal the “whole truth”. Apart from the epistemological 
dilemma that there is no objective truth untainted by subjective interpreta-
tion, criminal proceedings are also practically ill- suited to find the truth: the 
defendant may remain silent or even lie,ᇵᇳ and the criminal justice authorities 
only have limited means and resources available to them in order to investi-
gate the material facts.
ᇴ. Mؔءؗؔاآإج Iءةؘئا؜ؚؔا؜آء
eƩƣ ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ kƹƺǂƹ ƺƽ ƾǀƾƻƣơƿƣƢ ơƽiƸiƹƞl ƞơƿƾ iƾ ƸƞƹƢƞƿƺƽǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇹᄭ. 
The rationale behind mandatory investigation is equality of treatment: no 
one shall escape criminal liability, regardless of personal characteristics or 
circumstances. However, there are certain minor offences that are prosecu-
ted only on complaint, e.g. acts of aggression (Article 126 Criminal Code), 
ơƺƸƸƺƹ ƞƾƾƞǀlƿ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇴᇵ I CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣᄭ, ƺƽ ơƽiƸiƹƞl ƢƞƸƞƨƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ 
ᇳᇶᇶ I CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣᄭ. é ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿiƺƹ ƺƹlǄ ƿƞkƣƾ ƻlƞơƣ, iƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƣƽƾƺƹ ǂƩƺ ǂƞƾ 
harmed requests that the person responsible be prosecuted by filing a comp-
lƞiƹƿ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇲ I CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣᄭ. fƹlƣƾƾ ƺƿƩƣƽǂiƾƣ iƹƢiơƞƿƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ dƻƣơiƤiơ 
Part of the Criminal Code, all offences are prosecuted ex officio. 
Iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ ƺƹlǄ ǁƣƽǄ liƸiƿƣƢ ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿƺƽiƞl Ƣiƾơƽƣƿiƺƹ ƿƺ ƹƺƿ 
open an investigation or drop charges (Article 8). Prosecution can be discon-
tinued if defendants have already been severely affected by their actsᇵᇴ for 
example, this was the case where a defendant’s careless driving resulted in 
ᇵᇳ That an accused person may lie to the criminal justice authorities is not entirely uncon-
tested. Some authors suggest that in principle there is a right to lie; however this is lim-
iƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ơƽiƸiƹƞl ƻƽƺƩiƟiƿiƺƹƾ ƺƹ Ƥƞlƾƣ ƞơơǀƾƞƿiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇲᇵ CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣᄭ. 
ᇵᇴ Article 54 Criminal Code: “Effect on the offender of his act - If the offender is so seriously 
affected by the immediate consequences of his act that a penalty would be inappropriate, 
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the death of her husband and grave injuries to her children.ᇵᇵ Charges can 
also be dropped if reparations are made to the victim for any losses.ᇵᇶ This 
exception is problematic because it conflicts with the equality of treatment 
rationale behind mandatory investigation: by allowing charges to be drop-
ped where reparations have been made, Switzerland makes an exception to 
criminal liability that is available only to those wealthy enough to properly 
compensate victims. 
Another part of the rationale behind obliging the prosecutor to pursue all 
charges was a concern to limit the arbitrational powers of the prosecution. 
This lack of prosecutorial discretion seems to leave very little room for plea 
bargaining. Prosecutors can, however, offer leniency in sentencing in exch-
ange for, for example, a confession.ᇵᇷ Such deals are often struck in abridged 
ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇵᇷᇺ ƣƿ ƾƣƼƼ.ᄭ. 
Of course, even though the prosecution is legally bound to investigate all 
crimes brought to their attention they can, de facto, refrain from opening an 
investigation. This is particularly possible in cases with no immediate victim 
party to the proceedings (for example, eco- crimes or drug- selling) as there is 
no one to contest the abandonment of the investigation.
ᇵ. Nؘؠآ eؘءؘابإ ئؘ Iأئبؠ Aؖؖبئؔإؘ
Nƺ Ƹƞƹ iƾ ƟƺǀƹƢ ƿƺ ƞơơǀƾƣ ƩiƸƾƣlƤ. eƩiƾ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ iƾ ƣƹƾƩƽiƹƣƢ iƹ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇳᇵèI. 
Iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, ƿƩƣ ƻƽiǁilƣƨƣ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ ƾƣlƤ- iƹơƽiƸiƹƞƿiƺƹ ƣƹơƺƸƻƞƾƾƣƾ ƹƺƿ ƺƹlǄ 
a right to remain silent but also a right to refuse to co- operate with the crimi-
nal justice authorities. The accused cannot be obliged to actively hand over 
iƿƣƸƾ ƺƽ ƞƾƾƣƿƾ ǂƩiơƩ ƞƽƣ ƢƣƸƞƹƢƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇴᇸᇷ II liƿ.èƞᄭ. 
However, this does not give the accused the right to resist legal coercive mea-
sures. Thus, he or she must allow the criminal justice authorities to seize such 
the responsible authorities shall refrain from prosecuting him, bringing him to court or 
punishing him.”
ᇵᇵ BGE ᇳᇳᇻ Ig ᇴᇺᇲ.
ᇵᇶ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇷᇵ CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣ: “Reparation; If the offender has made reparation for the loss, 
damage or injury or made every reasonable effort to right the wrong that he has caused, 
the competent authority shall refrain from prosecuting him, bringing him to court or pun-
ishing him if: a. the requirements for a suspended sentence (Art. 42) are fulfilled; and b. the 
interests of the general public and of the persons harmed in prosecution are negligible.”
ᇵᇷ A confession as to the facts suffices; there need not be a guilty plea in the strict sense of 
the term, i.e. a declaration of one’s own guilt.
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items or assets themselves. Obviously, the accused is protected from being 
forcefully coerced (for example, through torture) to provide evidence or to 
ơƺƹƤƣƾƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇶᇲ Iᄭ. Oƹƣ ƞƽƣƞ ǂƩƣƽƣ ƿƩƣ ƹƣƸƺ- ƿƣƹƣƿǀƽ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ iƾ iƹ ƾƣǁƣƽƣ 
need of further implementation is in the auxiliary criminal law. For example, 
in Switzerland, citizens were under a legal obligation (backed up by fines) 
ƿƺ ơƺƺƻƣƽƞƿƣ iƹ ƿƞǃ ƣǁƞƾiƺƹ ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ. Iƹ J.B. ǁ. dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, ƿƩƣ ƞƻƻliơƞƹƿ 
had been fined CHF 4’000 under the administrative law for failing to provide 
information about his taxes. The European Court of Human Rights ruled that 
this provision violated the applicant’s right not to incriminate himself.ᇵᇸ Since 
this ruling, Switzerland has officially modified its tax legislation to align with 
the European Court of Human Rights case law.ᇵᇹ
ᇵᇸ J.B. ǁ. dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ éƻƻ ƹƺ ᇵᇳᇺᇴᇹ/ᇻᇸ, ECƿHc, ᇵ MƞǄ ᇴᇲᇲᇳ, ƞƿ ƻƞƽƞƨƽƞƻƩƾ ᇸᇵ ƣƿ ƾƣƼƼ. 
ᇵᇹ The new provision is Article 57a of the Tax Harmonisation Act of 14 December 1990, 
dcèᇸᇶᇴ.ᇳᇶ.
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III. Iƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƾ ƞƹƢ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ
The criminal justice institutions and procedure can best be understood when 
following the course of a standard case. A case involving a pensioner, a farmer 
and a herd of cows will be discussed to shine light on how the procedural 
rules actually work in practice. Following this, the extent to which the Swiss 
criminal procedural rules comply with requirements set by the Constitution 
and the ECHR will be examined, focusing on three key problem areas in this 
regard. 
On 17 June 2014, a farmer in the eastern Swiss mountains drove his cattle 
herd down from his alp. As he had done several times before, he passed in 
front of pensioner X’s house. The cows ate X’s grass and lavender and trampled 
over the meticulously groomed flowers. X, enraged, retrieved his revolver, 
aimed it at the cows and threatened to shoot them. 
On the same day, the farmer filed a complaint at the local police station. 
Whilst doing so, he himself was questioned by the police. The farmer’s filing 
ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƺƸƻlƞiƹƿ ƿƽiƨƨƣƽƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƣliƸiƹƞƽǄ ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇵᇲᇵᄭ. eƩƣ ƻƽƣ-
liminary proceedings are divided up into two stages:ᇵᇺ the police inquiries 
and the investigation by the prosecutor (Article 299). The preliminary pro-
ceedings are led overall by the prosecution (Article 61 lit. a). The police are 
ƾǀƟjƣơƿ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƾǀƻƣƽǁiƾiƺƹ ƞƹƢ iƹƾƿƽǀơƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿƺƽ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇷ IIᄭ. 
From the moment the complaint was filed by the farmer, X became “the accu-
sed” (Article 111). Through the filing of a complaint, the farmer automatically 
ƞơƼǀiƽƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƾƿƞƿǀƾ ƺƤ ƞ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ơlƞiƸƞƹƿ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇳᇺ IIᄭ. 
On the day after the incident, the prosecutor ordered a search of X’s house, 
ǂƩiơƩ lƣƢ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƾƣiǅǀƽƣ ƺƤ ƾƣǁƣƽƞl ƤiƽƣƞƽƸƾ ƞƹƢ ƞ Ɵƺǃ ƺƤ ƞƸƸǀƹiƿiƺƹ. Iƿ 
was during this search that X learned that a preliminary investigation had 
Ɵƣƣƹ ƺƻƣƹƣƢ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ ƩiƸ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇲᇻᄭ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƽƣƞƿƣƹiƹƨ ƟƣƩƞǁiƺǀƽ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ 
ᇳᇺᇲ CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣᄭ ƞƹƢ illƣƨƞl Ɵƣƞƽiƹƨ ƺƤ ƞ ǂƣƞƻƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇵ I liƿ. ƞ FƣƢƣƽƞl 
Weapons Act).ᇵᇻ i ǂƞƾ iƹƿƣƽƽƺƨƞƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƻƺliơƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇲᇹ II ƞƹƢ éƽƿiơlƣ 
ᇵᇺ See Figure 2, p. 404.
ᇵᇻ Federal Act on Weapons, Weapon Equipment and Ammunition of 20 June 1997 (Federal 
Weapons Act), SR 514.54.
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ᇵᇳᇴ Iᄭèᅬ Ʃƣ ƢƣƹiƣƢ ƿƩƣ ǀƾƣ ƺƤ ƞ ƤiƽƣƞƽƸ. Hƣ ơƺǀlƢ Ʃƞǁƣ ƽƣƼǀƣƾƿƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƞ lƣƨƞl- 
aid defence counsel be appointed, if he had lacked the necessary finances 
to provide his own. However, a counsel would most probably not have been 
ƞƻƻƺiƹƿƣƢ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩiƾ ơƞƾƣ, ƞƾ iƿ ǂƞƾ ƞ ƿƽiǁiƞl ƺƹƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇵᇴᄭ. Iƹ ƾƣƽiƺǀƾ ơƞƾƣƾ, Ƥƺƽ 
example when the accused is facing a prison sentence of more than one year, 
a defence counsel must be appointed, even against the accused’s will (Article 
ᇳᇵᇲᄭ. Iƹ ƺǀƽ ơƞƾƣ, i ơƺǀlƢ ƞƿ ƞƹǄ ƿiƸƣ Ʃƞǁƣ ƩiƽƣƢ ƞ ƢƣƤƣƹơƣ ơƺǀƹƾƣl ƩiƸƾƣlƤ ƞƹƢ 
iƹƾiƾƿƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ Ʃƣ ƺƽ ƾƩƣ Ɵƣ ƻƽƣƾƣƹƿ ƤƽƺƸ ƿƩƣ Ƥiƽƾƿ ƻƺliơƣ iƹƼǀiƽǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇷᇻ IIᄭ.40 
eƩƣ ǂƽiƿƿƣƹ ƽƣơƺƽƢƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ iƹƼǀiƽǄ ǂƣƽƣ ƩƞƹƢƣƢ ƺǁƣƽ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿƺƽ. IƤ 
the prosecutor had thought it necessary, he could then have interrogated the 
accused: this decision is entirely within the prosecutor’s discretion. During all 
interrogations the private claimant and his legal adviser could have participa-
ted both purely in presence and more actively by asking questions (Article 147 
I ƞƹƢ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇳᇴ IIᄭ. EƼǀƞllǄ, ƿƩƣ ƞơơǀƾƣƢ ƞƹƢ Ʃiƾ ơƺǀƹƾƣl ơƺǀlƢ Ʃƞǁƣ ƞƾƾiƾƿƣƢ 
in the prosecution’s interrogation of the private claimant and requested that 
additional questions be posed to him. 
When the prosecution considered the investigation to be complete, it had 
three possibilities: (1) to discontinue the proceedings and close the case, (2) 
ƿƺ Ɵƽiƹƨ ơƩƞƽƨƣƾ ƺƽ ᄬᇵᄭè ƿƺ iƾƾǀƣ ƞ ƾǀƸƸƞƽǄ ƻƣƹƞlƿǄ ƺƽƢƣƽ. Iƹ ƞƻƻƽƺǃiƸƞƿƣlǄ 
90 % of all cases that are not closed, the prosecution issues a penalty order. 
This is a judgment drafted by the prosecutor with a maximum sentence of six 
ƸƺƹƿƩƾ ƺƤ iƸƻƽiƾƺƹƸƣƹƿ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇷᇴᄭ. Iƿ ơƺƹƿƞiƹƾ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿƺƽ’ƾ ƾǀƸƸƞƽǄ 
ƞƾƾƣƾƾƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Ƥƞơƿƾ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣiƽ lƣƨƞl iƹƿƣƽƻƽƣƿƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƾiƿǀƞƿiƺƹ. Iƹ Ƥƞơƿ, 
if the defendant confesses to the police or if there is sufficient “objective” evi-
Ƣƣƹơƣ, ƿƩƣƽƣ ƹƣƣƢ ƹƺƿ Ɵƣ ƞƹǄ ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿƺƽiƞl iƹǁƣƾƿiƨƞƿiƺƹ ƞƿ ƞll ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇲᇻ 
Igᄭ. Oƹ ᇻèdƣƻƿƣƸƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇳᇶ, ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿiƺƹ ƾƣƽǁƣƢ iƿƾ ƻƣƹƞlƿǄ ƺƽƢƣƽ ƿƺ i. Hƣ 
was found guilty of threatening behaviour and illegal bearing of a weapon 
ƞƹƢ ƾƣƹƿƣƹơƣƢ ƿƺ ᇻᇲ ǀƹiƿƾ ƺƤ ƸƺƹƣƿƞƽǄ ƻƣƹƞlƿǄ ƞƿ CHF ᇵᇷᇲ.ᅬ ƣƞơƩ. eƩƣ ƻƣƹƞlƿǄ 
was suspended with a probation period of two years. Further, he was senten-
ced to an unconditional fine of CHF 1’000–. The weapon was confiscated and 
the costs of the proceedings were imposed on X.
Once the penalty order was issued, X had the choice to either accept it or to 
Ƥilƣ ƞƹ ƺƟjƣơƿiƺƹ ǂiƿƩiƹ ƿƣƹ ƢƞǄƾ. HƞƢ i ƞơơƣƻƿƣƢèᅬ ƞƾ ƞƟƺǀƿ ᇻᇲ % ƺƤ ƞll ƞơơǀ-
ƾƣƢ ƻƣƽƾƺƹƾ Ƣƺèᅬ ƿƩƣ ƻƣƹƞlƿǄ ƺƽƢƣƽ ǂƺǀlƢ Ʃƞǁƣ ơƺƸƣ iƹƿƺ Ƥƺƽơƣ ƞƾ ƞ ơƺƹǁiơƿiƺƹ, 
40 Nƺƿƣ ƿƩƞƿ ECƿHc ơƞƾƣ- lƞǂ ƾƿiƻǀlƞƿƣƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƞƾ ƞ ƽǀlƣ, lƣƨƞl ƞƾƾiƾƿƞƹơƣ Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ ƻƽƺǁiƢƣƢ 
from the moment the suspect is taken into custody “and not only while being questioned” 
ᄬDƞǄƞƹƞƹ ǁ. eǀƽkƣǄ, éƻƻ ƹƺ ᇹᇵᇹᇹ/ᇲᇵ, ECƿHc, ᇳᇵ OơƿƺƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇲᇻ, ƻƞƽƞƨƽƞƻƩ ᇵᇴᄭ.
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ǂiƿƩƺǀƿ ƞƹǄ jǀƢiơiƞl ƻƞƽƿiơiƻƞƿiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇷᇶ IIIᄭ. Oƹ ᇳᇷ dƣƻƿƣƸƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇳᇶ, 
however, X objected. When an objection is filed the prosecutor hears the 
ƞơơǀƾƣƢ ƩiƸƾƣlƤ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇷᇷ Iᄭ. Iƹ ƸƞƹǄ ơƞƾƣƾ, ƿƩiƾ iƾ ƿƩƣ Ƥiƽƾƿ ƿiƸƣ ƿƩƣ ƞơơǀ-
sed deals with the prosecutor in person. On 1 October 2014, X was questioned 
by the prosecutor in the presence of the farmer (the private claimant). 
The prosecutor then has to choose between upholding the penalty order, 
iƾƾǀiƹƨ ƞ ƹƣǂ ƺƹƣ, ơlƺƾiƹƨ ƿƩƣ iƹǁƣƾƿiƨƞƿiƺƹ ƺƽ Ɵƽiƹƨiƹƨ ơƩƞƽƨƣƾ. Iƹ ƺǀƽ ơƞƾƣ 
the prosecutor decided to uphold the penalty order. On 14 October 2014, he 
transferred the case to court. The penalty order thus constituted the indict-
Ƹƣƹƿ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇷᇸ Iᄭ. 
With the indictment, the preliminary proceedings against X came to an 
ƣƹƢ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇳᇺ Iᄭ. eƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻƞl ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ ƞƿ ƿƩƣ ơƺǀƽƿ ƺƤ Ƥiƽƾƿ iƹƾƿƞƹơƣ 
were commenced. From that point onwards the court was in charge of the 
ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇴᇺ IIᄭ. eƩƣ ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿiƺƹ ƟƣơƞƸƣ ƞ Ƹƣƽƣ ƻƞƽƿǄ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ơƞƾƣ 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇲᇶ I liƿ. ơᄭ. eƩƣ ơƺǀƽƿ ƣǃƞƸiƹƣƢ ƞƹƢ ƞƢƸiƿƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ ơƩƞƽƨƣƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇴᇻ 
Iᄭ ƞƹƢ ƾơƩƣƢǀlƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻƞl Ʃƣƞƽiƹƨ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇵᇳᄭ. éƿ ƞƹǄ ƻƺiƹƿ, ƿƩƣ ơƺǀƽƿ 
ơƺǀlƢ Ʃƞǁƣ ƞƾkƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿiƺƹ ƿƺ ƸƺƢiƤǄ ƺƽ ƞƸƣƹƢ ƿƩƣ ơƩƞƽƨƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇵᇵ 
Iᄭ. FƽƺƸ ᇳᇷ OơƿƺƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇳᇶ, i ǂƞƾ ƨiǁƣƹ ƞơơƣƾƾ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ Ƥilƣ Ƥƺƽ ƿƣƹ ơƺƹƾƣơǀƿiǁƣ 
days. Both parties may then request that more evidence is taken, for example 
they may request that a particular witness be heard. The presiding judge deci-
Ƣƣƾ ǂƩƣƿƩƣƽ ƿƺ ƨƽƞƹƿ ƿƩiƾ ƽƣƼǀƣƾƿ. é ƽƣƤǀƾƞl ơƞƹƹƺƿ Ɵƣ ơƩƞllƣƹƨƣƢ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇵᇳᄭ. 
Oƹ ᇴᇹ NƺǁƣƸƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇳᇶ, i ƤilƣƢ ƞ Ƹƺƿiƺƹ ƿƺ ƿƞkƣ ƞƢƢiƿiƺƹƞl ƣǁiƢƣƹơƣ. eƩƣ ơƺǀƽƿ 
turned down this request, anticipating that this would not affect their con-
clusion on whether or not the revolver had been used, thereby engaging in an 
anticipated assessment of evidence.41 
Cƺǀƽƿƾ ƺƤ Ƥiƽƾƿ iƹƾƿƞƹơƣ ƞƽƣ ǀƾǀƞllǄ ơƺƸƻƺƾƣƢ ƺƤ ƿƩƽƣƣ jǀƢƨƣƾ ƞƹƢ ƞ ơlƣƽk. IƤ 
ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿiƺƹ ƞƻƻliƣƾ Ƥƺƽ lƣƾƾ ƿƩƞƹ ƿǂƺ Ǆƣƞƽƾ ƺƤ iƸƻƽiƾƺƹƸƣƹƿèᅬ ƞƾ ƺơơǀƽƽƣƢ 
iƹ ƿƩiƾ ơƞƾƣ ƞƹƢ Ƹƺƾƿ ơƞƾƣƾ iƹ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣèᅬ ƿƩƣƹ ƿƩƣ ơƞƾƣ ƸƞǄ Ɵƣ ƩƣƞƽƢ ƟǄ ƺƹlǄ 
ƺƹƣ jǀƢƨƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇻ IIᄭ. éƾ ƸƣƹƿiƺƹƣƢ, ƤƣƢƣƽƞl lƞǂ Ƣƺƣƾ ƹƺƿ ƻƽƺǁiƢƣ Ƥƺƽ jǀƽǄ 
trials, meaning trial by jury is a very rare occurrence in Switzerland. X’s case 
was assigned to Judge Fإؘؘؗإ؜؞ Mü؟؟ؘإ, district court of Toggenburg. 
The principal hearing took place on 14 January 2015. X was joined by his 
ƢƣƤƣƹơƣ ơƺǀƹƾƣl ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇵᇸᄭ. eƩƣ ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿiƺƹ Ʃƞƾ ƿƺ ƞƻƻƣƞƽ ƞƿ ơƺǀƽƿ iƤ iƿ Ʃƞƾ 
requested a prison sentence of more than one year or if the court orders its 
41 See Judgment of the Federal Supreme Court 6B_495/2016 of 16 February 2017, consider-
ƞƿiƺƹ ᇳ.ᇵ.ᇵ.
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ƻƞƽƿiơiƻƞƿiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇵᇹᄭ. eƩƣ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ơlƞiƸƞƹƿ ƸƞǄ Ɵƣ ƺƽƢƣƽƣƢ ƿƺ ƞƻƻƣƞƽ ƞƿ 
ƿƩƣ Ƹƞiƹ Ʃƣƞƽiƹƨƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇵᇺᄭ. Iƹ i’ƾ ơƞƾƣ, ƟƺƿƩ ǂƣƽƣ ƺƽƢƣƽƣƢ ƿƺ ƞƻƻƣƞƽ ƞƿ 
court. The court hearing was public (Article 69). 
At court, it is only mandatory for the judge to interrogate the accused 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇶᇳ IIIᄭ. aƽiǁƞƿƣ ơlƞiƸƞƹƿƾ, ǂiƿƹƣƾƾƣƾ ƞƹƢ ƣǃƻƣƽƿƾ ƸƞǄ Ɵƣ ƩƣƞƽƢèᅬ ƿƩiƾ 
ǂill ƺơơǀƽ ƞƿ ƿƩƣ jǀƢƨƣ’ƾ Ƣiƾơƽƣƿiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇶᇵᄭ. Fƺƽ ƞll Ƥƺǀƽ ƺƤ ƿƩƣƸ, ƿƩƣ ơƺǀƽƿ 
relies heavily on the written records of their prior interrogations conducted 
ƿƩƣ ƻƽƣliƸiƹƞƽǄ ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇶᇵᄭ. eƩƣƾƣ ƾƿƞƿƣƸƣƹƿƾ Ƣƺ ƹƺƿ Ʃƞǁƣ ƿƺ Ɵƣ 
repeated at court. The hearings are conducted by the president of the court 
ƺƽ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ jǀƢƨƣ iƹ ơƩƞƽƨƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇶᇳ Iᄭ. Hƣƹơƣ, ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ ƹƺ ơƽƺƾƾ- ƣǃƞƸiƹƞƿiƺƹ 
by the parties. The parties can submit additional questions to the president, 
who then decides whether or not to pose this question to the person inter-
ƽƺƨƞƿƣƢ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇶᇳ IIᄭ. éƤƿƣƽ ƿƩƣ ƿƞkiƹƨ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƣǁiƢƣƹơƣ, ƿƩƣ ƻƞƽƿiƣƾ ƻlƣƞƢ iƹ 
the following order: prosecution, private claimant, the accused or his or her 
ƢƣƤƣƹơƣ ơƺǀƹƾƣl ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇶᇸᄭ. eƩƣ ƞơơǀƾƣƢ ƞlǂƞǄƾ Ʃƞƾ ƿƩƣ lƞƾƿ ǂƺƽƢ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ 
ᇵᇶᇹᄭ, ƣƹƾǀƽiƹƨ Ʃƣ ƺƽ ƾƩƣ iƾ ƞƟlƣ ƿƺ ƤǀllǄ ƽƣƾƻƺƹƢ ƿƺ ƞll ƞơơǀƾƞƿiƺƹƾ ǂƩiơƩ Ʃƞǁƣ 
been levelled against him or her. 
After the hearings, the court retires to deliberate in private. The clerk 
ƻƞƽƿiơiƻƞƿƣƾ ƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƢƣliƟƣƽƞƿiƺƹƾ ƞƾ ƞƹ ƞƢǁiƾƣƽ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇶᇺᄭ. eƩƣ ơƺǀƽƿ Ʃƞƾ 
to reach its verdict by a simple majority in cases involving a panel of judges 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇵᇷᇳᄭ. aƞƹƣlƾ ƺƤ jǀƢƨƣƾ ơƞƹ ơƺƹƾiƾƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƽƣƣ ƺƽ Ƥiǁƣ ƸƣƸƟƣƽƾ. OƹlǄ ƞ 
few cantons allow judges who disagreed with the verdict to write a dissenting 
opinion.42 Iƹ ơƞƾƣƾ ǂƩƣƽƣ ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ ƞƹ ƞơƼǀiƿƿƞl, ƿƩƣ ơƺǀƽƿ ƨƽƞƹƿƾ ƿƩƣ ƞơƼǀiƿƿƣƢ 
person compensation and reparation, which is done by the court ex officio 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇶᇴᇻᄭ. Iƹ ơƞƾƣƾ ǂƩƣƽƣ ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ ƞ ơƺƹǁiơƿiƺƹ, ƿƩƣ ơƺǀƽƿ ƢƣƿƣƽƸiƹƣƾ ƿƩƣ 
sanction (penalty and/or measure)ᇶᇵ and imposes the costs of the proceedings 
ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹǁiơƿƣƢ ƻƣƽƾƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇶᇴᇸᄭ. Iƹ ƿƩƣ ơƞƾƣ ƺƤ i, JǀƢƨƣ Mü؟؟ؘإ rea-
ched his verdict on the day of the hearing. X was found guilty of threatening 
behaviour and illegal bearing of a weapon. He was sentenced to 40 units of 
ƸƺƹƣƿƞƽǄ ƻƣƹƞlƿǄ ƞƿ CHF ᇵᇷᇲ.ᅭƣƞơƩ. eƩƣ ƻƣƹƞlƿǄ ǂƞƾ ƾǀƾƻƣƹƢƣƢ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ 
probation period set at two years. X’s revolver and ammunition were confisca-
ƿƣƢ. eƩƣ ơƺƾƿƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ ᄬCHF ᇵ’ᇳᇷᇲ.ᅬᄭ ǂƣƽƣ iƸƻƺƾƣƢ ƺƹ i. 
Judge Mü؟؟ؘإ delivered his verdict publicly, giving his reasons in a brief oral 
statement (Article 84). Written reasoning of the judgment has to be provided 
42 dƣƣ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇵᇶ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ gƞǀƢ.
ᇶᇵ For this dual system of sanctions see Chapter Criminal Law, pp. ᇵᇹᇹ.
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if a sentence of more than two years has been imposed, if a party requests it, 
or if a party lodges an appeal (Article 82). X appealed his conviction. Hence, 
written reasons had to be provided. 
eƩƣ jǀƢƨƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ Ƥiƽƾƿ iƹƾƿƞƹơƣ ơƞƹ Ɵƣ ƞƻƻƣƞlƣƢ ƟǄ ƞll ƻƞƽƿiƣƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇵᇺᇳ ƣƿ 
ƾƣƼƼ.ᄭ. Oƹ ᇳᇸ JƞƹǀƞƽǄ ᇴᇲᇳᇷ, i lƺƢƨƣƢ Ʃiƾ ƞƻƻƣƞl. eƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ơƺǀƽƿ ƺƤ dƿ.èGƞllƣƹ 
turned it down on 8 January 2016. X then took the appellate judgment to the 
Federal Supreme Court in Lausanne (Articles 78 et seqq. Federal Supreme 
Court Act).44 The Supreme Court decided that the cantonal court had applied 
the Criminal Code correctly. X’s property rights were infringed by the farmer. 
X was thus in a situation of necessity (Article 18 Criminal Code). However, 
the use of his revolver had been wholly disproportionate and therefore the 
justification of necessity did not apply. The Supreme Court further ruled that 
the anticipated assessment of the evidence had not been arbitrary. Thus, the 
ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ơƺǀƽƿ ƩƞƢ ƹƺƿ ǁiƺlƞƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ. Iƿ ƽƣjƣơƿƣƢ i’ƾ ơƺƸƻlƞiƹƿ ƺƹ 
16 February 2017. The judgment of the cantonal court was upheld. 
Most provisions of the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code are in line with the 
Constitution and the ECHR. Some individual provisions, however, need to be 
reconsidered. 
FiƽƾƿlǄ, ƿƩƣ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣ ƺƤèƞƹƿiơiƻƞƿƣƢ ƞƾƾƣƾƾƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƣǁiƢƣƹơƣ iƾ ƻƽƺƟlƣƸƞƿiơ. Iƿ 
allows prosecutors to adhere to the police’s assessment of the facts and courts 
to take the prosecutor’s stand without the accused ever having a real chance 
to “tell his side of the story”, or have any substantial involvement in the pro-
cess.45 This state of affairs violates the right of the accused to be heard. 
A second problem is the fact that courts are currently not strictly bound by 
ƿƩƣ ơƩƞƽƨƣƾ ƟƽƺǀƨƩƿ ƿƺ ƿƩƣƸ. IƹƾƿƣƞƢ, ƿƩƣǄ ơƞƹ ƞƿ ƞƹǄ ƿiƸƣ ƞƾk ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿƺƽ 
to amend or change the indictment. This is problematic in terms of the sepa-
ration of the investigative and adjudicative powers;46 the court interferes with 
the investigative stage when they engage in this practice. Further, this power 
works to the detriment of the defence, for while the prosecutors are provided 
with an opportunity to amend a poor indictment, the defence does not get a 
second chance to amend poor pleadings. 
The third and possibly the most persistent problem is that of the summary 
penalty order proceedings. Although defendants can de iure take their order 
44 FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ éơƿ ƺƤ ᇳᇹ Jǀƹƣ ᇴᇲᇲᇷ, dc ᇳᇹᇵ.ᇳᇳᇲ. 
45 For the associated problems of this state of affairs, see pp. 404.
46 eƩƣ iƹƢƣƻƣƹƢƣƹơƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ jǀƢiơiƞƽǄ iƾ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣƢ iƹ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇲ I Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ: “Any person 
whose case falls to be judicially decided has the right to have their case heard by a legally 
constituted, competent, independent and impartial court.”
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to court, in over 90 % of all cases they are de facto adjudicated by prosecu-
tors. Therefore, it should be mandatory for the prosecution to interrogate the 
accused in person before issuing a penal order. Currently, prosecutors are not 
even bound to open an investigation; they can issue a penalty order solely on 
ƿƩƣ Ɵƞƾiƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƺliơƣ ƽƣơƺƽƢ ƞƹƢ Ʃƞǁƣ iƿ ƾƣƽǁƣƢ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƞơơǀƾƣƢ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇲᇻ 
Igᄭ. Iƹ ƾǀơƩ ƞ ơƞƾƣ, iƿ iƾ ƹƺƿ ƨǀƞƽƞƹƿƣƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƞƢƢƽƣƾƾƣƣ lƣƞƽƹƾ ƞƟƺǀƿ Ʃiƾ ƺƽ 
her conviction or properly understands its dimensions. This is problematic in 
ƿƣƽƸƾ ƺƤ ECHc ơƺƸƻliƞƹơƣ. éƽƿiơlƣ ᇸ III liƿ. ƞ ECHc ƽƣƼǀiƽƣƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƞơơǀ-
sed be “ƩƵƣƶƹƴƢơ)ƷƹƶƴƷƻƳǀ … ƶƣ)ƻƨƢ)ƵƞƻƼƹƢ)ƞƵơ)ƠƞƼƺƢ)ƶƣ)ƻƨƢ)ƞƠƠƼƺƞƻƩƶƵ)ƞƧƞƩƵƺƻ)
him.”è47 Penalty orders are not explained to the accused in plain terms, nor are 
ƿƩƣǄ ƣǁƣƽ ƿƽƞƹƾlƞƿƣƢ. eƩiƾ lƞƿƿƣƽ iƾƾǀƣ ơlƣƞƽlǄ ǁiƺlƞƿƣƾ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇸ III liƿ. ƣ ECHc, 
which provides that everyone charged with a criminal offence must “have the 
free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the langu-
age used in court.”48 
A more fundamental concern about the summary penalty order must also 
be addressed. The overwhelming majority of all convictions are now handed 
down by prosecutors under the summary penalty order procedure: thus, Swiss 
criminal procedure needs a general overhaul. The procedural principles dis-
cussed above were all drawn up with the principal court proceedings in mind, 
and thus were not properly tailored to apply to special proceedings. However, 
today, the summary penalty order proceedings are no longer “special pro-
ceedings”:49 instead, they have become the true “principal proceedings”.50 
Therefore, Switzerland’s principles of modern criminal procedure should now 
be tailored to better address these summary proceedings, to ensure that the 
rights of the accused are always properly respected.
47 Iƹ ƿƩiƾ ƽƣƾƻƣơƿ, ƿƩƣ iƹƤƺƽƸƞƿiƺƹ Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ ƞơƿǀƞllǄ ƽƣơƣiǁƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƞơơǀƾƣƢ; ƞ lƣƨƞl ƻƽƣ-
ƾǀƸƻƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƽƣơƣiƻƿ iƾ iƹƾǀƤƤiơiƣƹƿ ᄬC ǁ. IƿƞlǄ, éƻƻ ƹƺ ᇳᇲᇺᇺᇻ/ᇺᇶ, ᇷᇸ Dc ᇶᇲᄭ. Iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ 
ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ iƹ Ƥƞơƿ ƞ ǁƣƽǄ ƟƽƺƞƢ ƻƽƣƾǀƸƻƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƾƣƽǁiơƣ. éƽƿiơlƣ ᇺᇺ Ig ƾƿƞƿƣƾ: “Decisions to take 
no proceedings and summary penalty orders are deemed to be served without publication 
being required.”
48 The ECHR provisions on the right to a fair trial are also applicable to the pre- trial pro-
ceedings; “CƢƹƻƞƩƵƳǀ) ƻƨƢ)ƷƹƩƴƞƹǀ)ƷƼƹƷƶƺƢ)ƶƣ)AƹƻƩƠƳƢ)6 … Ʃƺ) ƻƶ) ƢƵƺƼƹƢ)ƞ) ƣƞƩƹ) ƻƹƩƞƳ)Ɵǀ)ƞ) ‘ƻƹƩ-
ƟƼƵƞƳ’ … ƟƼƻ) Ʃƻ)ơƶƢƺ)Ƶƶƻ) ƣƶƳƳƶƾ)ƻƨƞƻ)AƹƻƩƠƳƢ)6)ƨƞƺ)Ƶƶ)ƞƷƷƳƩƠƞƻƩƶƵ) ƻƶ)ƷƹƢ-)ƻƹƩƞƳ)ƷƹƶƠƢƢơƩƵƧƺ” 
ᄬIƸƟƽiƺƾơiƞ ǁ. dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, éƻƻ ƹƺ ᇳᇵᇻᇹᇴ/ᇺᇺ, ECƿHc ᇴᇶ NƺǁƣƸƟƣƽᇳᇻᇻᇵ, ƻƞƽƞƨƽƞƻƩ ᇵᇸ; 
aiƾƞƹƺ ǁ. IƿƞlǄ, éƻƻ Nƺ ᇵᇸᇹᇵᇴ/ᇻᇹ, ECƿHc, ᇴᇹ JǀlǄ ᇴᇲᇲᇲ, ƻƞƽƞƨƽƞƻƩ ᇴᇹ; ƢiƤƤ. eإؘؖ؛ئؘ؟/
dبؠؠؘإئ, ƻ. ᇵᇳ.
49 dƣƣ ƿiƿlƣ ƺƤ aƞƽƿ ᇺ, éƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇵᇷᇴ ƣƿ ƾƣƼƼ., ᄬ“Part 8 Special Procedures, Chapter 1 Summary 
Penalty Order Procedure, Contravention Procedure”).
50 dƣƣ ƿiƿlƣ ƺƤ aƞƽƿ ᇹ, éƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇵᇴᇺ ƣƿ ƾƣƼƼ., ᄬ“Title 7 Main Proceedings of First Instance”). 
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Ig. LƞƹƢƸƞƽk Cƞƾƣƾ
eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ iƹ Lƞǀƾƞƹƹƣ iƾ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ’ƾ ƩiƨƩƣƾƿ ơƺǀƽƿ. Iƿƾ ƽƺlƣ 
in the field of criminal procedure has shifted considerably since the enact-
ment of the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure in 2011. Before, the Supreme 
Cƺǀƽƿ ƩƞƢ jǀƽiƾƢiơƿiƺƹ ƺǁƣƽ ᇴᇸ ƢiƤƤƣƽƣƹƿ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ơƺƢƣƾ. Iƿƾ Ƹƞiƹ ƿƞƾk ǂƞƾ ƿƺ 
set up common minimal standards regarding the rights of different parties 
for all the different codes. Because these codes were issued by the cantons, 
the Supreme Court had the power to nullify them. For example, in 1976, the 
directive on the police prisons of the canton of Zurich was partly nullified. 
The rules had not allowed prisoners to use their bed during the day and only 
allowed prisoners a walk in the open air every third day; as such, they were 
found to violate fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.51 
NƺǂƞƢƞǄƾ, ơƽiƸiƹƞl ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ iƾ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƞ federal code. Because the 
Federal Supreme Court is bound by the laws of the Federal Parliament (Article 
190 Constitution) it may not nullify provisions of the Swiss Code of Criminal 
aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ, ƞƾ iƿ ơƺǀlƢ Ƣƺ ƟƣƤƺƽƣ ǂiƿƩ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƞl ơƺƢƣƾ. Iƿƾ Ƹƞiƹ 
task is therefore to guarantee a consistent application of the Federal Code of 
Criminal Procedure throughout the cantons of Switzerland. As the following 
cases will show, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
has an even greater influence in the field of criminal procedure than in that 
ƺƤ ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹƿiǁƣ ơƽiƸiƹƞl lƞǂ. Iƹ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽ, ƿƩƣ dƿƽƞƾƟƺǀƽƨ ƽǀliƹƨƾ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƽiƨƩƿ 
to liberty (Article 5 ECHR) and the right to a fair trial (Article 6 ECHR) have 
had a deep impact on the criminal procedure rules of various member states.
ᇳ. dؖ؛ؘء؞ ة. dت؜احؘإ؟ؔءؗ52
One earlier case that had a strong influence on the rules which apply today 
surrounding the exclusion of evidence was that of a؜ؘإإؘ dؖ؛ؘء؞. This case 
was decided years before the introduction of the Federal Criminal Code of 
51 BGE ᇳᇲᇴ Iƞ ᇴᇹᇻ.
52 Schenk v. Switzerland, App no 10862/84, ECtHR, 12 July 1988.
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Procedure, but the principles developed under this case are still followed in 
the procedural laws of Switzerland today. 
dؖ؛ؘء؞ was suspected of having hired a hitman to kill his wife. The hit-
man, instead of executing his mission, had secretly taped a phone conversa-
tion with dؖ؛ؘء؞ and handed it to the investigating authorities. The tape was 
subsequently used as the main (but not sole) piece of evidence in the eventual 
trial against dؖ؛ؘء؞, where he was convicted for attempted instigation to 
murder. Secretly recording an individual is a criminal offence in Switzerland 
under Article 179ter Criminal Code. The question for the Supreme Court, when 
it considered dؖ؛ؘء؞’ئ case on appeal, was whether illegally obtained evi-
dence could be used in a criminal trial. The Federal Supreme Court, conside-
ring this issue, held: 
“Tƶ) ƠƶƵƠƳƼơƢ … ƻƨƞƻ) ƞƵǀ) ƢƽƩơƢƵƠƢ) ơƢƹƩƽƢơ) ƣƹƶƴ) ƼƵƞƼƻƨƶƹƩƺƢơ) ƻƞƷƷƩƵƧ) ƴƼƺƻ)
ƵƢƽƢƹ … ƟƢ)ƼƺƢơ) ƩƵ)ƢƽƩơƢƵƠƢ)ƾƶƼƳơ)ƟƢ)ƻƶ)ƞơƶƷƻ)ƻƶƶ)ơƶƧƴƞƻƩƠ)ƞ)ƷƶƺƩƻƩƶƵ)ƞƵơ)ƾƶƼƳơ)
ƶƣƻƢƵ)ƳƢƞơ)ƻƶ)ƞƟƺƼƹơ)ƹƢƺƼƳƻƺ … IƵ)ƺƼƠƨ)ƞ)ƠƞƺƢ)Ʃƻ)Ʃƺ)ƵƢƠƢƺƺƞƹǀ)ƻƶ)ƟƞƳƞƵƠƢ … ƻƨƢ)ƩƵƻƢƹƢƺƻ)
ƶƣ)ƻƨƢ)SƻƞƻƢ)ƩƵ)ƨƞƽƩƵƧ)ƞ)ƺƷƢƠƩƣƩƠ)ƺƼƺƷƩƠƩƶƵ)ƠƶƵƣƩƹƴƢơ … ƞƵơ … ƻƨƢ)ƳƢƧƩƻƩƴƞƻƢ)ƩƵƻƢƹƢƺƻ)
of the person concerned in the protection of his personal rights”.ᇷᇵ 
The Supreme Court considered in the case of dؖ؛ؘء؞ that the public inte-
rest in having the truth established overrode dؖ؛ؘء؞’ئ privacy interests. 
Thus, they ultimately upheld his conviction for attempted instigation to mur-
der, although the evidence had been obtained in an illegal manner. dؖ؛ؘء؞ 
took his case to the European Court of Human Rights, requesting a decla-
ƽƞƿiƺƹ ƿƩƞƿ Ʃiƾ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ ƞ Ƥƞiƽ ƿƽiƞl ǀƹƢƣƽ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇸ I ECHc ƩƞƢ Ɵƣƣƹ ǁiƺlƞƿƣƢ. 
However, after examining the trial process as a whole, the European Court of 
Human Rights concluded dؖ؛ؘء؞ had not been deprived of his right to a fair 
ƿƽiƞl. IƸƻƺƽƿƞƹƿ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹƾ ǂƩiơƩ iƹƤlǀƣƹơƣƢ ƿƩiƾ ơƺƹơlǀƾiƺƹ ǂƣƽƣ ƿƩƣ 
fact that dؖ؛ؘء؞’ئ defence rights had not been disregarded and that the tape 
had not been the only piece of evidence used to secure his conviction. 
dؖ؛ؘء؞ is the leading case on the exclusion of illegally gathered evidence. 
The Supreme Court, as quoted above, stated that when courts assess the 
admissibility of evidence they must weigh the public interest in truth- finding 
and securing a conviction for the relevant crime against the accused’s pri-
vacy rights. This balancing approach was approved by the European Court 
ᇷᇵ BGE ᇳᇲᇻ Iƞ ᇴᇶᇶ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ᇴƟ, ơiƿƣƢ iƹ dơƩƣƹk ǁ. dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, éƻƻ ƹƺ ᇳᇲᇺᇸᇴ/ᇺᇶ, ECƿHc, 
ᇳᇴ JǀlǄ ᇳᇻᇺᇺ, ƻƞƽƞƨƽƞƻƩ ᇵᇲ.
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of Human Rights when they heard dؖ؛ؘء؞’ئ ơƞƾƣ. Iƿ ƞlƾƺ lƞƿƣƽ ƟƣơƞƸƣ ƾƿƞƿǀ-
tory law in Switzerland: as was discussed earlier in the discussion about Part 
4 of the Swiss Code of Criminal Procedure rules on exclusion of evidence,54 
evidence gathered “in a criminal manner” is generally excluded, unless it is 
ƹƣƣƢƣƢ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹǁiơƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞ ƾƣƽiƺǀƾ ơƽiƸƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇶᇳ IIᄭ. CƺƹƾƣƼǀƣƹƿlǄ, illƣ-
gally obtained evidence can be used if a serious crime is at stake. The worrying 
implications of this provision were outlined earlier: it means that even when 
ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƞl ƽǀlƣƾ Ƹƞƿƿƣƽ ƿƩƣ Ƹƺƾƿèᅬ iƹ ƾƣƽiƺǀƾ ơƞƾƣƾ ǂƩƣƽƣ ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ ƿƩƣ ƻƺƾƾiƟi-
liƿǄ ƺƤ ƞ ƾƣǁƣƽƣ ƾƣƹƿƣƹơƣ Ɵƣiƹƨ iƸƻƺƾƣƢ ƞƤƿƣƽ ƞ ƤiƹƢiƹƨ ƺƤ ƨǀilƿèᅬ ƿƩƣǄ ƞƽƣ ƾƿill 
unlikely to be heeded. Further, it acts to remove any incentive the criminal 
justice authorities may have to comply with procedural rules.
ᇴ. Hبؘؕإ ة. dت؜احؘإ؟ؔءؗ55
Another case, decided in 1990, that had an influence on criminal procedural 
law was that of Huber v. Switzerland. Again, this case was decided before the 
enactment of the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure, and thus dealt with a 
cantonal criminal procedure regulation. 
The facts of the case were that members of the “Hell’s Angels” gang were 
suspected of having brought German prostitutes to Zurich, and subsequently 
forcing them to marry Swiss nationals who received payments in turn. 
These women were then forced into prostitution in Switzerland. The District 
Attorney of Zurich believed that Jبااؔ Hبؘؕإ was one of these women. On 
ᇳᇳ éǀƨǀƾƿ ᇳᇻᇺᇵ, Ʃƣ ƼǀƣƾƿiƺƹƣƢ Ʃƣƽ ƞƾ ƞ ǂiƿƹƣƾƾ. dƩƣ ƞƢƸiƿƿƣƢ Ƹƞkiƹƨ ƞ liǁiƹƨ 
from prostitution but denied any ties to the “Hell’s Angels”. At the end of 
the hearing, the District Attorney remanded her in custody on suspicion of 
having given false evidence. She was not released until a further eight days 
had passed. The District Attorney then indicted her. At trial, her lawyer 
argued that there had been two key failures by the authorities to respect 
Hبؘؕإ’ئ rights; in particular those guaranteed by the ECHR. Firstly: “anyone 
ƾƨƶ)Ʃƺ)ơƢƻƞƩƵƢơ … ƴƼƺƻ)ƟƢ)ƟƹƶƼƧƨƻ)ƷƹƶƴƷƻƳǀ)ƟƢƣƶƹƢ)ƞ)jƼơƧƢ … TƨƩƺ)ƵƢƽƢƹ)ƨƞƷƷƢ-
ned in the present case.” Secondly, there was a lack of independence at issue: 
“the person who remanded the accused in custody, District Attorney J., is now 
also prosecutor.” 
54 See pp. 406.
55 HǀƟƣƽ ǁ. dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, éƻƻ ƹƺ ᇳᇴᇹᇻᇶ/ᇺᇹ, ECƿHc, ᇴᇵ OơƿƺƟƣƽ ᇳᇻᇻᇲ.
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Unlike the Swiss courts, the European Court of Human Rights shared the 
ǁiƣǂ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƤƣƹơƣ lƞǂǄƣƽ, ơƺƹơlǀƢiƹƨ ƿƩƞƿ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇷ III ECHc ƩƞƢ Ɵƣƣƹ ǁiƺ-
lated. The District Attorney, who had ordered the detention of Hبؘؕإ on 
remand at the preliminary stage of the proceedings, had become party to the 
trial by taking on the role of the prosecution. He was thus no longer “inde-
pendent of the parties”56. Following this judgment, the canton of Zurich had 
to change its Code of Criminal Procedure, delegating the task of approving 
detention on remand to the President of the District Courts.57 Today, this task 
is vested in the “compulsory measures courts”.58
ᇵ. C؛ؔؠأ- Dآ؟؟آء59
A had been detained on remand on suspicion of large scale cocaine traffi-
cking, and was held for 478 days at the ‘Champ- Dollon’ detention facility near 
Geneva. For 199 days (157 of which were consecutive), he shared his three- 
Ƹƞƹ ơƣll ǂiƿƩ Ƥiǁƣ ƺƿƩƣƽ iƹƸƞƿƣƾ ᄬƿƩƣ ƾƻƞơƣ ƞƸƺǀƹƿƣƢ ƿƺ ᇵ.ᇺᇵƸᇴ ƻƣƽ ƻƣƽƾƺƹᄭ. 
Dǀƽiƹƨ ƿƩƞƿ ƣƹƿiƽƣ ƻƣƽiƺƢ Ʃƣ ǂƞƾ ơƺƹƤiƹƣƢ ƿƺ Ʃiƾ ơƣll Ƥƺƽ ᇴᇵ Ʃƺǀƽƾ ƻƣƽ ƢƞǄ. 
A claimed that such conditions of detention were inhuman and degrading, 
ǀƹƢƣƽ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇵ ECHc. 
Iƹ iƿƾ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ, ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƽƣliƣƢ ƩƣƞǁilǄ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ơƽiƿƣ-
ƽiƞ ƾƣƿ ƺǀƿ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ Eǀƽƺƻƣƞƹ Cƺǀƽƿ ƺƤ HǀƸƞƹ ciƨƩƿƾ. IƤ Ƣƣƿƞiƹƣƣƾ ƞƽƣ ơƺƹƤiƹƣƢ 
ƿƺ ƞ ƾƻƞơƣ ƺƤ lƣƾƾ ƿƩƞƹ ᇵƸᇴ ƻƣƽ ƻƣƽƾƺƹ, ƿƩƣ lƞơk ƺƤ ƾƻƞơƣ iƹ iƿƾƣlƤ ǂill ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿƣ 
ƞ ǁiƺlƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇵ ECHc. IƤ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl ƾƻƞơƣ ƽƞƹƨƣƾ ƤƽƺƸ ᇵᅬᇶƸᇴ ƻƣƽ ƻƣƽ-
son, other detention conditions are considered in order to establish whether 
ƿƩƣƽƣ Ʃƞƾ Ɵƣƣƹ ƞƹ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇵ ECHc ǁiƺlƞƿiƺƹ, ƾǀơƩ ƞƾ ᄬƢƞǄᄭliƨƩƿ, ǁƣƹƿilƞƿiƺƹ, 
temperature, sanitary facilities, time spent outside of the cell, health condi-
tions (for example the prevalence of tuberculosis), the quality of nutrition, 
and the overall duration of the detention. 
The Federal Supreme Court held that the Champ- Dollon prison has been 
heavily over- crowded for many years. The sanitary facilities, ventilation, light, 
and nutrition were deemed to meet the minimal standards. However, the fact 
that A had been detained for 157 consecutive days in a heavily overcrowded 
56 HǀƟƣƽ ǁ. dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, éƻƻ ƹƺ ᇳᇴᇹᇻᇶ/ᇺᇹ, ECƿHc, ᇴᇵ OơƿƺƟƣƽ ᇳᇻᇻᇲ, ƻƞƽƞƨƽƞƻƩƾ ᇶᇴ ƣƿ ƾƣƼƼ. 
57 Cantonal Act of 1 September 1991 for the amendment of the Cantonal Code of Criminal 
Procedure (OS 51/851 et seqq.), in force since 1 July 1992. 
58 éƽƿiơlƣ ᇴᇴᇲ I: “Remand begins when it is ordered by the compulsory measures court.”
59 Judgment of the Federal Supreme Court 6B_456/2015 of 21 March 2016
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cell with virtually no time outside this confinement led the court to declare 
that the conditions violated the national and inter- national rules on deten-
tion. Despite the successful outcome of this judgement for the applicant, 
there have since been numerous cases concerning the continuing severe over- 
crowding in Champ- Dollon, including a 2016 case where the Federal Supreme 
Cƺǀƽƿ ƩƣlƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ Ƣƣƿƣƹƿiƺƹ ƾƿƞƹƢƞƽƢƾ ǁiƺlƞƿƣƢ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇵ ECHc.60
ᇶ. Kإ؜ئاؔ؟؟ءؔؖ؛ا61
Iƹ Jǀƹƣ ᇴᇲᇳᇴ, ƞ dǂiƾƾ ơƞƾƣ ǂƩiơƩ Ʃƞƾ ơƺƸƣ ƿƺ Ɵƣ kƹƺǂƹ ƞƾ KƽiƾƿƞllƹƞơƩƿ ƾǀƽ-
faced.62 é؟ؘثؔءؘؗإ Mü؟؟ؘإ, a local politician of the conservative Swiss 
People’s Party in Zurich, posted a series of tweets on the social media plat-
form “Twitter” which made derogatory comments against Muslims. The most 
infamous quote was: “MƞǀƟƢ)ƾƢ)ƵƢƢơ)ƞƵƶƻƨƢƹ)KƹƩƺƻƞƳƳƵƞƠƨƻ … ƻƨƩƺ)ƻƩƴƢ)ƣƶƹ)ƴƶƺ-
ques”. Iƹ ƿƩƣ ƞƤƿƣƽƸƞƿƩ ƺƤ ƿƩiƾ ǂiƢƣlǄ ƻǀƟliơiƾƣƢ ƻƺƾƿ, Mü؟؟ؘإ had to resign 
from his party and leave political office. He lost his job as a credit analyst 
and was indicted and ultimately convicted for racial discrimination (Article 
261bis CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣᄭ. Iƹ ƺƽƢƣƽ ƿƺ ƞǁƺiƢ ƤǀƽƿƩƣƽ ƣǃƻƺƾǀƽƣ ƞƿ ƿƽiƞl, Mü؟؟ؘإ 
successfully demanded that the press coverage of the hearing be restricted. 
The District Judge of Uster in Zurich issued an order that forbade the media 
from publishing his name, picture, and any other personal details (age, resi-
dence, employer, and the web address of his blog). Anyone who contravened 
this order would be subject to a fine of CHF 1’000. Two journalists objected 
to this order and took a case all the way up to the Federal Supreme Court. 
They argued that the order infringed the freedom of the media (Article 17 
Constitution).
The Federal Supreme Court held that the freedom of the media is a pivotal 
part of free speech in a democratic society. Although trials are open to the 
60 See also the article ‘Prison overcrowding in Champ- Dollon: Federal Supreme Court 
judgements and an alarming medical study’ (Source: Humanrights.ch, 18 May 2016, 
Ʃƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ᇵikK- BkgGᄭ.
61 BGE ᇳᇶᇳ I ᇴᇳᇳ.
62 “Kristallnacht” refers to “the occasion of concerted violence by Nazis throughout Germany 
and Austria against Jews and their property on the night of 9–10 November 1938”. Iƿ’ƾ ƞ 
German word that translates literally “to ‘night of crystal’, referring to the broken glass 
produced by the smashing of shop windows” (source: Oxford Dictionary, https://perma.
ơơ/ᇴBᇹᇵ- EiMkᄭ.
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public, in practice not everybody is able to attend hearings. Therefore, the 
media has an essential role as a bridge of communication between the state 
and the general public. This information task can only be fulfilled if the media 
is not unjustifiably restricted in its reporting. Fundamental rights can only 
be restricted if: (1) there is a sufficient legal basis, (2) there is an overriding 
ƻǀƟliơ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿ ƞƹƢ ᄬᇵᄭ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƾƿƽiơƿiƺƹƾ ƞƽƣ ƻƽƺƻƺƽƿiƺƹƞƿƣ. eƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ 
explicitly provides in this regard that the essence of fundamental rights is 
sacrosanct, emphasising the fact that restrictions of rights are not allowed 
liƨƩƿlǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇵᇸ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. 
The Supreme Court found that a sufficient legal basis for imposing pre-
ǁƣƹƿiǁƣ ƽƣƾƿƽiơƿiƺƹƾ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƸƣƢiƞ ǂƞƾ Ƹiƾƾiƹƨ. Iƹ Ƣƺiƹƨ ƾƺ, ƿƩƣǄ ƣǃƞƸiƹƣƢ 
éƽƿiơlƣèᇹᇲ III, ǂƩiơƩ ƾƿƞƿƣƾ ƿƩƞƿ ơƺǀƽƿƾ ơƞƹ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣ ƿƩƞƿ ƸƣƢiƞ ƽƣƻƺƽƿƾ ƺƤ Ʃƣƞ-
rings meet specific conditions. However, this rule only applies when the gene-
ral public is excluded from a trial: this was not the case here. The Court also 
found that there was no legal basis for this order in the cantonal laws. Thus, 
the order was found to be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court failed to hold 
that the District Court’s decision had seriously violated the freedom of the 
media, thus reducing the impact of the Supreme Court ruling. Moreover, in 
this case the restrictions were unwarranted, for the defendant continues up 
to this day to behave in a contradictory manner to his supposed wish for total 
privacy; he consistently publishes posts under his full name, with pictures of 
himself included. By behaving as such, he seems to somewhat renounce his 
privacy rights.
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